British Military Current Events

[Blackadder1916]

What role did artillery play versus the roles of Naval gunfire?

Go to page 5.

https://sill-www.army.mil/fires-bulletin-archive/archives/1945/JAN_1945/JAN_1945_FULL_EDITION.pdf

ARTILLERY AT TARAWA
By Lt. Col. P. M. Rixey, USMC and Maj. Wendell H. Best, USMC
REPUBLISHED BY COURTESY OF THE "MARINE CORPS GAZETTE"

The First Battalion, Tenth Marines, equipped with 75-mm pack howitzers and attached to the Second Marines, Second Marine Division, as direct support artillery for that combat team, landed on Betio beach close behind their brothers-in-arm on that memorable morning, November 20, 1943. Under extremely adverse conditions they effectively accomplished the mission assigned. Though landed on call under battalion control, firing batteries were embarked on separate transports with normal infantry landing teams of the Second Marines. Headquarters and Service Battery was divided between two ships with one complete Fire Direction Center team on each. The Battalion Commander, Bn-3, Communication Officer, and Bn-2 embarked on the Combat Team command ship.

THE PLAN . . .

 

[Kirkhill]

Go to page 5.

https://sill-www.army.mil/fires-bulletin-archive/archives/1945/JAN_1945/JAN_1945_FULL_EDITION.pdf

Thanks for that. Excellent read.

Final sentence - "average range fired, 1,500 yards".

Is it inappropriate to note that this was with 75mm pack howitzers also operating in Direct Fire mode against bunkers? How would the fight have been managed with a combination of the 84mm Carl G and its full panoply of available rounds together with the 81mm mortar, similarly supplied?

From the article it seems the Arty struggled to get their guns ashore and then to find suitable ground to deploy them.

 

[daftandbarmy]

What role did artillery play versus the roles of Naval gunfire?

And the direct fire of the tanks..... Tracks in the Sand

 

[Kirkhill]

And the direct fire of the tanks..... Tracks in the Sand

Light tanks (by modern standards) used sparingly and armed, again, with a 75mm gun and a 30 cal Machine Gun. Given the struggle to get them ashore and manoeuvre in the trees (trees which also shielded machine gunners and snipers and would shield CG gunners) would the effort be worth it in the modern era?

The Japanese are were often criticized for the poor quality of their tanks --- but their position was that their light tanks were good enough for the job they were intended to do in heavily forested terrain.

This video on the Japanese Type 16 MCV (a Japanese Centauro type "tank destroyer") has a nice summary on the indigenous history of tank development in Japan. (And it also addresses the pros and cons of the MCV).

Start at about 1:30 for the historical review

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Not to mention the Japanese early war were facing the same issues with deploying tanks in amphibious operations as the US Marines, even if the Japanese were better equipped with landing craft.

 

[IRepoCans]

IF JTFX is analogous to the SRR and
IF JTF2 is analogous to the Tier 1 SAS/SBS

X has a limited slice of the capability / mission sets that SRR has, a lot of what SRR has done and does (inclusive of it's former titles) falls under the CANSOFCOM umbrella.

IF CSOR is analogous to the SFSG (1 Para)

Well, CSOR kind of traded its hard (scalable upwards) fighting power to go more into the IW and capacity building stream; and, while Group does do support and influence missions, they're really around to provide that company group to battalion level strike capability to UKSF.

A Special Operations Capable Light Infantry Brigade under command of the Army but deployable with CanSOFCom may be in the offing?

That then leaves the LAV Battalions, the Armoured and Cavalry Regiments and the RCA Regiments as legacy warfighting capabilities.

The Canadian Combat Support Brigade seems to fit nicely into this schema as well.

I'm curious to see what the Light Forces Review actually pushes out for force organization, equipment, sustainment and support WRT light infantry. All I know that has really been put out there is that the light infantry battalions as it stands are mechanized battalions minus LAVs, and are, ultimately wasted in the CMBGs as they currently are.

I wonder if we'll see a smaller combined light infantry fighting force (a tactical regiment instead of a brigade I'd imagine) similar to that of the old CAR or the Ranger Battalions as they initially started (I would favour this option as the Ranger battalion was far more robust than that of the CAR's Commandos when they were battalion-ish sized, plus their unique position between both the special operations and conventional frameworks of the US Army). Rangers also have the benefit that everyone regardless of the trade goes through the same assessment and selection process. But ultimately, we'd have to recognize and acknowledge that the skills and training of a light infanteer are different than that of the mechanized infanteer.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

i suspect that drones will have a short field day, cheaper missiles, anti-drone drones and lasers are all coming as well, drones did well in the last few conflicts because of poor Air Defense systems, once those improved the Turks lost a number of drones and had to pull their use back. Armenia's Air Defense system although better than ours (who's isn't?) suffered because of the lack of networking, Training and complimentary systems to protect each other. This is a propaganda video but it shows you how important the Arzies took artillery as well. A robust artillery allows you to prosecute the targets you spot and gives you another tool when your drones get stopped by their drones.

 

[daftandbarmy]

i suspect that drones will have a short field day, cheaper missiles, anti-drone drones and lasers are all coming as well, drones did well in the last few conflicts because of poor Air Defense systems, once those improved the Turks lost a number of drones and had to pull their use back. Armenia's Air Defense system although better than ours (who's isn't?) suffered because of the lack of networking, Training and complimentary systems to protect each other. This is a propaganda video but it shows you how important the Arzies took artillery as well. A robust artillery allows you to prosecute the targets you spot and gives you another tool when your drones get stopped by their drones, or if it's dark, windy, raining, snowing, 24/7/365 etc.

FTFY

 

[GR66]

And while drones and loitering munitions may be relatively cheap, they are still quite a bit more expensive than mortar or artillery rounds. Sometimes you need volume of fire to saturate an area rather than precision weapons to take out individual targets. Besides you still need a way to rain steel down on the enemy after all the expensive toys have been used up/shot down!

Obviously there's a role for both types of systems to complement each other. As for the USMC I can see the logic of dropping the tanks. They aren't well suited to the specific niche role of the Marines...they have the US Army to take on those roles. The artillery decision makes less sense to me. I can understand dropping the M777 specifically perhaps. It's not mobile enough and doesn't have the range that HIMARS can offer, but I don't hear any talk of them bringing in anything to replace the volume of fire they could provide. More 120mm mortars or something like the 105mm Hawkeye to provide close support for the reduced number of boots on the ground.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think the USMC has drunk the "Light Force koolaid" and will play that game for a decade till they realize all their opponents have oodles of artillery and light amphibious air mobile armour to kill them with.

 

[FJAG]

I think the USMC has drunk the "Light Force koolaid" and will play that game for a decade till they realize all their opponents have oodles of artillery and light amphibious air mobile armour to kill them with.

I can't help but think the same thing.

The problem with all of these types of restructures (as it was with ours in the 2000s) is that once you let a capability go it's hard to build it back up again if you find that you need it.

While I see a use for light and agile forces (right up to the LAV variety) they are just as susceptible to all of the modern weapon systems that everyone is touting as making "heavy metal" obsolete. The big difference is that they are also vulnerable to a whole slew of other weapon systems that "heavy metal" is still impervious to.

A case in point is the Type 16 above that is armoured against up to 25mm on the front and 12.5mm on the sides. Not much value if your foe's primary ICVs (the ZBD04 and the Type 86) have 30mm guns. (and that's not counting all their tanks and atgms). Fully 40% of the PLAGF's 13 corps are armoured or mechanized. More and more, ICVs or cavalry vehicles carry 30mm or more - Stryker Dragoon, BMP2 and 3, BTR 90 @ 30mm; Ajax, EBRC Jaguar @ 40mm. What's worse is that as loitering munitions are developed a whole range of lighter, less expensive ones can be fielded (and which will proliferate) which will specifically target these lighter, "more agile" vehicles that everyone is turning to.

I don't know the answer to the future any more than the next guy and I'm quite certain that we need to remain on the leading edge of new weapons, equipment and doctrine BUT at the same time we need to keep a fallback "in reserve". Unlike the Americans who at least put their older but still serviceable equipment into storage at the Sierra Army Depot in the California desert when we divest it's usually gone. More importantly, many armies, including the US keep considerable amounts of the equipment needed only in times of war with reserve forces at a lower state of readiness and at significantly less annual cost. Why we won't do that utterly boggles my mind. Surely out of a $23 billion plus budget a hundred million or so could be scraped together to maintain and train on this equipment and keep the essential skills needed to operate it alive.

I think there will come a time when the Marines will kick themselves for not keeping some of their M1s "in reserve".

 

[daftandbarmy]

I can't help but think the same thing.

The problem with all of these types of restructures (as it was with ours in the 2000s) is that once you let a capability go it's hard to build it back up again if you find that you need it.

While I see a use for light and agile forces (right up to the LAV variety) they are just as susceptible to all of the modern weapon systems that everyone is touting as making "heavy metal" obsolete. The big difference is that they are also vulnerable to a whole slew of other weapon systems that "heavy metal" is still impervious to.

A case in point is the Type 16 above that is armoured against up to 25mm on the front and 12.5mm on the sides. Not much value if your foe's primary ICVs (the ZBD04 and the Type 86) have 30mm guns. (and that's not counting all their tanks and atgms). Fully 40% of the PLAGF's 13 corps are armoured or mechanized. More and more, ICVs or cavalry vehicles carry 30mm or more - Stryker Dragoon, BMP2 and 3, BTR 90 @ 30mm; Ajax, EBRC Jaguar @ 40mm. What's worse is that as loitering munitions are developed a whole range of lighter, less expensive ones can be fielded (and which will proliferate) which will specifically target these lighter, "more agile" vehicles that everyone is turning to.

I don't know the answer to the future any more than the next guy and I'm quite certain that we need to remain on the leading edge of new weapons, equipment and doctrine BUT at the same time we need to keep a fallback "in reserve". Unlike the Americans who at least put their older but still serviceable equipment into storage at the Sierra Army Depot in the California desert when we divest it's usually gone. More importantly, many armies, including the US keep considerable amounts of the equipment needed only in times of war with reserve forces at a lower state of readiness and at significantly less annual cost. Why we won't do that utterly boggles my mind. Surely out of a $23 billion plus budget a hundred million or so could be scraped together to maintain and train on this equipment and keep the essential skills needed to operate it alive.

I think there will come a time when the Marines will kick themselves for not keeping some of their M1s "in reserve".

The harder change to make will be from a mental posture and long ingrained organizational culture embracing 'frontal assault with maximum violence' to 'masters of the indirect approach'.

I think they made a movie about that once

 

[Kirkhill]

i suspect that drones will have a short field day, cheaper missiles, anti-drone drones and lasers are all coming as well, drones did well in the last few conflicts because of poor Air Defense systems, once those improved the Turks lost a number of drones and had to pull their use back. Armenia's Air Defense system although better than ours (who's isn't?) suffered because of the lack of networking, Training and complimentary systems to protect each other. This is a propaganda video but it shows you how important the Arzies took artillery as well. A robust artillery allows you to prosecute the targets you spot and gives you another tool when your drones get stopped by their drones.

Yer right Colin! It's a fad. It'll pass.

 

[Kirkhill]

Asked by The Telegraph's political editor Ben Riley-Smith whether the Government's objective should be to eradicate Covid or simply bring down cases to the lowest levels, Mr Johnson said: "I'm not sure eradication makes sense in a globalised economy."

Chief medical officer professor Chris Whitty echoed the Prime Minister, adding: "I regret to say that the chances of eradicating this disease are close to zero."

Sir Patrick Vallance, chief scientific adviser also added: "Don't expect that this thing is going to disappear.

"The chances of eradication are very close to zero, as Chris said."

Covid or Little Green Men - neither are going away. We have to learn to adjust and accommodate - like living with a low grade fever, or as a high functioning alcoholic. Or perhaps more aptly, as a gardener who can never get rid of the weeds. The global war on weeds never ends.

 

[FJAG]

Major General becomes highest ranking Army officer to be convicted at court martial for 200 years after he was found guilty of fraudulently claiming £48k to pay his children's private school fees​

• Major General Nick Welch, 57, abused Continuity of Education Allowance (CEA)
• Sent 2 of his children to the £37,000-a-year Clayesmore School and £22,500-a-year Hanford School, both in Dorset
• Maj Gen Welch lied to Army that they were living in military quarters in London
• They in fact spent most time at their Dorset home, breaching allowance rules

By JEMMA CARR FOR MAILONLINE

Major General is found guilty of fraudulently claiming nearly £50,000

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Yer right Colin! It's a fad. It'll pass.

Ha, Ha very funny, i like you, I shoot you last.....

Smaller drones will stay and fill their niche, but their effects will be blunted by counter measures, just as the tank was blunted by the AT gun/ATGM and the Uboat was blunted by long range aircraft, radar and Hedgehogs

of course that is assuming you actually buy, equip and train with the counter measures and not talk about in for the next 20 years hoping it will all go away.

 

[Kirkhill]

I see your point - but can we wait out another century for the fad to pass? Like those airplanes, tanks and subs whose time has .....?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I see your point - but can we wait out another century for the fad to pass? Like those airplanes, tanks and subs whose time has .....?

I am all for getting our own drones and counter measures as well. My WO worked on drones in the 60's, I took part in RPV trials in the 80's and underwater AUV's in the 90's. We have been talking about it since the middle of the last century so lets get some. But keep in mind the seasaw continues.

 

[blacktriangle]

I think the USMC has drunk the "Light Force koolaid" and will play that game for a decade till they realize all their opponents have oodles of artillery and light amphibious air mobile armour to kill them with.

The USMC will focus more on GBAD, LRPF, and EW capabilities, among others. This should (in theory) help them cover avenues of approach. The proposed MLR structure I saw also includes an Inf Bn.

I don't think unmanned systems are going anywhere. There are simply too many useful applications. They will proliferate across all domains, from the depths of the ocean to Earth's orbit. At the same time though, I agree that we shouldn't replace legacy capabilities until new systems and methods mature sufficiently. That's why you will see terms such as "optionally manned" or "manned-unmanned teaming" more and more. It's an evolution - much like the path towards self-driving civilian vehicles.

When you consider the work ongoing at research establishments around the world, it is shaping up to be an interesting couple of decades. I wonder how a military with roughly a dozen major surface combatants and a single tank regiment (at best?) would fair in simulation against an adversary with hypersonic swarms?

 

[Kirkhill]

Several hundred 40mm Aussie grenade/drones included in the Brits' load-out to Mali

Hand launched, UGL launched. Reusable. Video. EW. Swarming. Individual. HE. AP. AT. Flash-Bang.

British Troops Get Small Swarming Drones They Can Fire From 40mm Grenade Launchers

The tiny drones can carry various payloads, including video cameras and explosive warheads, and fly together as a swarm after launch.

www.thedrive.com

Interesting video of how Brit light troops now operates with Jackals and Foxhounds (Light Dragoons and Anglians) .... and the aforementioned Drone40