Armoured Recce Vehicle

[DG-41]

Sounds like you could have used a scout/sniper team ahead/with your advance?

I dunno. Maybe.

I certainly like the ability of snipers to reach out and touch someone with surgical precision - that could be very useful in the "lone guy with RPG" scenario. But my experience with snipers (which I'll admit isn't very extensive) is that they take quite a bit of time working their way into position to take a shot. I can't afford all that dicking around; I'm all about speed. Make contact, establish what the contact is, and then either quickly take him out if he's in my means to do so, or set a piquet on him and bypass (probably 80% of the time) if he is too big or too entrenched for me to handle.

So while it certainly wouldn't break my heart if we had a Barrett in every patrol and soldiers who knew how to use it, I don't think - in this case anyway - that a full-bore sniper team would have bought us anything, at least on the first contact. On the second contact... yeah, maybe we could have put Rambo down without the whole Charge of the Light Brigade.

It's really a shame that didn't work; it was very pretty.

Side question, is this JANUS anything like TacOps (you guys would probably know it as TacOpsCav)?

It's actually very much like TacOps, except that it is real-time, not turn-based, and it scales down (I think) to individual callsigns and people better than TacOps does. I actually ordered the latest version of TacOps this week specifically so I could see if I could replicate some of the training we did in JANUS in TacOps, and to see if it reached the same conclusions.

DG

 

[a_majoor]

With lots of input from DG-41, 2Bravo, George Wallace, Lance Weibe, Matt Fisher and many others, here is my take on what a recce vehicle "should" be:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/35526/post-307202.html#msg307202

Anyone with artistic pretensions can try to create an illustration for us....

 

[Infanteer]

Anyone with artistic pretensions can try to create an illustration for us....

Yeah, here you go  ....

 

[Kirkhill]

I certainly like the ability of snipers to reach out and touch someone with surgical precision - that could be very useful in the "lone guy with RPG" scenario.

Do you really mean a "sniper" in the sense that Kevin means the term, a "Designated Marksman" or just a rifleman with a weapon that can engage targets at extended ranges?

Riflemen of a century ago were expected to engage targets at out to 800 yards directly and beyond 1000 yards indirectly and massed.

They didn't have to be "snipers" or "marksmen" to do their jobs.

 

[a_majoor]

Snipers are a more static recce asset, since they need to use stealth to move into and out of positions. This isn't to say they couldn't hitch a ride with an armoured recce patrol, but there is a mismatch between both the tasks and the speed with which they can move.

In a full spectrum op, there is no reason you could't cross fertilize. The Recce covers a wide area of the AOR, setting up (say) spot VCPs, doing route recces and convoy escort. From time to time, they will set up OPs and surveillance, and with some clever planning and a bit of a squeeze, a sniper team could be brought along, and when the OP packs up and drives away, they are lurking in a layback position....

 

[a_majoor]

Crudely photoshopped for your veiwing pleasure: the new recce vehicle as described :
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/35526/post-307202.html#msg307202

Basic vehicle platform is the Slovakian "Valuk" with the rear deck chopped. The patrolman's air sentry hatch and episcopes is that thing slightly behind the gun mount in the illustration, while the mast is not shown it would emerge from a hatch behind the turret.

 

[Eland]

Having ended my service in an reserve armoured recce unit over 25 years ago, I can't say I know anything about
current SOP's or doctrines.

But I will offer my two cents' worth on the utility of the G-Wagen. In my day, we had M38CDN and M151 jeeps
in our squadron inventory. Main armament was a 7.62mm GPMG mounted on a swinging pintle mounted bolted to the
side of the jeep, on the crew commander's side. The GPMG had little real value outside of being a means to try to force advancing enemy infantry to get their heads down - and thereby allow ourselves a chance to exfiltrate.

Our basic doctrine involved not deploying callsigns in situations where they would likely get roasted by the enemy. To satisfy
that doctrine, we would use cover and concealment wherever it could be found or quickly set up, defilades and hull-down positions
wherever practicable, dismount if necessary, and always *observe the enemy from the maximum possible distance* - in order minimize the risk of being detected.

The G-Wagen, by virtue of its extra armour, is light years ahead of the M151 and M38CDN in terms of the protection it offers the crew.
That would, in my estimation, allow it to get a little closer to the enemy, but not that much closer.

If you're trying to reconnoitre suspected enemy armour emplacements, i.e. where tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are located, you can't do the job safely with a jeep, be it a G-Wagen or otherwise. In other words, what you need is a tank, or a fast-moving wheeled vehicle with a reasonable main gun (think Rooikat or Centauro) and acceptable armour protection. On the other hand, if all you do is light flank or rear-echelon security or security ops in support of peacekeeping operations, the G-Wagen is well-nigh perfect.

The limitations of even armoured jeeps is probably one reason why the Germans, the British and the Americans now employ a doctrine of fighting for information. Or using sophisticated electronic intelligence assets like UAV's and satellites and fixed OP's using IR, radar and video sensor suites.

 

[George Wallace]

Having ended my service in an reserve armoured recce unit over 25 years ago, I can't say I know anything about
current SOP's or doctrines.

But I will offer my two cents' worth on the utility of the G-Wagen. In my day, we had M38CDN and M151 jeeps
in our squadron inventory. Main armament was a 7.62mm GPMG mounted on a swinging pintle mounted bolted to the
side of the jeep, on the crew commander's side. The GPMG had little real value outside of being a means to try to force advancing enemy infantry to get their heads down - and thereby allow ourselves a chance to exfiltrate.

Our basic doctrine involved not deploying callsigns in situations where they would likely get roasted by the enemy. To satisfy
that doctrine, we would use cover and concealment wherever it could be found or quickly set up, defilades and hull-down positions
wherever practicable, dismount if necessary, and always *observe the enemy from the maximum possible distance* - in order minimize the risk of being detected.

I am with you on all of the above.

The G-Wagen, by virtue of its extra armour, is light years ahead of the M151 and M38CDN in terms of the protection it offers the crew.
That would, in my estimation, allow it to get a little closer to the enemy, but not that much closer.

If you're trying to reconnoitre suspected enemy armour emplacements, i.e. where tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are located, you can't do the job safely with a jeep, be it a G-Wagen or otherwise. In other words, what you need is a tank, or a fast-moving wheeled vehicle with a reasonable main gun (think Rooikat or Centauro) and acceptable armour protection. On the other hand, if all you do is light flank or rear-echelon security or security ops in support of peacekeeping operations, the G-Wagen is well-nigh perfect.

Now you have lost me.  The Armoured G-Wagen is not good for Recce as you defined it, as the way you used to do it.  Too much reflective glass and an enclosed cab that will cut the use of your ears as a sensory device.  If you remove the cab and all the glass, then I will agree with you.

The limitations of even armoured jeeps is probably one reason why the Germans, the British and the Americans now employ a doctrine of fighting for information. Or using sophisticated electronic intelligence assets like UAV's and satellites and fixed OP's using IR, radar and video sensor suites.

The Germans and Americans have always been in the fighting for information mod.  That is why our and their Recce tactics have always been different, and probably why we are having this discusion now....because too many in this forum are confusing the two.

 

[Eland]

I apologize for causing you some confusion. My reading of the current deployment in Afghanistan suggests to me that G-Wagens are being used for most 'mud recce' taskings,including route proving, while the Coyotes are employed as semi-static battlefield surveillance posts. I didn't mean to suggest that the G-Wagen was an appropriate choice for such a tasking. My thinking was more along the line of, "well, if this is the best vehicle that the government is prepared to issue for recce work, then it's a better choice than the M38CDN or M151 vehicles I had to soldier on in, from the standpoint of minimal crew protection levels". It's clear that the G-Wagens' deficiencies as recce vehicles are now becoming more apparent, in light of the recent decision to purchase some RG-31 armoured vehicles.

I agree that the G-Wagen is a poor choice for traditional recce. It was never designed for that purpose, anyway. I'm given to understand that the German Army developed both the Iltis and the G-Wagen primarily as light utility and liaison vehicles. For legitimate recce work, the Germans have the right tools for the job: the Luchs 8 X 8 armoured car (replaced by the Fennek 4 X 4 scout car), which mounts a turret with a 20mm cannon, and when fighting for information is needed, the Leopard tank in one or more of its various iterations.

Right now, the army seems afflicted by lack of a coherent reconnaissance doctrine. That situation is brought on primarily by a lack of  coherent foreign and defence policies, and lack of a readily identifiable, monolithic threat. In this policy vacuum, you have a government unable to decide if the CF should continue on almost exclusively as a peacekeeping force, or a warfighting establishment with the ability to take on peacekeeping roles as needed.

As a result, you have a mix of vehicles looking for roles to fulfill. You have the Coyote, which excels in battlefield surveillance, but is a bit unwieldy for fast-moving mud recce jobs. The G-Wagen and the RG-31 have more of the needed speed, but less overall cross-country mobility. And none of these three vehicles have the capacity to survive in truly hostile environments, but that's a given even with a tank design which sacrifices armour protection in favour of adequate firepower and speed. All three vehicles will suffice in a low-intensity environment, and only provided that the environment in question stays that way.

In other words, the debate over which armoured recce vehicle the army should have will never be resolved until the government decides what level of intensity the army should operate at, and is prepared to properly fund the infrastructure needed to cope with the desired degree of intensity.

For anything in excess of low-intensity warfare, some sort of tank or tracked vehicle is going to be needed for recce, fire-support and counter-armour tasks, else you run the risk of sacrificing lives for the sake of economic considerations.

 

[Kirkhill]

OK.  Its Christmas time. I will admit it. I am officially dense.  I don't get it.

As far as I understand it.  Recce is about gathering as much information as possible at least cost so that the main force can best be utilized where it is most effective.

When recce can't "see" anything, when there is no information available, then the main force must advance to contact.  When the enemy is bumped, fighting commences, information is gleaned, plans are modified, reserves are committed.

Recce is a task.  Fighting is a task.

Cavalry conducts both.
Infantry conducts both.

Cavalry works from a vehicle, usually over open ground, covering large distances.
Infantry works on foot, usually in close terrain, relatively static.

Blurring occurs because Cavalry could also work from the air,  and conceivably with boats.  The infantry can now easily be moved from one "static" position to another by air, land or water.

If Cavalry wants to retain a fighting ability then great.  They should IMHO. Give them all the wheels and tracks and add infanteers in the back, assuming that they need them.

Organize Infantry to fight on their feet,  conducting holding actions, and supply transport that respects their organizational integrity.  Don't make them readjust their tactical structure just to fit into available vehicles.

But again IM (rather exercised) HO "fighting for information" is indistinguishable from an advance to contact and the conduct of operations by any combat arms unit or formation.

Cheers

 

[Infanteer]

Thank you Kirkhill; I've been thinking the same in this exhausting recce debate.  Boots get infantry soldiers their information and get them through the fight.  Doesn't it make sense that a well-armed, mobile and protected vehicle can get mounted forces through both as well?

 

[Kirkhill]

Your welcome

Re the vehicles - dead right - but just as tanks can't swim and boats can't fly not all vehicles are going to be equally available or effective across all terrestrial environments.  Light, medium or heavy vehicles, with or without tracks, amphibious or not, are all going to be chosen by the environment.    If we have vehicles that can operate in those environments then the Cavalry can fight there.  If we don't have the right vehicles for the environment then the Cavalry can't fight there.  And I accept that environmental conditions include not just snowfall and rain but also the density of airborne lead particles.

Following from that, and after stipulating that the infantry needs vehicles that fits its tactical structure,  does it follow that the Cavalry needs a tactical structure and a TTPs that make it adaptable to a variety of vehicles?

 

[DG-41]

Well I finally had a chance to kick the tires and beep the horn on a GWagon C&R - the softskin version, not the uparmoured version.

My first impression is actually pretty favourable. It's smaller than I expected. With your head out the hatch, visibility is great and the vehicle is tall enough that you'll be able to see over stuff better than in Iltis. The "turret" hatch works better (at least with the vehicle not moving) than I expected. There's less room for kit stowage than I thought, but it does seem like there's more space than in an Iltis.

But it is (now) very clear to me that this is NOT a fighting vehicle. The gun mount should make it easier to lay down covering fire as you run like hell for cover, but nobody in his right mind will be assaulting anything in one of these. It's an upgraded Iltis and will need to be treated as such. I suspect the same is true of the uparmoured version - it'll just take a hit better.

I reserve the right to change my mind once I've been in the vehicle on exercise, but my first impression is a good one.

If the intent is to move Armoured Recce to more of a Calvary role though, this ain't the vehicle to do it in.

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

I presume that was meant to be Cavalry, not Calvary.  Or perhaps it was the self-sacrifice thing that got you. 

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The Germans and Americans have always been in the fighting for information mod.  That is why our and their Recce tactics have always been different, and probably why we are having this discusion now....because too many in this forum are confusing the two.

I don't know much about the details of German recce, but the US Scout platoons employ fairly similar tactics as we do.  Their TF scouts in HMMVWs employ "stealth" as do the M3s in the Cav Sqns.  The biggest difference in my eyes is the use of dismounted scouts in their scout vehicles.  Their Cavalry Troops, however, with their integral tank or anti-tank platoons and mortars do give them options that a Canadian recce sqn does not.  Cavalry has a slightly different role than pure reconnaissance. 

Kirkhil,

What Cavalry gives a formation is protection. By this I mean that the main body (the protected force) does not blunder into the enemy or have the enemy smash into a flank unannounced and umimpeded.  Recce does some of this as well, but Cavalry adds the ability to fight.  An advancing brigade sized force could detach combat elements to find the enemy or neutralize  enemy OPs but this takes away from its ability to fight the main battle later on.  It could detach combat teams to guard the flanks (as opposed to just screening), but again this takes away from its ability to achieve its main task.  A Cavalry unit performs these tasks with some economy of force and helps to ensure that the main body (main effort) can get its job done without interference. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[George Wallace]

I don't know much about the details of German recce, but the US Scout platoons employ fairly similar tactics as we do.  Their TF scouts in HMMVWs employ "stealth" as do the M3s in the Cav Sqns.  The biggest difference in my eyes is the use of dismounted scouts in their scout vehicles.  Their Cavalry Troops, however, with their integral tank or anti-tank platoons and mortars do give them options that a Canadian recce sqn does not.  Cavalry has a slightly different role than pure reconnaissance. 

Unfortunately, all my experience with US Scouts have been to the effect where they send in a Contact Report, ending with the phrase: "Permission to Engage, Over".  That to me is not stealth, but fighting for info.  They had to be kept on a very tight leash.

Your last sentence is a very important point that many seem to be getting confused in this discusion.  "Cavalry has a slightly different role than pure reconnaissance."

 

[Kirkhill]

2B:

I agree entirely with you on the role of Cavalry as you define it.  As I said Recce and Fighting are tasks.  Cavalry and Infantry perform these tasks. 

Cavalry fights a dispersed battle over open terrain, whether that be around a static garrison or around a "garrison on the move", a main body in the advance or retreat.  Its mobility allows it to disperse to cover large areas and rapidly concentrate to meet to localized and isolated threats as an economy of force effort.  Infantry works well at countering a persistent and relatively immobile threat.

You are dead right, IMHO, as GW has pointed out, in your assertion " Cavalry has a slightly different role than pure reconnaissance."  Its also fair to point out that historically even horse cavalry comprised at least two, sometimes three separate genres: Light cavalry that conducted patrols, sometimes these were nothing more than mounted infantrymen, and Heavy cavalry kept in reserve to engage the enemy through shock action.  Because both forces were expert in horse riding, even if the horses and weapons were different, then both forces could swap roles (given time for retraining) depending on strategic need.

The defining characteristic for Cavalry, again IMHO, is mobility.  It can also excel in economy of force operations because of its ability to rapidly shift the point at which it concentrates effort.

I am starting to think that one of the reasons the Armoured/Cavalry Corps is having so much difficulty defining its space in the order of battle is that the internal combustion engine applied to aircraft, helicopters, boats, trucks and tanks has turned the entire Army into one large Cavalry Force. 

 

[a_majoor]

I have argued in the past that the defining characteristic of "Cavalry" is speed. Even cavalry soldiers who fought dismounted (Union Cavalry of the Civil War and Indian Wars era, for example) or pseudo cavalry like the Mounted Rifles, Light Horse and various other mounted Infantry units around the edge of the British Empire gained most of their effect because they could move at the speed of mounted troops, and substitute speed for mass (having somewhat less firepower than a battalion of rifle armed Infantry).

Buford's brigade was not only able to give Heath's division and thus Robert E. Lee's army a surprise by occupying the key terrain first, they were also able to pull out in good order under fire to fight again another day. Reynold's infantry soldiers were less fortunate when the Army of Northern Virginia closed in on their positions, they simply could not move fast enough to get out of the trap without breaking and running (fortunately they were able to run back to the remainder of the Army of the Potomac and reform).

Since we are talking about recce in this thread, mounted recce needs to be able to move at least as fast as any of the other mounted elements of the force, and prefferably somewhat faster. Major Taylor's observations about mounted recce pretty much demand this, since speed of advance is the Western asymmetrical advantage, and light recce vehicles which depend on stealth simply cannot move fast enough to do the job without putting themselves in terrible danger. Following the trail of shot up and destroyed recce call signs will provide some information, but not the sort the commander wants to get. This is where a protected AFV comes into play, rather than a modified SUV or utility vehicle.

If we want to follow Kirkhill a bit farther down the road, to get "Cavalry" performance in this era will require air mobility. Small helicopters like the old Kiowa, or American "Kiowa Warrior" and MD-500 series have a certain potential in this area, although their relatively limited on station time and high logistics requirements (fuel and maintenance) tend to limit their applicability. Going a bit farther we have to go to Ralph Peter's question: "how do we make helicopters more like tanks?" and postulate some sort of compact ducted fan vehicle which uses air mobility to displace itself but spends most of the time grounded with the observation mast out and maybe a few dismounts acting as local security.

 

[DG-41]

So last night we had a visitor from one of those private security companies in Iraq - ex Windsor who took a career path slightly off the beaten track.

He is doing convoy escorts. The AFV he is using is an armoured F350 crew cab pickup truck (armour consists of bulletproof glass, and I guess some sort of armour in the doors, etc)  protected to level "B6" (I guess the uparmoured GWagon is "B7") In the bed, they have a welded steel box with two MG pintles mounted on it (called it the "gun bucket") with a pair of gunners in the bucket - saw no gunshields, but gunners looked covered about chest high by the walls of the bucket. Commander sits in the front passenger seat, and carries an LMG as well.

Tactics seem similar to Canadian tactics - vehicles work in 2-truck patrols, with between 2-4 patrols per convoy, depending on size. Being a British company, they used British/Canadian style callsigns - this was effectively a privately owned Recce troop.

They got hit quite a lot. Usual tactic was to detonate a bomb of some sort, then hit convoy with small arms/LMG fire from alternate directions, sometimes with LMG gunners mounted on vehicles. He had a low opinion of the marksmanship of most AK gunners, but a healthy respect for the marksmanship of the LMG gunners. From his pictures, I could see why - burst spashes centered on driver's door/window and engine compartment giving testimony to gunners attempting to kill drivers and disable motors and hitting their targets.

Armoured glass works well, but becomes opaque at point of impact.

Another nifty innovation - a "panic button" connected to a transponder that broadcasts a distress code and a grid location to higher HQ.

Quite a lot of mobility kills on gun trucks. Tires shot out, "magic bullets" into engine compartments, servered steering/braking hydraulics, penetration of transmission casing causing catastrophic fluid loss, etc. Also a few firepower kills when guns and ammo boxes hit. Few KIA or WIA, due to vehicle/body armour and presence of nearby medical facilities. Occasionally gun truck taken out by initial bomb, but survivability good (even if truck utterly wrecked)

Common theme of engagements seemed to be initial ambush disables (M kills) leading gun trucks, disabled gun trucks and follow-on gun trucks immediately engage and suppress enemy fire, convoy bashes on through and follow-on trucks push or tow disabled trucks clear of ambush. He repeatedly stressed the need for IMMEDIATE and ACCURATE return supressing fire as being the key to surviving the ambush.

That struck me as a key point to practice with our GWagons - practicing gunnery off the top of the vehicle with the pintle mount MG.

I was struck by the resemblance between these gun trucks and the Vietnam-era ACAV M113, and that, plus the good Capt. Rosencrantz's recent rant, got me thinking.....

Take a Bison. Cover the commander's hatch with a gun mount similar to the M1 commander's hatch, plus maybe a gun shield - so now you have optics, power traverse, power elevation (ok, not on M1, but we could do it) maybe a simple laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, and gun stabilization (the constantly shrinking cost and size of electronics makes this feasible) - but the idea is a gun mount that can be fired either hatches up or hatches down, and can mount 50 cal, Mk19, or C6.

Now put two more of the same mount on the rear of the vehicle, forward of the "air sentry" hatches on the Bison, inside the wheelbase. (My experience with the air sentry hatches on Bison was that they were so far aft of the pitch centre that the vehicle kept trying to flip the air sentry out his hatch - but if you opened the central cargo hatch and worked out of that, the vehicle felt much more stable.)

Give it a 4-man crew - driver, crew commander, and 2 observer/gunners. Leave the internal configuration more or less standard Bison. Simplify the external hull to be just the three weapons stations and nothing else - no cargo hatch, no air sentry hatches, no big storage boxes.

What does this accomplish?

- provides a cheap (compared to a full-bore Coyote) recce vehicle that provides a useful convoy escort configuration and is perfectly workable for all other recce tasks (I've done recce in Bisons, and I thought they were GREAT) Bison was considered cheap enough at one time to provide to Reserve units en masse; this should be too. So we equip all the Reserve Recce Regiments with them.

- has a lot of internal volume, making rescue/evac of injured/immobile pers fromother vehicles in the convoy (or even cargo) much easier - plus it's just nicer to live out of than something really cramped (Lynx, Ferret, etc)

- provides a vehicle that is highly parts-compatible with the existing LAV fleet

- provides (assuming all three weapons stations are the same) a vehicle that is highly parts-compatible with ITSELF, further simplifying maintenance and logistics

- provides a vehicle made in Canada (always a nice selling point)

- provides a vehicle that has enough systems overlap with Coyote to greatly ease the transition from this thing (can I call it a "Puma"?) to a full on Coyote, meaning that a Reservist trained on Puma has most of what he needs to transition to Coyote, making augmentation much easier (Capt. Rosencrantz's complaint)

- provides enough integral capability that deploying them as actual Reserve formations in theatre is not unthinkable

So where do I put in my order?

DG

 

[DG-41]

...and then not 5 seconds later, I stumble on this:

http://www.janes.com/defence/land_forces/news/idr/idr060127_1_n.shtml

DG