Canada's tanks

[TangoTwoBravo]

Is a square combat team based on a 19 tank Squadron a unit or a sub-unit? Where I'm going with that, how thin would it be to take the CS and CSS elements of a Bde, an administrative Type 59 tank regiment and a full mech battalion, and fight the Bde with 3x square combat teams as your maneuver units?

The square combat team (a full squadron and a full infantry company) would be a rare grouping on an actual battlefield. Its more of a training construct. A more typical combat team from a battle group consisting of a tank squadron and two or three infantry companies would be something like a troop of tanks with an infantry company, or perhaps a half-squadron with an infantry company. You could see an infantry platoon and two tank or three troops in a combat team.

Combat Teams are a grouping of infantry and tank sub-sub-units (troops and platoons) under a sub-unit HQ. They are formed by the Battle Group commander based on his estimate of the situation. He might not form any and run his sub-units pure. I have a hard time conceiving of a situation where the available forces and situation result in a super-battle group with three square combat teams. That is almost a brigade of combat power.

 

[IKnowNothing]

The square combat team (a full squadron and a full infantry company) would be a rare grouping on an actual battlefield. Its more of a training construct. A more typical combat team from a battle group consisting of a tank squadron and two or three infantry companies would be something like a troop of tanks with an infantry company, or perhaps a half-squadron with an infantry company. You could see an infantry platoon and two tank or three troops in a combat team.

Combat Teams are a grouping of infantry and tank sub-sub-units (troops and platoons) under a sub-unit HQ. They are formed by the Battle Group commander based on his estimate of the situation. He might not form any and run his sub-units pure. I have a hard time conceiving of a situation where the available forces and situation result in a super-battle group with three square combat teams. That is almost a brigade of combat power.

Hence the second question in my post. Noodling in my head what it would like if 2RCR and 1 PPCLI were the only mech, and RCD was fully equipped with tanks and moved to Gagetown. Would it be one geographically split heavy Bde with commensurate CS and CSS, or could you go overweight with CS/CSS and have 2x Bde(-) formations. Thin but viable on their own, ideal for attaching a bn from a smaller country.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

A CMBG with two mech infantry (tracked or not) battalions and a tank regiment would certainly be viable. It is possible to have units of a brigade located in different bases (the case currently for two of our CMBGs), but it makes combined arms training more expensive and episodic. As a tanker in Petawawa we went to Gagetown on several occasions to train with 2 RCR. Split-basing will be more inefficient in terms of service support and have an effect on formation cohesion, but it can be a necessity. A CMBG with two units in Gagetown and one out in Alberta or Manitoba doesn't make a ton of sense to me? A CMBG with two units in Gagetown and one in Valcartier or Petawawa is much easier to conceive. Indeed, 2 RCR has previously belonged to 5 GBMC (80s?).

Still trying to understand your question. If you have three tank squadrons and six mech infantry companies (which could be LAV-based), then making two brigades out of that is, in my opinion, a dog that doesn't hunt. Its a brigade. It could be garrisoned in various locations, but it would operate as a formation.

Now, there is a point when a brigade becomes "over-stuffed." If you have five actual manouevre units (lets say six tank squadrons and nine infantry companies plus the unit-level HQs), then you would likely have two brigades.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Still trying to understand your question. If you have three tank squadrons and six mech infantry companies (which could be LAV-based), then making two brigades out of that is, in my opinion, a dog that doesn't hunt. Its a brigade. It could be garrisoned in various locations, but it would operate as a formation.

Now, there is a point when a brigade becomes "over-stuffed." If you have five actual manouevre units (lets say six tank squadrons and nine infantry companies plus the unit-level HQs), then you would likely have two brigades.

Sorry, will try to explain myself more clearly, I left out the underlying assumption that LdSH already has tanks.

2x tank regiments - LdSH and RCD
2x Mech Bn - 1 PPCLI and 2 RCR

in 2x 1+1 Regional regional groupings, 1 West, 1 East.

So the middle case, 4 actual maneuver units totaling 6 tank squadrons and 6 infantry companies.

With the question being, do you allocate CS/CSS/HQ resources for 2x Bde (-), or 1x Bde.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Sorry, will try to explain myself more clearly, I left out the underlying assumption that LdSH already has tanks.

2x tank regiments - LdSH and RCD
2x Mech Bn - 1 PPCLI and 2 RCR

in 2x 1+1 Regional regional groupings, 1 West, 1 East.

So the middle case, 4 actual maneuver units totaling 6 tank squadrons and 6 infantry companies.

With the question being, do you allocate CS/CSS/HQ resources for 2x Bde (-), or 1x Bde.

Well, we already have six mech battalions in our army, so getting us to 2 tank regiments would mean 2 x CMBG however they were geographically distributed. Likely one out west and one in Gagetown, but with the Gagetown one potentially having some its mech battalions elsewhere (just like 1 CMBG has a mech battalion two provinces away). We are now entering into napkin-army land and I am reaching my limit of exploitation!

I do think, though, that we need at least two full tank units in our army if we are going to fight in Europe.

 

[KevinB]

Sorry, will try to explain myself more clearly, I left out the underlying assumption that LdSH already has tanks.

2x tank regiments - LdSH and RCD
2x Mech Bn - 1 PPCLI and 2 RCR

in 2x 1+1 Regional regional groupings, 1 West, 1 East.

So the middle case, 4 actual maneuver units totaling 6 tank squadrons and 6 infantry companies.

With the question being, do you allocate CS/CSS/HQ resources for 2x Bde (-), or 1x Bde.

None of the above.
Get 2 more Tank units and 3 more Mech BN’s
So you can have an Armoured Bde 2:1 and two mech Bde’s of 1:2

For @TangoTwoBravo I still refuse to call the LAV BN’s mech

Keep in mind that Canada has had a fascination with 3 Infantry and 1 Armoured units for Bde’s since the close out of 4 CMBG in Germany.

Now 3 of those Infantry BN’s are light, but the CA hasn’t let that alter the plan.

For a while the CA was planning on making the 3rd BN’s LAV as well and having a Coy without LAV’s in each of the 9BN’s too (we need a SMFH smilie/emoji).

Many other militaries run a 3 Manuever unit Bde for Mech Inf or Armor units.

I don’t really care but I am a huge believer in that if you have a 3 or 4 Manuever unit Bde, that it needs the same amount of artillery firing batteries in close support to that manuever number.

Down here CAB’s are either 2:1 or 1:2 Coy’s of Armor and Infantry. Now they are removing Combined Arms Battalion from terminology, and the ABCT will consist of 2 Tank Battalions, and 1 Mech Infantry Battalion (which is solely a nomenclature change from CAB Armor Heavy, or CAB Infantry Heavy, as the Tank Battalions each have 2 Tank Coy and one Mech Infantry Company, and the Mech Infantry Battalion has 2 Mech Infantry Companies and 1 Tank Coy.
Plus a Cav Troop, Brigade Signals Coy, and Brigade Support Bn (technically not part of the Bde - but in direct attachment from the Division )

 

[daftandbarmy]

None of the above.
Get 2 more Tank units and 3 more Mech BN’s
So you can have an Armoured Bde 2:1 and two mech Bde’s of 1:2

For @TangoTwoBravo I still refuse to call the LAV BN’s mech

Keep in mind that Canada has had a fascination with 3 Infantry and 1 Armoured units for Bde’s since the close out of 4 CMBG in Germany.

Now 3 of those Infantry BN’s are light, but the CA hasn’t let that alter the plan.

For a while the CA was planning on making the 3rd BN’s LAV as well and having a Coy without LAV’s in each of the 9BN’s too (we need a SMFH smilie/emoji).

Many other militaries run a 3 Manuever unit Bde for Mech Inf or Armor units.

I don’t really care but I am a huge believer in that if you have a 3 or 4 Manuever unit Bde, that it needs the same amount of artillery firing batteries in close support to that manuever number.

Down here CAB’s are either 2:1 or 1:2 Coy’s of Armor and Infantry. Now they are removing Combined Arms Battalion from terminology, and the ABCT will consist of 2 Tank Battalions, and 1 Mech Infantry Battalion (which is solely a nomenclature change from CAB Armor Heavy, or CAB Infantry Heavy, as the Tank Battalions each have 2 Tank Coy and one Mech Infantry Company, and the Mech Infantry Battalion has 2 Mech Infantry Companies and 1 Tank Coy.
Plus a Cav Troop, Brigade Signals Coy, and Brigade Support Bn (technically not part of the Bde - but in direct attachment from the Division )

 

[Maxman1]

Hence the second question in my post. Noodling in my head what it would like if 2RCR and 1 PPCLI were the only mech, and RCD was fully equipped with tanks and moved to Gagetown. Would it be one geographically split heavy Bde with commensurate CS and CSS, or could you go overweight with CS/CSS and have 2x Bde(-) formations. Thin but viable on their own, ideal for attaching a bn from a smaller country.

Or, stand up a regular squadron of the 8th Hussars again in Gagetown.

 

[quadrapiper]

Or, stand up a regular squadron of the 8th Hussars again in Gagetown.

Half-serious adjacent question: would breaking everything up into single-battalion units be helpful to the Army's internal politics?

 

[GK .Dundas]

Half-serious adjacent question: would breaking everything up into single-battalion units be helpful to the Army's internal politics?

There's a reason I sometimes refer to the various regimental associations as "Families" ..

 

[GR66]

Apparently the US is re-evaluating how it will use tanks in light of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

Exclusive: US Army Reevaluates Tank Warfare Strategy Amid Drone Threats

Exclusive: US Army Reevaluates Tank Warfare Strategy Amid Drone Threats

www.armyrecognition.com

A couple of interesting points from the article:

The M1 Abrams, a cornerstone of U.S. armored forces, has historically led frontal assaults, leveraging its formidable firepower and armor. However, the proliferation of low-cost drones equipped with advanced surveillance and attack capabilities has exposed vulnerabilities in traditional tank tactics. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have suffered significant tank losses due to drone strikes, prompting a reevaluation of armored warfare strategies.

U.S. Army Secretary Driscoll highlighted the necessity for tanks to operate from more secure, defended positions, rather than spearheading attacks. This approach aims to mitigate the risk of detection and destruction by enemy drones, which have become ubiquitous on the modern battlefield. The U.S. Army is exploring the integration of uncrewed systems to lead initial assaults, allowing tanks to exploit breaches and provide sustained firepower from safer distances.

This paradigm shift in U.S. Army doctrine signals more than a mere tactical adjustment, it is a strategic recalibration in response to the realities of drone-dominated warfare. Tanks like the M1 Abrams, once designed for high-intensity frontal assaults, must now adopt new roles on the battlefield. The operational concept is evolving toward a dual-mode tactical employment: first, long-range fire support using the Abrams’ advanced optics, fire control systems, and 120mm cannon; second, a delayed frontline presence following initial breakthroughs by uncrewed systems. This approach minimizes exposure to the now omnipresent threat of low-cost loitering munitions and FPV kamikaze drones that have demonstrated their lethal effectiveness in Ukraine, even against vehicles with additional armor and electronic warfare shielding.

The implications are significant. By avoiding direct engagement and instead offering overwatch from protected distances, tanks regain their value not as spearheads but as precision fire platforms. This means fewer losses, preserved operational continuity, and the ability to reengage when uncrewed or infantry elements have secured drone-cleared corridors. As seen in Ukraine, even well-protected Western tanks can be rendered inoperable by $500 drones, highlighting the diminishing cost-effectiveness of traditional armored assaults and reinforcing the U.S. Army’s shift toward survivability through tactical withdrawal and phased engagement.

Strategically, this pivot aligns with broader U.S. modernization efforts to restructure forces for multidomain operations. The increasing reliance on drone swarms, satellite-guided munitions, and battlefield transparency, enabled by ISR networks and open-source intelligence, requires the U.S. Army to balance lethality with stealth.

Moreover, General Dynamics Land Systems, the prime contractor for the Abrams series, continues to be the beneficiary of modernization contracts. The most recent MBT-related contract, awarded in 2024, covers upgrades to the M1A2 SEPv3 variant and initial development for the M1E3 platform. However, with tanks now assuming a support role rather than a leading one, this evolution may shift future procurement priorities from sheer volume to system survivability, connectivity, and interoperability with unmanned platforms. While this may reduce the quantity of new builds, it enhances the quality and mission flexibility of armored units in drone-contested environments.

This seems like a pretty major shift in the expected employment of armoured forces in peer/near-peer conflict. There are several mentions of the assault being undertaken by uncrewed and/or infantry elements with the tanks holding back providing precision, long range fire rather than leading the assault and providing shock and mass. I wonder how uncrewed systems will be expected to take and clear the enemy front to allow the tanks to exploit the breaches? What impact these changes will have on the expected pace of an advance.

I also wonder how infantry and uncrewed systems will be able to secure a "drone-cleared corridor" given the relatively limited range of their LOS and weapons compared to the range of drones? Also, the uncrewed systems will be just as (or even more) vulnerable to enemy drones as tanks would so presumably they will be required in large quantities to achieve any breakthrough.

It also seems to me that the two proposed roles for the tank...precision long-range direct fire and exploitation of a breach in the enemy lines are possibly different enough to suggest different vehicles; one that prioritizes sensors and firepower and another that prioritizes armour and mobility.

Quite a bit to unpack from the article. It may have come across as a bit of "what if" thought exercise if the shift hadn't been announced by U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Regarding the M10 Booker, the requirement for the 82nd Airborne to fight in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) was one of the drivers of the requirement. The airborne is indeed supposed to be able to conduct LSCO, and an example can be found in the concept paper for the new US Army divisions released in 2023.

LSCO is a term that gets thrown around a lot. I think the current definition is "extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives." But I think LSCO mostly gets used to mean "Not that awkward COIN stuff we did for 20 years." Joint Forceable Entry Operations is LSCO. I'm not sure how viable it is against a peer, but its LSCO.

Now, I can't imagine that 82nd airborne and 1st Infantry Division would be used interchangeably in LSCO for tasks, but LSCO is part of what 82nd Airborne must be able to do. The concept paper has it conducting a turning movement as part of a Corps operation. They have a brigade attacking an objective, supported by two companies of M10s (they don't call them that, but they refer to Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) units). IBCTs can deal with tanks attacking them, but conducting offensive operations means having to attack defended positions. It was in that task that the M10 was intended to help. So back to the drawing board.

Back to Canada, no argument that a CMBG could consist of a tank unit and two mech infantry units. A tank force of 200ish MBTs would allow us to have two 3-sqn tank regiments (so two x CMBG), some school tanks and a deployment stock.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Back to Canada, no argument that a CMBG could consist of a tank unit and two mech infantry units. A tank force of 200ish MBTs would allow us to have two 3-sqn tank regiments (so two x CMBG), some school tanks and a deployment stock.

What about 1+1 to support non-Nato/ Non- LSCO deployment, supporting an established, long term framework for multinational Bde's and Division for NATO?

 

[GR66]

Back to Canada, no argument that a CMBG could consist of a tank unit and two mech infantry units. A tank force of 200ish MBTs would allow us to have two 3-sqn tank regiments (so two x CMBG), some school tanks and a deployment stock.

I don't think it would be a major stretch to re-organize the Reg Force to be set up like that:

Mechanized Division

- 12 RBC (Valcartier - Divisional Recce)

1 CMBG (Edmonton)

• LdSH (Edmonton - tank regiment)
• 1 PPCLI (Edmonton - LAV)
• 2 PPCLI (Shilo - LAV - reserve heavy)
• 3 PPCLI (Edmonton - LAV)
• 1 Svc (Edmonton)

5 CMBG (Valcartier)

• RCD (Gagetown) - tank regiment)
• 1 R22eR (Valcartier - LAV)
• 2 R22eR (Quebec - LAV - reserve heavy)
• 3 R22eR (Gagetown - LAV)
• 5 Svc (Valcartier)

Division would be rounded out by 6 CSSB and Engineers/Artillery (either embedded within the Brigade Groups or as separate Engineer & Artillery Brigades)

In case of conflict with Russia these two CMBG's could expand the Multinational Brigade - Latvia to a Division with each CMBG deploying their Tank Regiment and their 1st/3rd LAV Battalions. The Reserve-heavy 2nd Battalions would mobilize to provide replacements.

A Light Infantry Division would consist of the RCR (all three Battalions located in Petawawa) as the Reg-Force rapid reaction force. It would be rounded out by Reserve Brigades centred on Montreal/Eastern Ontario and Toronto/Central Ontario/SW Ontario.

To start the RCR would be flagged to supply the fly-over Infantry Battalion to round out eFP - Latvia. Eventually, once organization/equipment/training is worked out the Reserve infantry battalions would rotate responsibility to supply the fly-over Battalion.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

What about 1+1 to support non-Nato/ Non- LSCO deployment, supporting an established, long term framework for multinational Bde's and Division for NATO?

I am not sure what that means? What is 1+1?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I don't think it would be a major stretch to re-organize the Reg Force to be set up like that:

Mechanized Division

- 12 RBC (Valcartier - Divisional Recce)

1 CMBG (Edmonton)

• LdSH (Edmonton - tank regiment)
• 1 PPCLI (Edmonton - LAV)
• 2 PPCLI (Shilo - LAV - reserve heavy)
• 3 PPCLI (Edmonton - LAV)
• 1 Svc (Edmonton)

5 CMBG (Valcartier)

• RCD (Gagetown) - tank regiment)
• 1 R22eR (Valcartier - LAV)
• 2 R22eR (Quebec - LAV - reserve heavy)
• 3 R22eR (Gagetown - LAV)
• 5 Svc (Valcartier)

Division would be rounded out by 6 CSSB and Engineers/Artillery (either embedded within the Brigade Groups or as separate Engineer & Artillery Brigades)

In case of conflict with Russia these two CMBG's could expand the Multinational Brigade - Latvia to a Division with each CMBG deploying their Tank Regiment and their 1st/3rd LAV Battalions. The Reserve-heavy 2nd Battalions would mobilize to provide replacements.

A Light Infantry Division would consist of the RCR (all three Battalions located in Petawawa) as the Reg-Force rapid reaction force. It would be rounded out by Reserve Brigades centred on Montreal/Eastern Ontario and Toronto/Central Ontario/SW Ontario.

To start the RCR would be flagged to supply the fly-over Infantry Battalion to round out eFP - Latvia. Eventually, once organization/equipment/training is worked out the Reserve infantry battalions would rotate responsibility to supply the fly-over Battalion.

We are now into napkin-army territory. We already have a Mech battalion in Gagetown (2 RCR). It would be strange to replace them with R22eR.

It is quite a stretch when you move units around.

 

[KevinB]

Regarding the M10 Booker, the requirement for the 82nd Airborne to fight in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) was one of the drivers of the requirement. The airborne is indeed supposed to be able to conduct LSCO, and an example can be found in the concept paper for the new US Army divisions released in 2023.

The M10 was indeed envisioned that way - despite the US Army again affirming in the Light Infantry/Dismounted Infantry Doctrine that that sort of thing was exactly what Light Infantry where not for.

LSCO is a term that gets thrown around a lot. I think the current definition is "extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives." But I think LSCO mostly gets used to mean "Not that awkward COIN stuff we did for 20 years."

Predominantly down here is is being used to discuss theatre level combat at the Corps and Higher level.

Joint Forceable Entry Operations is LSCO. I'm not sure how viable it is against a peer, but it's LSCO.

I would argue that it may be part of a LSCO, but isn't in it's own right a LSCO. I will also put on my 'Merica Fuck Yeah hat on, and point out we have no peers.

Now, I can't imagine that 82nd airborne and 1st Infantry Division would be used interchangeably in LSCO for tasks, but LSCO is part of what 82nd Airborne must be able to do. The concept paper has it conducting a turning movement as part of a Corps operation. They have a brigade attacking an objective, supported by two companies of M10s (they don't call them that, but they refer to Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) units). IBCTs can deal with tanks attacking them, but conducting offensive operations means having to attack defended positions. It was in that task that the M10 was intended to help. So back to the drawing board.

That concept paper was incredibly dumb, and it was rebutted more that once. It was simply the good idea fairy designed to get something to advance an agenda (in this case the Armored due to concerns about Abrams deployments). It is the exact same thing that occurred in the 90's with the creation of the Stryker Brigades out of a knee jerk reaction that XVIII ABN Corps was too light to fight - without looking at what role was expected from Light Rapid Deployment Forces.

We have a lot of ABCT's and SBCT's, there is zero reason that the 82nd should need to conduct anything but a defensive against any enemy armed with more than a Toyota HiLux.

Back to Canada, no argument that a CMBG could consist of a tank unit and two mech infantry units. A tank force of 200ish MBTs would allow us to have two 3-sqn tank regiments (so two x CMBG), some school tanks and a deployment stock.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The M10 was indeed envisioned that way - despite the US Army again affirming in the Light Infantry/Dismounted Infantry Doctrine that that sort of thing was exactly what Light Infantry where not for.


Predominantly down here is is being used to discuss theatre level combat at the Corps and Higher level.

I would argue that it may be part of a LSCO, but isn't in it's own right a LSCO. I will also put on my 'Merica Fuck Yeah hat on, and point out we have no peers.

That concept paper was incredibly dumb, and it was rebutted more that once. It was simply the good idea fairy designed to get something to advance an agenda (in this case the Armored due to concerns about Abrams deployments). It is the exact same thing that occurred in the 90's with the creation of the Stryker Brigades out of a knee jerk reaction that XVIII ABN Corps was too light to fight - without looking at what role was expected from Light Rapid Deployment Forces.

We have a lot of ABCT's and SBCT's, there is zero reason that the 82nd should need to conduct anything but a defensive against any enemy armed with more than a Toyota HiLux.

Well, IBCTs (including those from 82nd) get trained to fight forces other than just HILUXs at JRTC.

And that concept paper is the White Paper on How the Army 2030 Divisions Fight. I think it is more than a good-idea-fairy.

 

[KevinB]

Well, IBCTs (including those from 82nd) get trained to fight forces other than just HILUXs at JRTC.

Training and doing operationally are different things, especially when we have better tools available.

And that concept paper is the White Paper on How the Army 2030 Divisions Fight. I think it is more than a good-idea-fairy.

No it was written by an idiot Armored guy who doesn’t have a fucking clue how the force employment plan for light forces is.

It was rebutted as garbage by the then FORSCOM Commander.

 

[GR66]

Training and doing operationally are different things, especially when we have better tools available.

No it was written by an idiot Armored guy who doesn’t have a fucking clue how the force employment plan for light forces is.

It was rebutted as garbage by the then FORSCOM Commander.

So to be clear, you're saying you have some minor issues with that document???