They even had a poster made up... there was a 'short bus' person involved as I recall
The Canadian Marine Commando Regiment (CMCR) idea surfaced in the 1990s and 2000s as a proposal to create a littoral-focused, ship-to-shore special operations-capable unit combining naval mobility with commando tactics. Proponents argued it would fill capability gaps between the Royal Canadian Navy’s boarding teams, the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) regular infantry, and Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) special operations by providing scalable maritime raiding, reconnaissance, and direct-action options.
Why it did not materialize as a standalone regiment
Cost and fiscal priorities: Establishing and sustaining a bespoke marine commando regiment would have required significant investment in training, vessels, amphibious craft, sustainment, and specialized equipment. During the years the idea circulated, Canadian defence budgets and procurement priorities focused on higher-profile programs (e.g., Arctic sovereignty, frigates, submarines, the Aurora replacement), constraining funds for a new capability layered between existing forces.
Overlap with existing capabilities: Defence planners judged that many intended CMCR tasks could be covered by existing units via task-organized forces—Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) boarding parties, Naval Tactical Operations (boarding) teams, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) including JTF2 and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), and mechanized/infantry units for larger amphibious operations—reducing the imperative for a separate regiment.
Political and strategic direction: Canadian defence policy emphasized expeditionary contributions, Arctic/sovereignty presence, and alliance interoperability rather than creating a new, niche commando service. Without a clear national strategic driver and strong political backing, the proposal lacked momentum.
Organizational and doctrinal challenges: Creating a marine-commando culture, recruitment pipelines, and doctrine bridging navy and army cultures posed complexity. CANSOFCOM’s mandate and the RCN’s force posture made a single-service regiment awkward without multi-service command arrangements and explicit doctrine changes.
What happened instead (how capability needs were addressed)
Use of existing SOF and CAF units: CANSOFCOM and CSOR have absorbed many of the high-readiness, maritime-capable special tactics roles, with JTF2 reserved for the highest-risk direct-action missions. RCN developed boarding teams, enhanced shipborne force protection, and interoperable amphibious procedures with allies.
The report of the arrival of France's F.N. Tonnerre in Halifax should raise some issues for Canada. Tonnerre is a four-in-one vessel - helicopter carrier, hospital ship, command ship, and amphibious ship - that might have been a potential contender for the Big Honking Ship once touted by no less...
Approved by cabinet. But not yet in the CIP ready for public servants to start cranking out bid documents. But yes, a bit out of date. Either way, there's so much to be done to simply get the base force built up. Before we start talking about that 400 k future force.
Approved by cabinet. But not yet in the CIP ready for public servants to start cranking out bid documents. But yes, a bit out of date. Either way, there's so much to be done to simply get the base force built up. Before we start talking about that 400 k future force.
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