Army Reserve Restructuring

[Colin Parkinson]

No one is going to make Mil vehicles EV. Hybrid yea, but not electric only.

Never say , never

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Some might suggest that a company of RCMP paid by the CAF for CAF policing, coupled with the MPs becoming a non specialist provost corps would be a key part of solving the problems.

Where are those RCMP coming from though, they too are suffering manpower issues. I like KevB idea of the Military Police taking on the Airfield Defense role and I suspect they would like it as well, particularly the Reserve MP's

 

[markppcli]

Where are those RCMP coming from though, they too are suffering manpower issues. I like KevB idea of the Military Police taking on the Airfield Defense role and I suspect they would like it as well, particularly the Reserve MP's

Again, it it’s a persistent or immediate requirement then it’s not an appropriate tasking for reserves. Reserve force generation works only with forewarning for temporary duty.

 

[KevinB]

Never say , never

Well maybe only Militaries that also issue 70 year old rifles…

 

[daftandbarmy]

Like having standby "companies" of soldiers for fire-fighting season, it strikes me as the sort of thing for which we could establish a task rather than a unit, and fill it with people on contracts.

Or CAF leadership needs to grow a pair and tell 'them' to go pound sand with their requests for clean up crew type labour and hire enough people to fight their own fires, while we get our troops ready for more lethal kinds of fire fights.

 

[dapaterson]

It is not the CAF leadership's role to tell anyone to pound sand.

Those are political decisions; CAF leadership can advise MND. MND can make those decisions and give whatever direction to the CAF is necessary (through the CDS, per NDA 18(2)).

 

[daftandbarmy]

It is not the CAF leadership's role to tell anyone to pound sand.

Those are political decisions; CAF leadership can advise MND. MND can make those decisions and give whatever direction to the CAF is necessary (through the CDS, per NDA 18(2)).

The CDS complains to the press. I assume that's one way of getting the message across...

Facing foreign conflicts, domestic disasters, Canada's top soldier worries about readiness​

Forces grappling with equipment, personnel needs as capacity is stretched​

Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre, shown in Ottawa in May, says with demands on Canada's military increasing both at home and abroad, he's concerned about equipment and personnel shortages. (Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press)

Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre says he's worried about the Canadian Armed Forces' readiness as it faces pressure both from the conflict in Ukraine and the need to respond to natural disasters at home.

In an interview on Rosemary Barton Live on Sunday, Eyre said the two issues represented "strong demands on both sides" and, given issues with equipment and personnel shortages, he was "concerned about our overall readiness."

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/eyre-military-readiness-challenge-1.6603430

 

[FJAG]

Totally agree, but that’s going to be a persistent need. I see that as a requirement for a regular Bn being re rolled to a “RCAF Regiment” vs a task for the reserves which are unreliable at best for domestic force generation. Alternatively that seems like a fine job for the GRTF.

Bingo. "Persistent need" = "continuing, full-time" = regular force. An RCAF regiment or a role for a less trained component of the military police (air force branch).

If you put your heads together and start defining the specifications and design a recruiting and training plan today then you might even have them in place when the first aircraft arrives.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Or CAF leadership needs to grow a pair and tell 'them' to go pound sand with their requests for clean up crew type labour and hire enough people to fight their own fires, while we get our troops ready for more lethal kinds of fire fights.

Maybe it's what soldiers in fact prefer. It's warm, dry work, during pleasant late spring and summer weather, that gets one out in the sun, enjoying the tangy scent of wood smoke. Surely that is more enjoyable than running soggy live fire traces in Latvia?

 

[FJAG]

The ARes can’t reliably force generate because it’s a voluntary system. It really comes down to how appealing the task is, and I don’t imagine going roving patrols around the Cold Laken air field in January is going to get a lot of volunteers. Trying to form a company size organization is going to difficult when you need one of X, two of Y, and 7 of Z but your volunteers don’t line up to that.

It is not a voluntary system. It's coercive as hell, if we are prepared to use it like that. There's noting voluntary about being placed on active duty or called out on service which the NDA clearly provides for. The fact that we allow it to continue on on a purely voluntary basis is a failure to use the system as designed, and IMHO a failure in leadership.

That said, I do agree that the ARes is incapable of reliably force generating. Once again that's because the leadership has not provided for proper force generation mechanisms and has allowed the ARes structure to atrophy to its current state. Allowing that to happen over the decades is, again IMHO, professional negligence by the CAF's leadership in that they have effectively taken a major policy option away from the government.

This is of course then compounded by an inefficient organization that throws 80 odd UICs, BORs, and COs signatures to generate augmentees.

That being said we’re going to try to have two Force Protection platoons in Latvia. We’ll see how that goes, I knew guys in the reserves that didn’t deploy to Afghanistan because they felt those tasks were beneath them. Absolutely the extreme minority but I can see it being less that appealing and that makes the pitch difficult.

While there were folks who thought those jobs were beneath them there were actually a good number of ARes folks, like you at the time, that volunteered for jobs with the PRT and NSE as drivers and jobs other than in rifle platoons and on the gun lines. I know of some who did force protection. One was a bombardier who did several tours in Bosnia and Afghanistan with force protection and ended up with a Chinese 107mm rocket splinter next to his heart.

Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre says he's worried about the Canadian Armed Forces' readiness as it faces pressure both from the conflict in Ukraine and the need to respond to natural disasters at home.

This is an interesting little issue actually. I read Auchterlonie's comments about domestic operations.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-armed-forces-auchterlonie-wildfires-1.7060034

Couple that with Sajjan's new job to find a national emergency response strategy.

It strikes me that we have a subtle movement starting where the CDS might start pushing back against some of these requests for military assistance where a purely military presence isn't needed. I've been involved in fire fighting and floods and effectively 95% of our assistance is dog bodies doing manual labour. And let's face it, notwithstanding all the complaints about pay, a battalion of infantry (even a ResF battalion) is probably the most highly paid group of sand bag fillers known to man.

 

[markppcli]

Maybe it's what soldiers in fact prefer. It's warm, dry work, during pleasant late spring and summer weather, that gets one out in the sun, enjoying the tangy scent of wood smoke. Surely that is more enjoyable than running soggy live fire traces in Latvia?

You get paid extra for Latvia.

It is not a voluntary system. It's coercive as hell, if we are prepared to use it like that. There's noting voluntary about being placed on active duty or called out on service which the NDA clearly provides for. The fact that we allow it to continue on on a purely voluntary basis is a failure to use the system as designed, and IMHO a failure in leadership.

That said, I do agree that the ARes is incapable of reliably force generating. Once again that's because the leadership has not provided for proper force generation mechanisms and has allowed the ARes structure to atrophy to its current state. Allowing that to happen over the decades is, again IMHO, professional negligence by the CAF's leadership in that they have effectively taken a major policy option away from the government.


While there were folks who thought those jobs were beneath them there were actually a good number of ARes folks, like you at the time, that volunteered for jobs with the PRT and NSE as drivers and jobs other than in rifle platoons and on the gun lines. I know of some who did force protection. One was a bombardier who did several tours in Bosnia and Afghanistan with force protection and ended up with a Chinese 107mm rocket splinter next to his heart.


This is an interesting little issue actually. I read Auchterlonie's comments about domestic operations.

Couple that with Sajjan's new job to find a national emergency response strategy.

It strikes me that we have a subtle movement starting where the CDS might start pushing back against some of these requests for military assistance where a purely military presence isn't needed. I've been involved in fire fighting and floods and effectively 95% of our assistance is dog bodies doing manual labour. And let's face it, notwithstanding all the complaints about pay, a battalion of infantry (even a ResF battalion) is probably the most highly paid group of sand bag fillers known to man.

Shh don’t tell twitter or Reddit, we’re the worst paid people in Canada apparently.

 

[MilEME09]

That said, I do agree that the ARes is incapable of reliably force generating. Once again that's because the leadership has not provided for proper force generation mechanisms and has allowed the ARes structure to atrophy to its current state. Allowing that to happen over the decades is, again IMHO, professional negligence by the CAF's leadership in that they have effectively taken a major policy option away from the government.

It's border line criminal, Took us 10 years to actually build a maintenance workshop, finally up and running this past year, thats a capability you would think we wouldn't have to build

 

[Kirkhill]

It is not a voluntary system. It's coercive as hell, if we are prepared to use it like that. There's noting voluntary about being placed on active duty or called out on service which the NDA clearly provides for. The fact that we allow it to continue on on a purely voluntary basis is a failure to use the system as designed, and IMHO a failure in leadership.

That said, I do agree that the ARes is incapable of reliably force generating. Once again that's because the leadership has not provided for proper force generation mechanisms and has allowed the ARes structure to atrophy to its current state. Allowing that to happen over the decades is, again IMHO, professional negligence by the CAF's leadership in that they have effectively taken a major policy option away from the government.


While there were folks who thought those jobs were beneath them there were actually a good number of ARes folks, like you at the time, that volunteered for jobs with the PRT and NSE as drivers and jobs other than in rifle platoons and on the gun lines. I know of some who did force protection. One was a bombardier who did several tours in Bosnia and Afghanistan with force protection and ended up with a Chinese 107mm rocket splinter next to his heart.


This is an interesting little issue actually. I read Auchterlonie's comments about domestic operations.

Couple that with Sajjan's new job to find a national emergency response strategy.

It strikes me that we have a subtle movement starting where the CDS might start pushing back against some of these requests for military assistance where a purely military presence isn't needed. I've been involved in fire fighting and floods and effectively 95% of our assistance is dog bodies doing manual labour. And let's face it, notwithstanding all the complaints about pay, a battalion of infantry (even a ResF battalion) is probably the most highly paid group of sand bag fillers known to man.

FJAG you can keep talking about the letters on the page and coercion to your heart's content but there has been no indication since 1917 that any Canadian government is keen on coercing anybody militarily.

It just ain't gonna happen.

Canada's military will continue to ride populist waves and be used when the government feels pressured to use it.

The exceptions are those aspects of the military that don't make it to the front pages - Standing Patrols and Special Operations.

 

[Blackadder1916]

MPGS is a weird trade and I’ll give you those numbers.

https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/adjutant-generals-corps/provost/military-provost-guard-service/

All are prior service and to make them even weirder, they are to be employed within 30 miles of the base to which they have contracted.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c10dd2840f0b60c82ef0866/10964.pdf

43.918. Military Local Service Engagement (MLSE). MPGS personnel serve on a MLSE as
full time Regular Army personnel. The specific MLSE ToS are as follows:
a. Length of Engagement. The MLSE provides for an initial term of 3 years’ service from the date
of enlistment. Subject to approval, subsequent 3 year engagements may be granted thereafter …
b. Area of Service. MPGS personnel are restricted to serving in a particular area of the
United Kingdom as determined by the individual before enlistment.
(1) The individual is to notify their Recruiting Officer in writing on an AFB 271 – Area of
Service Certificate of their desired base location, and are to be employed within 30 miles of
that location.
(2) Unless doing so as a volunteer, an individual may only serve outside their Area of
Service for a maximum of 30 days in any calendar year, or part of a year, in which the
individual is serving.
(3) An individual may not be assigned, whether temporarily or permanently, or operate in
either the armed or unarmed guarding role outside of the UK. They may volunteer to
participate in overseas sports tours, adventure training and shooting team
tours.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG you can keep talking about the letters on the page and coercion to your heart's content but there has been no indication since 1917 that any Canadian government is keen on coercing anybody militarily.

It just ain't gonna happen.

Canada's military will continue to ride populist waves and be used when the government feels pressured to use it.

The exceptions are those aspects of the military that don't make it to the front pages - Standing Patrols and Special Operations.

You're getting caught up in the conscription drama. It's nothing like that at all. Mobilization of reserve forces is a fact - so was conscription in WW2

Canada, having gained a measure of political autonomy between the wars, actually carried out a partial mobilization on 25 August 1939 in anticipation of the growing diplomatic crisis. On 1 September 1939, the Canadian Active Service Force (a corps-sized field force of two divisions) was mobilized despite war not being declared by Canada until 10 September 1939. Only one division went overseas in December 1939, and the government hoped to follow a "limited liability" war policy. When France was invaded in May 1940, the Canadian government realized that would not be possible and mobilized three additional divisions, beginning their overseas employment in August 1940 with the dispatch of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division (some units of which were deployed to Iceland and Newfoundland for garrison duty before moving to the UK). Canada also enacted the National Resources Mobilization Act in 1940, which among other things compelled men to serve in the military, though conscripts mobilized under the NRMA did not serve overseas until 1944. Conscripts did, however, serve in the Aleutian Islands in 1943 though the anticipated Japanese defence never materialized due to the evacuation of the enemy garrison before the landings. Service in the Aleutians was not considered "overseas" as technically the islands were part of North America.

See also: Canadian Military Mobilization on JSTOR

Essentially the government initially mobilized (placed on active service) 10,000 militiamen for domestic guard etc duties in late Aug 39. On Sep 1 the government placed the units for two divisions on active service but gave their militiamen the opportunity to volunteer for overseas duties - 60,000 volunteered. Volunteering stayed brisk until late in the war - five divisions plus two corps of support troops worth of volunteers. Under the 1940 NMRA conscription was used for defence industry and home defence duties. Only volunteers were used for overseas service until 1944 when 16,000 of the 65,000 conscripts serving at the time were ordered overseas (only 2,500 got there before the end of the war). The government (and population) was quite divided about sending non volunteers overseas - it wasn't a one sided thing at all and "zombies" were generally despised. King's timidness on the matter did much to hold up the reinforcements needed.

I would propose that Canada's attitude to "mobilizing" people who have already "volunteered" for military service depends on the cabinet of the day, how solidly that government is currently in power, and the extent of the crisis that requires more troops than the regular force can generate. I obviously could never imagine a Justin-ish government of "mobilizing" reservists for expeditionary service even with a big US boot up his ass. (One fear King had was that ordering conscripts overseas would result in a Canadian civil war and the US would step in an annex Canada.)

In any event, Canada has only mild hesitation to mobilize its reservists to active service (or for that matter to conscript civilians). The only demonstrated hesitation is in sending non-volunteers off on foreign expeditions.

 

[MilEME09]

In any event, Canada has only mild hesitation to mobilize its reservists to active service (or for that matter to conscript civilians). The only demonstrated hesitation is in sending non-volunteers off on foreign expeditions.

With the state of the forces as it is, calling up a ARes unit or two to active duty may be needed to prevent burn out of the regular force. Not many units could bring a lot of TES (Except the QoR) but call them up for a period of 1 year (5 months work up, plus 6 months deployed) and you'll have a high TES ARes in a few years.

 

[Rifleman62]

King's timidness on the matter did much to hold up the reinforcements needed.

At the time Inf Bn's were well understrength, plus fighting a determined enemy. RWpgRif - Moyland Wood -Feb 45- 4 Inf Coys totalled 218.

Today In Military History - Moyland Wood 18 Feb 45

Feature in the current The Devils' Blast. LCol (Retd) Norm Donogh participated in the battle. Posted in seven parts. THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN By Lieutenant-Colonel Norman R. Donogh AUTHOR’S NOTES In September 2008 I was invited to Europe to deliver three lectures and to participate in British...

army.ca

All that to say King, a Liberal PM, during wartime, didn't want to lose the Quebec vote, thus men died needlessly in under strength units.

 

[Kirkhill]

At the time Inf Bn's were well understrength, plus fighting a determined enemy. RWpgRif - Moyland Wood -Feb 45- 4 Inf Coys totalled 218.

Today In Military History - Moyland Wood 18 Feb 45

Feature in the current The Devils' Blast. LCol (Retd) Norm Donogh participated in the battle. Posted in seven parts. THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN By Lieutenant-Colonel Norman R. Donogh AUTHOR’S NOTES In September 2008 I was invited to Europe to deliver three lectures and to participate in British...

army.ca

All that to say King, a Liberal PM, during wartime, didn't want to lose the Quebec vote, thus men died needlessly in under strength units.

And I argue that that reluctance pervades all military decision making from the Boer War forwards. The "easy" thing politically is to call for volunteers and sometimes even that is too much if the population is divided on whether a cause needs supporting. WW2 saw a good chunk of the population both demanding that Canada (and the US) keep out of this foreign affair while others denied there was a problem at all - heck some folks were actively rooting for the other side.

The same thing applies to kit - kit equals capability - if you have capability at Notice To Move then you might find yourself being asked to use it.

Canada does not have a strong record of speaking with one voice and its politicians reflect that.

 

[FJAG]

And I argue that that reluctance pervades all military decision making from the Boer War forwards. The "easy" thing politically is to call for volunteers and sometimes even that is too much if the population is divided on whether a cause needs supporting. WW2 saw a good chunk of the population both demanding that Canada (and the US) keep out of this foreign affair while others denied there was a problem at all - heck some folks were actively rooting for the other side.

The same thing applies to kit - kit equals capability - if you have capability at Notice To Move then you might find yourself being asked to use it.

The last concept - which I agree is a real one that pervades the halls of Ottawa - doesn't help one whit in being able to deter aggression and, if required, be capable of reacting. This is the primary reason why I believe Canada's military is failing the country. You need both personnel and equipment to generate deterrence. A well trained reserve can be bigger and stronger for the same price as a small full-time force. Equipment used by reservists takes much less wear and tear, and requires less maintenance and lasts longer. The biggest fiscal problems that the military has arises out of keeping more full-time forces than needed and in particular, the vast administrative structure that mostly supports itself rather than the force. 10-20,000 less full-timers would fund 50-100,000 part-timers, or more realistically 30-40,000 part-timers and their equipment and a mobilization base.

Canada does not have a strong record of speaking with one voice and its politicians reflect that.

That's really a feature of democracies. Not all the Athenians agreed to the need to prepare to fight the Persians. This from during the interlude after Marathon.

The politician Themistocles, with a power base firmly established amongst the poor, filled the vacuum left by Miltiades's death, and in the following decade became the most influential politician in Athens. During this period, Themistocles continued to support the expansion of Athens' naval power.[116] The Athenians were aware throughout this period that the Persian interest in Greece had not ended,[95] and Themistocles's naval policies may be seen in the light of the potential threat from Persia.[116] Aristides, Themistocles's great rival, and champion of the zeugites (the 'upper hoplite-class') vigorously opposed such a policy.[117]

 

[Kirkhill]

The last concept - which I agree is a real one that pervades the halls of Ottawa - doesn't help one whit in being able to deter aggression and, if required, be capable of reacting. This is the primary reason why I believe Canada's military is failing the country. You need both personnel and equipment to generate deterrence. A well trained reserve can be bigger and stronger for the same price as a small full-time force. Equipment used by reservists takes much less wear and tear, and requires less maintenance and lasts longer. The biggest fiscal problems that the military has arises out of keeping more full-time forces than needed and in particular, the vast administrative structure that mostly supports itself rather than the force. 10-20,000 less full-timers would fund 50-100,000 part-timers, or more realistically 30-40,000 part-timers and their equipment and a mobilization base.


That's really a feature of democracies. Not all the Athenians agreed to the need to prepare to fight the Persians. This from during the interlude after Marathon.

So the Greeks were debating tanks or ships....