daftandbarmy
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No, not a Cold War movie...
Underwater infrastructure, not underground...
Underwater infrastructure, not underground...
British Military Current Events
- Thread starter daftandbarmy
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Halifax Tar
Army.ca Fixture
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I've been watching this... Almost like they are getting things into position
medicineman
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Would be a shame if they accidentally hit an unmarked shoal...
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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I should say so, that dressing's abominable 
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2025), which will be looking for further ways to deliver the UK’s mandated defence outputs for less. Regular Army soldier numbers should not be the only factor in deciding how the Land Force should be structured, however they do constrain what tasks and outputs the Army are instructed to achieve. And today’s small number of regular troops appears contrary to the current global instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well tension and conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. It worries the UK’s allies across NATO, but especially in the US. An independent report issued in 2024 by New Bletchley is a clear warning that the UK is running huge risks by ignoring the ever weakening capability of the British Army.
In 2021, the previous Government’s Security Defence Review (SDR) dealt an uncomfortable blow to the British Army. The Army was reduced from a regular force of some 82,000 to 72,000. Regiments became smaller and more niche in their roles. The Army reduced from two warfighting (armoured or mechanised) divisions to just one. Equipment capabilities were cut and a new era of ‘light, expeditionary and agile’ was announced. Back in 2021, this almost seemed like a plausible concept for the future Land Force to many optimists. A return to armoured warfare (i.e. the mass use of tanks and heavy artillery) anywhere in the world, let alone in Europe, appeared highly unlikely. Yet just a year later, President Putin invaded Ukraine (for the second time) and suddenly all bets were off.
Warfighting
The British Army has retained, in theory, the ability to deploy and operate as a warfighting armoured division. However, it is obvious to most in the profession that the British Army’s core capability of armoured warfare had been diluted to a point where it would be difficult to deploy now with the kind of capability that it promises to deliver. It is not just tank numbers that have ben cut in successive SDRs (which will always grab the headlines), but all the essential combat support such as armoured engineers, bridging assets, equipment support, communications and logistics that also took hit after hit, and cutback after cutback. Over the years, a catchy phrase called ‘frontline first’ has tried to cover over the cuts to all the combat support and support capabilities. It is an easy image to portray in peacetime but it falls apart very quickly when that same armoured division needs to deploy in short order, and then be sustained on combat operations for possibly many months. Given these changes and cuts to the British Army, it becomes harder to convince NATO allies, especially the US, that the British Army is still capable of deploying and operating at the sort of scale an armoured division brings with it. There is one thing worse for an army than not having a desired warfighting capability, and that is pretending that you have one. And that is where the British Army finds itself today. How did this happen? When did it happen? What caused it? And what, if anything, can be done about it?
nationalsecuritynews.com
The British Army is in serious trouble. How did this happen and what can be done about it? Guest writer Colonel (retd) Harry Fullerton OBE gives his view.
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2025), which will be looking for further ways to deliver the UK’s mandated defence outputs for less. Regular Army soldier numbers should not be the only factor in deciding how the Land Force should be structured, however they do constrain what tasks and outputs the Army are instructed to achieve. And today’s small number of regular troops appears contrary to the current global instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well tension and conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. It worries the UK’s allies across NATO, but especially in the US. An independent report issued in 2024 by New Bletchley is a clear warning that the UK is running huge risks by ignoring the ever weakening capability of the British Army.
In 2021, the previous Government’s Security Defence Review (SDR) dealt an uncomfortable blow to the British Army. The Army was reduced from a regular force of some 82,000 to 72,000. Regiments became smaller and more niche in their roles. The Army reduced from two warfighting (armoured or mechanised) divisions to just one. Equipment capabilities were cut and a new era of ‘light, expeditionary and agile’ was announced. Back in 2021, this almost seemed like a plausible concept for the future Land Force to many optimists. A return to armoured warfare (i.e. the mass use of tanks and heavy artillery) anywhere in the world, let alone in Europe, appeared highly unlikely. Yet just a year later, President Putin invaded Ukraine (for the second time) and suddenly all bets were off.
Warfighting
The British Army has retained, in theory, the ability to deploy and operate as a warfighting armoured division. However, it is obvious to most in the profession that the British Army’s core capability of armoured warfare had been diluted to a point where it would be difficult to deploy now with the kind of capability that it promises to deliver. It is not just tank numbers that have ben cut in successive SDRs (which will always grab the headlines), but all the essential combat support such as armoured engineers, bridging assets, equipment support, communications and logistics that also took hit after hit, and cutback after cutback. Over the years, a catchy phrase called ‘frontline first’ has tried to cover over the cuts to all the combat support and support capabilities. It is an easy image to portray in peacetime but it falls apart very quickly when that same armoured division needs to deploy in short order, and then be sustained on combat operations for possibly many months. Given these changes and cuts to the British Army, it becomes harder to convince NATO allies, especially the US, that the British Army is still capable of deploying and operating at the sort of scale an armoured division brings with it. There is one thing worse for an army than not having a desired warfighting capability, and that is pretending that you have one. And that is where the British Army finds itself today. How did this happen? When did it happen? What caused it? And what, if anything, can be done about it?
The British Army is in serious trouble. How did this happen and what can be done about it? Guest writer Colonel (retd) Harry Fullerton OBE gives his view. - National Security News
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence...
nationalsecuritynews.com
FJAG
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I can't help myself. Every time I see an article by a former soldier which laments the decrease in size of the regular army, I cringe. The size of the regular army has only a partial impact at the capability and staying power of an army. What needs to be included and discussed and debated just as much , if not more, is the size and equipment capability of the reserves.
A real capability assessment would look at what one can throw into the fray quickly and what one has to sustain and expand that force. By looking at the one without the other one is just PY fluffing. The Brits reserve capability is, IMHO, as bad as Canada's considering their regular to reserve ratios are worse than ours. You would think that the lessons from Ukraine should be sinking in by now.
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I should say so, that dressing's abominable
The British Army is in serious trouble. How did this happen and what can be done about it? Guest writer Colonel (retd) Harry Fullerton OBE gives his view.
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2025), which will be looking for further ways to deliver the UK’s mandated defence outputs for less. Regular Army soldier numbers should not be the only factor in deciding how the Land Force should be structured, however they do constrain what tasks and outputs the Army are instructed to achieve. And today’s small number of regular troops appears contrary to the current global instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well tension and conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. It worries the UK’s allies across NATO, but especially in the US. An independent report issued in 2024 by New Bletchley is a clear warning that the UK is running huge risks by ignoring the ever weakening capability of the British Army.
In 2021, the previous Government’s Security Defence Review (SDR) dealt an uncomfortable blow to the British Army. The Army was reduced from a regular force of some 82,000 to 72,000. Regiments became smaller and more niche in their roles. The Army reduced from two warfighting (armoured or mechanised) divisions to just one. Equipment capabilities were cut and a new era of ‘light, expeditionary and agile’ was announced. Back in 2021, this almost seemed like a plausible concept for the future Land Force to many optimists. A return to armoured warfare (i.e. the mass use of tanks and heavy artillery) anywhere in the world, let alone in Europe, appeared highly unlikely. Yet just a year later, President Putin invaded Ukraine (for the second time) and suddenly all bets were off.
Warfighting
The British Army has retained, in theory, the ability to deploy and operate as a warfighting armoured division. However, it is obvious to most in the profession that the British Army’s core capability of armoured warfare had been diluted to a point where it would be difficult to deploy now with the kind of capability that it promises to deliver. It is not just tank numbers that have ben cut in successive SDRs (which will always grab the headlines), but all the essential combat support such as armoured engineers, bridging assets, equipment support, communications and logistics that also took hit after hit, and cutback after cutback. Over the years, a catchy phrase called ‘frontline first’ has tried to cover over the cuts to all the combat support and support capabilities. It is an easy image to portray in peacetime but it falls apart very quickly when that same armoured division needs to deploy in short order, and then be sustained on combat operations for possibly many months. Given these changes and cuts to the British Army, it becomes harder to convince NATO allies, especially the US, that the British Army is still capable of deploying and operating at the sort of scale an armoured division brings with it. There is one thing worse for an army than not having a desired warfighting capability, and that is pretending that you have one. And that is where the British Army finds itself today. How did this happen? When did it happen? What caused it? And what, if anything, can be done about it?
The British Army is in serious trouble. How did this happen and what can be done about it? Guest writer Colonel (retd) Harry Fullerton OBE gives his view. - National Security News
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence...
What? No Taffs on parade?
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 1,160
I should say so, that dressing's abominable
The British Army is in serious trouble. How did this happen and what can be done about it? Guest writer Colonel (retd) Harry Fullerton OBE gives his view.
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR 2025), which will be looking for further ways to deliver the UK’s mandated defence outputs for less. Regular Army soldier numbers should not be the only factor in deciding how the Land Force should be structured, however they do constrain what tasks and outputs the Army are instructed to achieve. And today’s small number of regular troops appears contrary to the current global instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well tension and conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. It worries the UK’s allies across NATO, but especially in the US. An independent report issued in 2024 by New Bletchley is a clear warning that the UK is running huge risks by ignoring the ever weakening capability of the British Army.
In 2021, the previous Government’s Security Defence Review (SDR) dealt an uncomfortable blow to the British Army. The Army was reduced from a regular force of some 82,000 to 72,000. Regiments became smaller and more niche in their roles. The Army reduced from two warfighting (armoured or mechanised) divisions to just one. Equipment capabilities were cut and a new era of ‘light, expeditionary and agile’ was announced. Back in 2021, this almost seemed like a plausible concept for the future Land Force to many optimists. A return to armoured warfare (i.e. the mass use of tanks and heavy artillery) anywhere in the world, let alone in Europe, appeared highly unlikely. Yet just a year later, President Putin invaded Ukraine (for the second time) and suddenly all bets were off.
Warfighting
The British Army has retained, in theory, the ability to deploy and operate as a warfighting armoured division. However, it is obvious to most in the profession that the British Army’s core capability of armoured warfare had been diluted to a point where it would be difficult to deploy now with the kind of capability that it promises to deliver. It is not just tank numbers that have ben cut in successive SDRs (which will always grab the headlines), but all the essential combat support such as armoured engineers, bridging assets, equipment support, communications and logistics that also took hit after hit, and cutback after cutback. Over the years, a catchy phrase called ‘frontline first’ has tried to cover over the cuts to all the combat support and support capabilities. It is an easy image to portray in peacetime but it falls apart very quickly when that same armoured division needs to deploy in short order, and then be sustained on combat operations for possibly many months. Given these changes and cuts to the British Army, it becomes harder to convince NATO allies, especially the US, that the British Army is still capable of deploying and operating at the sort of scale an armoured division brings with it. There is one thing worse for an army than not having a desired warfighting capability, and that is pretending that you have one. And that is where the British Army finds itself today. How did this happen? When did it happen? What caused it? And what, if anything, can be done about it?
The British Army is in serious trouble. How did this happen and what can be done about it? Guest writer Colonel (retd) Harry Fullerton OBE gives his view. - National Security News
The British Army’s regular force now stands at a mere 72,000 soldiers, the smallest it has been since the mid-Eighteenth Century. Whilst it is still a much respected organisation that continues to deliver incredible outputs, it must now contend with the new Labour Government’s Strategic Defence...
35 years of Canadian politicians (and soldiers?) thinking well if the Brits can get away with it so can we!. Worse when they hire the same consultants.
Having said that the two week war concept was a Cold War nuclear plan - and thus the lack of factories for energetics, shells, barrels, cannons and missiles. Don't worry about planes. Or ships for that matter. We can work around them.
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