C3 Howitzer Replacement

[FJAG]

There needs to be a reckoning of "what types of units can be what distances from bases that provide training areas and support". That, in turn, means units in some locations will have to be re-roled. Never assume the current laydown is optimal.

I go back to my 2 RCHA days where F Bty maintained a complete C1 battery in Petawawa which ResF units from all over Ontario came to use. They'd board a bus at their armouries, sign for the kit on the 2HA parade square and do a night deployment with rounds down range at first light.

Quebec units are even closer to Valcartier.

M109 Paladin's have a cab training simulator where all the complex tasks can be taught. Driver training can easily be done at smaller training facilities.

ResF units do not live fire that much. Most do two a year and a summer concentration. Most everything else can be done locally. One doesn't need to modify armory doorways. Most don't have a floor stressed to take that much weight easily - but they all have parking lots. More importantly, only a few units need large guns anyway. Half the artillery uses lighter guns like M777s and LG1s and could easily handle STA and and OWUAV systems.

Let me reiterate. Canada's army, as currently authorized with RegF and ResF personnel, could usefully use the support of 9 SP, 3 HIMARS, 9 light, 3 AD, 3 or more OWUAS and 3 STA batteries - 30 in total (excluding the FOO batteries). The RegF currently has 6 gun and 3 STA and 3 GS batteries. There are also 16 ResF regiments and three independent batteries, all of which are hard pressed to generate a battery each - say 17 batteries total. That adds up to 29 batteries in grand total to draw on unless we drastically restructure the artillery manning. If all Canada can generate is some 30 batteries. Based on a three gun/rocket battery structure, that means we only need 10 regiments total - 4 RegF and 6 ResF. Even less if you plug the OWUAS batteries into the DS regiments. My napkin force has eight regiments total supporting the army's two divisions.

Since the CAF hasn't interested itself in growing a "great host" through Stage 4 mobilization we really need to concentrate at building the ResF into a viable structure that a) provides trained reservists as augmentees to all the the specialties that the artillery needs to support the greater army as a whole during peacetime; and b) has the personnel and equipment to expand the army to its full capability during wartime. As a tertiary goal there should be a plan that facilitates expanding the army beyond its current size with new personnel and equipment.

Honestly, distance from training areas and re-roling units to match training areas is the least of the army's problems. First the army needs to figure out what it wants to be (or perhaps what it's capable of becoming) when it grows up.

 

[KevinB]

I get the need , but I doubt the money, political support and will is there.

Like @FJAG points out, I don’t see the need to have guns at the local armory.

Just do what the ARNG does and have equipment at the major training centers.

 

[Kirkhill]

Like @FJAG points out, I don’t see the need to have guns at the local armory.

Just do what the ARNG does and have equipment at the major training centers.

On the other hand me, the pessimist, does see a need for a C-UAS troop at each armoury - along with a well organized field security company/squadron.

 

[FJAG]

At the link below is a Facebook 1970's Brit Video of the Brit army. Starting around 0:35 are a number of artillery scenes that include my era as a gunner with brief images of the L5, and the FACE computer system in action - not to mention Abbots, M110, M109s, Honest Johns and a Bristol Bloodhound. Oh yeah, there are also Brit infantry and a tank and Ferret.

British infantry in the 1970s | © Crown copyright. IWM (COI 904-1) | The many roles of the British infantry: this 1970 government film showcases the variety of roles available soldiers in the army, including gunners,... | By Imperial War Museum Lond

 

[FJAG]

Like @FJAG points out, I don’t see the need to have guns at the local armory.

Just do what the ARNG does and have equipment at the major training centers.

Exactly. I would go so far to even say that one could remove turrets from some guns and tanks to set up turret training simulators in one or two armouries in Toronto and Montreal, and have the hulls at places like Downsview and CFB Montreal or St Jean to provide opportunities for the fundamental introduction to driver training which would then be rounded out at a major training centre.

If recruiting is a problem for the reserves then we need to do everything we can to make it more accessible for them including using local facilities where they live and convenient training bases. LAVs, TAPVs and M777s are no problem whatsoever. Tracked vehicles offer a bit more of a challenge but nothing insurmountable.

Distances aren't a major problem. Look at Florida as an example. Most of the units are in the southern portion of the state yet their training facility, Camp Blanding, is just outside Jacksonville in the north up to 300 miles (as the crow flies) away from many of their units - about the same distance as London from Petawawa.

 

[GK .Dundas]

I posted this year's ago about a pres armour officer who said that if one lousy tank to park outside an armoury. He be able to recruit a squadron .
Give his a couple of simulators and access to some tanks and within 3 to 5 years he not only be provide a Squadron that would be able to deploy within 90 days of the word being given .
Now to be honest when the conversation was happening when we both drinking but he seemed to have given it a fair bit of thought.

 

[KevinB]

I posted this year's ago about a pres armour officer who said that if one lousy tank to park outside an armoury. He be able to recruit a squadron .
Give his a couple of simulators and access to some tanks and within 3 to 5 years he not only be provide a Squadron that would be able to deploy within 90 days of the word being given .
Now to be honest when the conversation was happening when we both drinking but he seemed to have given it a fair bit of thought.

Based on my PRes experience, and talking to a bunch of other, many folks who actually have time (HS and Uni students) leave due to boredom.

It’s hard to induce excitement with no equipment.

 

[dapaterson]

Based on my PRes experience, and talking to a bunch of other, many folks who actually have time (HS and Uni students) leave due to boredom.

It’s hard to induce excitement with no equipment.

Even harder to do so with no leadership, but instead people more worried about dinners for retired COs than with training soldiers.

 

[KevinB]

Even harder to do so with no leadership, but instead people more worried about dinners for retired COs than with training soldiers.

But how was your dinner

 

[Kirkhill]

Based on my PRes experience, and talking to a bunch of other, many folks who actually have time (HS and Uni students) leave due to boredom.

It’s hard to induce excitement with no equipment.

A few replacement barrels and some boxes of link would be a start.

 

[FJAG]

I guess if you haven't the gear then organizing a dinner is all you can do.

Seriously though, I can still think back to the 16 to 18 year-old me as a gunner in the reserves. It's the getting to do my thing with howitzers and trucks and radios and rifles - to get my hand busy and dirty - that motivated me to not only stay in but to move forward at a time when the army was taking a shit-kicking.

It doesn't have to be big gear although big gear sure helps. Everyone has a need to feel like they belong to something that's worthwhile.

On the one hand, I think the ResF needs adult leadership. IMHO, reservists shouldn't command or lead anything greater than a company. On the other hand, I'm not quite sure that the RegF, at present, can provide that in a uniform fashion.

I sometimes think that the institutional distain many RegF people feel for reservists runs too deep. Conversely my talking to Afghan vets and their almost universal praise for the reservists that served with them makes me feel that if we stop separating reservists from regulars and integrate them more closely with terms of service that more clearly govern reservists responsibilities and duties then it could be made to work. That's the theory behind 30/70 - integration, adult leadership and access to gear when its in short supply.

I'm a glass-half-full kind of guy.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just before Christmas, the US Marine Corps held their 248th Birthday Ball in a hotel in London. It was a lavish evening, with medals galore on display, dinner and dancing. But the highlight of the night’s revelry was a nine-minute video. Set to a soundtrack of Future Warrior by Audiomachine, it began with a thrilling montage: of ships steaming through choppy waters, planes doing death-defying loops, helicopters buzzing low over hostile territory and lots and lots of guns, fire and explosions. “Si Vis Pacem Para Bellum” flashed up on the screen. “If you desire peace, prepare for war.”

“Even I was on the edge of my seat,” says one British Army officer who was there. “I thought, ‘I want to join the US Marine Corps right now’.” That, he adds, “is the s--- we need.”

In 2022, the US Marine Corps stood at 174,577 troops, with another 32,599 on reserve. In 2020, the Corps received 358,240 applications and accepted just 38,800 of them. Its annual budget is roughly $53.2 billion (£42.1 billion)

‘No longer a top-level fighting force’: How the British Army lost its way

So where’s it all gone wrong? And how can we fix it?

‘Start thinking soldier’​

Ask your average soldier why he signed up, and a significant majority – if they’re honest – will say they’re in it for the drama, danger and excitement. Or, as one Army officer puts it bluntly, “they want a scrap, and to be able to bayonet someone in the face.”

 

[daftandbarmy]

I posted this year's ago about a pres armour officer who said that if one lousy tank to park outside an armoury. He be able to recruit a squadron .
Give his a couple of simulators and access to some tanks and within 3 to 5 years he not only be provide a Squadron that would be able to deploy within 90 days of the word being given .
Now to be honest when the conversation was happening when we both drinking but he seemed to have given it a fair bit of thought.

He's not wrong.

While fighting for enough ammo to do 1 x PWT 3 per year gets boring after awhile, being 'Op Tasked' to provide a Recce Pl with zero courses, NVG, or other key kit, is just absurd.

 

[markppcli]

I posted this year's ago about a pres armour officer who said that if one lousy tank to park outside an armoury. He be able to recruit a squadron .
Give his a couple of simulators and access to some tanks and within 3 to 5 years he not only be provide a Squadron that would be able to deploy within 90 days of the word being given .
Now to be honest when the conversation was happening when we both drinking but he seemed to have given it a fair bit of thought.

I seriously doubt that.

I get his thought process and I agree that the reserves should be making better use of simulation, and that equipment is a draw for sure. But no once who’s worked in the army could reasonably expect a reserve unit to force generate and deploy any kind of formed sub unit in 90 days. Even following his logic of - tanks are cool and we’ll get more people with tanks, who’s showing up to drive the Sqns refueling trucks / SQ vehicles. All that uncool stuff is what lets the military function.

 

[dapaterson]

But how was your dinner

Last time there was a dinner it was a send off for a passing of the stick of the RSM. There were two retired COs in attendance, together with all the troops. We stood back, so when they almost ran out, we didn't eat.

Old habits die hard.

 

[FJAG]

I seriously doubt that.

I get his thought process and I agree that the reserves should be making better use of simulation, and that equipment is a draw for sure. But no once who’s worked in the army could reasonably expect a reserve unit to force generate and deploy any kind of formed sub unit in 90 days.

That, unfortunately is very true. Both that no one expects it and that they can't do it. To me, that is negligence in the highest degree within the army's leadership for decades.

Even following his logic of - tanks are cool and we’ll get more people with tanks, who’s showing up to drive the Sqns refueling trucks / SQ vehicles. All that uncool stuff is what lets the military function.

Also very true.

It just so happens that I was taking a napkin force look at what I could do with the current structure of the army using 30/70 // 70/30 hybrid units if we reduced the RegF field force by 1 full brigade but leave the ResF at its current paid strength.

Just using the key field strengths I could generate a two division force with a total of three 30/70 armoured brigades; one 70/30 airborne brigade; one 50/50 mech brigade; one 30/70 mech brigade; two 30/70 coastal battle groups; one 30/70 artillery brigade; two 30/70 sustainment brigades; one 30/70 combat support brigade and one engineer brigade.

Here's the interesting result in RegF statistics. To form the RegF, equipped, cores (note I simplified it by ignoring HQ and combat support companies as they follow the key companies, batteries etc ratios) you can:

reduce 27 infantry rifle companies to 21;
reduce 12 gun, STA and GS batteries to 8;
reduce 9 armd/recce sqns to 6;
reduce 8 engr fd sqns to 5;

but, you need to:

increase 9 log/maint/tpt coys to 17.

Yup. I could create a 2 Div hybrid army while cutting the RegF combat arms by almost a third but needed to double the combat service support.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I seriously doubt that.

I get his thought process and I agree that the reserves should be making better use of simulation, and that equipment is a draw for sure. But no once who’s worked in the army could reasonably expect a reserve unit to force generate and deploy any kind of formed sub unit in 90 days. Even following his logic of - tanks are cool and we’ll get more people with tanks, who’s showing up to drive the Sqns refueling trucks / SQ vehicles. All that uncool stuff is what lets the military function.

I agree.

OTOH, I see where he's coming from as it's disheartening seeing promising young Cpl/ Ptes leave after a couple of years or so, some of whom go on to pass selection for various SoF organizations, because - with the best will in the world - you can't hang onto to keen young soldiers with the promise of yet another disappointing training year e.g., no clear and consistent training aim, not enough ammo, no well managed progression leading to a useful, challenging and inspiring collective training event, mismanaged Class A budgets leading to last minute 'stop training' orders and, oh, there are no C6s or 84mm because they weren't returned from last summer's course training period, or are broken,, and the computer range has been down for 5 years because the guy from Quebec hasn't been able to make it out here yet to fix it.

Most of these kids are smart university type folks, and otherwise savvy, so are hard to fool

 

[markppcli]

I agree.

OTOH, I see where he's coming from as it's disheartening seeing promising young Cpl/ Ptes leave after a couple of years or so, some of whom go on to pass selection for various SoF organizations, because - with the best will in the world - you can't hang onto to keen young soldiers with the promise of yet another disappointing training year e.g., no clear and consistent training aim, not enough ammo, no well managed progression leading to a useful, challenging and inspiring collective training event, mismanaged Class A budgets leading to last minute 'stop training' orders and, oh, there are no C6s or 84mm because they weren't returned from last summer's course training period, or are broken,, and the computer range has been down for 5 years because the guy from Quebec hasn't been able to make it out here yet to fix it.

Most of these kids are smart university type folks, and otherwise savvy, so are hard to fool

I suppose I just won’t buy the “if we only had x it would fix everything “ narrative. As you pointed out there are a hockey sock of issues and they all stack on top of each other. Equipment is for sure one of those pieces; and frankly it should be an easy solve but it of course can’t be.

 

[childs56]

I seriously doubt that.

I get his thought process and I agree that the reserves should be making better use of simulation, and that equipment is a draw for sure. But no once who’s worked in the army could reasonably expect a reserve unit to force generate and deploy any kind of formed sub unit in 90 days. Even following his logic of - tanks are cool and we’ll get more people with tanks,

Considering the Regular force has a hard time deploying on 90 days notice unless they are the Reaction group or what ever they call them this year. It will not happen in todays environment, to many people against the idea of equipping Reserves with good equipment, providing steady training and real budgets consistently
I am sure if they equipped a Reserve force correctly, gave them the budget, provided the training you would be surprised what could be accomplished.

who’s showing up to drive the Sqns refueling trucks / SQ vehicles. All that uncool stuff is what lets the military function.

One might be surprised who would show up to perform those functions of uncool stuff if they mix it in with some actual cool stuff.

 

[dapaterson]

One might be surprised who would show up to perform those functions of uncool stuff if they mix it in with some actual cool stuff.

Leadership is the start point for all this.

It's actually difficult to create boring Army training. But somehow, the Army Reserve manages to do so. Regularly.