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Artillery Logistics Lessons.

The words are actually Conrad's and not mine. But I accept what he says. During my time in RegF regiments I dealt with a number of Regimental Quartermasters and Maintenance officers. I found all the MaintO I met to be great at their jobs. Loggies I found as a mixed bag on the small sample I knew. 1 was a plug, the rest really good folk. Strangely the further away they were from a unit position--like base staff--the less one had the impression that they were there to help you but more concerned about making their own life easier. I'm not sure if that's disdain but more like the typical we/them tribalism that's at the core of military structures. When you deal with battalions there's the battalion themselves and everyone else is just an enabler.

I know, I know, I'm showing my age again but IMHO it was a big mistake to create one overarching logistics system. Each service has different needs and needs specialists able to deal with those specifics. That applies to both supply and maintenance in a big way. Add to that the low priority for resources allocated to logistics because our experience base is peacetime where the role and need for logistics is significantly lower than for wartime and its easy to see where things go off the rails.

It's kind of funny actually (maybe not funny but sad). Artillery used to be classified a combat arm (along with Fd Engrs). When they were relegated to combat support I was pissed and felt devalued - and we probably were devalued. When there isn't a war going on a whole lot of people get shoved into the second and third tier category. People that I've interviewed for our book on Afghanistan are pretty universal in their views that the infantry battalions generally paid lip service to the gunners as a valuable asset but after the first danger close mission had a resounding change in attitude about their gunners.

I'm a bit that way about the logistics system. The Afghanistan NSE structure might have been PY efficient but wasn't an optimal logistics solution. It didn't endear itself to the end users and IMHO, while adequate for peacetime operations is unfit for purpose for real war. When I see what the Ukrainian log and main system are able to accomplish with the dog's breakfast of equipment and supplies they have to deal with, I'm flabbergasted. What really concerns me, and should concern every "operator" that we have, is whether or not our system is still capable of scaling up. If I was CDS that would be the one thing keeping me from sleeping at night.

At heart, I'm an optimist. I believe anything can be fixed but only if you put your mind to fixing it. Letting things drift is not a viable course of action.

In my days the supply system was made up of paper cards and stocktaking. In my mind I have troubles seeing why the supply system, with all the new warehousing concepts and computerization systems can't work like Amazon does. IMHO logistics is as due for a major transformation just like the ResF is.

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The supply systems effectiveness depends 3 things:
  1. The volume of stores being pumped into it; and
  2. The quality of data entry going into; and
  3. The distribution system.
Let me be the first to admit, we are making this way more complicated than it has to be.

My ALP paper argued for as a remedy; a massive budgetary and PY increase for spares and stores; and an increase in regional depots, moving away from our centralized depot method.
 
The supply systems effectiveness depends 3 things:
  1. The volume of stores being pumped into it; and
  2. The quality of data entry going into; and
  3. The distribution system.
Let me be the first to admit, we are making this way more complicated than it has to be.

My ALP paper argued for as a remedy; a massive budgetary and PY increase for spares and stores; and an increase in regional depots, moving away from our centralized depot method.
I would argue the depots are not the true issue at all and adding more regional depots won't fix much. If stock exists, is released and is not pegged as Op/project/otherwise stock (so essentially in a MRP relevant SLoc for those Supply nerds out there) the depots on average have the material picked and issued within 3 days (most material is same/next day regardless of Pri). However, less Pri 1 material which will go commercial, it means that the material will sit on the floor awaiting distribution via the national freight run.

IMHO stock outs and distribution are the 2 largest contributors to material not in the right place at the right time. Distribution/NFR is going through a revamp as we speak to shore up some of those inefficiencies, so if anything we need to add more folks and/or stream line procurement side of the house so material is there for end operators.

Regional depots may alleviate some of the distribution issues but it is probably easier and less PY intensive to just create a better distribution network with a better mix of commercial & white fleet for routine distribution rather than the current reliance on majority white fleet.

The other argument against regional depots is as a whole the amount of material flowing in and out of our depots has been steadily decreasing over the last two decades. There was a Afghan blip but number swiftly dwindled post that time period. With the two coastal BLogs taking on limited 3rd line mostly for RCN material and the RCAF fleets using ISS models and leveraging distribution networks from the aircraft manufacturers it leaves only the CA using the depots as the main source for spare parts nationally.
 
I would argue the depots are not the true issue at all and adding more regional depots won't fix much. If stock exists, is released and is not pegged as Op/project/otherwise stock (so essentially in a MRP relevant SLoc for those Supply nerds out there) the depots on average have the material picked and issued within 3 days (most material is same/next day regardless of Pri). However, less Pri 1 material which will go commercial, it means that the material will sit on the floor awaiting distribution via the national freight run.

IMHO stock outs and distribution are the 2 largest contributors to material not in the right place at the right time. Distribution/NFR is going through a revamp as we speak to shore up some of those inefficiencies, so if anything we need to add more folks and/or stream line procurement side of the house so material is there for end operators.

Regional depots may alleviate some of the distribution issues but it is probably easier and less PY intensive to just create a better distribution network with a better mix of commercial & white fleet for routine distribution rather than the current reliance on majority white fleet.

The other argument against regional depots is as a whole the amount of material flowing in and out of our depots has been steadily decreasing over the last two decades. There was a Afghan blip but number swiftly dwindled post that time period. With the two coastal BLogs taking on limited 3rd line mostly for RCN material and the RCAF fleets using ISS models and leveraging distribution networks from the aircraft manufacturers it leaves only the CA using the depots as the main source for spare parts nationally.

The current national depot's aren't a problem. They are doing the job as best they can. Having said that storing your spares geographically close to the end-user just makes sense.

This is the reason the RCN has and is trying to pull all its parts out of 25 and 7. There are only ships in two places, the spares should be in those two places.

I agree we need more PYs in procurement, that was meant to be included in my PYs in my statement.

A military can't survive on JIT logistics. I am of the belief we need lots of stores sitting around gathering dust, just in case. JIT is great when you want a ball glove. Not so great when you need a widget to make the thingy turn to make the ship go boom boom.
 
The current national depot's aren't a problem. They are doing the job as best they can. Having said that storing your spares geographically close to the end-user just makes sense.

This is the reason the RCN has and is trying to pull all its parts out of 25 and 7. There are only ships in two places, the spares should be in those two places.

I agree we need more PYs in procurement, that was meant to be included in my PYs in my statement.

A military can't survive on JIT logistics. I am of the belief we need lots of stores sitting around gathering dust, just in case. JIT is great when you want a ball glove. Not so great when you need a widget to make the thingy turn to make the ship go boom b
Having spares geographically close is what 2nd line is good for. You don't need a more 3rd line depots to make that happen, you need material in the system and proper replenishment levels set.
 
Having spares geographically close is what 2nd line is good for. You don't need a more 3rd line depots to make that happen, you need material in the system and proper replenishment levels set.

Just my opinion... And remember I'm skewed by the RCN.

3rd line depot's should be nothing but bulk clothing and long term storage/war stock. Along with the maintenance and associate work shop abilities.

Every major base should have a depot to support the local operations and trg. Or the 2nd line needs a major boost.

But this is all fictitious as you're correct first we need parts in the system.
 
Just my opinion... And remember I'm skewed by the RCN.

3rd line depot's should be nothing but bulk clothing and long term storage/war stock. Along with the maintenance and associate work shop abilities.

Every major base should have a depot to support the local operations and trg. Or the 2nd line needs a major boost.

But this is all fictitious as you're correct first we need parts in the system.
We used to send vehicles radios and small arms to CFB Chilliwack for repairs, replacements. They could do a lot of that on the base. They could also do some repairs on the 106mm RR's, mortars and C1 105mm Howitzers. Major repairs of those systems required shipping to 202 Workshops. We did first line maintenance and could swap out a few bits and pieces at the unit. Svc Battalion sometimes did extra maintenance for us on vehicles. When we were ops tasked, we had a 5/4 ton full of vehicle parts and tools and vehicle mechanic (who owned his own Damilar Dingo Scout Car) doing a lot of the maintenance on the trucks. We unofficially rebuilt the engine in our 3 ton stake truck to keep it from falling into the hands of Crown Assets as well. Not to mention building a flying kitchen into a Deuce and a CP into one as well.
 
Meanwhile a couple of different logistics stories




But no word yet on the Light Amphibious programme. I suspect that that is all entangled with the Army's watercraft programme and the Navy's Large Unmanned programme.
 
Theatre Logistics

Poland,

Japan, Philippines, Australia - marries up with the proposal for 3 Marine Littoral Regiments.

The Philippines kind of surprises me. As does Indonesia and Vietnam. - my biases I guess - I can't see any of them as reliable partners - but would I have said that about Poland, or even France, 20 years ago.



 
An argument for missiles over guns

Guns, and ammunition, are dependent on foundries and machine shops. Lots of energy. Lots of cooling. Lots of precision. They epitomize the crafts of the blacksmith.

Now we have a cardboard tube, a binary explosive and a microchip manufactured in sea cans by robots

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Theatre Logistics

Poland,

Japan, Philippines, Australia - marries up with the proposal for 3 Marine Littoral Regiments.

The Philippines kind of surprises me. As does Indonesia and Vietnam. - my biases I guess - I can't see any of them as reliable partners - but would I have said that about Poland, or even France, 20 years ago.



My tenant is Filipino. Just going off of what he says, they feel stuck between a rock & a hard place...

They don't like China, for lots of good reasons.

They like America generally speaking, but worry it makes them a target for Chinese aggression when it comes to Taiwan.

But if they don't allow American forces there, they are worried China will essentially take over.


One way or another, it seems they accept that whether they like it or not, they have to pony up to one superpower or the other
 
My tenant is Filipino. Just going off of what he says, they feel stuck between a rock & a hard place...

They don't like China, for lots of good reasons.

They like America generally speaking, but worry it makes them a target for Chinese aggression when it comes to Taiwan.

But if they don't allow American forces there, they are worried China will essentially take over.


One way or another, it seems they accept that whether they like it or not, they have to pony up to one superpower or the other

Kind of like Canada, but warmer, then right? ;)
 
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