Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

[markppcli]

IF you are the IRU

My Reserve time is even further away from my decades stale Reg time but.

Using the Infantry as an example
There are 9 BN’s
1 will be gone on tour
1 will be prepping for tour
1 will be IRU
1 maybe NEO/DART whatever tasked

Worst case that is 5 BN’s basically available.
Infantry MTC areas are what 6-7
Gagetown
Valcartier
Petawawa
Meaford
Shilo
Wainwright.

Most ran 2-3 companies of Reserve DP1 (or whatever)
Let’s say 3 each @7 locations or 21 total

So 3 Major and MWO at each location

and Nationally 1 LtCol and RSM
21 Captains as Coy Commander’s and 21 WO/MWO
84 Lt’s and Sgt/WO’s
336 MCpl/Sgt
336 MCpl/ ISSC Qualified Cpl
108 Cpl/Pte

For 5 weeks for TQ/QL/DP whatever it is now
Figure the PRes will be able to supply minimum 25% of the staff, ideally more.

Generally most Reserve Leadership courses are also 1 month. So if you use May for that
It still leaves the July/Aug time frame

Using more Reg NCO’s in May to help make Reserve NCO’s to teach later in the summer seems like a no brainer as well.

Dude… we are on IRU every year. Op Lentus simply doesn’t stop, now if you mean the high readiness Bn that’s a whole other kettle of fish.

Reserve leadership courses are generally the exact same TP as the regular ones to allow them to slot in when augmenting. They are on average two months, often longer by the time you ad trade specific quals on top.

 

[Good2Golf]

I am not say "Army is better". I am saying that the RCAF needs greater depth. I am saying that the method they employ other than full time personnel does not adequately compensate those personnel.

I could opine at length about the flaws in the Army reserve (and have).

…as it rebuilds from years earlier, before the Army-centric CAF Reserve mafia had their giant Militiaborgification. ARAFs definitely had notably more flex and scalability through the 90s to about mid-2000s before the one(green)-size fits all wave hit. That the essence of several ‘total-force’ RCAF squadrons still exist to this day and contribute meaningfully to the CAF is heartening.

 

[Kirkhill]

Regardless of the historical background, regardless of the legislation, the ARNG has changed over the last century. States do not need Abrams and Bradleys and Paladins. These are tools of the Federals. Regardless of the historical genesis and regardless of the fact that they have a residual state role, the ARNG is equipped and organized top to bottom to go to war in foreign lands. You are not helping your arguments for whatever third and fourth tier forces you are proposing through this analogy.

We agree on a lot but at heart I believe that an army needs to exist even if it doesn't go expeditioning.

I agree that States do not need Abrams and Bradleys and Paladins. But they do need soldiers.

And the Federal government needed those same soldiers to fill their Abrams and Bradleys and Paladins. The only soldiers available were members of the "unorganized militias" of the individual states. Kind of like the problem of the taxpayer. There is only one. In a sense military service is just another tax - a tax in kind.

My proposition, in it's simplest form is that our reserve force ought to be organized like the ARNG i.e. for combat operations (albeit I'd like to see a bigger RegF presence amongst the ARes as our Class B structure sucks.)

I would word it differently. I would organize the reserve force so that it could produce combat effective forces. To me that doesn't mean that ALL the reserves have an expeditionary task. Serving the needs of the Army is one of the tasks of a "militia", organized or not.

Yeah. Talk to the governor of California about that right now about the "loan" he's making to support ICE.

I spent a chunk of my life working in a Matrix. I had a vertical regional boss. I had a horizontal application boss. People that hold two commissions are going to be subject to those tensions.

Personally I don't see a problem with State soldiers being made available for service in a Federal Army. Unless the Federal Army is used against the States from which the soldiers come.

State Active Duty Status seems pretty clear.
Title 10 Status, federal service overseas also seems pretty clear.

This Title 32 seems like an abomination that only lawyers and politicians could love. As an individual, when both my masters are in conflict with each other then I would be inclined to ignore both of them. As I have done in the past.

@KevinB said it best up above about the fact that not everyone in the RegF is on a posting or on leave all summer long. One doesn't have to shove leave for the RegF to May. Just make sure that there are adequate numbers of RegF shifting through training support during the May to August timeframe. It's a simple time management issue. It's not a numbers issue its a priority issue.

But lets for argument's sake say that every RegF guy is spoken for. Then create and pay for a class of full-time service dedicated to ARes leadership and training. Make Class B contracts in support of RegF positions for Sep to April only and requiring them, as part of that Class B contract, to do a separate Class B contract from May to Aug exclusively tied to training the ARes. Or increase the role and numbers of the RSS. There are dozens of solutions as long as it starts to matter to someone that the ARes effectiveness depends on good leadership and proper full-time support.

But let's be honest. There are a multitude of things that need to be done to make the ARes a viable, effective force but no one is doing any of those except to keep pointing fingers at others. The institutional lethargy is unbelievable and borders on professional negligence. Ultimately that rests on the senior RegF leadership.

 

[Infanteer]

During my time I've watched the army go from RegF CIBGs to CbtGps and airborne regiments to CMBGs to 1 Div and back to CMBGs (albeit with a light inf bn) and a CCSB with virtually no improvement. meanwhile the ARes has gone from Militia Commands and Militia Groups to Militia Areas and Districts to Land Force Areas and Districts to Land Force Areas and CBGs and finally to Divisions and CBGs. None of those transformations has resulted in a demonstrably improved ARes albeit the ARes did provide value during the limited war that Afghanistan was. The problem is that the army has limited vision beyond a very small contribution by the ARes to the RegF establishment.

Excuse me if I don't consider the proposed reorganization to be anything other than another deck chair reshuffle. Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. It makes very little difference that the repetition is being done cyclically rather than sequentially.

The army is effectively heading back to 1968-1991 MilDists but under a single, not multiple, Militia Area if not 1954-1968 Militia Groups under a single, not multiple, Militia Command. Just wait for it - I expect some intermediate regional headquarters as between 7 Div HQ and its various CBGs will spring up.

Yeah, but was there ever 3x Maintenance Battalions that landed at Normandy and can talk to the mayor?

 

[MilEME09]

If only every one could hope to be treated as well as an Army primary reservist…#daretodream

So forgotten or outright have the system working against you? I've never heard of a reg force member having to redo a course they passed, I had to do my browning pistol course 3 times because the school played games with reservists. That was the last straw that caused CTC gagetown to take direct control of the school after ottawa got involved as well.

I dont know what world you living in but reservists and treated well are not statements that normally go together. The last two years has been different granted but thats because even the reg force is so desperate for help they know they dont wanna burn that bridge.

 

[PrairieFella]

If only every one could hope to be treated as well as an Army primary reservist…#daretodream

We've got it so good our armour units have 2 or 3 working trucks and our artillery units have a gun. At least our sigs may have a working CP if maintenance can get it back in time for the weekend concentration. We're so spoiled we that we often go weeks without getting paid when we volunteer for named named ops.

Is this where we should say thank you?

 

[daftandbarmy]

We've got it so good our armour units have 2 or 3 working trucks and our artillery units have a gun. At least our sigs may have a working CP if maintenance can get it back in time for the weekend concentration. We're so spoiled we that we often go weeks without getting paid when we volunteer for named named ops.

Is this where we should say thank you?

The Infantry says thank you.

But, then again, we are simple creatures

 

[FJAG]

Yeah, but was there ever 3x Maintenance Battalions that landed at Normandy and can talk to the mayor?

Best I can figure is that the following is the RCEME structure for a WW2 div:

On 1 September 1939, with the guns already firing in Poland, the Department of National Defence issued a General Order authorizing the immediate organization of a CASF of two divisions with a proportion of ancillary troops.4 The ancillary troops included two Army Field Workshops (AFW), one for each division, each with an establishment of 32 officers and 750 other ranks organized into a Main Shop, three Recovery Sections and seventeen LADs.5

3 Div's RCEME elements in 1944 were:

• Headquarters RCEME​
  • 7th Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME​
  • 8th Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME​
  • 9th Infantry Brigade Workshop, RCEME​
  • One LAA workshop​
  • Eleven light aid detachments.​

There was also the 2nd Armoured Brigade Workshop, RCEME and its LADs.

Their deployment was:

There were to be fourteen LADs supporting the assault. Each was to land a recovery group of five men with a recovery vehicle (armoured or wheeled, depending on the type of unit being supported) at H plus-4 hours. These were to be reinforced by another seven groups and a complete LAD by H-plus-9 hours. 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop was to land twelve recovery groups late on D-Day. A further three groups from the workshop were to land on D-plus-1 and combine to form the only second-line workshop available to the Canadians for the first days. The three infantry brigade workshops were to land forward elements on D-plus-3.

So I'm putting two and two together and figure the equivalent of one large, reinforced, Canadian maintenance battalion landed at Normandy with 3 Div or a few days after (not counting REME with I Brit Corps and later RCEME with II Cdn Corps and 1st Cdn Army).

I have no idea if they talked to any mayors.

Seriously though, is there some plan in this restructure which doesn't make this look like a return to a MilArea/MilDist structure by another name?

 

[FJAG]

Deleted - double post.

 

[GK .Dundas]

There was a reason the Military Districts survived as long as they did aside from inertia although there was some of that as well. They worked.
As for the reason for the near constant reorganization for past 30 plus odd years is......yeah ,I got nothin' ...oh wait there was a reason. ...they could .
And did so ,repeatability to the point where we've been rendered almost useless from an operational point of view.
But I'll bet that it looked really, really good on someone's resume.

 

[McG]

So I'm putting two and two together and figure the equivalent of one large, reinforced, Canadian maintenance battalion landed at Normandy with 3 Div or a few days after (not counting REME with I Brit Corps and later RCEME with II Cdn Corps and 1st Cdn Army).

But that maint battalion supported brigades that did not have integral maintenance companies.

 

[Furniture]

Summer training for the Reaervists is a large period

Basically May-Aug

Summer Leave is at best 5 weeks, so you have a pretty large bracket.

Most Reserve course are in 1 month (20-25 training day classes).
So if you need to use the Reg Force (and I’d say that would be the best option) you have basically 66% availability (2 of 3 months).
Yes there will be APS issues (but let’s be honest one doesn’t need even 50% of the Reg Force to run PRes stuff - and yes there is a larger burden at the MCpl and higher ranks.

The problem with this thinking is it forgets that most of the CAF isn't in combat arms regiments, and most of the ResF trades having issues with training aren't combat arms. Most support occupation/units don't have block leave apart from Christmas, when most of the CAF/GoC shuts down. Even then, some occupations/units work right through the holidays, because some things can't shut down.

My point was, that an institutional change to make the RegF spend it's summers training ResF would have massive and likely unintended consequences, that would need to be weighed against the potential benefit of getting a few more reservists through a few more courses.

The CAF is a big institution, and changes to the CAF as an institution need to be considered beyond how they would impact an infantry battalion.

 

[ytz]

If a trade is technical enough that it needs more than a couple months to train, it probably also needs hundreds of mentored hours to become technically competent in post trades school.

That cant be offered on a reserve training night a week + a weekend ex.

Again we need to be honest about what we can expect from a 1 week night a week, 1 weekend a month and maybe an FTSE reservist.

Agree that you can't get full competency out of such. But, you can probably get somebody that is qualified and can be mobilized in said trade in months. And I think that's the point of a mobilization/augmentation reserve.

I do think there's a ton of trades that outside health and tech, where you can could get trained from Basic to OFP inside 1 year. And it would be great to get more emphasis on something like this. Heck, there's a ton of trades that can train using several university summer breaks. It's a good way to give people a chance to serve. Sign up for 6-12 months and get trade qualified. Then take up some kind of reserve commitment for a few years.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Agree that you can't get full competency out of such. But, you can probably get somebody that is qualified and can be mobilized in said trade in months. And I think that's the point of a mobilization/augmentation reserve.

I do think there's a ton of trades that outside health and tech, where you can could get trained from Basic to OFP inside 1 year. And it would be great to get more emphasis on something like this. Heck, there's a ton of trades that can train using several university summer breaks. It's a good way to give people a chance to serve. Sign up for 6-12 months and get trade qualified. Then take up some kind of reserve commitment for a few years.

Are any of those trades ones that we have a big shortage on?

Of the top of my head, the RCN trades that are in the red/black/whatever is worse have OFPs timelines in the 2-3ish year timeframe, if they do the training/OJT without major breaks. Those are all generally restricted by training capacity, with the schools maxed out.

Nice giving people a chance to serve, but we really need to triage things, especially seeing as we're still expected to somehow cut 2% of our spending while also growing. O&M gets screwed again.

 

[Kirkhill]

The problem with this thinking is it forgets that most of the CAF isn't in combat arms regiments, and most of the ResF trades having issues with training aren't combat arms. Most support occupation/units don't have block leave apart from Christmas, when most of the CAF/GoC shuts down. Even then, some occupations/units work right through the holidays, because some things can't shut down.

My point was, that an institutional change to make the RegF spend it's summers training ResF would have massive and likely unintended consequences, that would need to be weighed against the potential benefit of getting a few more reservists through a few more courses.

The CAF is a big institution, and changes to the CAF as an institution need to be considered beyond how they would impact an infantry battalion.

And yet an Army is fundamentally about fielding infantry battalions (and cavalry squadrons and gun batteries).

The more complex we make a command the harder we make the ability to assemble, organize and train it.

Training rifle platoons, cavalry troops and gun sections is relatively easy and straight forwards. The difficult bit seems to come when capabilities that require more training and constant use are incorporated into the permanent structure of higher levels of command. When Atts become permanent if you will.

If infantry battalions were primarily about raising rifle companies then creating reserve mass would be a lot simpler. But when every battalion is seen as a mini battle group ready to take the field tonight, with all sorts of support elements and required Atts like Medics and MPs and Mechanics then we complicate things, and perhaps overly complicate them.

I have continually made reference to the difference between Woolwich and Sandhurst, between Ordnance and the Combat Arms, between scarlet and blue, and I would note the association of Woolwich and Greenwich.

The raising of an army is about creating mass and particularly massing infantry and cavalry. That is where the reserve system can excel.

The Ordnance is always going to be a different beast, and in that I include the Navy and the Air Force, the other blue suiters. That dichotomy has been recognized at least since the Hanoverians established the Corps of Engineers and Royal Regiment of Artillery at Woolwich Arsenal in 1716.

The Commissariat has a different set of skill sets, and provenance entirely, with ranks and promotions more akin to the police and the civil service.

Only in Canada, courtesy of Paul Hellyer, do we try to a Bombardier and a Corporal into the same thing. Or a Sergeant into a Stores Clerk. Actually, that isn't right. It isn't just in Canada.

But there are perfectly valid reasons for treating different trades differently. A career in an office, or one that requires a life at sea, or occasionally being called out to live in a tent in a desert for months, all require separate management.

So when Army.CA spends time talking about Army requirements, and that includes how to raise an effective mass army in an emergency, it isn't to denigrate the other professions that are necessary to the success of the army. Nor is it to ignore the importance of the Ordnance, the Navy and the Air Force to the national defence, with or without the army.

But the constant tendency of every discussion to revert to a discussion about the army reserve might suggest the centrality of the issue at least as far as the Army itself is concerned.

....

Every Army discussion starts with looking for more Privates for Majors to command. We maintain the number of regular infantry battalions and cavalry regiments, and even artillery and engineer regiments. This despite reducing the number of soldiers in the battalions to 40% of their authorised strength 40 years ago. We reduced the number of rifle companies from 4 to 3 to 2. We eliminated the support company and then re-raised it. We reduced the number of platoons in the companies left. We are reducing the number of sections in the platoons. We have reduced the size of the sections.

But we always maintain the number of command billets.

And then wonder how we are going to make up the numbers.

Of course everything ends up being a discussion about the reserve.



Everyone of you see this coat of arms on a daily basis.
The Lion and the Unicorn.
It is easy to discuss the attributes of the Unicorn.
The Lion is harder.

The Unicorn is the national animal of Scotland. It may as well be the mascot for the Canadian Army Reserves.

 

[KevinB]

The problem with this thinking is it forgets that most of the CAF isn't in combat arms regiments, and most of the ResF trades having issues with training aren't combat arms. Most support occupation/units don't have block leave apart from Christmas, when most of the CAF/GoC shuts down. Even then, some occupations/units work right through the holidays, because some things can't shut down.

Actually I’m of the opinion that most support trades need to be regular force.

The Schools (be it Infantry, Armour, or technical trade) should be able to run Reg Force course from Sept - March, and devote April to August for PRes Training.

My point was, that an institutional change to make the RegF spend it's summers training ResF would have massive and likely unintended consequences, that would need to be weighed against the potential benefit of getting a few more reservists through a few more courses.

Chicken v Egg.

If you want a larger PRes, the Reg Force is going to need to shoulder the growth.

The CAF is a big institution, and changes to the CAF as an institution need to be considered beyond how they would impact an infantry battalion.

I used the Infantry Bn as an easy example.
Mainly as the DP1 Infantry can be taught at pretty much any place that has the ability to conduct field firing, and doesn’t need to use ‘the schoolhouse’.

 

[FJAG]

But that maint battalion supported brigades that did not have integral maintenance companies.

Very true, and for the most part, except the armoured brigade, had limited vehicular equipment.

If I understand the LAD concept of the day, LADs formed what today would be the unit's maintenance platoons. I note that by the time of Normandy there were specific numbered "workshops" for each brigade which I assume would be the rough equivalent of today's brigade service battalion maintenance company. My very brief review of the material leaves me wondering what exactly was left of the "Army Field Workshop" that the division originally started the war with but I'd be quite surprised if there wasn't a company level type of organization left in the "Headquarters RCEME" that supported the divisional support troops.

I know very little about the details of the WW2 RCEME structure and my little delve into this was mostly piqued by @Infanteer's comment. It was a "squirrel" moment on my part. Something that I'm quite prone to.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Can someone please explain to me how exactly DND is supposed to realize a 2% savings while surging to a massive growth (while critical support departments like PSPC may be downsized).

A lot of our processes are mandated by TBS and/or GoC, so we can't trim there. We are augmenting with contractors already because we don't have enough people, and the GoC has directed us for over a decade to have things like ISSCs, engineering service contracts, or creation of DCC, so we just don't have the internal capacity anymore to do just core work without that, let alone grow.

Still haven't heard an announcement of the $900M/year O&M cuts being rolled back, and the only purse strings opened so far is on the capitol project side, so are we going to get stuck in this fantasy land where we're doing a lot of work to get new stuff, while existing infra continues to fall apart, part shelves stay empty and basic day to day things like ongoing training don't happen because we can't get the right colour bean to spend on maintenance and operations?

 

[FJAG]

My point was, that an institutional change to make the RegF spend it's summers training ResF would have massive and likely unintended consequences, that would need to be weighed against the potential benefit of getting a few more reservists through a few more courses.

The CAF is a big institution, and changes to the CAF as an institution need to be considered beyond how they would impact an infantry battalion.

But the constant tendency of every discussion to revert to a discussion about the army reserve might suggest the centrality of the issue at least as far as the Army itself is concerned.

Boy have we ever hit the heart of the debate here. You are both absolutely right while also reflecting the polarity that exists around these issues. For once I'm 100% on board with what you are saying @Kirkhill.

I agree with your comments, too, @Furniture. Your comments, while also 100% correct, are where the gap between the RegF and the ResF - especially ARes - appears. There is a need for an absolutely essential institutional change vis a vis the army and it does have institutional consequences. They are only "unintentional consequence" if they are not examined and accounted for in the plan. The problem is that we all - RegF and ARes alike - acknowledge that the ARes is a weak organization for multiple reasons. During Afghanistan we acknowledged how vital ARes augmentation is to any sustained war-fighting effort by Canada. The army has, as an institution, examined transformation of the ARes and the army as a whole in a serious way at least a half dozen times during my years of service. And yet the army has accomplished a net zero improvement.

My objection to the proposed 6 Div/7Div model (now and when it was floated for Force 2025) is that the Land Force Area (LFA) model of integrated RegF and ARes units worked for Afghanistan. For the most part - not always, but for the most part - LFAs were able to FG deployable brigade/TF headquarters and battlegroup entities based on their integral RegF units augmented by their own ARes units. There was a vested interest in each LFA to foster and nurture their ARes components because they relied on them. Force 2013 was designed to build on that but floundered due to lack of $ and interest. Basically, in peacetime the CAF reverts to being concerned about generating Class Bs to fill cubicles and not with generating a viable mass army for the field.

When I floated the 30/70 concept I was in fact building on the successful aspects Afghanistan FG model to bring the level of RegF/ARes integration to a lower, and more intimate, level so that the training of given ARes personnel came under the direct control of the full-time staff of the hybrid unit. Again, its a model of the RegF having a vested interest in the quality of their ARes counterparts at the level where it matters - the unit. As a biproduct the system would create more deployable battalion and brigade level headquarters to form around and create the mass needed for a mobilized army and spread the burden of peacetime operational deployments. It also provided the higher level CS and CSS forces needed and was a roadmap to a force equipping program.

My biggest opposition to the proposed 6 Div/7 Div model is that it makes it very convenient to, once again, not ask all those questions about unintended consequences by hiving the ARes off into a little world of their own. The first unintended, but foreseeable, consequence of this reorganization may very well be an even weaker ARes than we already have.

I'll go a step further @Furniture - all these questions, should not only be considered, but they should be answered and a viable plan of action developed and implemented.

Actually I’m of the opinion that most support trades need to be regular force.

I disagree.

Quite clearly there need to be more full-time support personnel than there currently are in peacetime but you will also need substantially more during a war. The whole NES system was an ad hoc structure poorly designed to meet the needs of a deployed force operating out of base camps. That system is utterly incapable of supporting a large deployed force operating in the field.

But many of the required CSS personnel for large scale deployments are not needed in large numbers during peacetime. You need enough to properly handle the supplies and maintenance held by the force. Logistics, maintenance, transport, and medical services can be greatly reduced during peacetime but need to be able to quickly scale up when the need arises. That requires a trained and equipped reserve CSS structure.

I know this will raise hackles (hopefully not blue ones) but lets be honest; many CSS trades are not rocket science at the DP1 level. Canada was able to fill out deployed NESs with All Trades and Ranks (ATR) ARes personnel as transport operators, warehouse staff and even wrench turners (I know of one ARes gunner who went over for the better part of a year working on in-theatre TLAV upgrades). What is needed is a large, core of trained and experienced leaders in these fields to mobilize on. These definitely need to be full-timers integrated into the mobilization plan. But that also needs a large base of adequately trained reservists to fill out the ranks.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Can someone please explain to me how exactly DND is supposed to realize a 2% savings while surging to a massive growth (while critical support departments like PSPC may be downsized).

It's a bird, it's a plane... no, it's