Army Reserve Restructuring

[daftandbarmy]

I think this is the way.

It already is, about 80% of the time.

The ability to advance beyond 'the basics' is - or was - pretty limited depending on your leadership and the available resources.

 

[Halifax Tar]

It already is, about 80% of the time.

The ability to advance beyond 'the basics' is - or was - pretty limited depending on your leadership and the available resources.

I think the basics is all we should expect from part timers. And anything more than that can be accomplished during WUP trg.

 

[Kirkhill]

It already is, about 80% of the time.

The ability to advance beyond 'the basics' is - or was - pretty limited depending on your leadership and the available resources.

Is it time to go zen on the system and just accept the 80% solution and optimize for that?

Once the basic skills, whatever those are defined to be, skills that can be taught locally cost effectively, then those "graduates" become eligible for advanced courses and employment commensurate with their skills.

IE, hand the armouries over to CADTC. Make the regiments lodgers and employers of the graduates.

 

[Rifleman62]

A good read​

https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/exclusives/reserves-without-purpose-the-hidden-weakness-in-modern-militaries/​

Reserves Without Purpose: The Hidden Weakness in Modern Militaries - 18 Nov 25 ​

Alex Gerald is a former regular officer who served in British artillery and armoured regiments and continues to serve as a reserve officer. He is currently at King’s College London, where his research focuses on mobilisation, deterrence and military strategy​

Extract:
One of the key lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that military mass has an inherent property that cannot be replaced with other capabilities.[1] The obvious problem is that mass is expensive to maintain. In war, military mass has great utility; in peacetime that same mass has limited utility at best yet must be maintained in case of, or to deter, war. This gets to the heart of the idea of strategy as ‘the use of military force to achieve political outcomes at tolerable cost’.[2] How can military force be maximised, while minimising the costs in peace as well as war? At its simplest, the answer is reserve forces.

Reserve forces trade time for mass. A professional army is deployable in a relatively short timeframe, but the cost of maintaining a commensurate standard of training and readiness is high. A reserve army, comprised of part-time volunteers, maintains a lesser standard of training and readiness at greatly reduced cost, but in return can only be deployed within a moderate timeframe. Building any reserve force requires a series of decisions from policymakers and military planners. What ratio of reserves to regulars should comprise the whole force? What level of training should reserve forces maintain? How can you recruit and motivate them? However, all decisions are subordinate to one key decision: what function should that reserve force fulfil in your national security strategy?

 

[daftandbarmy]

A good read​

https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/exclusives/reserves-without-purpose-the-hidden-weakness-in-modern-militaries/​

Reserves Without Purpose: The Hidden Weakness in Modern Militaries - 18 Nov 25 ​

Alex Gerald is a former regular officer who served in British artillery and armoured regiments and continues to serve as a reserve officer. He is currently at King’s College London, where his research focuses on mobilisation, deterrence and military strategy​

Extract:
One of the key lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that military mass has an inherent property that cannot be replaced with other capabilities.[1] The obvious problem is that mass is expensive to maintain. In war, military mass has great utility; in peacetime that same mass has limited utility at best yet must be maintained in case of, or to deter, war. This gets to the heart of the idea of strategy as ‘the use of military force to achieve political outcomes at tolerable cost’.[2] How can military force be maximised, while minimising the costs in peace as well as war? At its simplest, the answer is reserve forces.

Reserve forces trade time for mass. A professional army is deployable in a relatively short timeframe, but the cost of maintaining a commensurate standard of training and readiness is high. A reserve army, comprised of part-time volunteers, maintains a lesser standard of training and readiness at greatly reduced cost, but in return can only be deployed within a moderate timeframe. Building any reserve force requires a series of decisions from policymakers and military planners. What ratio of reserves to regulars should comprise the whole force? What level of training should reserve forces maintain? How can you recruit and motivate them? However, all decisions are subordinate to one key decision: what function should that reserve force fulfil in your national security strategy?

FWIW, despite the challenges, I think Canada has shown the rest of the world how to do a good job with respect to integrating Reservists into the RegF on operations.

FRY deployments were a rocky start, but it improved through the AFG period.

Could it be better? Hell yeah, but we've got alot of good stuff to build on IMHO.

 

[Kirkhill]

FWIW, despite the challenges, I think Canada has shown the rest of the world how to do a good job with respect to integrating Reservists into the RegF on operations.

FRY deployments were a rocky start, but it improved through the AFG period.

Could it be better? Hell yeah, but we've got alot of good stuff to build on IMHO.

So we can take a bunch of keen youngsters, with basic skills, and with 4 to 6 months intensive training turn out a battle ready product?

That is inded a good thing.

Next question, how many of those people that served in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Eritrea, Rwanda and Afghanistan did we manage to hold on to?

Reg force retention is an issue but I think reserve force retention might be a greater issue. It is fashionable to deride the social aspects of the reserves but at the same time one of the issues arising among returning vets, both regs and reserves, is the feeling of loss of family and isolation. Keeping those folks engaged and giving them a purpose couldn't be bad.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So we can take a bunch of keen youngsters, with basic skills, and with 4 to 6 months intensive training turn out a battle ready product?

That is inded a good thing.

Next question, how many of those people that served in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Eritrea, Rwanda and Afghanistan did we manage to hold on to?

You mean the ones who were treated like shit, not by the Reg F but by the Reservists who remained at home, after they returned from battle?

Not many...

 

[Kirkhill]

You mean the ones who were treated like shit, not by the Reg F but by the Reservists who remained at home, after they returned from battle?

Not many...

F*ckery all round then?

 

[daftandbarmy]

F*ckery all round then?

YMMV, but I saw some really bad examples of various leaders engaging with these young veterans, and corrected that when I could.

Although I detected no sense of general entitlement, the overall feeling seemed to be "Oh, so you think you're so special?".

Their experiences with the RCLegion seemed to be the same, based on a few chats I had with some. This might have had something to do with the fact that there was so much positive national coverage for the CAF's troops during the AFG period, unlike other eras, which sparked some jealousy.

I preferred to mine them for the latest good practises for us to adopt and rehearse e.g.,'9 liners' anyone?

Regardless, we lost alot of good people who only signed up for abuse from the enemy. Many CT'd I believe, several went on to SOF roles, so their experience wasn't lost to the CAF as a whole.

 

[Kirkhill]

YMMV, but I saw some really bad examples of various leaders engaging with these young veterans, and corrected that when I could.

Although I detected no sense of general entitlement, the overall feeling seemed to be "Oh, so you think you're so special?".

Their experiences with the RCLegion seemed to be the same, based on a few chats I had with some. This might have had something to do with the fact that there was so much positive national coverage for the CAF's troops during the AFG period, unlike other eras, which sparked some jealousy.

I preferred to mine them for the latest good practises for us to adopt and rehearse e.g.,'9 liners' anyone?

Regardless, we lost alot of good people who only signed up for abuse from the enemy. Many CT'd I believe, several went on to SOF roles, so their experience wasn't lost to the CAF as a whole.

I believe the WW2 tribe had the same reaction to the "Koreans".

 

[Nvlgzr]

You mean the ones who were treated like shit, not by the Reg F but by the Reservists who remained at home, after they returned from battle?

Not many...

It’s a real shame when you don’t retain and want to learn from those whom have real experience.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I think the basics is all we should expect from part timers. And anything more than that can be accomplished during WUP trg.

Define basics. Should what the US has demonstrated it can teach/maintain in the NG be the baseline?

 

[Brad Sallows]

So we can take a bunch of keen youngsters, with basic skills, and with 4 to 6 months intensive training turn out a battle ready product?

Shouldn't take anywhere near that long.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

FWIW, despite the challenges, I think Canada has shown the rest of the world how to do a good job with respect to integrating Reservists into the RegF on operations.

FRY deployments were a rocky start, but it improved through the AFG period.

Could it be better? Hell yeah, but we've got alot of good stuff to build on IMHO.

Every Roto is Roto Zero.