American Airlines crash at Reagan international 29 Jan 2025

[OldSolduer]

I’ve seen a few things on TV and experts weighing in.
We can never ignore the fact as humans we can become tunnel visioned during periods of stress - like landing a jet plane.

 

[YZT580]

…and if you miss something outside because you’re focusing inside on the scope? Where does second guessing stop? The controller gave conditions for continuing forward and the pilot positively acknowledged. That is not at all an unreasonable scenario. The impact came 5-6s after that communications, the very same 5s you say above is all it takes to make sure things are good. The two aircraft were 900’ apart when the pilot confirmed visual on the aircraft.

You are correct. It is a reasonable scenario but unfortunately it is the wrong one, not only in this case but in many others as well even when there is no report to write up. VFR is see and be seen but in all complex environments it come with limitations. Controllers must compensate by providing additional safeguards alongside the rulebook and you should never give up one form of separation until another form is assured to your satisfaction. An example would be two a/c converging to the downwind on STAR tracks. One is descending to 10,000 the second to 9,000 as per the star which builds in a buffer as a matter of safety. You will often hear the controller clear both to the same altitude sacrificing the altitude safety to eliminate having to make a second transmission. Should there be a conflict his plan is to alter one of their headings. Works well, saves time until the rare occasion when the controller is distracted. ATC has encouraged slackness in the guise of expediting traffic.
there are very few controllers around who still focus out the window. Some focus almost entirely on the scope. The better ones alternate between the two as it is almost impossible to gauge distance between a/c and closing headings visually yet looking out the window gives you better situation awareness. Regardless of the pilot's comments, the predicted track would have indicated the intercept. The altitude readout would have shown conflict. The controller ignored rule number 1.

 

[Good2Golf]

You are correct. It is a reasonable scenario but unfortunately it is the wrong one, not only in this case but in many others as well even when there is no report to write up. VFR is see and be seen but in all complex environments it come with limitations. Controllers must compensate by providing additional safeguards alongside the rulebook and you should never give up one form of separation until another form is assured to your satisfaction.

And so deliberately deviate from MANOPS?

An example would be two a/c converging to the downwind on STAR tracks. One is descending to 10,000 the second to 9,000 as per the star which builds in a buffer as a matter of safety. You will often hear the controller clear both to the same altitude sacrificing the altitude safety to eliminate having to make a second transmission.

Haven’t heard that to be honest, but that’s a deviation by the controller. Frankly, that control should not be issued as you describe.

Should there be a conflict his plan is to alter one of their headings. Works well, saves time until the rare occasion when the controller is distracted. ATC has encouraged slackness in the guise of expediting traffic.
there are very few controllers around who still focus out the window. Some focus almost entirely on the scope. The better ones alternate between the two as it is almost impossible to gauge distance between a/c and closing headings visually yet looking out the window gives you better situation awareness.

So what dwell time between scope and outside should be used?

Regardless of the pilot's comments, the predicted track would have indicated the intercept. The altitude readout would have shown conflict. The controller ignored rule number 1.

I see, so controller is more accountable for actions not taken the pilots for actions taken?

 

[YZT580]

And so deliberately deviate from MANOPS?

not a deviation. Pearson for example has/had a tower radar position with a job description including vectors that were binding in the zone. MANOPS provides your basic thou shalt and shalt not processes that are supplemented by unit procedures

Haven’t heard that to be honest, but that’s a deviation by the controller. Frankly, that control should not be issued as you describe. It is indeed a deviation but events like that occur frequently. Controllers amend the profiles all the time to expedite traffic. How often have you heard the expression SID is cancelled, followed by a change in heading, altitude or speed? Altering a STAR is no different. In the case I described the controller would say that his secondary plan is to alter the heading if required while the safest course would be to wait until longitudinal separation was established and then issue the same altitude.

So what dwell time between scope and outside should be used? As required. What has happened is that controllers have become overly reliant on tools to cover up bad control techniques. Plus it is really easy to sit in the high chair looking down on the scope as lord and master of all you survey. When you are driving, how much attention do you pay to your mirrors when reversing and how much are you looking at the backup display? We tend to focus on the technology rather than paying attention out the window. The display focuses on a specific point looking over your shoulder or at the mirrors will help you see the lady with the shopping cart converging from the side.


I see, so controller is more accountable for actions not taken the pilots for actions taken? Exactly