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British Military Current Events

More mea culpas...



please keep anon mate. I served as a REME inspector on the Ajax acceptance and testing team, where my primary role was to inspect all variants of the Ajax vehicles at Merthyr Tydfil in partnership with General Dynamics. Unfortunately, the vehicles consistently arrived in a poor state, and our inspections uncovered a long list of serious faults. Over 150 faults is accurate, and if anything is slightly an understatement. There are many usage limits on the platform, many of which get disregarded by CoC in order to "test" the vehicles to a standard required to meet IOC. How can a vehicle with usage limitations be classed as IOC is beyond my understanding.. The culture was always to just pass the vehicles regardless of what faults were found. We would have a very strict standard, and we would inspect and fail to that standard. Return to work on the following Monday and suddenly that standard has gone from the document and we are advised to use our judgement rather than a set criteria. I am ashamed of my time there, as I honestly felt that I could have done more to stop it. On top of that I have to live with a guilt that I was once a part of the cogs that was trying to bring this platform into service, and I failed at persuading the CoC to follow through on safety concerns.
I really hope they cancel the project. Maybe then I will have a good night sleep thats not haunted by ajax..

Some more
Please keep anon. The issues that are coming out for AJAX are the tip of the iceberg, the list is endless. The PXR delivered by a unit on scorpion cyclone highlighted so much that has been ignored. And I’m only listening a few issues.
  • The vehicle batteries cannot sustain the vehicle for general use and the APU that is fitted to the AJAX variant is so prone to failing that units are stopping troops from using them. The COA for this is to carry a manpack on exercise to avoid the need of running the vehicle up, but this also effects training, with students not being able to receive full lessons.
  • There are no cam nets or thermal sheets designed for AJAX, we use AS90 cam nets that we cut to fit in the bin because its too big. We cant hide the thermal signature on the vehicle or hide it effectively enough to survive any kind of enemy searching for us.
  • Fuel tanks are failing, which means crews need to use the fuel pump in the CES to move fuel around and between vehicles. Whilst we talk about fuel tanks, its fair to mention that we mock the Russians for having fuel tanks on the rear doors, and yet we have made the same mistake.
  • The technical document is over 20k pages which is essentially needs a course to navigate. The CES schedule is multiple pages of army jargon and GD numbers that troops are struggling to decipher and I would argue that most people cannot accurately account for their kit because of this.
  • The L-specs used by instructors are a copy and paste mess from other vehicles, which leads to dangerous confusion in lessons, such as instructing a user to carry out GPMG drills on a HMG, and despite it being flagged, it remains in the L-spec.
  • When a stoppage occurs in the 40mm cannon, a 30 minute wait period is enforced on the vehicle by the system, this also stops the chain gun from being used because it lacks any mechanical means of firing. The obvious solution to this would have been to fit a L37 so that during a stoppage the COAX can still be fired and any faults/damages can be rectified at crew level and would give crews a dismountable GPMG for sentries.
  • Fuel… the vehicle is unsuitable by even a challenger 2 G4 chain. A squadron used 15000L of fuel in 35 hours if movement across 27 vehicles. The vehicles use approx 16L of fuel an hour, and with a tank of 795L, we will get 50hours of movement before empty. This is a vehicle designed to be used as a DEEP recce vehicle, and it cant even be sustained with POL by its G4 chain.
  • Recently ATDU was given the task of proving an AJAX can go from factory to the ranges and fire. To start with they couldn’t grease the tracks because the grease gun wouldn’t work, so they used a warrior grease gun (GD has now reinvented this and created their own worser version). next came the comms check, and the crews found that the internal wiring was incorrect and kit was missing or broken which had to be salvaged from other vehicles. The next hurdle was boresighting the vehicle which required someone from GD to come and do for the crews. In the end out of 4 vehicles, only 1 fired 10 rounds.
  • The vibration issues are worse than people realise. I challenge anyone to get in the back of a ARES and survive 30 minutes cross country. The same for AJAX when crews are hatch down. Crews have reported watching cables unscrewing while the vehicle is running. GD and the MOD’s solution is rubber tracks… AJAX is designed to be crewed by 3 people, and they expect them to be capable of replacing a rubber track without bringing other troops in to help, so that they don’t highlight their position.
  • GD has realised they are in the red with AJAX and will recoup their losses via spares on the vehicle. An ares dented a back bin, which required a replacement that cost £90k +, because they decided they would only replace the entire unit, including lights and cameras, despite them being perfectly fine.
  • Lets talk about train as you fight. Unlike during training, the CES cannot be carried by the vehicle when fitted with its war fighting armour, which means it will need to be added to the growing G4 packet following on behind troops, alongside the crates of locktite that EVERY nut on the vehicle requires before fitting.
These issues have been raised at every level, and they have been ignored. Regimental CoC have been told, brigade commanders have been informed, we even informed the GCGS team when they visited. They don’t care, and its clear that people are prioritising potential careers with GD than the MOD and the effect their negligence has on the troops they are dumping AJAX onto. I watched a vehicle nearly burn down when the crew crawled it back into camp because GD failed with mount the engine correctly and yet the crew was still blamed for the damage.
The reality is, CVRT and warrior should have been upgraded to meet modern threats and come in line with equivalent vehicles. Someone decided that we need to move away from the “CVRT mentality” and that the CT40 and new turret cannot be fitted to warrior in a cost effective manner.
 
Yet another victim of the dreaded Scope Creep...

Insider says only hull redesign can save British Ajax​


The source argues the roots of the failure run deep. From the outset, the Army issued “over 1,000 separate system requirements” in the RFP, producing a programme whose scope far exceeded the capabilities of the ASCOD platform on which Ajax was based. In an effort to accelerate schedules, “the usual Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacturing, In-Service, Disposal (CADMID) acquisition process used by the UK Ministry of Defence was condensed so that the Demonstration and Manufacturing phases were combined.” Production began before a final specification had been agreed.

After signing the contract, the Army revised its requirements. The insider said the service demanded higher protection levels, pushing the weight from the original 19-tonne ASCOD design to “36 tonnes” in base configuration and “43 tonnes” with appliqué armour. “From the outside looking in, it appears that ‘scope creep’ resulted in a vehicle that exceeded the capacity of the ASCOD platform on which Ajax was based,” the source said.
https://defence-blog.com/category/security/
The insider believes the only realistic technical fix would require deep structural changes. “The Commander of the Armoured Trials & Development Unit (ATDU) told his superiors in 2020 that the only way to fix Ajax was to redesign the hull (including the engine mountings) and the running gear. He also suggested adopting Horstman’s hydro-pneumatic suspension and composite rubber tracks.” The Army did not pursue this option.



Condensed CADMID .... succesfully gone direct from concept to disposal.
 
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