Infanteer, a_majoor, good points! (Infanteer, I was just as surpised by the SBCT Bn Comd as you about the Stryker comments...definitely seems the grass may not be greener on the other side!)
Firstly, yes, much of the work we're doing ranging from doctrine development, down to TTPs (and even BTS I've been working on for a unit working up to SHIRBRIG high readiness) takes into account other nations' LL. Specifically regarding US Army aviation, I have been working very closely for the last year and a half with the US Army Aviation Center in Ft. Rucker, AL, to take down their lessons from OEF, OIF and other ops (including aviation from those whom some of you who have been down to Bragg or were in Khandahar in 2002 may have had the opportunity to fly with.) I have shared our aviation transformation material with the US Army's senior aviation transformation guru (a VERY savvy, CW5 ret'd aviator) and likewise, he with me, so the link is one person TIGHT. Tugged along by my US Army counterpart, I had the opportunity to chat very briefly with US Gen Cody (VCSA, but more importantly an aviator) down in Washington this summer at an ABCA meeting. I learned alot about US Army views of ops in about three minutes and took what he had to say to heart, you don't get that kind of advice every day.
A-majoor, regarding the OIF incidents, yes, we're definitely learning from the unfortunate experiences of the US (and the Brits), -64's, the -47 near Khanduz, etc.... I'll talk about doctrinal employment of AH vs. ARH below, but interestingly, one of the biggest take aways about loss of aircraft, crew and pax came from not the tactical employment of aviation but other factors related to the terrain of the theatre. Interestingly, there were numerous cases where of all things, the Air Traffic Control folks had won the war over having aviators return home from missions in nice orderly patterns that make ATC's job easier. Imagine the joy of the insurgents when they saw that all returning aircraft changed from tactical use of terrin and features into lined up blips all coming along the same route towards the airfiled while still way outside the perimeter fence! Sadly, it's only a matter of time before and RPG connects with the boys. US Army is re-writing TTPs on a continual basis, and ATC no longer directs how aircrew will return to base, thus avoiding the potential establishment of undesireable routine.
Now, that is also not to say the an armed Griffon, or any armed hel would be employed (per current doctrine) as an AH. Just so folks don't think we're trying to get to big for our britches, we clearly understand that AH per se are part of a large, integrated force package, whose purpose is very specific, primarily anti-armour or all-arms call-for-fire support (I would call it aviation CAS, but the '18 boys get kind of snarky when any other than them uses the term CAS to describe what they do...
A Canadian armed hel (ARH vice AH)would most likely be used primarily as part of the combined recce team (mounted) with the connotation of "fight to see" beyond the engagement range of en wpn systems, or in a supporting fires to the DFS engaged in decisive actions. In both cases, the "ARH" would function as a team member within a larger formation, not being the spear point of ops as the AH often finds itself in.
Funny about some call CAS (or what we all know to be more accurately avn support to an all arms call for fire)! I've spoken recently with Marines who describe what their "grey angels, dealing death from above, and dropping 30mm brass on top of their heads (AH-1W's)" as CAS. The boys aren't fussed over the intracacies of words...in their eyes, ugly grey helo's chucking Hellfire and 30mm forward over top while they advance over the ground is pretty effective "CAS" in their eye's! When I talk of USAF 'CAS', they usually just call that "air force stuff'..."it's not close at all, not like my fellow soldiers flying Cobras over my head...that's CLOSE."
Cheers,
Duey