Army Reserve Restructuring

[Kirkhill]

And if you irretrievably damage the aquifers with salt water ? This seems to be a case of damned if you do and damned if you don't.
I'm not sure that there's a good answer here.

I agree that it would be wrong to pump salt water into the aquifers. Perhaps they could be isolated with valving at the pump stations?

I was thinking more about the vegetation issue. The faster they get the fires out the less ground would be contaminated and the less the amount of salt that would be applied.

But over all, as I said, a last ditch effort.

Kind of like the 415's scooping sea water out of the Pacific.

Everything you need to know about the water drops in California during wildfires

Firefighters in California are battling the fires from the sky using a variety of specialized aircraft that dump water and fire retardant onto the terrain below.

www.foxnews.com

Los Angeles fires: Saltwater used to combat flames comes with immediate benefits but long-term risks

Firefighters have taken the rare but not unusual move of scooping up ocean water to help battle the flames as wildfires rage across Southern California.

www.foxnews.com

 

[KevinB]

I was talking to @Kirkhill about the fires - and he brought up a really good point that links back to the CA ARES.

He pointed out that Unions hate Volunteers, and that the CA Regular Army acts like a union, and sees the ARES as scabs to take their jobs if given equipment etc. The way to defeat that sort of mentality is to have the Union buy into the Volunteers - for Fire Fighters down here it is generally done by having the Professionals control the training, and Volunteers are used either for surge requirements, or for tasks that the Professional Fighter Fighters are spread to thin for, the non full time personnel are also union members - so it is viewed as a win win - as the full time personnel get the lion share of the salaries, and the part timers get a lot of shit jobs, or less technicality demanding roles, but still get to perform roles with the full time personnel as well.

In looking at the CA, the whole Hybrid Unit aspect could (and should) be used to solve the Reg/Res issues. The Command and Control would be full time personnel, and the training system would be controlled by full time personnel - but the units would be fully resourced in terms of equipment and personnel.

 

[Rifleman62]

I'm not sure that there's a good answer here.

Forget saving the California Smelt. A problem for years.

 

[FJAG]

I was talking to @Kirkhill about the fires - and he brought up a really good point that links back to the CA ARES.

He pointed out that Unions hate Volunteers, and that the CA Regular Army acts like a union, and sees the ARES as scabs to take their jobs if given equipment etc. The way to defeat that sort of mentality is to have the Union buy into the Volunteers - for Fire Fighters down here it is generally done by having the Professionals control the training, and Volunteers are used either for surge requirements, or for tasks that the Professional Fighter Fighters are spread to thin for, the non full time personnel are also union members - so it is viewed as a win win - as the full time personnel get the lion share of the salaries, and the part timers get a lot of shit jobs, or less technicality demanding roles, but still get to perform roles with the full time personnel as well.

In looking at the CA, the whole Hybrid Unit aspect could (and should) be used to solve the Reg/Res issues. The Command and Control would be full time personnel, and the training system would be controlled by full time personnel - but the units would be fully resourced in terms of equipment and personnel.

Regretfully, while I agree completely with the root cause of the RegF v ARes problem as @Kirkhill and you describe it and what ought to be the way forward, but unfortunately I do not agree that the suggested solution is a possible one. I don't believe you can ever get RegF "buy-in" to the level needed to primarily because of the PY fights that go on as between branches within the army and at a higher level between the army, navy and air force.

Every time that a branch or command agrees that it could off load responsibilities to a stand-by, reserve, surge component it will be required to give up PYs. The fight for or the need to transfer PYs plays a critical role in everything the CAF does organizationally. DND also ties that to major combat equipment, equipping only that part of the force that can man it full-time, or even worse, only to the extent of that part of the force expected to be able to be sustained on deployment.

The primary purpose of a reserve force is to have personnel and equipment available to surge in the event of a major crisis (or for those who think even more deeply; to create a large enough force to be an effective deterrent to aggression). Neither the government nor DND concern themselves with the need to rapidly expand the force in a crisis but merely concern themselves with what capabilities they can afford to maintain during continued peace-time conditions.

I fully agree that a hybrid force is the only one that will work for the Canadian scenario - sufficient full-timers to train and lead the force and to conduct peace-time missions; and sufficient trained reservists with combat capable equipment to bulk out the force for a crisis scenario.

The question is how do you get to that. One way is more money - the almost mythical 2%, or more, to allow the purchase and maintenance of more equipment so that the reserves can actually have equipment to man in a crisis. Alternatively you cut PYs drastically in order to reallocate money for equipment. I see neither of those options as realistic ones in our current government/DND bureaucracy construct. In other words, I see no current scenario that would persuade the RegF under the current funding envelope to divert one additional nickel to ARes equipment, etc.

What's worse, if additional funding were to become available I would expect that with the current mentality, the vast bulk of it would go to more PYs and RegF equipment and not to a surge capability. Canada has been fully and completely submerged into the "forces-in-being" concept that sees reservists as nothing more than augmentees. It considers the likelihood of an "all-in" commitment of its forces to major combat as a very remote possibility and not worth investing a continued capital stream on. If almost a decade of agreeing to 2% and pressure from NATO, if not outright derision, and if the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 was not able to get Canada to move the goal posts on a credible CAF surge capability then what will do it? And even if more funding were to cone, what would persuade the CAF to spend it on reservists rather than additional PYs and equipment for the core RegF?

Sorry folks. Like you I see what the solution needs to be; I just don't see it happening with the way DND/CAF leadership acts when the chips are down.

 

[Kirkhill]

And thus my shared interest in the National Guard model. But on different grounds.

US state governors need and want and value their National Guards. They fight for them. They fight to retain them against the Federal government. They fight to have them trained and equipped by the Federal government to meet State as well as Federal needs.

Canadian premiers are only to happy to offload anything that looks like a cost to the Feds.

The Feds are disinclined to do anything they don't absolutely have to.

D9 asked why Trump had to be so obnoxious. Because Biden and Obama asked nicely and nothing happened.

I like the US Guard model. But for that we need US governors with US responsibilities.

 

[GK .Dundas]

There are times when I swear that this Country needs to be bitch slapped every so often .
Successive Canadian governments have proven to have a truly stunning ability to ignore the obvious .

 

[Halifax Tar]

There are times when I swear that this Country needs to be bitch slapped every so often .

I too share the belief that every so often Canada and Canadians need some tough love.

 

[GK .Dundas]

I still remember Obama's speech .
Whatever his politics are . He's an incredibly eloquent speaker .
There was no doubt when he spoke of the The world needing more Canada what he was talking about.
Assuming you had two or more functioning brain cells. It was a plea for increased Defence spending. It was basically the same speech that just about every President that's spoken in Parliament in the past 40 odd years have given.

 

[KevinB]

Regretfully, while I agree completely with the root cause of the RegF v ARes problem as @Kirkhill and you describe it and what ought to be the way forward, but unfortunately I do not agree that the suggested solution is a possible one. I don't believe you can ever get RegF "buy-in" to the level needed to primarily because of the PY fights that go on as between branches within the army and at a higher level between the army, navy and air force.

IMHO that should be an easy fix - because frankly the CAF serves the Canadian Government - and needs to shut the fuck up, salute and say "aye aye" and get on with it.

Every time that a branch or command agrees that it could off load responsibilities to a stand-by, reserve, surge component it will be required to give up PYs. The fight for or the need to transfer PYs plays a critical role in everything the CAF does organizationally. DND also ties that to major combat equipment, equipping only that part of the force that can man it full-time, or even worse, only to the extent of that part of the force expected to be able to be sustained on deployment.

The way to make it more palatable for the Reg Force hierarchy is to say.
Either you get 6 Infantry Battalions, 2 Arty Reg't, 2 CER's and 2 Armoured Reg't of all Regular Force, and say that is it - you get 2 Col's to run those Bde's and we are scaling back the CCA to a 2 Star with a 1 Star COS, and that is it.
Or you can take your Hybrid units and have 2 Divisions of them, and every position above WO or Capt will be a Regular Force member.
And you get equipment for those Divisions.

The primary purpose of a reserve force is to have personnel and equipment available to surge in the event of a major crisis (or for those who think even more deeply; to create a large enough force to be an effective deterrent to aggression). Neither the government nor DND concern themselves with the need to rapidly expand the force in a crisis but merely concern themselves with what capabilities they can afford to maintain during continued peace-time conditions.

The Ostrich syndrome.

I fully agree that a hybrid force is the only one that will work for the Canadian scenario - sufficient full-timers to train and lead the force and to conduct peace-time missions; and sufficient trained reservists with combat capable equipment to bulk out the force for a crisis scenario.

The question is how do you get to that. One way is more money - the almost mythical 2%, or more, to allow the purchase and maintenance of more equipment so that the reserves can actually have equipment to man in a crisis. Alternatively you cut PYs drastically in order to reallocate money for equipment. I see neither of those options as realistic ones in our current government/DND bureaucracy construct. In other words, I see no current scenario that would persuade the RegF under the current funding envelope to divert one additional nickel to ARes equipment, etc.

Looking at the authorized strength versus the actual strength of the CA, there are a lot of other issues at play.
But the fact remains that Regular Force soldiers are a bad value for the money for the Canadian Tax payer, unless they are constantly deployed doing Gov directed missions.

What's worse, if additional funding were to become available I would expect that with the current mentality, the vast bulk of it would go to more PYs and RegF equipment and not to a surge capability. Canada has been fully and completely submerged into the "forces-in-being" concept that sees reservists as nothing more than augmentees. It considers the likelihood of an "all-in" commitment of its forces to major combat as a very remote possibility and not worth investing a continued capital stream on. If almost a decade of agreeing to 2% and pressure from NATO, if not outright derision, and if the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 was not able to get Canada to move the goal posts on a credible CAF surge capability then what will do it? And even if more funding were to cone, what would persuade the CAF to spend it on reservists rather than additional PYs and equipment for the core RegF?

Sorry folks. Like you I see what the solution needs to be; I just don't see it happening with the way DND/CAF leadership acts when the chips are down.

I agree the CAF/CA Leadership tends to have myopia, which is why someone from the outside or a very motivated insider who can weather the storm needs to push the Hybrid aspect up the hill.