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Army Reserve Restructuring

For some reason, all the company HQs I deployed with were staffed with clerks who were also excellent soldiers.

The OC's Rover Group (a driver/body guard team comprised largely of clerks) had the highest scores on some of our shooting competitions.
I'm not suggesting clerks can't be/aren't great soldiers/sailors/airhumans, I'm simply suggesting that rather than beat our heads against the wall to find ways to fill the empty uniformed HRA/FSA positions for the reserves, maybe create part-time civilian positions.

We have lots of civilians handling admin in the Regs, why not extend that to the Res as well?
 
I'm not suggesting clerks can't be/aren't great soldiers/sailors/airhumans, I'm simply suggesting that rather than beat our heads against the wall to find ways to fill the empty uniformed HRA/FSA positions for the reserves, maybe create part-time civilian positions.

We have lots of civilians handling admin in the Regs, why not extend that to the Res as well?

So what happens when we deploy on operations or, gawd forbid, go to a 'real war'?

Civvies wouldn't be likely seen within artillery range of the frontline, in a Coy or BGp/Bde HQ, and would therefore be useless to us.
 
So what happens when we deploy on operations or, gawd forbid, go to a 'real war'?

Civvies wouldn't be likely seen within artillery range of the frontline, in a Coy or BGp/Bde HQ, and would therefore be useless to us.

Because there is more to a defence establishment than the people in range of the guns?

Your ammunition will dry up in a big hurry absent the bodies not in the field with you. And those are the very same people you don't hire in peacetime because they are not real army.
 
So what happens when we deploy on operations or, gawd forbid, go to a 'real war'?

Civvies wouldn't be likely seen within artillery range of the frontline, in a Coy or BGp/Bde HQ, and would therefore be useless to us.
The civilian admin clerks in your local armoury would stay there when the unit is mobilized and remain to administer the new recruits that are brought in for mobilization at the local unit. The local armoury BOR is part of the force generation side of the equation not the force employment side.
 
The civilian admin clerks in your local armoury would stay there when the unit is mobilized and remain to administer the new recruits that are brought in for mobilization at the local unit. The local armoury BOR is part of the force generation side of the equation not the force employment side.
I keep thinking that the more we get away from referring to Res F "units" and "brigades" and made it clearer that they are administrative and training entities, the fewer times it would be necessary to explain things like this.
 
I keep thinking that the more we get away from referring to Res F "units" and "brigades" and made it clearer that they are administrative and training entities, the fewer times it would be necessary to explain things like this.
If we had a clearly defined mobilization plan then these types of questions would become a lot clearer.
 
I keep thinking that the more we get away from referring to Res F "units" and "brigades" and made it clearer that they are administrative and training entities, the fewer times it would be necessary to explain things like this.
I think that the sooner we stop having ResF administrative and training entities and make them combat capable battalions and brigades, the better off we'll be.

;)
 
I think that the sooner we stop having ResF administrative and training entities and make them combat capable battalions and brigades, the better off we'll be.

;)
True, but also it's not like upon mobilization we're going to turn off the lights and lock the doors of the local armouries because the units have been mobilized and deployed. That's not how it worked in WWI or WWII and I'm guessing it's not how it works in the US Army National Guard either.

There may be units or the Reserve Force that get mobilized and deployed but there will be elements that stay behind as administrative units and in the case of national mobilization will be involved in raising and training the follow on forces.

What is missing is an actual plan on how ANY of this would actually happen.
 
True, but also it's not like upon mobilization we're going to turn off the lights and lock the doors of the local armouries because the units have been mobilized and deployed. That's not how it worked in WWI or WWII and I'm guessing it's not how it works in the US Army National Guard either.

There may be units or the Reserve Force that get mobilized and deployed but there will be elements that stay behind as administrative units and in the case of national mobilization will be involved in raising and training the follow on forces.

What is missing is an actual plan on how ANY of this would actually happen.
Working on it

:giggle:
 
I think that the sooner we stop having ResF administrative and training entities and make them combat capable battalions and brigades, the better off we'll be.
First we make the tools to make the tools.
 
So what happens when we deploy on operations or, gawd forbid, go to a 'real war'?

Civvies wouldn't be likely seen within artillery range of the frontline, in a Coy or BGp/Bde HQ, and would therefore be useless to us.
Well we probably aren't staffing main travel claims
 
An interesting run down on some different models of mandatory service...

Europe’s Conscription Challenge: Lessons From Nordic and Baltic States

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has alerted European leaders that their armed forces are not ready for war. Recognizing this reality, they are responding by increasing their defense budgets, purchasing new weapons systems, and ramping up defense industrial production capacity. But lessons from the battlefield in Ukraine are also showing European militaries that they can no longer ignore long-standing manpower challenges. In a war of attrition, Ukraine has struggled to recruit enough troops to match Russia’s rate of mobilization. Meanwhile, Europe’s armed forces have failed for years to meet their recruitment goals and make military service attractive enough to retain their troops. This has revived a debate over the usefulness of conscription.

While most European militaries suspended mandatory military service after the end of the Cold War, some retained it. And several countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden, have in recent years reinstated conscription in response to a changing security environment. In the last several months, Western European politicians, including in Germany and the United Kingdom, have publicly pondered the benefits of returning to mandatory military service. The promise of conscription is powerful: it offers a path to building up military reserves while strengthening civil-military relations and promoting defense-relevant skills that bolster societal resilience to attack.

In search of a cost-effective personnel model that is palatable to their skeptical publics, European leaders have been looking to their neighbors in the north and east. Some military service models—in Finland and Sweden in particular—are considered exemplary in Europeand beyond. Today, all Baltic and Nordic NATO nations (except for Iceland, which has no military) operate a version of a mandatory service system, each with distinct strengths and weaknesses. As a region, these European frontline countries serve as a laboratory for national defense best practices. Therefore, it is useful to (1) consider how these countries have attempted to tackle manpower challenges via various models, (2) pressure test their approaches, and (3) lay out what other countries can learn from them.


 
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