Building Better Officers (merged)

[Haggis]

I find Generals are too often the most self serving careerist douchebags imaginable. Too much politics, PR and taking credit for others work and not enough character.

I disagree.  And I daresay that I deal with more Generals on a daily basis than you do. There are some incredibly talented, astute and intelligent General and Flag Officers in the CF today.  There are also some numptys - just like any other large organization - but, in my experience, they are becoming fewer and farther between.

 

[Towards_the_gap]

I've long said that the CF suffers from over supervision from the top down, right to the recruit level. No one is allowed to make an error in training, and we all know the best lessons come from failure, not success. It irks me to see a WO, a Sgt and a MCpl watch a Cpl/Pte and all offering suggestions on how he could do it better. Give the kid the task, explain what you want, the limitations  and get out of he way.  Let him figure out the "how".

I imagine it is the same at higher levels except its much more polite....

+1 on this one.

The real problem I suspect is fear of failure, at all levels. And an inability to really critically examine our shortcomings. Ever see a Maple Leaf article which states ' Exercise reveals major problems'??? No, it's like reading Pravda sometimes. Which of course is why I do not read it.

 

[Robert0288]

There are some incredibly talented, astue and intelligent General and Flag Officers in the CF today.

I've spoken with more than a few while working civy side.  And from what I've seen, the above statement is fairly accurate.

 

[Dissident]

The real problem I suspect is fear of failure, at all levels. And an inability to really critically examine our shortcomings.

ALLE-FUCKING-LUIA

As someone who has come a long way because I had to (and still do) take a good long hard honest look at myself, it is absolutely frustrating to see people living in denial.  Lets make mistakes, let subordinates make mistakes, be honest (but tactful) with superiors when they make mistakes.

 

[Blackadder1916]

As this thread has veered from the specifics of one individual's peccadillos to a wider discussion of military leadership, it is inevitable that someone must mention ""Where, oh where have all the Tigers gone".  It has been, after all, the lament of Canadian officers for nearly forty years. 

. . . . .
What preoccupies me is the suspicion, confirmed by one experience as a member of a promotional board, that the higher-rated officers are the earnest, colourless young men whose chief virtue is technical diligence; who never express boisterous exuberance in the mess; whose manners and social conduct are impeccable; and who always accord their seniors (and their seniors' wives, of course) the proper degree of reverence. There seems to be a concerted effort to prevent the advancement of any young officer who deviates from the nice, neat, grey middle ground. In other words, the road to flattering PERs, and to promotion, seems to be open primarily to those who do not  “rock the boat". I find it hard to reconcile this approach to officer development with my own experience. It has always seemed to me that those people with the greatest lust for life are the ones most likely to attempt, in defiance of all logic, to achieve the "impossible" goal.
. . . . .

While it was often in reflection on the quality of young subbies following an uneventful mess dinner that did not result in any "extras", it can equally be applied to (now grown up) senior leadership.  Though there is a new generation of young officers who have been blooded in battle and performed well, Colonel Nicholson’s timeless article (to my understanding) was more about the growing tendency (that he noticed back then) to approach a military career in the same manner as one would in scaling the corporate (or public service) ladder.  Credentials seemed to be more important than competence, and there was often as much effort put into ensuring an unblemished record as there was in learning the craft.

. . . . . . . When he, McNamara, returned to Washington, as SecDef, he had a fully formed idea that a "systems approach" to management should and could work on the US defence-industrial base and, perhaps, even deeper in the military itself. He was right on the former idea, wrong on the latter - but it's not fair to blame McNamara for the systematic errors made inside the US military: generals and admirals were fascinated by his ideas, in part, at least, because the very notion of systemization seemed to promise less risk and "more bang for the buck," (one of the watchwords of operational research, but usually called utility in that domain).  . . . . .

While initial acceptance of "systemization" by the generals and admirals may have been based on its promise of "less risk", my belief is that its entrenchment in (and effect on) the personality of many military leaders is also due to the constant measurement of everything.  More so in the US military than the CF (though I fear that that we have drunk the cool-aid) nearly all aspects (including advancement) of an officer’s career is predicated on meeting certain benchmarks, the measurement of which is often unrelated to military success.

 

[Old Sweat]

As one who had the honour and the pleasure of working for Colonel "Nick" for three years when he commanded the Combat Arms School, I can attest that he practiced what he preached. He also would come down very hard on people who abused students for the sake of instilling discipline - he called it mindless bullsh.t. Nick also was capable of coming very close to the line. When he was CO of the Recce Sqn in 4 Brigade he was ordered by the commander to attend a reception in the mess for a fairly senior German general. During the war Nick had been a trooper in the 12th Manitoba Dragoons, which was the 2nd Canadian Corps Armoured Car Regiment. He did not like socializing with German officers of the same vintage all that much and protested and was ordered to attend. He was duly introduced to Herr General who said something like "Nicholson, Nicholson. Haff ve ever met?" Nick replied "I don't think so, oh wait, I didn't recognize you without your hands up."

 

[FJAG]

:goodpost:

 

[q_1966]

As one who had the honour and the pleasure of working for Colonel "Nick" for three years when he commanded the Combat Arms School, I can attest that he practiced what he preached. He also would come down very hard on people who abused students for the sake of instilling discipline - he called it mindless bullsh.t. Nick also was capable of coming very close to the line. When he was CO of the Recce Sqn in 4 Brigade he was ordered by the commander to attend a reception in the mess for a fairly senior German general. During the war Nick had been a trooper in the 12th Manitoba Dragoons, which was the 2nd Canadian Corps Armoured Car Regiment. He did not like socializing with German officers of the same vintage all that much and protested and was ordered to attend. He was duly introduced to Herr General who said something like "Nicholson, Nicholson. Haff ve ever met?" Nick replied "I don't think so, oh wait, I didn't recognize you without your hands up."

That made my night

 

[BeyondTheNow]

This question is only slightly related to the initial paragraph of this article, which made me wonder if there are any similar feelings among the Canadian Forces regarding this particular line, “...Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished..."

I have no military experience. The closest thing I do have is a few relatives who served, a few acquaintances who are serving members and a brother who was ResF for 10+ years.  I'm just curious if the general consensus is that the CF recognizes its officers/NCMs in a timely manner for exceptional work either in combat or otherwise? On the flip side, are disciplinary measures enforced readily and in equal measure? (i.e. 'x' action will equal 'x' result in all instances). I'm just trying to gain a greater understanding of the overall environment. To clarify, I'm not the type of person who expects a, "Gee, great job, Jonny! You just earned yourself a raise and a beer with the boys!" and a pat on the back for simply doing what was expected.  I'd just like anyone's personal perspective on the subject.  (Please let me know if this topic has been discussed in other threads.)

 

[The Anti-Royal]

Shared with the usual caveats:

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_BuildingBetterGenerals_0.pdf

I must admit that I've only skimmed the paper, but found the notion of "tracking" officers to either operational or enterprise appointments an intriguing one.

 

[The Bread Guy]

I must admit that I've only skimmed the paper, but found the notion of "tracking" officers to either operational or enterprise appointments an intriguing one.

I just skimmed the exec summary, and wonder what happens if you get a "warfighter" who knows little/nothing about institutions, or an "institutional" person who knows little/nothing about war fighting, at the very top of the military pyramid where they'd have to deal with both.

 

[The Anti-Royal]

I suppose you get a general officer who's insufficiently "general".

 

[FJAG]

This type of proposal makes its way in and out of military command philosophy on a cyclical basis.

The problem is that people just don't live enough to gather all the training and experience necessary to be all-singing, all-dancing senior leaders.

After a dozen years of anti-terrorism warfare, a developing, outward looking China, and a resurging Russia, are we in a situation where we need to seriously address our roles, missions and methods? Hell, yes.

In an environment where there is limited time to develop senior leaders in all the ever expanding complexity of their jobs do we need to address how best to do this? Hell, yes again.

Do we need to create flag officer career silos? Hell, no.

If one creates two classes of officers (operational and enterprise), regardless of what rank level you start at, you will create two groups whose practical experience in the other class approaches zero. At best the result will be distrust and inefficiency; at worse chaos.

It's interesting to recall that Eisenhower never commanded anything bigger than a battalion before he was made Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations although he held numerous significant staff jobs. Under the proposed system he could easily have been shunted into the "enterprise" stream and never received operational command.

If we need CEO-like skills for certain areas of expertise then that can be provided through properly trained civil servants or the senior leadership of military administrative branches or other solutions short of the authors' recommendations. In many ways senior leaders are already "streamed" into appropriate education and experience positions but without the rigidity called for here.

Sorry, but this whole article strikes me as a "publish or perish" paper written to justify the funding grants that CNAS receives. Regretfully CNAS, while a young organization, seems to be listened to in high places (read the White House)

I hope that what appears to me as a fad hitting the top of the reinventing the wheel cycle doesn't become a policy set in stone.  :2c:

:cheers:

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

This type of proposal makes its way in and out of military command philosophy on a cyclical basis.

The problem is that people just don't live enough to gather all the training and experience necessary to be all-singing, all-dancing senior leaders.

After a dozen years of anti-terrorism warfare, a developing, outward looking China, and a resurging Russia, are we in a situation where we need to seriously address our roles, missions and methods? Hell, yes.

In an environment where there is limited time to develop senior leaders in all the ever expanding complexity of their jobs do we need to address how best to do this? Hell, yes again.

Do we need to create flag officer career silos? Hell, no.

If one creates two classes of officers (operational and enterprise), regardless of what rank level you start at, you will create two groups whose practical experience in the other class approaches zero. At best the result will be distrust and inefficiency; at worse chaos.

It's interesting to recall that Eisenhower never commanded anything bigger than a battalion before he was made Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations although he held numerous significant staff jobs. Under the proposed system he could easily have been shunted into the "enterprise" stream and never received operational command.

If we need CEO-like skills for certain areas of expertise then that can be provided through properly trained civil servants or the senior leadership of military administrative branches or other solutions short of the authors' recommendations. In many ways senior leaders are already "streamed" into appropriate education and experience positions but without the rigidity called for here.

Sorry, but this whole article strikes me as a "publish or perish" paper written to justify the funding grants that CNAS receives. Regretfully CNAS, while a young organization, seems to be listened to in high places (read the White House)

I hope that what appears to me as a fad hitting the top of the reinventing the wheel cycle doesn't become a policy set in stone.  :2c:

:cheers:

:goodpost:

Many people who comment on what we "need our generals to be" have little to no clue on what a general officer actually does.  Generals are by definition "Generalists" and they need to have a breadth of experience across a cross-section of areas so that they are able to make "informed" decisions.  Btw we already have streaming systems in place to make Generals and Formation CWO's, they just are invisible to most people within the organization.

edit:  Just skimmed the paper, it is a bunch of mumbo-jumbo.... goes on about how our Generals haven't been given enough time to adequately develop their strategic thinking ability through education.... My Answer:  "Earth to Johnny!  We have been fighting a war for the past 12 years where the heck have you been!"

Talks about managing an "increasingly volatile international security environment".... In what sense?  The wars we just fought are winding down, defense budgets are being slashed and the "security situation" is probably the best its been.... ehhh ever  :

Sorry, but this whole article strikes me as a "publish or perish" paper written to justify the funding grants that CNAS receives. Regretfully CNAS, while a young organization, seems to be listened to in high places (read the White House)

Couldn't agree more

 

[jollyjacktar]

But have we been fighting what will be the last war and not our next one?  As is one of the common complaints on a militaries focus.  And, those senior commanders who saw us through the last 12 years.  How many will be left in a couple of years time?

Do we generally (pardon the pun) get enough experience at the coal face for those who will be our next commanders?  It's not like we're operationally busy as the Yanks are on a regular basis.  Won't we always be doomed to learn on the fly as the war arises as has been our experience these past say 125 years or so?

 

[pbi]

Still not finished this piece, but my initial comments:

-Gen (Retd) David Barno is not really somebody who has

little to no clue on what a general officer actually does.

. He was the overall US Comd in Afghanistan (CFC-A) when I was there in 04-05, so he does have at least a modicum of operational experience (and thus IMHO should know better);

-I agree completely with FJAG that this type of thinking is both cyclical, and IMHO typically US. It's cyclical because every so often we realize that our officers aren't being educated or trained (or both) properly for what we think they should be capable of doing. On our side, you can go back to the Rowley Report of 1969, and lots of stuff out of CDA and other places since. Its typically American, because it proposes yet another "systems" approach to solving an essentially human or social problem, which may actually not have a real "solution". It reminds me of Macnamara's idea of dividing the US Army into a "Support Army" and a "Field Army" (I'm paraphrasing here...), which IMHO was an equally unsound idea; and

-a "general officer", as Royal Drew points out, is exactly that: a generalist. If you look at the most successful general officers in history, you will probably find that very little of their success had to do with any particular aspect of their officer career development process, or their specific knowledge of anything, and much more to do with their character, mental flexibility and decision making skills. This is much the same for CEOs and for senior level public servants. Look at Arthur Currie or Bert Hoffmeister: what "officer career development process" did either of them go through? (They may be limited examples because they were both war fighting generals and not institutional generals, but I think they illustrate the point...)

I would not want to see a CCA who had no operational experience, any more than I would want to see one who had no concept of how to manage the institutional aspects of the CA, either. I spent much of the first two thirds of my military career serving under GOFOs who were all about the "institutional" side (because that's what our system produced) but whose last operational experience was maybe as CO in Cyprus (if they were lucky...). The results were usually uninspiring and sometimes hideous. "Streaming" is IMHO an almost certain guarantee of this kind of outcome.

And please don't try to use the "German example" of the General Staff Officer class to justify the sort of idea proposed in the paper: the German system was designed to produce well-rounded and capable officers who could be both effective commanders and very good senior staff officers: it was not "either/or".

The Americans already have a pretty damned good PME system(I'm a graduate of part of it): IMHO what happened is that the massive pressures of two wars, combined with all the other extant demands on the US military, caused a focus away from PME as a "luxury" and onto operational duty. The system is fine if is allowed to work properly.

 

[FJAG]

But have we been fighting what will be the last war and not our next one?  As is one of the common complaints on a militaries focus.  And, those senior commanders who saw us through the last 12 years.  How many will be left in a couple of years time?

Do we generally (pardon the pun) get enough experience at the coal face for those who will be our next commanders?  It's not like we're operationally busy as the Yanks are on a regular basis.  Won't we always be doomed to learn on the fly as the war arises as has been our experience these past say 125 years or so?

I think this is a general (also pardon the pun) problem.

If you think about it the US officer corps that existed during the 80s and 90s had their experience in Vietnam, a specialised and often counter-productive, experience for the Cold War army (including Korea). Those who led in the two Gulf wars and Afghanistan got their experience (what there was of it) in Grenada, Panama and Somalia as well as the then disintegrating Cold War army. Again nothing that really prepared them for the next event.

Canadian officer development experiences prior to Afghanistan were decade after decade of blue beret peacekeeping, a little Somalia and a lot of book-learning. We seemed to muddle through okay.

I sometimes think that the only army that ever really trained for the war they were fighting next were the Romans.  ;D

:cheers:

 

[GAP]

I suspect that the Israeli's are probably closest to training for the next war.....they know they are going to have one periodically....

 

[tomahawk6]

Selection for general officer in the US and perhaps most others is who do you know and if you have checked the right boxes.To be selected for BG you have to have had a brigade command as a Colonel.You have to have graduated from a war college and you have to have had Joint Staff experience.It helps to have been an Executive Officer for a General.Generals tend to select officers that mirror themselves.In some cases they may have served with one or more Board members.

 

[daftandbarmy]

A Letter from General George S. Patton to His Son

On June 6, 1944, General George S. Patton wrote this letter to his twenty-year-old son, George Jr., who was enrolled at West Point. Patton Sr. was in England training the Third Army in preparation for the battles that would follow the invasion at Normandy.

Note: The letter’s grammar and spelling have been slightly edited for clarity.

APO 403, N.Y.

“D-Day”

Dear George:

At 0700 this morning the BBC announced that the German Radio had just come out with an announcement of the landing of Allied Paratroops and of large numbers of assault craft near shore. So that is it.

This group of unconquerable heroes whom I command are not in yet but we will be soon—I wish I was there now as it is a lovely sunny day for a battle and I am fed up with just sitting.

I have no immediate idea of being killed but one can never tell and none of us can live forever, so if I should go don’t worry but set yourself to do better than I have.

All men are timid on entering any fight; whether it is the first fight or the last fight all of us are timid. Cowards are those who let their timidity get the better of their manhood. You will never do that because of your blood lines on both sides. I think I have told you the story of Marshall Touraine who fought under Louis XIV. On the morning of one of his last battles—he had been fighting for forty years—he was mounting his horse when a young ADC [aide-de-camp] who had just come from the court and had never missed a meal or heard a hostile shot said: “M. de Touraine it amazes me that a man of your supposed courage should permit his knees to tremble as he walks out to mount.” Touraine replied “My lord duke I admit that my knees do tremble but should they know where I shall this day take them they would shake even more.” That is it. Your knees may shake but they will always take you towards the enemy. Well so much for that.

There are apparently two types of successful soldiers. Those who get on by being unobtrusive and those who get on by being obtrusive. I am of the latter type and seem to be rare and unpopular: but it is my method. One has to choose a system and stick to it; people who are not themselves are nobody.

To be a successful soldier you must know history. Read it objectively–dates and even the minute details of tactics are useless. What you must know is how man reacts. Weapons change but man who uses them changes not at all. To win battles you do not beat weapons–you beat the soul of man of the enemy man. To do that you have to destroy his weapons, but that is only incidental. You must read biography and especially autobiography. If you will do it you will find that war is simple. Decide what will hurt the enemy most within the limits of your capabilities to harm him and then do it. TAKE CALCULATED RISKS. That is quite different from being rash. My personal belief is that if you have a 50% chance take it because the superior fighting qualities of American soldiers lead by me will surely give you the extra 1% necessary.

In Sicily I decided as a result of my information, observations and a sixth sense that I have that the enemy did not have another large scale attack in his system. I bet my shirt on that and I was right. You cannot make war safely but no dead general has ever been criticised so you have that way out always.

I am sure that if every leader who goes into battle will promise himself that he will come out either a conqueror or a corpse he is sure to win. There is no doubt of that. Defeat is not due to losses but to the destruction of the soul of the leaders. The “Live to fight another day” doctrine.

The most vital quality a soldier can possess is SELF CONFIDENCE–utter, complete and bumptious. You can have doubts about your good looks, about your intelligence, about your self control but to win in war you must have NO doubts about your ability as a soldier.

What success I have had results from the fact that I have always been certain that my military reactions were correct. Many people do not agree with me; they are wrong. The unerring jury of history written long after both of us are dead will prove me correct.

Note that I speak of “Military reactions”–no one is borne with them any more than anyone is borne with muscles. You can be born with the soul capable of correct military reactions or the body capable of having big muscles, but both qualities must be developed by hard work.

The intensity of your desire to acquire any special ability depends on character, on ambition. I think that your decision to study this summer instead of enjoying yourself shows that you have character and ambition—they are wonderful possessions.

Soldiers, all men in fact, are natural hero worshipers. Officers with a flare for command realise this and emphasize in their conduct, dress and deportment the qualities they seek to produce in their men. When I was a second lieutenant I had a captain who was very sloppy and usually late yet he got after the men for just those faults; he was a failure.

The troops I have commanded have always been well dressed, been smart saluters, been prompt and bold in action because I have personally set the example in these qualities. The influence one man can have on thousands is a never-ending source of wonder to me. You are always on parade. Officers who through laziness or a foolish desire to be popular fail to enforce discipline and the proper wearing of uniforms and equipment not in the presence of the enemy will also fail in battle, and if they fail in battle they are potential murderers. There is no such thing as: “A good field soldier:” you are either a good soldier or a bad soldier.

Well this has been quite a sermon but don’t get the idea that it is my swan song because it is not–I have not finished my job yet.

Your affectionate father.

http://www.artofmanliness.com/2011/08/21/manvotional-a-letter-from-general-george-s-patton-to-his-son/