C3 Howitzer Replacement

[CBH99]

Light, heavy, rocket etc. - this is what we are going up against:

The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5b17fd67562fa70b3ae0dd24/1528298869210/The+Russian+Reconnaissance+Fire+Complex+Comes+of+Age.pdf

A scary read, especially when they claim their sensor to shooter link and kill chain can be established in as little as 10 seconds. While this is under ideal conditions, it still means that it does not take a great deal of time even under adverse conditions to find, target and strike you.

The Ukrainians learned this the hard way.  In the opening months (roughly 1st year) of Crimea, anytime they would even use their radios, they would artillery coming down on them within a minute or so.

I'll post a link later, where the Russians would literally have several UAV's orbiting overhead.  Any time the Ukrainians transmitted ANYTHING, the UAV's would feed those coordinates to Russian artillery, and the artillery would engage almost immediately.  Their kill chain was absolutely on point.

 

[FJAG]

This is why I want armoured self propelled guns with any medium or heavy brigade and not a tube on a flatbed.

:cheers:

 

[tomahawk6]

Strategy Page touts Caesar and reveals a new Chinese entry in the type.

https://strategypage.com/htmw/htart/20200609.aspx

 

[quadrapiper]

The Ukrainians learned this the hard way.  In the opening months (roughly 1st year) of Crimea, anytime they would even use their radios, they would artillery coming down on them within a minute or so.

I'll post a link later, where the Russians would literally have several UAV's orbiting overhead.  Any time the Ukrainians transmitted ANYTHING, the UAV's would feed those coordinates to Russian artillery, and the artillery would engage almost immediately.  Their kill chain was absolutely on point.

Was there a countermeasure found? Disrupting the UAVs, or some less-interceptible comms system?

 

[Old Sweat]

Din I hear someone murmur "lay line"? In the mid-seventies we tried using certain regimental survey devices that used point-to-point very narrow microwave beams for distance measuring, one could talk back and forth between instruments. Given the technology of the time, it fell in the too difficult category. I'm still a little ambivalent, as it was my brainwave.

The idea of shooting down UAVs appeals to me, but I wonder about the practicality.

 

[Kirkhill]

Din I hear someone murmur "lay line"? In the mid-seventies we tried using certain regimental survey devices that used point-to-point very narrow microwave beams for distance measuring, one could talk back and forth between instruments. Given the technology of the time, it fell in the too difficult category. I'm still a little ambivalent, as it was my brainwave.

The idea of shooting down UAVs appeals to me, but I wonder about the practicality.

The Cluster Swarm project is developing a missile warhead to dispense a swarm of small drones that fan out to locate and destroy vehicles with explosively formed penetrators or EFPs. (An EFP spits a high-speed slug of armor-piercing metal some tens or hundreds of meters). This is similar in concept to the existing CBU-105 bomb, a 1000-pound munition which scatters forty ‘Skeet’ submunitions each over the target area, each of which parachutes down, scanning the ground with a seeker until it finds a tank and fires an EFP at it; the picture above shows one test. CBU-105’s dropped by B-52 bombers successfully knocked out entire Iraqi tank columns in 2003, leading them to be termed ‘Cans of whup-ass.’ The Cluster Swarm would be vastly more powerful.

The Cluster Swarm involved drones packed into the Army’s existing GMLRS rockets, which carry a 180-pound payload and have a range of over 70 kilometers, or ATACMS missiles that carry a 350-pound payload over 270 kilometers. The original idea was that the missile payload would be quadcopter drones encased in an aerodynamic shell that would disperse them over the target area. However, the challenges of unfolding quadcopters mid-air may have been too great, as the Phase II development, recently completed, went to AVID LLC, who have a slightly different approach.

The Cluster Swarm would be far more powerful than the existing CBU-105 ‘cans of whup-ass’ for two reasons. A CBU-105 can only hit targets in an area a few hundred meters across. The Cluster Swarm can go hunting for vehicles dispersed over many square miles.

The other advantage is efficiency. CBU-105 gives little overlap in search area for each warhead; many will not have a target, and where there is overlap two or more may attack the same tank and ignore others. A true swarm acting co-operatively will ‘de-conflict’ so forty drones always attack forty different targets.

If Cluster Swarm drones have EFP warheads similar to existing weapons, then each MLRS missile would release about ten drones. Each M270 MLRS vehicle fires twelve missiles in a salvo, for a hundred and twenty drones. So a battery of nine launch vehicles would deliver a thousand killer drones over the target area, enough in theory to stop an entire armored division in its tracks.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/06/01/why-new-us-armys-tank-killing-drone-swarm-may-be-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction/#3220715fece8


Bit difficult to shoot down that mob.

 

[MilEME09]

Only way to prevent that in my opinon is a very strong EW net. If you jam the drone signal, you stop them cold, perhaps even hacking them, taking them over.

 

[CBH99]

I miss the good old days where we could just outmaneuver, out think, and out shoot each other.

Modern warfare is getting a wee bit too crazy for me 

 

[Ostrozac]

Only way to prevent that in my opinon is a very strong EW net. If you jam the drone signal, you stop them cold, perhaps even hacking them, taking them over.

Yeah, but your jammers are putting out transmissions that can then be detected by the other side, who might just respond by attacking the jammers. At the end of the day, the side with the best sensors and firepower has an enormous advantage. But you really need both.

 

[AmmoTech90]

Light, heavy, rocket etc. - this is what we are going up against:

The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5b17fd67562fa70b3ae0dd24/1528298869210/The+Russian+Reconnaissance+Fire+Complex+Comes+of+Age.pdf

A scary read, especially when they claim their sensor to shooter link and kill chain can be established in as little as 10 seconds. While this is under ideal conditions, it still means that it does not take a great deal of time even under adverse conditions to find, target and strike you.

None of this is new.  As a Private in 1988 I knew that the Soviets could bring fire down on an undisciplined emitter around five minutes after the transmission.  There is no reason to believe they've gotten worse at it.  Yes, spread spectrum and frequency hopping and other techniques can help, the Russians haven't been slacking on their end.

Why is what a Private knew in the 80s new to "strategic" thinkers in the 20s?

 

[dapaterson]

Because today's strategic thinker came of age fighting insurgents without ever considering air, artillery or airwaves as real threats.

 

[Ostrozac]

Because today's strategic thinker came of age fighting insurgents without ever considering air, artillery or airwaves as real threats.

Hence our position as an army that self-propelled artillery, manportable antitank missiles, and land based air defence systems were all passing fads that are completely unnecessary in the modern day. So long as our next conflict is another pointless quagmire in the Third World, we can get away with it, but it we try to engage with somebody more sophisticated, like the Russians or Chinese, or possibly even the Iranians or the North Koreans, we are setting ourselves up to get the short end of the stick.

 

[OldSolduer]

Because today's strategic thinker came of age fighting insurgents without ever considering air, artillery or airwaves as real threats.

Not only that but institutional memory of the Cold War and all its complexities have been forgotten or "pooh poohed" away. Can anyone tell me what the ORBAT is of a Russian Tank Div is? Or a Chinese MRD is?

 

[FJAG]

Because today's strategic thinker came of age fighting insurgents without ever considering air, artillery or airwaves as real threats.

You all know where I stand on this.

"Adaptive, agile, multi-purpose force" = "jack of all trades, master at none."

We are, however, absolute geniuses at writing jingoistic, platitudes about ourselves in official publications that are never read by the people that matter. Land Operations 2021 & Waypoint 2018, I'm talking about you.

Multipurpose forces provide full spectrum capability derived from a combination of integral capability plus the full use of joint and coalition assets.  Integral capability is founded in turn on a range of leading edge technologies that provide enhanced deployability, mobility, survivability, lethality and modularity. A multipurpose force includes medium and light elements augmented as necessary by heavy elements. Medium elements exploit technology to achieve the level of lethality and protection formerly provided by heavy forces while light elements trade a measure of lethality and protection for enhanced responsiveness, deployability, and mobility.  The high level of combat power
inherent in medium elements is derived from both its integral capabilities and its ability to make full use of heavy elements and integrated effects.  Light elements maximize flexibility and agility in order to compensate for reduced combat power and can be employed across the spectrum of conflict and continuum of operations in specific roles.

:facepalm:

 

[dapaterson]

OK, back of the cigarette pack estimate here.  Let's create the "Light Indirect Fires Modernization (LIFM) Project" for the Army.

In scope: Acquisition of new howitzers, capable of firing in-service ammunition and capable of being housed in existing infrastructure; related specialized tools and test equipment (STTE); training materials; conversion training.

Out of scope: New ammunition natures; digitization; prime movers, infrastructure; ammunition (existing National Procurement holdings and purchases will sustain this acquisition).


Project office: Assume six personnel for seven years, after which time functions will be handed off to the Life Cycle Materiel Manager.  Assume a full cost (including benefits) of $150K per person per year, of $900K/year, or $6.3M for the project life.

Office Space: Set by formula at 20?% of personnel cost; assume $1.26M for the project life.

TD: Assume every member of the PMO travels 4 weeks per year: 3 weeks INCAN, 1 week OUTCAN, and assume a full cost of $2K/week INCAN and $4K/week OUTCAN.  That's $60K/year or $420K through the project life.

O&M: Paper, training for PMO staff, snazzy pamphlets that get sent to units years after the fact... call it $40K/year or $280K for the project life.

Total overhead: $8.26M


We are limiting ourselves to a 105 or 155 gun; from a cost perspective, 105 will be less expensive and since we want no infra costs it's also the solution that meets that demand - how many armouries could accommodate 155 guns instead of 105?


So, how many guns?  The Res F has 16 Regiments and 3 independent batteries; the Reg F has three gun Regiments (plus whatever it is they do in 4 GS - they will not be included in this), and the RCAS.

If we assume 4 gun batteries, that's (16+3+3) = 22 firing batteries for 88 guns.  Plus one for the RCEME school.  Plus one reference model.  Plus six for the school.  Plus four modified to fire blank exclusively for ceremonial functions for 30 Fd (Parenthetic note: Why aren't 30 Fd RCA and the GGFG OPCON to ADM PA, since they're basically  PR elements?  But I digress...).  This takes us to a production run of 100 guns.


How much would training cost?  Assume 1000 Res F personnel at an average of $250/day (full cost including PILL and benefits) will each require 5 days of conversion training = $1.25M; add another $1M for ancillary costs associated with conversion training, both Reg and Res, and we're at $2.25M


How much would new guns cost?  That's a good question, without much in the way of answers.  Best I can find suggests the M777 would run around $8M+ each (Canadian); the last production M198s in current dollars would be around $1.2M each.

If we assume $2M each for new 105 guns (probably L119 under license from a temporary Canadian line set up by GDLS in Windsor), that's $200M.

As we are seeing compatibility with current systems, I'll lowball STTE at $5.49M (and also assume that our "temporary" line, above, will also be contracted for lifecycle maintenance, reducing costs for STTE).

Our total project comes out to: PMO $7.26M; training $2.25M; guns $200M; STTE $5.49M = $215M.  Add a 15% contingency, and you're at $247M.


TL;DR: One hundred guns with no infra, no ammo, no digitization, minimal training and tooling would cost, VERY ROUGH estimate, a quarter of a billion dollars.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Good news is that most of that spent in the country. I suspect if we reopened a M119 production line, we may actually get some oversea orders, which might reduce production cost. Plus we are increasing the knowledge technical base of our arms industry. I would have any blank ceremonial guns, based on the C3, which we have more than enough of. Store the remaining C3 so they can be pulled out of reserve if required. Consider arming a couple of Reserve battery's with M777 if they are near a reg force unit also equipped with them.

 

[dapaterson]

We don't have sufficient C3s to dedicate to the ceremonial role in any sort of long term; the guns are aging and, to use that great Army term. are "self divesting".

(Plus, if the mods are minor, those four give additional depth to the fleet - not a bad thing).

 

[FJAG]

OK, back of the cigarette pack estimate here.  Let's create the "Light Indirect Fires Modernization (LIFM) Project" for the Army.

In scope: Acquisition of new howitzers, capable of firing in-service ammunition and capable of being housed in existing infrastructure; related specialized tools and test equipment (STTE); training materials; conversion training.

Out of scope: New ammunition natures; digitization; prime movers, infrastructure; ammunition (existing National Procurement holdings and purchases will sustain this acquisition).


Project office: Assume six personnel for seven years, after which time functions will be handed off to the Life Cycle Materiel Manager.  Assume a full cost (including benefits) of $150K per person per year, of $900K/year, or $6.3M for the project life.

Office Space: Set by formula at 20?% of personnel cost; assume $1.26M for the project life.

TD: Assume every member of the PMO travels 4 weeks per year: 3 weeks INCAN, 1 week OUTCAN, and assume a full cost of $2K/week INCAN and $4K/week OUTCAN.  That's $60K/year or $420K through the project life.

O&M: Paper, training for PMO staff, snazzy pamphlets that get sent to units years after the fact... call it $40K/year or $280K for the project life.

Total overhead: $8.26M


We are limiting ourselves to a 105 or 155 gun; from a cost perspective, 105 will be less expensive and since we want no infra costs it's also the solution that meets that demand - how many armouries could accommodate 155 guns instead of 105?


So, how many guns?  The Res F has 16 Regiments and 3 independent batteries; the Reg F has three gun Regiments (plus whatever it is they do in 4 GS - they will not be included in this), and the RCAS.

If we assume 4 gun batteries, that's (16+3+3) = 22 firing batteries for 88 guns.  Plus one for the RCEME school.  Plus one reference model.  Plus six for the school.  Plus four modified to fire blank exclusively for ceremonial functions for 30 Fd (Parenthetic note: Why aren't 30 Fd RCA and the GGFG OPCON to ADM PA, since they're basically  PR elements?  But I digress...).  This takes us to a production run of 100 guns.


How much would training cost?  Assume 1000 Res F personnel at an average of $250/day (full cost including PILL and benefits) will each require 5 days of conversion training = $1.25M; add another $1M for ancillary costs associated with conversion training, both Reg and Res, and we're at $2.25M


How much would new guns cost?  That's a good question, without much in the way of answers.  Best I can find suggests the M777 would run around $8M+ each (Canadian); the last production M198s in current dollars would be around $1.2M each.

If we assume $2M each for new 105 guns (probably L119 under license from a temporary Canadian line set up by GDLS in Windsor), that's $200M.

As we are seeing compatibility with current systems, I'll lowball STTE at $5.49M (and also assume that our "temporary" line, above, will also be contracted for lifecycle maintenance, reducing costs for STTE).

Our total project comes out to: PMO $7.26M; training $2.25M; guns $200M; STTE $5.49M = $215M.  Add a 15% contingency, and you're at $247M.


TL;DR: One hundred guns with no infra, no ammo, no digitization, minimal training and tooling would cost, VERY ROUGH estimate, a quarter of a billion dollars.

Regretfully, I expect this is how the thing will be done in Ottawa when the time comes. I worked out a lengthy and sarcastic critique but I'll let that fly by the window.

The real problem is that we continue to think of how to "modernize" our existing ResF when a large part of the problem is that its an anachronistic organization that's not fit for the purpose and therefore when we say it will cost $x, the logical question is: "yes but what does that really do for us? We could hire another three GOFOs and a thousand full-time administrators in Ottawa with that money"

On the other hand, if we create a ResF that designed to be employable/deployable for whatever purpose we consider necessary--light, heavy, service support etc--then the organization's equipment needs become obvious and justified.

It's simply an exercise in frustration to try to justify anything for the organization as it stands; with all the negative effects that brings about in recruiting and retention and competence.

Let's be honest, without an ongoing Afghanistan, there is no need for "trained" reservists beyond the horde that fills Class B positions in Ottawa and other places. Their equipment needs are met with one desktop computer each. There is therefore little justification to equip the reserves beyond the very basic kit needed to complete BMQ/SQ and other DP1 training.

Quite frankly, the C3 in use today is on the very same gun carriages I did my basic gun numbers course on back in 1965. If we need a training aid gun then let's go back to manufacturing an M2A2 barrel that'll last two or three decades, install it and get on with business. Who needs a longer barrel and range for a training aid anyway?

On the other hand, if we do need air defence and HIMARS and anti-armour and more drones then let's get the right gear, reorganize appropriately and start making a new contribution.

:cheers:

 

[dapaterson]

Given the title of the thread, that was a quick and dirty assessment of what it would cost to replace roughly two thirds of the in-service guns.  Agreed that any equipping discussions need to be in the context of force outputs desired.

That said, Canada does need to invest in indirect fire capability.  My quick and dirty cost of $250M over seven years is not a huge amount out of the defence budget to sustain a necessary capability.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If the C3 self-divest with no replacement, then expect your reserve gunners to "self divest" as well. They are not joining up to play computer games, they want to fire howitzers and other big toys.

The scenario to replace the C3 with the M119 does not preclude having some units equip with M777 if justified. It also does not preclude MRLS, UAV or AD units within either. In fact the Reserve Artillery should also house these as well. You can raise troop level units within the existing units, one may get tagged with AD, another with UAV. For the moment the AD units get classroom and field simulators so they can learn the basic skills while the senior leaders start to incorporate AD defense back into the command structure as a real thing. The units tagged with a UAV troop would be close to a training area to be used, using cheaper smaller drones. They would learn to fly and maintain them, giving the senior leaders the chance to incorporate UAV's  into the command structure as a real thing. A small portable MRLS system would also be doable. The bigger systems are to big and complex for the current reserve units, we need stuff like this https://www.overtdefense.com/2019/06/03/russia-turns-to-smaller-rocket-artillery-for-specialist-light-roles/
The other potentiel role is a ATGM system that is a step up from whatever the infantry will use. That may be a bridge to far for the moment though.


Setting up these specialist Troops within the existing Reserve Artillery structure, along with new guns means that the Reserve Artillery will be the desirable place for smart people to go. If you want to recruit good people and retain you better put your money where your mouth is, because with no guns and no specialist trades, mean that those people won't bother to join because the army has a big billboard saying "WE DON"T CARE".