- Reaction score
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- Points
- 410
Explain the decision of the Canadian government not to join the coalition in the war against Iraq.
The decision of the Canadian government not to participate in the American - led "coalition of the willing" that was intended to remove the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein from power, was an easy one. There were a wide variety of reasons, in the political, economic and strategic arenas for the Canadian spectator status, any one of which would have precluded a similar nation with similar characteristics and commitments from participating. Having said this, while Canada may not have been capable of, or willing to make a massive commitment to this war, a token military element, and political recognition of the wars' necessity and legitimacy could have been extended, but was not. Canada not only declined to join the coalition, but also questioned the reasons for the very existence of it, the accuracy of the most comprehensive security and intelligence apparatus in history, and exactly which aims the coalition was hoping to achieve in the long run. The Canadian federal political leadership did all of this with a federal election looming, two major trade disputes with the US ongoing, and world energy prices setting all time highs, setting the stage for a drastic cooling of both the Canadian and American economies. The decision of the Canadian government not to join the coalition in the war against Iraq was made for many reasons, and ultimately was supported by the majority of the voting blocs in Canada, validating this course of action.
The reasons for the Canadian government not participating in the Iraq war can most easily be separated into the two areas of political and strategic/military. Political reasons for the lack of participation are by nature, the most subjective, and prone to misinterpretation. Strategic and military motives are not as subjective, and easily quantifiable, if just as easily concealed, especially in the name of "national security". Additionally, the question of why Canadians chose not to support the war in Iraq, even if they did not participate in it is valid, especially since support for the war would have had significant benefits, must be asked.
Domestic Politics
Political reasons for the Canadian government choosing not to participate in the Iraq war were centered on one major feature. The majority of the Canadian public, from the time that the war became a possibility until it began, opposed Canadian participation in it. The Canadian government acted in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the electorate. Although this acting in accordance with the wishes of the electorate could be seen as a sign of a healthy democracy, there were other significant political factors, which precluded a move towards war, and were in the interests of the liberal government of then Prime Minister Jean Chretien, as well. The first of these reasons was the very survival of the liberal party of Canada as the ruling party. There was a federal election on the horizon when the possibility of war in Iraq became an issue. Both of the plausible choices for a controlling percentage of the vote immediately established their position on the matter, with the Conservatives, led by Stephen Harper strongly supporting a pro-war stance. The Liberals, led by the Prime Minister with his successor, Paul Martin waiting in the wings, were against the war on the basis that it (the anti war stance) was "consistent with decades of Canadian policy" The National Democratic Party (NDP), the fledgling Green Party and the Bloc Quebecquois all aligned themselves with the left leaning liberals. The failure of the Conservatives lay primarily in their assertations that Canada should support the US because of their status as a strong and faithful ally of Canada. The left countered that the looming war would be fought on false pretences, as the head UN weapons inspector, and head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Hans Blix, was unable to find any evidence of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that the US justified the invasion with. The whole conflict was colored by the suspicion held by people all over the world that the US was only invading Iraq to gain control of the considerable petroleum reserves it had, and strategically placed bases close to more of the same. If need be, neighbouring countries with more oil would be "liberated" to solidify US control of a market it no longer dominated. As Iraq has approximately 112.5 billion barrels of oil underneath it , the fifth largest reserves in the world, this was not an unreasonable suspicion.
United Nations - United in Opposition
Another significant political stumbling block to Canadian participation in the Iraq war was the lack of UN sanction for such an event. Although Iraq had been embargoed by the UN since the end of hostilities in the Gulf war of 1990-91, violations of the embargo had been ongoing and blatant, with some of the most active violators being members of the UN security council, namely France and Russia. Both of these nations were firmly opposed to the US invasion of Iraq, mostly due to the fact that Saddam Hussein's regime owed them billions of dollars for already-delivered arms and nuclear technology. A regime change would undoubtedly cause the country to default on these loans. China (also a permanent member of the security council) was also staunchly opposed to the US invasion, with allegations that the Chinese had been promised for sale at less than world prices all of the oil produced in the Kirkuk oil fields for a period of time in exchange for military equipment, political support and desperately needed cash. Canada's slavish adherence to UN resolutions prevented the government from viewing the possibility of these biases as influencing the UN position on the matter though, and one of the major reasons for Canada (and Canadians in general) opposing the war was the lack of UN support. It should be noted however, that the lack of UN support for the US invasion of Iraq was based upon the failure of the IAEA President and chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix, to discover any of the WMD that the Americans alleged Iraq had, to attack Iraq in order to defend themselves from future aggression. That the US knew Iraq possessed WMD, particularly certain biological agents, namely anthrax, was a non - issue, as the US had given anthrax spores to Iraq when it was at war with another erstwhile US ally, Iran, in the 1980s.
Anti-War Reasons - Real and Created
There are aspects of the Canadian political picture that were less tangible at the same time (early 2003) that the US was preparing for war. First and most importantly, it is very popular policy in Ottawa and most of Canada to refuse to do the bidding of the United States, or join it in various excursions around the globe. Canadian politicians have always enjoyed popularity (in the short term) for opposing the US publicly, as both John Diefenbaker and Pierre Trudeau demonstrated. The Iraq war was no different, with Prime Minister Chretien waffling on the issue of sending troops, before finally deciding that his reasoning was that the UN had not authorised the invasion, which was therefore illegal under international law. There was also the issue that Canada had already contributed a significant number of troops and resources to the Afghan war to unseat the Taliban in 2002, and regarded this military commitment as long term and ongoing. Chretien may have wished to make Canada's sole contribution to the "War Against Terrorism" as Bush called it, to Afghanistan. This was an expedient solution for the Liberals as the mission in Afghanistan could be spun as "Peacekeeping" or "Stabilization" operations, which are much more palatable to the Canadian public. With a federal election looming, the possibility of Canadian troops coming home in body bags fighting a war in Iraq was unacceptable when a relatively safe Afghan mission could be undertaken instead. The Canadian public is generally supportive of military activity that can be construed as anything other than offensive combat operations. In the end, this action was taken, with Canada claiming (somewhat truthfully) that the nation was not capable of committing to the Iraq war due to commitments in Afghanistan. As a result, the practice of "deflecting" the Canadian Forces to an area where the Americans are not asking for them, but that is far less dangerous, and less likely to fail than the riskier American areas of responsibility continues. The final, and perhaps most influential aspect of the Canadian political climate in early 2003 was that there was not a great deal of goodwill towards the United States of America, or her president. The post September 11 2001 international outpouring of sympathy had abated. Canada had gone to war in Afghanistan for the first time since the Korean War on the basis that an ally had been attacked, with strong public support. The friendly-fire incident of April 2002, which killed four Canadian soldiers and wounded eight more was still fresh in the minds of many, as was the lack of punishment for the US pilot who bombed them. The ongoing softwood lumber dispute, which was devastating parts of the British Columbian lumber industry was far more important to many Canadians, as were the ongoing trade disputes over water rights and environmental issues that the United States seemed to dismiss in light of the far more pressing need for allies in the coming war. The Canadian public was wary of committing lives and money to a war in which the US had yet to provide any reason for. Canadians seemed to regard George Bush as a warmonger, and ignorant of the rest of the world and their priorities . In addition to this, the Canadian public was suspicious of US claims of WMD in Iraq, and consistently requested better evidence, which the UN and their investigators could not produce. This suspicion was eventually borne out when the American State Department admitted in 2004 that some of their pre-war intelligence regarding WMD in Iraq was "shaky". Finally, the general public did not view the US as a good neighbour. Many Canadians believed that US influence in Canada was already too great, and to do US bidding in committing troops was not a popular choice. Canada signing up to fight an American war on dubious pretences in this political climate was simply unacceptable. The Canadian public simply did not want to be dictated to by the US, and the Canadian government, with an election so near, heeded the electorate.
Military and Strategic Realities
While Canadian participation in what came to be termed "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was debated from the beginning as a partnership of equals between powerful national militaries, all but the most delusional followers of Canadian politics were painfully aware of the lack of Canadian military might available to undertake such a mission. The strategic realities that undoubtedly had an impact on the government's willingness to wage war on Iraq can be most easily divided into two areas. The first area is that of the "not possible", that is, practical factors which would have posed insurmountable obstacles to any Canadian military deployment. The second area is that of the "not willing", or factors which would have had surmountable obstacles, but unpleasant consequences to them. Both of these areas played important factors in the lack of Canadian participation, and must be considered alone and in conjunction with the political realities at the time.
Not Possible
There were several problems that the Canadian Forces (CF) would have to overcome in order to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The first was getting there. The CF has no long-range heavy lift capability, by air or sea, and as a result relies upon civilian contractors to move Canadian military equipment around the world. This has led to a few embarrassing mishaps, one in which a civilian transport loaded with military vehicles and munitions had to be boarded by the Canadian Navy in order to compel it to return to Canada after the CF did not pay the bill! More seriously, the CF is not able to project ground force outside of Canada without the co-operation of properly equipped allies. In addition to this, the medium lift aircraft capability of the CF was already completely overwhelmed by the sustainment requirements of Operations Apollo and Athena, the Canadian commitments to Afghanistan. While the US or Britain probably would have been willing to transport Canadian troops to Iraq, the capabilities of the CF present a definite problem when the nation wishes to act in the manner of a wealthy, powerful nation, but only has the military equipment of a poor, weak one. There is also the problem of supplying and maintaining those soldiers, even if they were deployed. Canada does simply not have the capability, and commercial transport is expensive and unreliable.
Out-Gunned
Even if the Canadian military were able to reach Iraq with a motley collection of civilian transport and assistance from her allies, the Canadian Forces, most notably the army, would be unable to take a leading role anyway. The equipment of many of the Iraqi army units that Canadian troops may have faced is superior to that of the Canadian army! There is a real danger that Canadian Mechanised units may have lost decisively had they been engaged by some of the better Iraqi units, namely the Republican Guard Divisions and the Special Republican Guard. This is compounded by the lack of air superiority that the Canadian army has come to expect on operations. While there is little doubt that the Canadian Military is, as a group better trained than the Iraqis, the fact of the matter is that most modern armoured fighting vehicles, even of Russian/Federation of Independent States (FIS) design have eclipsed the capabilities of Canadian military equipment, in terms of speed, range of weapons, effectiveness of those weapons and targeting capabilities. Russia and the FIS are the primary arms suppliers of Iraq. In short, if Canadian troops were deployed to Iraq with the intent of undertaking a combat role, it is entirely possible that they may have sustained very high casualties or even been defeated in battle by the better equipped Iraqis. To mitigate this, they would have undoubtedly been employed in rear areas, doing primarily administrative duties, as they were in the Gulf War of 1991. Since the Canadian Government was unwilling to contribute troops in the first place, this was an unlikely scenario.
Troop Shortage
Even before the end of the Cold War in 1992, the Canadian Governments, Conservative and Liberal alike, have been drastically cutting the size of the uniformed side of the Department of National Defence, mostly as cost savings measures. This continual cutting of the defence budget has continued under various banners, first as the collection of the "peace dividend" in the immediate post Cold War years, then under the aegis of "Internationalist" thought, under which a powerful, or even respectable military seemed to be out of style, and an admission of the failure of diplomacy. Throughout this period (1984-1999) however, the CF took on twenty-two new missions at the government's behest, with capabilities and resources being taxed brutally in the process. The end result of this was that the CF had been reduced to three effective Brigade Groups (approximately five thousand strong each) by the end of 1994, and each of these relied upon the other two for specialised equipment and ammunition for which to train with for any upcoming deployments. The total strength of the CF (army, navy and air force) numbered a tiny sixty thousand by the end of 1998 . In addition to this, there was only enough air transport to supply one of these Brigades beyond our borders! The end result of this vigorous budget cutting and regular clawbacks, was that the Canadian Forces was incapable of supporting both an ongoing commitment of 700 - 2000 troops in Afghanistan, and any commitment of any size in Iraq. There were simply not enough troops to go around.
Not Willing
Although this essay has outlined the lack of political will associated with the possibility of combat in Iraq, there was also hesitation on the part of the Canadian Forces to go to Iraq as well. These reasons are easily divided into three areas of concern. The first is that a real "shooting war" is incredibly expensive. Transportation, fuel, rations, munitions and spare parts are far more expensive than any comparable civilian equipment. To make matters worse, the military is also tied into restrictive, politically influenced and slow procurement methods, which hamstring their efforts to supply themselves. The CF had no significant "war stocks" in early 2003, with which to sustain a formation in the field, and no funding was available to replenish them in a timely manner. The second reason is that the CF was concerned about entering an open-ended conflict, which would have years of low intensity conflict ahead. This would mean a serious drain on the manpower of all three services, and with little political support at home, the likelihood of the proper funding for such an adventure was slight. The third, and perhaps most influential reason that the CF was wary of participation in the Iraq war is that it would have brought into the spotlight not only the effects of years of government neglect, but the woeful unreadiness of the CF itself. The possibility that the Canadian public may have found out that the Canadian Forces does not have the capability to move even a single tank and crew to Iraq without the help of civilian transport ships, and even if they did, could not have fed the crew or maintained that tank, may have been too much for Canada's Generals. Even if a single brigade had been deployed, it would have required the "borrowing" of all of the operational vehicles in Canada, in the hopes that one in three could be used. In short, the Canadian Forces was not ready for a deployment to Iraq, and would have been ineffective almost immediately upon arriving there. The leadership of the CF knew this, and opposed the possible deployment.
Support the War?
The vast majority of the nations who comprised the "Coalition of the willing" in the invasion of Iraq did not actually participate in the invasion at all. There were thirty such nations, plus an unidentified number of Arab nations and Israel, who chose to be excluded from the list, for domestic political reasons. Only Spain, Australia, the United Kingdom and the US committed troops for the initial invasion, with some of the other nations contributing once the war was over and "stabilization" efforts had begun. But the question remains. If Canada was not prepared to participate in the war, could the nation not at least voice her support for it? The answer, both in the press and in the area of popular opinion was a resounding "no". Most Canadians, although more in eastern Canada than in the west and especially in Quebec, opposed the war, although a majority were willing to consider participation if the UN sanctioned action against Saddam Hussein's regime. The interesting point here is that the terms "support" and "participate" seemed to be used interchangeably. The fact that both of these terms have very different meanings, and courses of action for any sovereign nation seemed to go unnoticed. The Canadian public seemed to revel in the chance to refuse to do the bidding of the US, or even to accept their reasons for war at face value. There seemed to be a deep cynicism of the American motives, and those of President Bush. Interestingly, none of these cynicisms were linked to Canadian consumer behaviour, or were detrimental to cross border trade, suggesting that this was simply a childish fit of anti-Americanism, and not a very prudent one at that. Considering that Canada and Canadian Corporations could have profited handsomely from the war, as many had done in the first Gulf war in 1991, the fact that so many Canadians and the federal government chose to condemn the US for the war seems to be unwise. (Canada was specifically excluded from eligibility for application for lucrative contracts to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure) Nevertheless, the Canadian government, while not condemning the Iraq war, refused to offer any helpful words to the US, other than to state that thirty-one exchange officers presently employed in the American armed forces would not be recalled. The end result was that the Canadian government was unwilling to take a position on the Iraq war unless the UN did first, and the Canadian public supported them in this aspect.
End Result
The end result of this chapter of Canadian history was that Canada did not commit any ground troops to the Iraq war, other than those exchange officers who were already committed to US units being deployed. Canada did however, fulfill her NATO obligations of the use of Canadian airspace, continued the commitments of ground troops in Afghanistan, and also continued the operations of ships of the Canadian Navy in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, which is ongoing. So while the Canadian Government chose not to support this particular theatre of the American War against Terrorism, they acted in direct support of other theatres, freeing up US troops and materiel for use elsewhere. While this was undoubtedly beneficial to the US, the support of an ally with which they have more in common than any other nation is what the US was primarily interested in. The support, if not direct participation of Canada would have lent a veneer of credibility to the Iraq war, which is probably precisely why it was withheld, and why Canada was correct in doing so. The unflinching support of a war which was fought on false pretences, (as it appears to have been) would not have been a positive event for Canada or Canadian aims on the world stage, and would have damaged Canadian diplomatic credibility. This would have made Canada appear to be only an American colony, with little choice in the execution of domestic or international affairs.
The decision of the Canadian government not to go to war in Iraq was indeed an easy one. Canadians did not support the war, or Canadian participation in it. In fact, there was a great deal of animosity towards the US for the actions that took place against the regime of Saddam Hussein. This animosity extended towards the President and his party, widely regarded as elitist warmongers. The Canadian government responded to this groundswell of popular opposition and refused to contribute a land component to the war. The decision not to go to war was made even easier by the short handed and ill-equipped CF, which was tottering under the strain of modest commitments to Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. That the Canadian Forces could have even made a meaningful contribution is doubtful, and even if they had, would have "cleared the shelves" of money, manpower and equipment, which successive governments in recent history refuse to pay to replace. In conclusion, the Canadian government did not participate in the war in Iraq because the Canadian public did not want them to, and Canada did not have a credible contribution to make in terms of military might even if they had.
The decision of the Canadian government not to participate in the American - led "coalition of the willing" that was intended to remove the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein from power, was an easy one. There were a wide variety of reasons, in the political, economic and strategic arenas for the Canadian spectator status, any one of which would have precluded a similar nation with similar characteristics and commitments from participating. Having said this, while Canada may not have been capable of, or willing to make a massive commitment to this war, a token military element, and political recognition of the wars' necessity and legitimacy could have been extended, but was not. Canada not only declined to join the coalition, but also questioned the reasons for the very existence of it, the accuracy of the most comprehensive security and intelligence apparatus in history, and exactly which aims the coalition was hoping to achieve in the long run. The Canadian federal political leadership did all of this with a federal election looming, two major trade disputes with the US ongoing, and world energy prices setting all time highs, setting the stage for a drastic cooling of both the Canadian and American economies. The decision of the Canadian government not to join the coalition in the war against Iraq was made for many reasons, and ultimately was supported by the majority of the voting blocs in Canada, validating this course of action.
The reasons for the Canadian government not participating in the Iraq war can most easily be separated into the two areas of political and strategic/military. Political reasons for the lack of participation are by nature, the most subjective, and prone to misinterpretation. Strategic and military motives are not as subjective, and easily quantifiable, if just as easily concealed, especially in the name of "national security". Additionally, the question of why Canadians chose not to support the war in Iraq, even if they did not participate in it is valid, especially since support for the war would have had significant benefits, must be asked.
Domestic Politics
Political reasons for the Canadian government choosing not to participate in the Iraq war were centered on one major feature. The majority of the Canadian public, from the time that the war became a possibility until it began, opposed Canadian participation in it. The Canadian government acted in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the electorate. Although this acting in accordance with the wishes of the electorate could be seen as a sign of a healthy democracy, there were other significant political factors, which precluded a move towards war, and were in the interests of the liberal government of then Prime Minister Jean Chretien, as well. The first of these reasons was the very survival of the liberal party of Canada as the ruling party. There was a federal election on the horizon when the possibility of war in Iraq became an issue. Both of the plausible choices for a controlling percentage of the vote immediately established their position on the matter, with the Conservatives, led by Stephen Harper strongly supporting a pro-war stance. The Liberals, led by the Prime Minister with his successor, Paul Martin waiting in the wings, were against the war on the basis that it (the anti war stance) was "consistent with decades of Canadian policy" The National Democratic Party (NDP), the fledgling Green Party and the Bloc Quebecquois all aligned themselves with the left leaning liberals. The failure of the Conservatives lay primarily in their assertations that Canada should support the US because of their status as a strong and faithful ally of Canada. The left countered that the looming war would be fought on false pretences, as the head UN weapons inspector, and head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Hans Blix, was unable to find any evidence of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that the US justified the invasion with. The whole conflict was colored by the suspicion held by people all over the world that the US was only invading Iraq to gain control of the considerable petroleum reserves it had, and strategically placed bases close to more of the same. If need be, neighbouring countries with more oil would be "liberated" to solidify US control of a market it no longer dominated. As Iraq has approximately 112.5 billion barrels of oil underneath it , the fifth largest reserves in the world, this was not an unreasonable suspicion.
United Nations - United in Opposition
Another significant political stumbling block to Canadian participation in the Iraq war was the lack of UN sanction for such an event. Although Iraq had been embargoed by the UN since the end of hostilities in the Gulf war of 1990-91, violations of the embargo had been ongoing and blatant, with some of the most active violators being members of the UN security council, namely France and Russia. Both of these nations were firmly opposed to the US invasion of Iraq, mostly due to the fact that Saddam Hussein's regime owed them billions of dollars for already-delivered arms and nuclear technology. A regime change would undoubtedly cause the country to default on these loans. China (also a permanent member of the security council) was also staunchly opposed to the US invasion, with allegations that the Chinese had been promised for sale at less than world prices all of the oil produced in the Kirkuk oil fields for a period of time in exchange for military equipment, political support and desperately needed cash. Canada's slavish adherence to UN resolutions prevented the government from viewing the possibility of these biases as influencing the UN position on the matter though, and one of the major reasons for Canada (and Canadians in general) opposing the war was the lack of UN support. It should be noted however, that the lack of UN support for the US invasion of Iraq was based upon the failure of the IAEA President and chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix, to discover any of the WMD that the Americans alleged Iraq had, to attack Iraq in order to defend themselves from future aggression. That the US knew Iraq possessed WMD, particularly certain biological agents, namely anthrax, was a non - issue, as the US had given anthrax spores to Iraq when it was at war with another erstwhile US ally, Iran, in the 1980s.
Anti-War Reasons - Real and Created
There are aspects of the Canadian political picture that were less tangible at the same time (early 2003) that the US was preparing for war. First and most importantly, it is very popular policy in Ottawa and most of Canada to refuse to do the bidding of the United States, or join it in various excursions around the globe. Canadian politicians have always enjoyed popularity (in the short term) for opposing the US publicly, as both John Diefenbaker and Pierre Trudeau demonstrated. The Iraq war was no different, with Prime Minister Chretien waffling on the issue of sending troops, before finally deciding that his reasoning was that the UN had not authorised the invasion, which was therefore illegal under international law. There was also the issue that Canada had already contributed a significant number of troops and resources to the Afghan war to unseat the Taliban in 2002, and regarded this military commitment as long term and ongoing. Chretien may have wished to make Canada's sole contribution to the "War Against Terrorism" as Bush called it, to Afghanistan. This was an expedient solution for the Liberals as the mission in Afghanistan could be spun as "Peacekeeping" or "Stabilization" operations, which are much more palatable to the Canadian public. With a federal election looming, the possibility of Canadian troops coming home in body bags fighting a war in Iraq was unacceptable when a relatively safe Afghan mission could be undertaken instead. The Canadian public is generally supportive of military activity that can be construed as anything other than offensive combat operations. In the end, this action was taken, with Canada claiming (somewhat truthfully) that the nation was not capable of committing to the Iraq war due to commitments in Afghanistan. As a result, the practice of "deflecting" the Canadian Forces to an area where the Americans are not asking for them, but that is far less dangerous, and less likely to fail than the riskier American areas of responsibility continues. The final, and perhaps most influential aspect of the Canadian political climate in early 2003 was that there was not a great deal of goodwill towards the United States of America, or her president. The post September 11 2001 international outpouring of sympathy had abated. Canada had gone to war in Afghanistan for the first time since the Korean War on the basis that an ally had been attacked, with strong public support. The friendly-fire incident of April 2002, which killed four Canadian soldiers and wounded eight more was still fresh in the minds of many, as was the lack of punishment for the US pilot who bombed them. The ongoing softwood lumber dispute, which was devastating parts of the British Columbian lumber industry was far more important to many Canadians, as were the ongoing trade disputes over water rights and environmental issues that the United States seemed to dismiss in light of the far more pressing need for allies in the coming war. The Canadian public was wary of committing lives and money to a war in which the US had yet to provide any reason for. Canadians seemed to regard George Bush as a warmonger, and ignorant of the rest of the world and their priorities . In addition to this, the Canadian public was suspicious of US claims of WMD in Iraq, and consistently requested better evidence, which the UN and their investigators could not produce. This suspicion was eventually borne out when the American State Department admitted in 2004 that some of their pre-war intelligence regarding WMD in Iraq was "shaky". Finally, the general public did not view the US as a good neighbour. Many Canadians believed that US influence in Canada was already too great, and to do US bidding in committing troops was not a popular choice. Canada signing up to fight an American war on dubious pretences in this political climate was simply unacceptable. The Canadian public simply did not want to be dictated to by the US, and the Canadian government, with an election so near, heeded the electorate.
Military and Strategic Realities
While Canadian participation in what came to be termed "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was debated from the beginning as a partnership of equals between powerful national militaries, all but the most delusional followers of Canadian politics were painfully aware of the lack of Canadian military might available to undertake such a mission. The strategic realities that undoubtedly had an impact on the government's willingness to wage war on Iraq can be most easily divided into two areas. The first area is that of the "not possible", that is, practical factors which would have posed insurmountable obstacles to any Canadian military deployment. The second area is that of the "not willing", or factors which would have had surmountable obstacles, but unpleasant consequences to them. Both of these areas played important factors in the lack of Canadian participation, and must be considered alone and in conjunction with the political realities at the time.
Not Possible
There were several problems that the Canadian Forces (CF) would have to overcome in order to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The first was getting there. The CF has no long-range heavy lift capability, by air or sea, and as a result relies upon civilian contractors to move Canadian military equipment around the world. This has led to a few embarrassing mishaps, one in which a civilian transport loaded with military vehicles and munitions had to be boarded by the Canadian Navy in order to compel it to return to Canada after the CF did not pay the bill! More seriously, the CF is not able to project ground force outside of Canada without the co-operation of properly equipped allies. In addition to this, the medium lift aircraft capability of the CF was already completely overwhelmed by the sustainment requirements of Operations Apollo and Athena, the Canadian commitments to Afghanistan. While the US or Britain probably would have been willing to transport Canadian troops to Iraq, the capabilities of the CF present a definite problem when the nation wishes to act in the manner of a wealthy, powerful nation, but only has the military equipment of a poor, weak one. There is also the problem of supplying and maintaining those soldiers, even if they were deployed. Canada does simply not have the capability, and commercial transport is expensive and unreliable.
Out-Gunned
Even if the Canadian military were able to reach Iraq with a motley collection of civilian transport and assistance from her allies, the Canadian Forces, most notably the army, would be unable to take a leading role anyway. The equipment of many of the Iraqi army units that Canadian troops may have faced is superior to that of the Canadian army! There is a real danger that Canadian Mechanised units may have lost decisively had they been engaged by some of the better Iraqi units, namely the Republican Guard Divisions and the Special Republican Guard. This is compounded by the lack of air superiority that the Canadian army has come to expect on operations. While there is little doubt that the Canadian Military is, as a group better trained than the Iraqis, the fact of the matter is that most modern armoured fighting vehicles, even of Russian/Federation of Independent States (FIS) design have eclipsed the capabilities of Canadian military equipment, in terms of speed, range of weapons, effectiveness of those weapons and targeting capabilities. Russia and the FIS are the primary arms suppliers of Iraq. In short, if Canadian troops were deployed to Iraq with the intent of undertaking a combat role, it is entirely possible that they may have sustained very high casualties or even been defeated in battle by the better equipped Iraqis. To mitigate this, they would have undoubtedly been employed in rear areas, doing primarily administrative duties, as they were in the Gulf War of 1991. Since the Canadian Government was unwilling to contribute troops in the first place, this was an unlikely scenario.
Troop Shortage
Even before the end of the Cold War in 1992, the Canadian Governments, Conservative and Liberal alike, have been drastically cutting the size of the uniformed side of the Department of National Defence, mostly as cost savings measures. This continual cutting of the defence budget has continued under various banners, first as the collection of the "peace dividend" in the immediate post Cold War years, then under the aegis of "Internationalist" thought, under which a powerful, or even respectable military seemed to be out of style, and an admission of the failure of diplomacy. Throughout this period (1984-1999) however, the CF took on twenty-two new missions at the government's behest, with capabilities and resources being taxed brutally in the process. The end result of this was that the CF had been reduced to three effective Brigade Groups (approximately five thousand strong each) by the end of 1994, and each of these relied upon the other two for specialised equipment and ammunition for which to train with for any upcoming deployments. The total strength of the CF (army, navy and air force) numbered a tiny sixty thousand by the end of 1998 . In addition to this, there was only enough air transport to supply one of these Brigades beyond our borders! The end result of this vigorous budget cutting and regular clawbacks, was that the Canadian Forces was incapable of supporting both an ongoing commitment of 700 - 2000 troops in Afghanistan, and any commitment of any size in Iraq. There were simply not enough troops to go around.
Not Willing
Although this essay has outlined the lack of political will associated with the possibility of combat in Iraq, there was also hesitation on the part of the Canadian Forces to go to Iraq as well. These reasons are easily divided into three areas of concern. The first is that a real "shooting war" is incredibly expensive. Transportation, fuel, rations, munitions and spare parts are far more expensive than any comparable civilian equipment. To make matters worse, the military is also tied into restrictive, politically influenced and slow procurement methods, which hamstring their efforts to supply themselves. The CF had no significant "war stocks" in early 2003, with which to sustain a formation in the field, and no funding was available to replenish them in a timely manner. The second reason is that the CF was concerned about entering an open-ended conflict, which would have years of low intensity conflict ahead. This would mean a serious drain on the manpower of all three services, and with little political support at home, the likelihood of the proper funding for such an adventure was slight. The third, and perhaps most influential reason that the CF was wary of participation in the Iraq war is that it would have brought into the spotlight not only the effects of years of government neglect, but the woeful unreadiness of the CF itself. The possibility that the Canadian public may have found out that the Canadian Forces does not have the capability to move even a single tank and crew to Iraq without the help of civilian transport ships, and even if they did, could not have fed the crew or maintained that tank, may have been too much for Canada's Generals. Even if a single brigade had been deployed, it would have required the "borrowing" of all of the operational vehicles in Canada, in the hopes that one in three could be used. In short, the Canadian Forces was not ready for a deployment to Iraq, and would have been ineffective almost immediately upon arriving there. The leadership of the CF knew this, and opposed the possible deployment.
Support the War?
The vast majority of the nations who comprised the "Coalition of the willing" in the invasion of Iraq did not actually participate in the invasion at all. There were thirty such nations, plus an unidentified number of Arab nations and Israel, who chose to be excluded from the list, for domestic political reasons. Only Spain, Australia, the United Kingdom and the US committed troops for the initial invasion, with some of the other nations contributing once the war was over and "stabilization" efforts had begun. But the question remains. If Canada was not prepared to participate in the war, could the nation not at least voice her support for it? The answer, both in the press and in the area of popular opinion was a resounding "no". Most Canadians, although more in eastern Canada than in the west and especially in Quebec, opposed the war, although a majority were willing to consider participation if the UN sanctioned action against Saddam Hussein's regime. The interesting point here is that the terms "support" and "participate" seemed to be used interchangeably. The fact that both of these terms have very different meanings, and courses of action for any sovereign nation seemed to go unnoticed. The Canadian public seemed to revel in the chance to refuse to do the bidding of the US, or even to accept their reasons for war at face value. There seemed to be a deep cynicism of the American motives, and those of President Bush. Interestingly, none of these cynicisms were linked to Canadian consumer behaviour, or were detrimental to cross border trade, suggesting that this was simply a childish fit of anti-Americanism, and not a very prudent one at that. Considering that Canada and Canadian Corporations could have profited handsomely from the war, as many had done in the first Gulf war in 1991, the fact that so many Canadians and the federal government chose to condemn the US for the war seems to be unwise. (Canada was specifically excluded from eligibility for application for lucrative contracts to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure) Nevertheless, the Canadian government, while not condemning the Iraq war, refused to offer any helpful words to the US, other than to state that thirty-one exchange officers presently employed in the American armed forces would not be recalled. The end result was that the Canadian government was unwilling to take a position on the Iraq war unless the UN did first, and the Canadian public supported them in this aspect.
End Result
The end result of this chapter of Canadian history was that Canada did not commit any ground troops to the Iraq war, other than those exchange officers who were already committed to US units being deployed. Canada did however, fulfill her NATO obligations of the use of Canadian airspace, continued the commitments of ground troops in Afghanistan, and also continued the operations of ships of the Canadian Navy in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, which is ongoing. So while the Canadian Government chose not to support this particular theatre of the American War against Terrorism, they acted in direct support of other theatres, freeing up US troops and materiel for use elsewhere. While this was undoubtedly beneficial to the US, the support of an ally with which they have more in common than any other nation is what the US was primarily interested in. The support, if not direct participation of Canada would have lent a veneer of credibility to the Iraq war, which is probably precisely why it was withheld, and why Canada was correct in doing so. The unflinching support of a war which was fought on false pretences, (as it appears to have been) would not have been a positive event for Canada or Canadian aims on the world stage, and would have damaged Canadian diplomatic credibility. This would have made Canada appear to be only an American colony, with little choice in the execution of domestic or international affairs.
The decision of the Canadian government not to go to war in Iraq was indeed an easy one. Canadians did not support the war, or Canadian participation in it. In fact, there was a great deal of animosity towards the US for the actions that took place against the regime of Saddam Hussein. This animosity extended towards the President and his party, widely regarded as elitist warmongers. The Canadian government responded to this groundswell of popular opposition and refused to contribute a land component to the war. The decision not to go to war was made even easier by the short handed and ill-equipped CF, which was tottering under the strain of modest commitments to Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. That the Canadian Forces could have even made a meaningful contribution is doubtful, and even if they had, would have "cleared the shelves" of money, manpower and equipment, which successive governments in recent history refuse to pay to replace. In conclusion, the Canadian government did not participate in the war in Iraq because the Canadian public did not want them to, and Canada did not have a credible contribution to make in terms of military might even if they had.
