- Reaction score
- 19,532
- Points
- 1,160
I've lost a bit of touch with the divisional level thinking beyond the 1980s. I frankly didn't think there was except at the staff course level. By 1989 the theoretical structure of the DISGP was for it to own all CSS elements and to allocate a service battalion per manoeuvre brigade and had an additional logistics battalion, transportation battalion and maintenance battalion for the division as a whole.
Within the division, 1st line support comes from unit maintenance platoons. 2nd line comes support from brigade service battalions and from the divisional battalions for those organizations, like the arty brigade and the various divisional units, which were not part of a CMBG. 3rd line support came the corps service command (COSCOM).
The reason that the DISGP maintenance battalion had six companies is because it had a lot of divisional units to provide 2nd line support for. The same for the transport battalion which had a lot of responsibility for artillery ammunition.
In the CAMO structure, each of the divisional brigades - CMBG, fires bde, and CCSB - has its own service battalion so there is minimal need for any additional 2nd line CSS resources at div like the DISGP provided.
Like I said above, the doctrinal concept we learned was that 3rd and 4th line support came from above division. In large measure that was because divisions are too mobile to provide level 2 or above services (especially maintenance which would come from a 3rd line corps maintenance brigade which has the stability to conduct 3rd line reconditioning of assemblies and even 4th line workshop overhaul of equipment).
This is where my problem with the CAMO system comes in. It's neither fish nor fowl. By providing every brigade with a service battalion and by not having any resources above division, one is left wondering what the logistics battalion and maintenance battalion in the sustainment brigade are really for; do they provide 3rd line support within the division? are they to provide 3rd line theatre-level support in support of an independent deployed brigade or a rump division deployment. This is the problem when you throws over 20,000 RegF apples in one gigantic barrel that wants to be both a force generation and force employment entity.
As an example of other modernization programs take note that 101 Airborne Division is reorganizing its IBCTs under the US's Transformation in Contact initiative. Their IBCTs are changing into MBCTs and under the process each MBCT is loosing its artillery, engineers and brigade support battalions. Instead it sustainment brigade now has a division sustainment support battalion, a division sustainment troops battalion, three light support battalions and an MP battalion. There is no protection brigade. It wll be interesting to see what direction the armored divisions will go under TiC 2.0.
