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Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

So whats the solution to this problem you say exists? Not let in Arabs? Or just not allow them to have an independent opinion?
 
So whats the solution to this problem you say exists? Not let in Arabs? Or just not allow them to have an independent opinion?

If your family has came from a county that doesn’t have a place on the coat of arms you don’t get to have an opinion for 75 years.
 
Let's get away from this xenophobic tangent and back to pondering defence capability in a 3.5% funding model.

No. The equivalent of what some here are discussing is if the RCAF started campaigning to field an entire division of fighters so that whole fighter wings could be rotated through Europe. There's fighter pilots who dream of that. Most of us would say it's impractical today.
There is no government policy endorsing expeditionary fighter wings. There is published government policy requiring the capability for sustaining an expeditionary brigade.

The specifics packages that we commit to are classified. That said, I have real doubts that they are anywhere close to the fantasies being discussed here. More likely something a long the lines of a full medium to heavy brigade with the ability to operate and resource a full division (ie provide all the enablers).
Details of national commitments and NATO's capability packages are described through various documents with a lot of information in the unclassified domain. You can fill in more details by connecting dots from government policy documents, like SSE which committed the CA to being capable fielding brigades and which commited to being capable of Canada taking the role of frame work nation for a MN mission (all during the era of only 1.3% GDP funding).

So, if Canada is providing just a brigade, that brigade needs to meet all the NATO capability expectations ... but also, we have learned anything we deploy needs some higher level enablers (combat support and combat service support) which may or may not be declared activities. If Canada puts a battlegroup into a theatre, we need to put some brigade capabilities there too (and sometimes some Division capabilities as well). If Canada puts a brigade into a theatre, we need to put some division and corps capabilities there too. If Canada wants to be a framework nation, it needs to sustain at least one manoeuvre brigade in theatre as well as a plurality of the division enablers and also some corps/theatre assets for national support.

While the RCAF could commit everything in the shop window on any given day to deliver its core mission in defence of Canada at home, sustainable expeditionary capabilities need a substantially larger force at home preparing. If Canada wants to sustain a Canadian brigade within a Canadian framework division, then CA needs a robust division to sustain that.

NATO would be foolish to rely on a country thousands of miles away to provide combat power that makes a difference. We're going to be best used as follow on forces and for a sincere effort at keeping Atlantic SLOCs open.
NATO would be foolish not to leverage all the potential at its disposal, including resources that arrive after D-Day when there will be holes that need to be plugged, penetrations that need to be countered, forces that need to be relieved, or opportunities that need to be exploited.
 
Whew! Good, Newfoundlanders have been allowed to have opinions for a year.
You try and stop them from having opinions. Only one example: My neighbour is a 85yo Newf lady who tells me how to raise my kids, look after my dogs and was telling the fire dept how to do their job when they were on a call to HER OWN HOUSE!

She's wonderful, give you the shirt off her back if you needed it, but boy, no one is stopping her from saying what she wants.
 
While the RCAF could commit everything in the shop window on any given day to deliver its core mission in defence of Canada at home, sustainable expeditionary capabilities need a substantially larger force at home preparing. If Canada wants to sustain a Canadian brigade within a Canadian framework division, then CA needs a robust division to sustain that.
This. Excellent way to put it. And to take it one step further, to sustain a division you need more than one division. Hence why the Army reorg will include a Sustainment Division (Log), Continental Defence Division (PRes Augments/replacments/trainers) and likely others which are being sketched out.

The RCN uses similar with 1 ship available, 2 in maintenance/training. Hence why most of the time our ships numbers are in units of 3 or 4 (looks sadly at only 2x JSS with 1xAsterix augmentation).
 
Let's get away from this xenophobic tangent and back to pondering defence capability in a 3.5% funding model.


There is no government policy endorsing expeditionary fighter wings. There is published government policy requiring the capability for sustaining an expeditionary brigade.


Details of national commitments and NATO's capability packages are described through various documents with a lot of information in the unclassified domain. You can fill in more details by connecting dots from government policy documents, like SSE which committed the CA to being capable fielding brigades and which commited to being capable of Canada taking the role of frame work nation for a MN mission (all during the era of only 1.3% GDP funding).

So, if Canada is providing just a brigade, that brigade needs to meet all the NATO capability expectations ... but also, we have learned anything we deploy needs some higher level enablers (combat support and combat service support) which may or may not be declared activities. If Canada puts a battlegroup into a theatre, we need to put some brigade capabilities there too (and sometimes some Division capabilities as well). If Canada puts a brigade into a theatre, we need to put some division and corps capabilities there too. If Canada wants to be a framework nation, it needs to sustain at least one manoeuvre brigade in theatre as well as a plurality of the division enablers and also some corps/theatre assets for national support.

While the RCAF could commit everything in the shop window on any given day to deliver its core mission in defence of Canada at home, sustainable expeditionary capabilities need a substantially larger force at home preparing. If Canada wants to sustain a Canadian brigade within a Canadian framework division, then CA needs a robust division to sustain that.


NATO would be foolish not to leverage all the potential at its disposal, including resources that arrive after D-Day when there will be holes that need to be plugged, penetrations that need to be countered, forces that need to be relieved, or opportunities that need to be exploited.

"Sustain" is an interesting word. The is a suggestion of a time element to it. How long do you expect to "sustain" the force and under what conditions?

Do we sustain it only in peace time?
Only until war breaks out?
Until the first engagement?
Until the force in place is exhausted?
Or do we sustain the force for the duration of the peace and the war until peace breaks out again?

It is one thing to keep a force in place in peacetime. It is another thing entirely once bullets start flying. The force that endured for 9 months in peace time, until the next rotation, may only last 72 hours in war time. And need to be replaced again, and again, and again ....

Thus the need for multiple brigades in waiting. But while they are waiting they can be doing other things. Like keeping the peace elsewhere. Helping out LEOs and firefighters and emergency workers at home. Or holding down civilian jobs.
 
This. Excellent way to put it. And to take it one step further, to sustain a division you need more than one division. Hence why the Army reorg will include a Sustainment Division (Log), Continental Defence Division (PRes Augments/replacments/trainers) and likely others which are being sketched out.

The RCN uses similar with 1 ship available, 2 in maintenance/training. Hence why most of the time our ships numbers are in units of 3 or 4 (looks sadly at only 2x JSS with 1xAsterix augmentation).
I believe that was the initial concept for the Cold War army of the early 50s albeit on a smaller scale. One brigade group for Korea, one for NATO in Germany and 3 at home to sustain them.
 
It requires at least one division, and then a backup division of replacements.

No, this isn't anything close to the motivation for the reorganization and investment.

The defence of continental Canada priorities are clearly Naval and Airforce. That's been stated many times on various channels/podcasts/media by the talking heads. No one is arguing that. However, the Canadian all encompassing defence strategy has always been "we fight over there so the fight doesn't come over here". And its worked. Its a Maritime geopolitical strategy (albet a rudimentary one). Similar to the British historical strategy. If we stop the threat far away it doesn't come to our shores (as much).

The re-org to a divisional model is because as we are looking towards near peer conflict again and move away from the Post Cold War small wars. Ukraine has shown that a division is the proper size for a square manouver element that has everything it needs to fight the full scale land conflict. Deep fires down to recce platoon.

As such re-org to the divisional model will allow Canada to mobilize, equip and train to the appropriate level needed to deploye a proper manouver element that remains entirely Canadian, under Canadian command with all the effectors, and no need to attach ourselves into some multinational division. This was the lesson from WW1, and re-enforced during WW2.

NATO's Eastern European countries know in their bones that Russia is coming for them next. Because they always do. And if Russia does come for them, we're gonna need a division to fight them properly.
I would argue a land portion to the defense of Canada has became a lot more important in the last 6 months.

My concern not being a American invasion, rather a American collapse (a la USSR). If that ever happens we don’t want to be the underarmed incapable of defending ourselves country we are, as the power vacuum resulting might get us sucked into it.

We are pretty much defenceless on our own. As much as we like to claim we are peaceful the reality is we are harmless. The Swiss are peaceful as they can defend themselves if they need/want to. We cannot, we rely on everyone else to do the heavy lifting for us. We are basically a state that exists on the good will of other states around us.
 
I would argue a land portion to the defense of Canada has became a lot more important in the last 6 months.

My concern not being a American invasion, rather a American collapse (a la USSR). If that ever happens we don’t want to be the underarmed incapable of defending ourselves country we are, as the power vacuum resulting might get us sucked into it.

We are pretty much defenceless on our own. As much as we like to claim we are peaceful the reality is we are harmless. The Swiss are peaceful as they can defend themselves if they need/want to. We cannot, we rely on everyone else to do the heavy lifting for us. We are basically a state that exists on the good will of other states around us.

I am not sure about the collapse of America but I agree with the last half of ypur post.
 
I am not sure about the collapse of America but I agree with the last half of ypur post.
I don't think collapse is the right word. Hostile takeover fits.

With the eroding of democratic institutions in the U.S. by the current Executive, I don't think we need to worry about a 1991USSR collapse; more a realization that we are now neighbours with Italy circa 1937.
 
I don't think collapse is the right word. Hostile takeover fits.

With the eroding of democratic institutions in the U.S. by the current Executive, I don't think we need to worry about a 1991USSR collapse; more a realization that we are now neighbours with Italy circa 1937.
Theres no such scenario that doesn't become at very least an insurgency, more likely a limited civil war.
 
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