British / US Blue on Blue Incident - Merged

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think that the A-10 has always belonged to the USAF, but I could be wrong.  The US Army owns very little in the way of "fixed wing."   

With regards to Harriers, we had UK Harriers (GR7s?) providing CAS overseas, along with USAF B1s, A-10s and some other systems.  By CAS I mean providing effects in support of troops in contact on the ground.  Those effects are usually in the form of bombs (JDAMs, Laser guided or otherwise), rockets, missiles or cannons but can also be non-kinetic (show of force).  The JDAM has changed the rules of the game somewhat.  I don't know if we called AH-64s "CAS", but they were a part of the picture as well.  All were effective, although each had its strengths and drawbacks.

My own thoughts are that friendly fire can happen with any technology, system or level of training.  This is especially true with aircraft, but it can also happen with ground forces.  Ground controllers for air strikes can certainly help, but that doesn't take away the chance. 

Vigourous efforts should still be made to reduce the likelihood of fratricide, but we should be realistic.  When you mix nationalities it can get even trickier.  Mixed nationalities and services can also make the reaction to the incident more strong.

One thing to consider is that placing too many restrictions on enablers such as CAS can in turn lead to more casualties due to enemy action.

Cheers

Red Five

 

[geo]

Just did my homework.... after the fact
A10 is a USAF product. 
The first production A-10 flew in October 1975, and deliveries to the Air Force commenced in March 1976. The first squadron to use the A-10 went operational in October 1977. In total, 715 aircraft were produced, the last in 1984... and Gulf war 1 happened in 1991.

 

[3rd Herd]

Geo:

"Because few of the high-speed fighters are forward deployed, they must orbit in preplanned locations, awaiting missions from ground commanders. The A-10 is forward deployed to Iraq at several locations but has relatively short loiter capability over a convoy or fixed location; furthermore, we must use many of these aircraft to provide necessary coverage during refueling. The A-10 is designed to provide CAS and convoy escort, but its slow speed, vulnerability to ground fire, and few numbers limit the aircraft to night time only missions of high priority."(Davis)

"The United States faces an enemy who avoids US strengths by utilizing lesser technology and asymmetric tactics. Only by turning to a propeller-driven CAS platform that can support the Army in its current mission will our country gain the upper hand." The author goes onto suggest an off the shelf aircraft such as the "T-6 Texan II, or something similar, might be a good start."(Davis) However, "The Air Force plans to replace the A-10 with the multi purpose F-35A and F-35B in the next 10 to 15 years When this happens there will be no dedicated aircraft designed to conduct." Contining Deyo argues" With the F-35A/B aircraft designated to replace the A-10, the Air Force risks repeating its history of trying to fill the CAS void with a multi-purpose aircraft. The danger of this is that the pilots of these new aircraft will not train sufficiently for CAS and the Air Force will once again be unprepared to provide CAS to the joint forces."(Deyo)

As for case studies in supporting his thesis Davis uses two; Vietnam and the Spad and one overlooked by us all the French and Algeria. Some interesting tactical innovations in the French campaign included the "use of forward-operating locations, often along the route of march,to rearm and refuel their aircraft so that a convoy would always have access to some form of on-hand air support." And that "tactical air command maintained centralized control to some extent, but execution remained extremely decentralized, allowing the ground commander to adjust to mission needs and keep aviation support on hand." In the realm of doctrine Dayo points out in regard to the branches of service in the United States, "unlike the other service’s tactical aviation, Marine aviation existed primarily for providing CAS to their ground forces." In the debate of accurate support or wide spread suppression based in the affair in Somalia, "The ground commanders were left to perform a mission without the required support because the political leadership was afraid of how the images of the resulting military action would appear on the news."(Deyo)

A very interesting critique involving Operation Acconda is summarized, "CAS can provide a distinct advantage to a commander if used effectively. The effective use of CAS requires many elements to function correctly. One element is that doctrine must be followed when establishing command and control of CAS assets. Another element is the understanding commanders and planners must have of CAS effects and limitations. The last element is training. Many of the problems encountered in Anaconda could have been overcome with regular joint training of both ground and air components. Air Force and Army units get minimal joint training opportunities."(Deyo) Recommendations in the report compiled by Deyo are as follows; "the first recommendation for change is the Air Force must make CAS a higher priority, second recommendation is for the Army and the Air Force to make greater efforts to include CAS into its large force exercises, is to include a detachment of Air Force fighter aircraft in an Army UA when it deploys, lastly, failing to implement the previous recommendations, that the CAS mission should belong to one service."

In a three person study conducted by GruetzmacherJeffrey K. CDR, USN.,Holtery,Michelle Joerin.LTC , USA and Putney, Jonathan R. Maj., USAF it was found, "Should the U.S. military continue to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism with existing CAS doctrine and JTTP, additional fratricide will have a negative impact on the American will to fight. To reduce that potential, USJFCOM must take action by expanding joint doctrine and JTTP." Justifying that "Even one more friendly fire casualty due to faulty targeting is too high a price to pay when the solution to the problem appears to be readily at hand." (one of my major points) "While the use of precision-guided munitions is increasing, problems in close air support persist. Experienced pilots and ground controllers say this is largely due to insufficient training, inadequate communications and night vision gear, and outdated tactics and doctrine…. In an interim report in October 2000, the Joint Close Air Support Study reported that in 22 exercise battles involving 218 close air support missions, there were major problems in planning, coordination, training, and equipment…. Fewer than half of all ground-control teams conducted realistic training with ground troops present"

Source:



Source:
DAVIS, ARTHUR D."Back to the Basics An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgent Warfare", Air University Press: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, December 2005.

Deyo, Matthew S. BREAKING THE PARADIGM: THE CHALLENGE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT".JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL. May 2005

CDR Jeffrey K. Gruetzmacher, USN, LTC Michelle Joerin Holtery, USA, Maj Jonathan R. Putney, USAF
FRATRICIDE: THE ULTIMATE COST OF JOINT INTEROPERABILITY FAILURE, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School. 11 June 2002

Edit to add: I found a information pathway into the Defense Techinical Information Center: http://stinet.dtic.mil/

 

[Blackadder1916]

http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-03-16T151815Z_01_L16613309_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-IRAQ-BRITAIN-INQUEST-COL.XML

Iraq Friendly Fire Death Unlawful: UK Coroner

By Peter Graff  Fri Mar 16, 2007 11:18 AM EDT

LONDON (Reuters) - A British coroner ruled on Friday that a U.S. friendly fire air strike that killed a British soldier was "criminal," a scathing verdict in a case that has exposed rifts between the Iraq allies.

A U.S. A-10 tankbuster attack plane killed Lance Corporal Matty Hull by firing on his convoy near Basra in the first week of the 2003 invasion, after the American pilots mistook the British convoy for Iraqis.

Washington has said its own investigation into the incident exonerated the pilots, while an earlier British military probe concluded "procedures were not followed" because the planes opened fire without seeking clearance from ground controllers.

Coroner Andrew Walker called the incident a crime.

"The attack on the convoy amounted to an assault. It was unlawful because there was no lawful reason for it and in that respect it was criminal," he said.

He said the planes were not in danger and the incident could not therefore be justified as self-defense.

The case has been covered extensively in British media, where the issue of friendly fire deaths has been a vivid one since the first Gulf War in 1991 when another U.S. A-10 killed nine British soldiers in a mistaken attack.

British commentators said Hull's death -- and the Pentagon's insistence that no one was to blame -- demonstrated that rules for U.S. pilots allow them to be more gung-ho than their British comrades, and a potential menace to allies and civilians.

Washington does not publish the "rules of engagement" that explain when its forces can fire, but strongly denies they behave irresponsibly.

REMORSE
In a cockpit video, the U.S. pilots are repeatedly told there are no friendly vehicles in the area and can be heard convincing themselves that orange panels -- meant to mark the British vehicles as friendly -- were in fact orange Iraqi rocket launchers. They then open fire without seeking permission.

The coroner and Hull's family also repeatedly accused Washington of trying to hide details from the inquest. At one point Walker suspended the inquest when Washington refused to allow him to see the cockpit video.

The inquest resumed after a British newspaper leaked the video, and Washington later said the coroner could see it. But parts of the transcript of the U.S. probe remained blacked out.

Hull's widow said she did not want criminal or disciplinary action to be taken against the American pilots.

"I hope that they are at peace with themselves and they can move on in their lives," Susan Hull told reporters. "I'm sure that they are feeling remorse for what they did."

The Ministry of Defense said in a statement it was carefully considering the coroner's comments and apologized for the "confusion and upset" caused over the handling of the video.

Susan Hull said the lack of cooperation from the United States throughout the trial had been "very disappointing."

No American witnesses gave evidence.

But the video footage -- which was played out on television -- gave a graphic account of the incident. One of the pilots could be heard weeping after they realized what they had done.

"We're in jail, dude," one of them says.

(Additional reporting by Michael Holden, Paul Hughes and Katherine Baldwin)