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Army Reserve Restructuring

Patriotism, a sense of duty, love of Canada ?
If that’s what you’re looking for, you can already get all of that as a civil servant. What’s the extra incentive to put on a uniform? And quite possibly a metaphorical uniform, as we don’t even budget for uniforms for our current Supplementary Reservists, Maybe it’s as simple as that one week a year DAG being in a Hilton convention centre so you can bank some rewards points. Maybe it’s recognizing SuppRes service as counting towards the CD or a SUPPRES bar for the SSM similar to the RANGER bar. Maybe it’s a personal handshake and a thank you from your department’s DM. But it’s got to be something. There’s got to be some value added.
 
Warning: May offend some sensibilities.


"As for mobilization planning, having such a plan carefully developed ahead of time is essential to a serious military — and to securing the safety of our people in a crisis. And yet when I interviewed senior officers for my book, including a number of former chiefs of defence staff, until a year ago they almost universally told me there would “never” be mobilization in the traditional sense. I hope they are right.

"But two authors from Finland and the Netherlands put it this way: “Ukraine offers a cautionary tale … directly applicable to NATO countries,” in a recent U.S. Army War College paper. With the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s “professional army (perishd) on the front lines (and) with their loss, the training establishment also largely vanished.”

"Here’s the lesson: Without a large partially trained reserve within a CAF-wide plan, in a crisis you are forced, like Ukraine, to conscript from the “eligible civilian population with no previous military training.” As defence researcher Peter Dawson wrote in the journal Armed Forces and Society in 1989, “Contingency planning must therefore include plans for mobilization” based on partially-trained units. That was recognized in the mid-1930s when Canada found it too costly to maintain “a large standing force” and therefore “A large militia capable of further expansion was an effective solution.”

"That is one of the reasons you need proper mobilization plans. Having a solid plan contributes to the deterrence of our enemies. It means our military would organize, train and prepare for the greatest possible national effort — and therefore would be capable of handling any situation equal to or less than the real deal. A military trained for national mobilization can handle anything less: peacekeeping tasks, domestic emergencies like floods and fires, counter-terrorism, and deal with blockades or sabotage of vital infrastructure from within such as roads, railways and power lines.

"In the ideal system, there would be a reserve leadership training plan (currently there is none for non-commissioned members) to get recruits trained up over the course of four summers (16 months in total) to the level of captain (officer stream) or sergeant (non-commissioned stream). Canada’s brilliant army intellectual Colonel Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon has written and spoken about the concept. The lack of such a program explains why many leave, bored, after a year or two — no mentoring, no career plan, little explanation of what the CAF can offer, and little support from the regular force.

"Canada’s reserves should be a popular, well-supervised national program that the majority of young Canadians would be proud to serve in for a few years or, for some, a lifetime — to earn tuition money, to wear the uniform, to gain confidence by learning skills such as drill, fire and movement, intelligence preparation, first aid, logistics, outdoor survival, civic knowledge and history, and a host of other fields. With more reservists would come more opportunities to build lifelong friendships that benefit not only themselves, but society at large."

....

Something is better than nothing. Half a loaf is better than none. Even a partially trained civilian is better than an untrained civilian. Even if that partially trained civilian is only doing military adjacent tasks like civil defence, disaster relief, emergency management, logistics, emergency medical services.
 
If Canada is mobilizing, a lot of the large departments and agencies that have the bulk of the Public servants are going to be very involved already.

Taking public servants from CBSA, RCMP, DND, Fisheries and Oceans, Corrections Canada etc to fill out CAF seems like it will be robbing Peter to pay Paul.
It’s not just impact on other government that will be a concern. The new DG Mobilization is already asking both how one mobilizes 31 CBG without shutting down GDLS and how one mobilizes 33 CBG without shutting down ADM(Mat).
 
With the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s “professional army (perishd) on the front lines (and) with their loss, the training establishment also largely vanished.”
This is the reason why I disagree with the current plans to create two divisions - one with the vast majority of the regular force planned for expeditionary use (and at higher readiness) - and another for the reserves - planned for homeland defence.

This separation not only has consequences on the morale of the homelanders and a different equipment plan but ensures that the base of any subsequent mobilization will be less competent than those who went in the "first wave."

I'm not advocating that the the first wave be inexperienced cannon fodder. I'm saying there needs to be a leveling of the entire force. There needs to be substantial regular force leadership and training effort blended into a hybrid force of regulars and reservists so that the overall reserve force rises in competence, is properly equipped and fully integrated into any expeditionary force including the first wave.

It became abundantly clear in doing the interviews and research for our book "With A Few Guns" that the thousands of reservists who deployed to Afghanistan were fully accepted by their regular force counterparts and were every bit as capable of doing their jobs as everyone else. The key to that was the initial training they had as reservists and the inclusion of them in predeployment training. What needs to be done is that the important elements from predeployment training - the step up in collective training - has to become part of standard reserve force training from year-to-year. The current direction of army modernization appears to be going in a diametrically opposed direction.

It’s not just impact on other government that will be a concern. The new DG Mobilization is already asking both how one mobilizes 31 CBG without shutting down GDLS and how one mobilizes 33 CBG without shutting down ADM(Mat).
Here's the clue for the 33 CBG problem. If Class B service is propping up the cubicles in Ottawa when they can't find enough regular folks to fill those seats on an ongoing basis, then maybe DND needs to convert a lot more of those seats to be filled by civilians, or better yet, create a class of regular force service that guarantees no postings outside of a give geographic area.

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Here's the clue for the 33 CBG problem. If Class B service is propping up the cubicles in Ottawa when they can't find enough regular folks to fill those seats on an ongoing basis, then maybe DND needs to convert a lot more of those seats to be filled by civilians, or better yet, create a class of regular force service that guarantees no postings outside of a give geographic area.

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That's not a class B problem.

It's a "federal public servant who is also a class A reservist who, if placed on active service, creates a skill and capability gap in the public service" problem.

Similar to 31 CBG - all the GDLS employees who are also class A reservists and, if placed on active service, leave large workforce gaps in a critical part of the defence industrial base.

Or like how individuals who are first responders and class A reservists are likely unavailable for DomOps in their local region since their civilian role likely requires them to be present (and likely racking up substantial overtime).
 
That's not a class B problem.

It's a "federal public servant who is also a class A reservist who, if placed on active service, creates a skill and capability gap in the public service" problem.

Similar to 31 CBG - all the GDLS employees who are also class A reservists and, if placed on active service, leave large workforce gaps in a critical part of the defence industrial base.

Or like how individuals who are first responders and class A reservists are likely unavailable for DomOps in their local region since their civilian role likely requires them to be present (and likely racking up substantial overtime).
We're looking at this from two different angles.

You are thinking of the "all (or most) civil servant will be part of some form of reservist" issue. That's a concept that I think is silly in part for the reason that you state but much more beyond that. I think that's someone's wet dream to quickly get those 3-400,000 reservists we are phantasizing about.

Incidentally that problem hits other core functions as well. Medical is a big one. Mobilizing health care reservists who already work in civilian health care can negatively effect the care for the civilian population, especially in small communities where services are already limited.

The GDLS example shows that there needs to be a preexisting policy for essential workers that is capable of easy implementation and supervision.

The concern I had above is the general existing reliance on Class B reservists to do basic admin and other related functions throughout DND and the CAF when they are really doing continuing, full-time work with a wink, wink, nudge, nudge and their loss as valuable members of reserve units who should be engaged in doing unit work - especially training.

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Re the medical side

Lack of professionals is exactly the reason for recruiting, training and provisioning volunteers with first aid skills.

And the rationale applies across the board.

Start at the bottom up. If you are not being shot at do you need to wear a uniform? Or at least a combat uniform?
 
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