Canada's tanks

[Kirkhill]

And while we debate how to make World War 2 relevant to the world today RUSI is publishing articles like this:

Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine

Ukrainian forces have begun to develop novel approaches to combined arms manoeuvre, incorporating new capabilities, that bear scrutiny for NATO armies.

www.rusi.org

Contested or Grey Zone - the point of contact beyond FLOT
Mid Zone - zone from which enemy supplies support (C5ISR, EW, Arty, UAV)
Deep Zone - Log support (rail, road, warehouses, factories, camps)
Open Ground - beyond the reach of effective enemy fire.

Contested fronts typically 15 km for a battlegroup
Mid Zone 30 km beyond the contested area (to me that suggests that the area of operations for a battle group is 75 km wide and 30 km deep)
Deep Zone is beyond the Mid Zone.
Open Ground is a long, long way away.

The battlespace is transparent
Both sides can quickly match concenrtration of force with concentration of effect.

Russians have material and manpower advantages but can't exploit them even though the Ukrainians have been forced by necessity to experiment with UxVs of all types.

The Russians have been reduced to hiding two men under a tent, like two men in a cow costume, blind, and directing them by radio while their commander observes their progress by UAV. Practice your "Pin-The-Tail-On-The-Donkey" skills.

Once the Russians have infiltrated a section into position, a process that can take days, assuming the Ukrainians haven't been watching them concentrate at the FUP and waiting for a juicy target, then the group breaks cover.

The Russians have been getting better at countering the UxVs so both sides are becoming stymied.

New pla developing - bite and hold variant.

7 phases.

Survey - 24 to 48 hours

Isolate - 24 to 48 hours

Degrade - 24 to 48 hours

Fix - FPVs loitering overhead reduces enemy movement

Suppress - infiltrate LOS support weapons on UGVs to hides covering the enemy, EW,
- conventional artillery and supersonic missiles ( can't be heard arriving - sonic boom arrives after impact boom)

Close and Destroy - tanks and APCs, tracked tanks draw fire but can withstand 10 to 15 FPV hits

• wheeled APCs are preferred because they can cover distances faster allowing the infantry to be held to the rear and join the tanks on the objective after it has been suppressed by EW, UxVs, LAMs and Arty of various types.
• tracked APCs are held in unit stocks for occasions when terrain requires them

Consolidate - assault force replaced by consolidating force and withdrawn

• consolidate beyond the objective, not on the objective
• consolidation troops supplied by UGVs and UAVs
• no 120 lb packs and coils of concertina.

Sounds like a role for teleoperated Bobcats here.

 

[Kirkhill]

From the previous article

"Howitzers and Mortars

Artillery pieces remain fundamental to Ukrainian operations. Howitzers and mortars have several advantages over UAVs for conducting strikes:

Their engagements have a low latency between fire and effect.

The kinetic energy and explosive payload they deliver increases the damage inflicted.

A single system can fire multiple ammunition natures to deliver different effects.

Howitzers can suppress enemy infantry with cluster munitions, destroy enemy fighting positions with high explosives, fire sensor-fuzed munitions to knock out moving vehicles or use laser-guided munitions to eliminate point targets.

Howitzers and mortars do not lose their effectiveness in bad weather and can be brought into action when heavy EW is reducing the efficiency of UAVs.

....

However, the use of howitzers and mortars has changed markedly owing to the threat from UAVs.

They are now almost always operated from closed positions – dug into the ground in tree lines – with mesh screens surrounding the pieces, which are then opened when the system moves forward to fire.

Artillery pieces operate independently, rather than in batteries.

In addition, fire missions are very rarely more than 10 rounds to complete the fire mission before the piece comes under observation.

Before going into action, artillery crews check whether they are under observation from UAVs and only fire if not under observation – unless ordered to do so.

Ammunition is stored away from the weapon,17 and resupply is generally done by UGV.

Repositioning of guns is carried out periodically or when there is an indication that the firing position has been identified by the enemy and must be covered by other operations.

It should be noted that with these precautions, artillery and mortars can be highly survivable.

Ukrainian analysts assess that the number of Russian artillery pieces destroyed in Ukrainian UAV strikes is approximately 50% of what is publicly claimed, as many hits against artillery pieces damage rather than destroy their targets and the artillery is subsequently recovered and repaired.18"

 

[Colin Parkinson]

And mines, mines are everywhere and are emplaced/scattered by drones. Routes have to be cleared everyday, not just roads, but any identifiable path.

 

[Kirkhill]

"Bomber UAVs

Bomber UAVs are one of the deadliest tools in Ukraine’s arsenal, but also have a wider utility as logistics and engineering assets. Usually operating at night, due to their vulnerability to direct fire, these platforms are used to drop heavier munitions than FPVs can deliver. Bomber UAVs (shown in Figure 4 overlying the author) are highly precise at engaging point targets. They are also used to lay mines, deploy communications relays and deliver ammunition to assault troops, food, water and other consumables like fuel and batteries to fighting positions, and medical supplies to casualties."

"Powered Bombs (One-Way Effectors)

UAVs adapted as powered bombs to conduct point attacks have become a key part of the ‘middle strike’ toolset of both Ukrainian and Russian forces. These tools may be considered distinct from FPV UAVs in that they are not actively piloted: they navigate through combinations of terrain elevation tracking, visual odometry, inertial navigation and GNSS, or by detecting the emissions of their intended victim. The overall view of these systems among Ukrainian units is that they have a low success rate, are easily intercepted, and rarely have the kinetic energy or payload to decisively destroy many classes of target."

"FPV UAVs

The mass employment of FPVs has had a significant and visually compelling impact on the battlefield. Their utility is clear. They are cheap enough to be used en masse and can be used to target individuals and systems over significant distances which would previously have fallen below the threshold to justify unmasking one’s own positions. FPVs are also capable of engaging moving targets and are accurate enough to disable many classes of military equipment.

Nevertheless, FPVs have tactically important limitations:

Forces can easily protect positions from FPVs.
EW can effectively deny a part of the battlespace from FPVs which use radio frequency control.
FPVs do not function in bad weather, have too small a payload to engage numerous classes of targets, and are comparatively easy to shoot down.
FPV pilots must have extremely low latency connections to fly FPVs and must be static while flying them. Pilots can be detected and struck, including pilots using fibreoptic cables. As offensive counter-UAV methodologies have started to expand, pilots have been forced further away from the front, reducing their effective range of flight. As a result, the majority of FPV kills occur between -3 km and 3 km from the forward line of Ukrainian fighting positions.22
These limitations are precisely why these systems are most effective when combined with other types of fires, "

 

[Kirkhill]

"Armour and Protected Mobility
The use of armour on the battlefield has declined over the course of the conflict. Between 1 and 24 August 2025, Ukrainian ISR detected a total of only 23 Russian tanks operating within 70 km of the frontline, compared, for example, with 470 tanks on the southern axis alone in May 2023.24 Russia has since increased its use of armour in Ukraine, using them in deliberate attacks rather than routinely. Ukrainian forces continue to employ armour, and brigade commanders continue to emphasise its utility. Currently, Ukrainian forces have a company of armour per brigade. Large-scale use of armour is extremely difficult because of the complex logistics of these formations. At platoon size, however, armour has proven indispensable in the firepower it brings to clearing enemy positions and drawing fire away from infantry. One Ukrainian tank platoon observed by the author had been operating four captured Russian tanks for over a year, and while they conceded that they would be hit between two and 12 times per operation, the vehicles were still in good condition, even if their armour had to be regularly replaced.

.....

Protected mobility is even more critical to Ukrainian forces than armour. Protection of troops from fragmentation and strike from above is invaluable. These vehicles are also critical for logistics and evacuations; during assaults, armour brings firepower, especially in urban terrain. Again, however, Ukrainian officers emphasise that these vehicles are persistently damaged. As a result, Ukrainian forces have started to favour locally produced armoured vehicles with modular armour, since these can be more easily repaired and maintained.



Infantry


Ultimately, the infantry hold ground and will continue to be the core of Ukraine’s effective fighting forces. The low level of training in many Ukrainian units, combined with a Soviet legacy mentality in some parts of the AFU that infantry work is akin to unskilled labour and thus unimportant relative to other arms, means that for much of the war there has been a lack of a distinctive set of Ukrainian battle drills. Nevertheless, more proficient units are increasingly developing new infantry tactics,....

Infantry combat currently revolves around the section/squad.

It is extremely rare that large numbers of infantry find themselves in contact within a given piece of geography. This is because of the dispersion of forces, caused by the challenges of resupply and concealment.

The optimised Ukrainian section comprises seven soldiers, divided into two fireteams of three plus the section commander.

When holding a position, a section will usually deploy one fireteam to cover enemy forces, supported by the section commander, and deploy the other fireteam to cover the air.

When moving, the section divides, with two soldiers from each fireteam moving and firing to cover the enemy, and the third covering the air.

The section commander coordinates the bounds of the two fireteams.

When taking enemy positions, the first fireteam moves through the position: the first man covers the trench, the second throws grenades, and the third covers the air.

The second fireteam remains out of the position and protects the group which is in the trench.

The standard load-out for a Ukrainian assaulter is 12–15 magazines and 4–6 grenades, with resupply carried out by UAV.26

Infantry movements must be coordinated with EW, air defence and fires, and so it is normal for a UAV from the company command post to observe the movement of the troops and to coordinate activity. Once on an enemy position, troops will dig and conceal themselves in the tree lines in fighting positions of two to three people, creating overhead protection.

.....

And much, much more on CSS.

 

[Kirkhill]

It strikes me that the old WW2 Commonwealth infantry battalion support company's Bren/Universal Carriers are being replaced by UGVs.

The other thing that struck me is that even the Fire Team of three puts out an air guard during operations.

One moving,
One covering the front
One covrring the air

 

[Kirkhill]

WW2 Commonwealth Battalion







Carrier mounted mortar platoon
6x 3" Mortars on Universal Carriers
1x Cmd Carrier
3x LUVW.

Carrier platoon / MG platoon
13x MG Carriers
2x LUVW

Anti-Tank platoon
6x ATG 57mm 6 pdrs
13x Carriers
2x LUVW

Pioneer platoon
2x Jeeps with trailers

Arty Bty in Support

.....

Suggest the following




Either the Estonian Thales THeMIS (tracked) or the Canadian Rheinmetall Argo (wheeled and/or tracked) would make a usefui stand in for the Bren Carrier.

Mortar Platoon - swap out the mortar for the 70mm rounds to reduce the need to reload. -
3x LUVW
6x Carrier with 70mm Hydra/APKWS (6x 14 rounds = 84 ready rounds - rotate in pairs and reload from caches)

Carrier/MG Platoon - swap out the Brens and Vickers for the MOOG RWiP with the M230LF 30mm and a C6. (Both DFS and CUAS)
2x LUVW
12x Carriers with 30/7.62 RWS

Anti-Tank Platoon - swap out 6 Pdrs for RWiP with 30mm and Javelin and/or 70mm APKWS (rotate in pairs and reload from caches)
2x LUVW
12x Carriers with 30/ATGM

Pioneer Platoon
2x LUVW
4x Carriers fitted with drills, saws and shovels.

.....


CQs get a pair of UGV carriers and 4 of these

 

[Kirkhill]

"Ukrainian echelons do not correspond to NATO ones, but within NATO, the logic that the brigade should fight the contact battle, the division the middle battle, and the corps the deep battle is compelling."

Keeping in mind that the article describes the contact zone a 15 km wide
So a brigade has to manage a 15 km front.

The Division needs to keep the Contact Zone isolated and cover the Mid Zone and the Mid Zone is described as 30 km around the 15 km long front.
That suggest to me that the Division needs to cover a 75 km front to a depth of 30 km (75 = 30 + 15 + 30, the front plus 30 km on either flank).

The Corps covers the Deep Zone which starts at 30 km in front of the Division.

And reversing the view and looking at it from the enemy's perspective.

Minimize the manpower in the Contact Zone for as long as possible.

Stay out of the Mid Zone for as long as possible and transit it as fast as possible

Support will come from 30 km away.

Dig in and stay hidden.