My advice for Bill Blair
AN EX DEFENCE MINISTER ADDRESSES THE URGENT NEED TO FIX CANADA’S MILITARY
National Post - 12 Aug 2023 - Peter Mackay
With the recent federal cabinet shuffle, Canada has a new defence minister. As Bill Blair takes the reins, it is worth taking stock of where the Department of National Defence finds itself and the headwinds Blair faces in this new role. It is critically important to examine what opportunities exist to revitalize arguably the most important file of any government.
The challenges facing DND and the Canadian Armed Forces are as daunting and as complex as they are numerous. Most recently, Canada has been maligned by international partners, perhaps especially the United States, for failing to reach the NATO spending target. Adding insult to injury were reports of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau telling NATO officials behind closed doors that we “never will” reach that goal, only to contradict himself a few weeks later at a NATO meeting in Vilnius by agreeing to see two per cent of GDP spending on defence as a floor, not a ceiling. Canada’s behaviour has spread confusion and mistrust among allies and gives glee to our adversaries.
It is important to look beyond that headline number and accept that even if Canada were to invest two per cent of its GDP in defence (we are currently pegged at 1.29 per cent according to most recent NATO figures), there is no guarantee that we have a system capable of managing, let alone investing, an additional $20 billion in defence funding annually.
In my experience, there has been a distinct lack of co-ordination and communication between the departments responsible for military procurement. Industry Canada, Public Works and Procurement, and National Defence — all overseen by the Treasury Board — often work at cross purposes and in silos. These woes have long plagued Canada’s approach to defence spending, from boots to battleships. It would not be a stretch to call Canada’s defence procurement system among the worst in the West, having bedevilled successive governments for years.
With the failure to get new and necessary equipment to our troops in a timely and efficient fashion, Ottawa has fostered a crisis of faith in Canada as a defence partner. Our allies and adversaries alike have called us out as a laggard and free rider. Perhaps more troubling, our men and women in uniform are acutely aware that Canada has underinvested in their success, which has led to serious morale and personnel deficits. Most troubling, we have put them in harm’s way at times at elevated risk due to improper equipment, uniforms and personal protection.
What young pilot dreams of flying fighter aircraft that are almost older or are older than their parents? How can we tolerate asking them to deploy to a desert combat mission in forest green uniforms, or more recently, require them to buy their own helmets or feed themselves? It is truly falling well below what any G7 country’s citizens should ever tolerate when it comes to the treatment of those who put their lives on the line to protect us.
Undeniably there are also other issues that we are facing as a nation, some of an urgent nature, but we are now at an inflection point. Ottawa must not allow our nation’s defence readiness to continue to decline, putting all that we have accomplished and all that we hold dear at risk. A new approach is needed. If the new minister of defence is listening, I have a few suggestions he might consider as he settles into his role.
The first thing that must be done is to call for a détente. The government and opposition must come together to work on depoliticizing defence generally and procurement specifically. This doesn’t mean that the government should be absolved of responsibility for legitimate shortcomings, nor that the opposition stop asking questions, but rather that all parties should agree that the fundamentals of defence and procurement must have continuity between governments and must be defined by interparty co-operation rather than political competition.
If defence can be depoliticized, even in part, much more progress can be made toward cutting bureaucratic processes designed to insulate politicians, allowing us to reduce costly delays and finally get our men and women in uniform the tools and resources they most need, much more quickly than is currently possible. The spectacular failures of the Sea King helicopter, Victoria class submarine and ongoing and escalating CF-18 fighter replacement programs, costing billions and causing long delays for short-term political gain, highlight this pressing need. Partisan political games and broken promises have devastating implications for those who risk their lives in the CAF.
If defence and procurement can be depoliticized, we can then consider what the government ought to do with a freer hand. First things first, Canada needs certain interoperable capabilities in order to contribute to our international obligations. We must be able to perform the tasks required of us in the air, on land, at sea, and in space, and we must be able to do so in co-operation with our most important partners and allies.
As a middle power with limited resources, this means that we must pursue joint builds for many of our major capabilities, such as the F-35, and must also be assertive in participating in international training exercises and supply chains for future capabilities. Refuelling capabilities across all elements as well as spare parts, ammunition and training are part of that interoperability puzzle.
An aspect of defence that has been allowed to atrophy has been our manufacturing capabilities. While Canada will never be able to develop all its necessary capabilities domestically, and while we should not attempt to embrace complete autonomy, we are not helping our allies if we lack the ability to meaningfully contribute to manufacturing, to produce crucial capabilities and material necessary for collective defence. Consider the shortage of artillery munitions that Ukraine is contending with; Canada could help fill that gap, but doing so requires significant investments in domestic production.
And to that end, Canada must strive to seize upon its comparative advantages. What we as a nation might lack in domestic air combat platform manufacturing, we can make up for in our burgeoning tech sector. Satellite imagery and LIDAR technology, ground- and ocean-based sensors, search and rescue, artificial intelligence, drones, and more are all capabilities where Canada cannot only develop value for our military, but indeed may be able to manufacture goods and services that benefit our partners and allies more generally. Surely some buys will have to come off the shelf from allied countries, but by focusing on areas where we have advantages, while not neglecting areas which we must have some self-sufficiency, the government can make smart investments that yield benefits with respect to defence and the economy.
Similarly, with major purchases and economic opportunities that come from such things as navy vessels and subsea autonomous vessels, Canada has a choice to make: do we continue to pursue domestic builds — which have significant economic benefits and the ability to be tailormade to the needs of the Royal Canadian Navy — or do we pursue off-the-shelf options, such as purchasing older U.S. vessels? My own view is that Canada is nurturing shipbuilding and marine technology expertise that we would be fools to not continue to invest in. But we should consider the broader implications and pressing needs of this for niche capabilities such as future submarines. Or explore lease-to-own options as we did with joint support supply ships. There is a place for sole source when an urgent need arises, as was the case when the RCN faced an inability to refuel at sea.
Urgency requires innovative thinking, thinking sometimes out of the box and outside the beltway of Ottawa. There are tremendous minds with invaluable experience available to the new minister from among retired military personnel, public servants and organizations like the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and Canadian Global Affairs Institute, which regularly convene and ponder these pressing issues. Looking farther afield to countries like Australia and New Zealand as comparators for how to untie the Gordian Knot of procurement would help. Dusting off the 2013 Jenkins report, a call to action authored by Tom Jenkins and a panel of experts on federal R&D innovation, would also provide evergreen advice.
This is effectively a question of what model of military we want to develop: one like that of Australia — which is sharp, powerful, domestically fit for purpose, but smaller in size — or one more similar to that which Poland is building — a robust military with significant mass of personnel and equipment prepared for a major conventional conflict. There are benefits to both approaches, and neither is inherently superior; the best approach is based on what we want our military to be able to achieve. The CAF’S current mandate of home game, North American defence and one or more missions abroad demands the latter model.
The new minister might contemplate standing up more reserve units to build the larger regular force Army that we need. They need to consider a type of emergency management agency specifically mandated for domestic emergency response — still deployable, but more of a robust Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) with emphasis on Canada and our changing climate and extreme weather systems. An expanded Rangers and Junior Rangers program for south of 60 in some urban centres would provide enormous benefits for Aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians.
Therefore, if Ottawa wants to get the critically important future of our Canadian Armed Forces right and make the correct decisions, the government must start by addressing the strategic atrophy that has been allowed to fester around defence. Move forward on the recommendations already made on culture and improvement, without continually slamming the current members. The government must articulate a clear vision for Canada’s defence, must seek buy-in across party lines, and must pursue that vision honestly and forcefully with commensurate priority investment.
If we can fix these issues, then we can also restore the hope and pride of Canada’s military service members. This, above all else, should be our lodestar: we must inspire the next generation to defend our country and way of life. Restoring morale, recruitment and retention, and increasing the overall numbers and capabilities fundamentally depends upon the government’s ability to fix the chronic issues facing our military.
The competent management of Canada’s defence is vital not only to the battlefield success of our men and women in uniform, but is indispensable to our national and international interests. Defence is our national insurance policy; in an increasingly dangerous world, our government has a sacred duty to ensure that defence is prioritized, and that democracy and freedom are preserved for our citizens and for those internationally whom we have committed to defend.
From a former defence minister to one just starting, I wish Minister Blair all the best in this enormous task. I sincerely hope he can bring success to a portfolio in desperate need of reinvigorated and inspiring leadership.
WE MUST INSPIRE THE NEXT GENERATION TO DEFEND OUR COUNTRY AND WAY OF LIFE.