Over the past few days, the Prime Minister has stated his unequivocal support for the Armed Forces and for the mission in Afghanistan, and will doubtless do so again in his conference speech this afternoon. For those who care about defence, this is most welcome. But the reality, as Dr Liam Fox has argued, is not so straightforward. After their respective speeches today, both Dr Fox and Mr Cameron will return to Whitehall to make vital decisions about our overall defence and security policy, and the size and shape of the Armed Forces.
…it is clear that there is no real appetite to reduce further our role on the world stage. However, the expensive decision to commit to a replacement for our nuclear deterrent is likely to be deferred, as a pragmatic response to the current funding crisis. Also, it is widely accepted that there will be no credible conventional threat to our territorial integrity for the foreseeable future. Instead, it is the consequences of failed and failing states that threaten our security – so complex operations such as Afghanistan represent not just a current challenge, but are likely to characterise our immediate future as well.
Several other conclusions have been drawn. There is no strict military necessity for air power to be deployed from platforms at sea in support of British operations, although the option to project power is alluring. Also, Nato will remain the principal guarantor of our collective security, and the US will remain our principal bilateral defence partner.
…The guiding principle must be that of graduated readiness. I chaired the Readiness Working Group for the last Strategic Defence Review, held in 1997-8, and remain convinced that this discipline must be applied now that the money is tight. Military units held at high readiness are the most expensive, so in this age of austerity, the only units that can be retained at that level are those which we are actually using on operations, or are likely to need in the near future. Thus our land forces – the Royal Marines, the bulk of the Army (less about half of our main battle tanks and heavy artillery), and the helicopter and transport elements of the RAF – should stay at their current levels, at least until our operations in Afghanistan are complete. Should there then be no similar campaign in prospect, they could be reduced, or more units transferred to the Territorial Army.
Within the discipline of graduated readiness, our holdings of fast jets should also be shrunk significantly…
…it is to the debate over the Navy, and its aircraft carriers, that the principle of graduated readiness must be applied in particular. Although possession of one or two modern aircraft carriers is highly desirable, it is just that – desirable, not essential. The logical decision would be to complete the first aircraft carrier (which is half-built and paid for already) and place it in “extended readiness” (which some might describe as in mothballs) until there is an evident need for the capability it could provide and the new aircraft to fly off the carrier are available.
This delay to the vessel coming into Fleet service would also be matched by a reduction in the number of Joint Strike Fighters acquired to fly off it – 50, not 135 [emphasis added, more on F-35s generally here
http://unambig.com/the-f-35-and-the-fighters-the-us-navy-still-is-buying/ ].
There would, though, be a fresh opportunity for the Royal Navy, and our ship-building industry, through the diversion of funds earmarked for the second carrier towards a modest building programme of low-cost frigates. This would both increase the capability of our surface fleet, and provide the financial headroom to retain our relatively new amphibious ships [more here
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/lpd/ ],
which give the Royal Marines their raison d’être [our Navy has no equivalent ships, and procurement efforts for the closest thing, the Joint Support Ship, have been a mess for several years
http://unambig.com/canadian-shipyards-cant-competitively-build-large-civilian-vessels-but-the-government-insists-they-build-naval-ones/ ]…
