Army Reserve Restructuring

[MilEME09]

Sorry to be Joe-Negative, but you don't create a battlegroup by mashing together a foot-borne rifle company with a light reconnaissance squadron with a handful of TAPVs. At the very best you are creating a stepping stone to something, but from where I sit on the outside looking in, any move of this sort should be accompanied by a fully developed plan with a specific end-state which is well thought out and well communicated.

If there is a plan and communication of what an end-state CARB is to be and where it fits into the overall defence plan, then I'm failing to see it. All I'm seeing is a knee-jerk reaction to some personnel/leadership issues that have been around for decades.

I feel a bit more positive about the logistics restructure which, to me, looks to be paralleling the American brigade/light support battalion/forward support company construct and the MBCT divisional sustainment brigade structure. I'm not sure if that is the eventual intent but it looks like it's doing that. What I don't see, so far, is an expansion of field logistics beyond service battalions - I don't see maintenance battalions or special troops battalions or ammunition transport battalions or POL companies etc etc. We're starting to talk divisions but are ignoring, IMHO, structuring the theatre level support structure that a division needs for MCO.

I'm actually a fan of ARes unit amalgamations into a battalion with discrete companies that reflect their prior unit affiliation. IMHO, it's the best way of retaining a force expansion/national mobilization base.

The two big enablers to a proper CARB that are missing for me is the replacement of weak ARes leadership at the CO/RSM level with proper RegF personnel who have had both the proper training and experience to command full-sized units (and that leaves out the bulk of the Class Bs) and the equipment and associated training program to make them effect and more than just a pool of augmentees.

Honestly, if the army has a vision it should be made public and not hidden away in the halls of Ottawa.

Eventually the CARBs end state will be taking the roles of the ARCG, TBG, and IRUs. As well there is mention of CARBs being deployable on expiditionary Ops but I havent seen how that would work. I agree with you, if we are creating a high readiness ARes unit, leadership needs improvement, training and equipment.

This will also need significant expansion of the ARes authorized strength in order to feed the CARBs. Plus much stronger job protection laws to protect the class A types.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Eventually the CARBs end state will be taking the roles of the ARCG, TBG, and IRUs. As well there is mention of CARBs being deployable on expiditionary Ops but I havent seen how that would work. I agree with you, if we are creating a high readiness ARes unit, leadership needs improvement, training and equipment.

This will also need significant expansion of the ARes authorized strength in order to feed the CARBs. Plus much stronger job protection laws to protect the class A types.

And mukluks.... don't forget the (apparently very scarce) mukluks etc

 

[DBNSG]

Almost every CBG is implementing tactical grouping with its infantry and armoured units. As the army makes the transition from ad hoc battlegroup ops to divisional ops, it has been identified that the reserve units need to be capable of deploying formed sub-units and operating effectively. With most units current authorized establishments being in the ballpart of 180-230, even at full strength, a reserve unit can't consistently put a coy in the field. By grouping units, it takes their authorized establishments to close to their reg force counterparts. This will let units start training with a company in the field sooner, while DND, the MND and PMO begin the process of actually increasing the authorized strength of the army.

In town halls over the last month or so with both a CBG Comd and a Div Comd, they both said the vision is that reserve units will have the same authorized establishment as their reg force counterparts. They also said that being un-tactically grouped was tied to two key metrics, the first being able to reliably and consistently put a company+ in the field for exercises (ballpark 150 all ranks), and second, approaching the size of a reg force battalion.

So at this time what reserve units are best able to attempt these battle groups? Who is the most healthy?

 

[markppcli]

Perfect. I can share my 1 TAPV and 6 golf carts amongst 450 dudes.

The reality is though that its much easier to equipment units when we have size, mission, and tasks assigned. Equipping the 60 plus maneuver units when they vary in size from 35 to 220 isnt going to be efficient.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So at this time what reserve units are best able to attempt these battle groups? Who is the most healthy?

I have no idea how 'healthy' each of these units is right now but, based on many years of experience in other units, I can guarantee you they will likely go through the swings and roundabouts of an inconsistent ARes leadership supply chain.

Sometimes things will be great with lots of well trained and experienced people in the leadership structure but, other times, you'll be left with one Major, an untrained 2Lt, and a handful of new MCpls.

And this is the point as, under the current terms of service and CAF management culture, we'll never be able to ensure a strong, well trained, and consistently fully staffed org chart for any A Res unit no matter how many tactical grouping iterations are initiated.

To assume away this reality and go forward regardless is folly, of course.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I can guarantee you they will likely go through the swings and roundabouts of an inconsistent ARes leadership supply chain.

How many other countries use this model, in which the leadership of the Res F (army, anyways) is left entirely to the circumstances and fortunes of each unit acting almost alone? Surely most have larger full-time cadres?

 

[daftandbarmy]

How many other countries use this model, in which the leadership of the Res F (army, anyways) is left entirely to the circumstances and fortunes of each unit acting almost alone? Surely most have larger full-time cadres?

We've copied the British model, which is equally unsustainable but (most importantly) a 'cheap' method of sustaining a broad national mobilization baseline.

 

[Kirkhill]

Perfect. I can share my 1 TAPV and 6 golf carts amongst 450 dudes.

I have no idea how 'healthy' each of these units is right now but, based on many years of experience in other units, I can guarantee you they will likely go through the swings and roundabouts of an inconsistent ARes leadership supply chain.

Sometimes things will be great with lots of well trained and experienced people in the leadership structure but, other times, you'll be left with one Major, an untrained 2Lt, and a handful of new MCpls.

And this is the point as, under the current terms of service and CAF management culture, we'll never be able to ensure a strong, well trained, and consistently fully staffed org chart for any A Res unit no matter how many tactical grouping iterations are initiated.

To assume away this reality and go forward regardless is folly, of course.

It would be a win just to get Prairie Fella's 450 all on parade on the same day with all the same $2000-worth of uniforms and $6000-worth of weapons and "ammunition" that was claimed was necessary to supply the 300,000.

$3,600,000 investment in those 450.