Breaching Operations & Equipment

[McG]

With the AEV replacement project make its way forward, the decision has been made to retire and not replace the AVLB.  Say good-bye to our only assault bridging capability.

 

[Kat Stevens]

Fucking near sighted morons.

 

[X-mo-1979]

Until we invade a country that needs bridging to bring leopards across....then they will panic and buy what we had.

Why could we have kept the equipment the way and layout it was say in 2000.We would be functional.

Who needs tanks?Who needs a badger?
I remember a certain general talking about that.

 

[George Wallace]

What?  Have all the bridges in the world suddenly become up to the standard of 70 to 100 ton Bridge Class?  I wonder if the twit who made this decision has heard of "overbridging"?  Does (s)he think that the Leo 2 can cross all the bridges it encounters?  Even in Europe we needed to overbridge bridges for the much lighter Leo 1 to cross.


Ditto to what Kat says.

 

[McG]

What?  Have all the bridges in the world suddenly become up to the standard of 70 to 100 ton Bridge Class?  I wonder if the twit who made this decision has heard of "overbridging"? 

The twit who made this decision was given a too small pot of money and told to replace the engineer tanks.  The decision was made to do the AEV fleet right.  The alternative would have been to buy a few tokens of each vehicle type but not enough of either to create & sustain a capability.

It is a crappy situation, but (in this case) the decision makers don't deserve name calling from the peanut gallery. 

 

[George Wallace]

.......  The alternative would have been to buy a few tokens of each vehicle type but not enough of either to create & sustain a capability.

It is a crappy situation, ........

It is a crappy situation, and we don't have much of a capability as is.  This type of decision was pulled on the CF so many times in the past, that all Elements and Branches have lost capabilities due to the shortsightedness of our political masters.  We are slowly being neutered.  This is how the CF is being whittled down to being little more than a Paramilitary Force.  It isn't now, but may soon be.  I know some "Economics Major" will surely jump in and fill us all in on the state of the economy and why the Government must make these decisions, but the current state of the CF is the result of these "Peace Dividend" cuts perpetuated by every Government since the Korean War.  With technological advancements, the maintenance of a reasonable armed force to protect a nation only gets more expensive, not cheaper.  Canada has been on the cheap for half a century now.  In fifty years, will we be down to a CF of 15,000 (10% of whom are Cbt Trades in all three Elements)?

I know that we can't do anything without the funding, but do we have to silently slink off to our dark corners and accept ill thought out dictates from those higher sources?  Again.....the Economist will step in and tell me the error of my ways, and I will have to concede.

 

[George Wallace]

Where am I coming from?

Well.  I am of the philosophy that it is cheaper in the long run to take the extra expense now and do the job right the first time with good quality ____________ to last a long period of time/lifetime; than to wait, allowing the problem to get exponentially worse, and the expense of the job to increase with inflation, and then do the job to lower standards which will require repair/replacement at more expense within a short period of time. 

Sorry, but I see the current management (government bureaucracy) as holding the opposite philosophy; "go on the cheap" and have to spend more in the long run, due to replacement and/or repairs.


[Edit to add:]

At the same time, I look at the whole CF as being an "essential service" that requires the constant training and equipping to be able to react to the "worse case scenarios".  That means that we have to maintain capabilities and skillsets and constantly train on them.  Once again, my "fireman/firetruck analogy":  Just because the town hasn't had a fire in ten years, doesn't mean that we can sell off the firetruck.

The CF has many skills and many types of equipment, to fight on land, sea and in the air, that must be maintained and skillsets to be kept up on so that we can do our jobs.  Relearning lost skills in a case of war, emergency or even in training, is NOT, as Martha Steward would say, a good thing.  Not a good thing at all.

 

[Larkvall]

Where am I coming from?

Well.  I am of the philosophy that it is cheaper in the long run to take the extra expense now and do the job right the first time with good quality ____________ to last a long period of time/lifetime; than to wait, allowing the problem to get exponentially worse, and the expense of the job to increase with inflation, and then do the job to lower standards which will require repair/replacement at more expense within a short period of time. 

Sorry, but I see the current management (government bureaucracy) as holding the opposite philosophy; "go on the cheap" and have to spend more in the long run, due to replacement and/or repairs.

Exactly. Another example would the AORs. Spending perfectly good money to keep 40 year old ships in service because they don't want to pay the price of new ones. There are billions of dollars of stimilus being thrown around and where is that money going? Don't get me started on the automakers.
Yes, I will quit before I get too off topic.

 

[Kat Stevens]

So now, effectively, there is no bridging capability of any kind in the Canadian army.  you would be hard pressed to find 30 bodies in a CER that are even familiar with, let alone good at, MGB, ACROWE, or MR building.  You may find 2 or 3 SNCOs that barely remember something about it on their 6A, but couldn't command a build.  Most of the current sappers of all ranks have never even seen a Baillie bridge, except for on "A Bridge Too Far" on History Channel.  Just break up the regiments, send them all to infantry battalions with appropriate new hatbadges, and have done with it.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Kat the Section Member Course (aka QL3) does bridging mind you only the MGB and MR and this training has recently been reintroduced to the Reserve Force.

 

[McG]

So now, effectively, there is no bridging capability of any kind in the Canadian army. 

Arguably, this situation existed prior to the AVLB decision.  The current AVLB bridge cannot support the Leopard 2A6 (especially with all the extra add-on stuff) beyond a few risk crossings.  We'd be burning through bridge quarters very fast and it would not belong before they'd all be condemned.

 

[Kat Stevens]

An upgrade to the existing rolling stock is available, including an MLC 70 bridge.  Made in Greece, I think.

 

[X-mo-1979]

So now, effectively, there is no bridging capability of any kind in the Canadian army.  you would be hard pressed to find 30 bodies in a CER that are even familiar with, let alone good at, MGB, ACROWE, or MR building.  You may find 2 or 3 SNCOs that barely remember something about it on their 6A, but couldn't command a build.  Most of the current sappers of all ranks have never even seen a Baillie bridge, except for on "A Bridge Too Far" on History Channel.  Just break up the regiments, send them all to infantry battalions with appropriate new hatbadges, and have done with it.

Your right Kat.
The skill set is faded huge even since 2001.We had the leo E guys (all newfs IIRC) with us and they knew how to use that equipment.Unfortunately those guys are all Mcpl-Wo now and there is a ;lack of knowledge at the lower level.

Found that the kids driving em learned pretty quick over 7 months of it daily though!So there are some young operators that are very skilled.

 

[McG]

An upgrade to the existing rolling stock is available, including an MLC 70 bridge.  Made in Greece, I think.

You are thinking of the Leguan 26 m bridge.  That system has been adapted to trucks, Leopard 1 hulls and Leopard 2 hulls.  It is also the system used by the US M1 Wolverine AVLB.

http://www.armedforces-int.com/categories/mobile-bridges/leguan-system.asp
http://www.kmweg.de/produkt-leguan-en.html

I know the NDHQ staff responsible for managing the current AVLB are fully aware of this option.  There is no money though.

 

[Kat Stevens]

AVLB was always my baby, and I've got ten years of pretty much continuous time on them.  I've always been a track head, and this is yet another decision that is going to turn around and chew our asses to pieces.

You are thinking of the Leguan 26 m bridge.  That system has been adapted to trucks, Leopard 1 hulls and Leopard 2 hulls.  It is also the system used by the US M1 Wolverine AVLB.

http://www.armedforces-int.com/categories/mobile-bridges/leguan-system.asp
http://www.kmweg.de/produkt-leguan-en.html

I know the NDHQ staff responsible for managing the current AVLB are fully aware of this option.  There is no money though.

The option is called AVLB beaver 70, google it.  Bridge is still 22m, class 70, bridge dimensions are the same, hydraulics are upgraded.  Made in Greece, looks very cool.

 

[McG]

http://www.thorntone.com/en/pdf/AVLB_70/pages/AVLB%20BEAVER%2070_%20ENG.pdf

In any case, I am certain that all the Leguan documentation stated it was a 24 m MLC 70 bridge as recently as 8 months ago.  However, the NATO Engineer community is leaning toward raising the agreed minimum standard MLC for assault bridges by 10 (I believe this was to go from MLC 70 to 80) because of the operational weight of the tanks operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I suspect most companies marketing AVLB bridges will be increasing the capability of their products because of this.

 

[McG]

I was wrong.  Leguan has always been a 26 m bridge capable of spanning a 24 m gap.  However, it was previously listed as MLC 70.  Looks like the company probably did raise the capacity to match NATO's vision.

http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2004/jdw09046.htm@current&Prod_Name=JDW&

 

[Haligonian]

Sorry to switch topics, but earlier in this thread somone had stated that to breach a minefield to roller would go first and then the plow would go through.  I read elsewhere that the plough would go through first and then the roller would prove the route.  Any comments?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

If you don't know where a minefield is but have an idea that one is there you can lead with the roller to find the edge of the minefield by detonating one (or seeing them once you are real close). The theory is that the roller tank can find a mine and survive. In general, though, you lead with the plough in a minefield breach and follow with the roller (if you have them mounted). The plough clears a lane while the roller "proves" it (don't want to get into a doctrinally argument about the definition of "proving"). Some argue that the plough tank proves the lane itself, but heh, if you have the rollers go with them.

All of this can be modified (within reason) to suit the situation and the equipment available.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

From Engineer Field Manual, Volume 10, Mines and Booby Traps, Part 1, All Arms. Take the following into consideration.

MECHANICAL BREACHING AND CLEARANCE

11. General. Mechanical means of breaching include ploughs, rollers and flails which are employed in accordance with Engineer Field Manual, Volume 10, Mines and Booby Traps, Part 2, Engineers and Assault Pioneers and Armoured Regiment in Battle. The full details of these are beyond the scope of this chapter but are summarized below.

12. Ploughs. Tanks can be fitted with a plough attachment which ploughs through the ground in front of each track; it lifts any mines in its path and pushes them to one side clear of the tracks. If a tank is fitted with the plough attachment, its mobility is
restricted when ploughing and crossing hard ground is slow which lengthens the time the tank is exposed to enemy fire. The plough follows the terrain but it is unlikely to be effective in close country where there are roots and boulders or where there are numerous ditches. If the leading tank only is fitted with ploughs, the following tanks must keep in exactly the same track which is
difficult under operational conditions. Otherwise the following tanks may actuate mines pushed to one side by the plough. As the
plough covers only the line of the tracks, the tank could also be immobilized by full width attack mines.

13. Rollers. Tanks can also be fitted with heavy rollers which cover the ground in front of each track and actuate single pressure
mines. These rollers can be defeated by mines with double impulse fuses or full width attack mines. If every tank were fitted with
rollers, then an attack through minefield could be mounted on a broad front, but the mobility of the tank is restricted when fitted
with rollers. If only a proportion of tanks have rollers, then the other tanks must cross the minefield by following exactly in the
tracks of the leading tank. This is technically not difficult, but may be hazardous, particularly if under direct fire and attempting to
cross as fast as possible. There is a good chance that a following tank will actuate a mine which has not been covered by the roller.

14. Flails. A proportion of tanks may be fitted with a flail, which is a high speed rotating drum, the width of the tank, with
lengths of heavy chain attached. The flail poses similar restrictions to the mobility of the breaching tank described above, but has the advantage of being able to actuate all mines over the full tank width.