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Canadian River Class Destroyer Megathread

Pretty sure the HFX class has more tactical and sprint maneuverability than the larger ships, and in a tighter loop. It can fight hard and probably win at least a meeting engagement within its weapons radius and ammunition load limits. Not sure how the 2 compare in the ESM/EW charts, but the modernized HFX is no slouch. And it can also land attack with the latest/last block of Harpoon. But, they are old ships that need too much attention for the bang-buck ratio.
 
As an uninitiated in the naval ways, something keeps sticking out to me. How does the USN do screwing different than any other navy on Earth, more crew? Less crew? All crew members can only use their left hands on Thursdays? What is unique about it?
 
The CAF in many domains uses fewer, more highly trained, individuals.

This is driven in part by the CAF refusal to consider its training system as a strategic resource, and thus it is constantly starved for resources, and reliant on field force augmentation to meet its baseline trickle of personnel.

In a real conflict, of course, the lack of capacity of the training system would render the CAF inoperable in short order. Fortunately, those responsible would be long retired and well positioned to sit as talking heads and complain about the disasters their decisions caused.
 
As an uninitiated in the naval ways, something keeps sticking out to me. How does the USN do screwing different than any other navy on Earth, more crew? Less crew? All crew members can only use their left hands on Thursdays? What is unique about it?

Their crewing system operates on the basis of mass of young people on short term employment. Their re-enlistment rate after five years is quite low compared to most other NATO nations. As a result, they trained them quickly in one specific job to get the most out of their service.

To give you an example: We operated our PB's (ex-minesweepers) in the old days with two classes of engineers: One electrician and seven MarEng Tech. A similar American minesweeper had seven different categories of engineers for a total of 16, because the operators could not be the maintainers, and the people doing diesels could not be the ones doing generators or small engine repairs, etc. etc.

That's why you have over 5,500 people to operate aircraft carriers, most of whom are under the age of 24, when most other nations that have them do so with less than half that number. Another example: we have all the electronics work done by our Weapons tech in Canada. The US would have a HF radio tech, a UHF radio tech, a Aegis radar tech, a Navigation radar tech, etc. While each one of those technician knows the sole system it is there to fix like the back of their hand, none of these techs would be able to step into the next one's shoes, so redundancy is made by having more techs of all types than needed. A Canadian NWT would be a little slower at fixing things, but can do them all.
 
Their crewing system operates on the basis of mass of young people on short term employment. Their re-enlistment rate after five years is quite low compared to most other NATO nations. As a result, they trained them quickly in one specific job to get the most out of their service.

To give you an example: We operated our PB's (ex-minesweepers) in the old days with two classes of engineers: One electrician and seven MarEng Tech. A similar American minesweeper had seven different categories of engineers for a total of 16, because the operators could not be the maintainers, and the people doing diesels could not be the ones doing generators or small engine repairs, etc. etc.

That's why you have over 5,500 people to operate aircraft carriers, most of whom are under the age of 24, when most other nations that have them do so with less than half that number. Another example: we have all the electronics work done by our Weapons tech in Canada. The US would have a HF radio tech, a UHF radio tech, a Aegis radar tech, a Navigation radar tech, etc. While each one of those technician knows the sole system it is there to fix like the back of their hand, none of these techs would be able to step into the next one's shoes, so redundancy is made by having more techs of all types than needed. A Canadian NWT would be a little slower at fixing things, but can do them all.
In other words, they have a mobilization mindset and a training system to deliver it.
 
Their crewing system operates on the basis of mass of young people on short term employment. Their re-enlistment rate after five years is quite low compared to most other NATO nations. As a result, they trained them quickly in one specific job to get the most out of their service.

To give you an example: We operated our PB's (ex-minesweepers) in the old days with two classes of engineers: One electrician and seven MarEng Tech. A similar American minesweeper had seven different categories of engineers for a total of 16, because the operators could not be the maintainers, and the people doing diesels could not be the ones doing generators or small engine repairs, etc. etc.

That's why you have over 5,500 people to operate aircraft carriers, most of whom are under the age of 24, when most other nations that have them do so with less than half that number. Another example: we have all the electronics work done by our Weapons tech in Canada. The US would have a HF radio tech, a UHF radio tech, a Aegis radar tech, a Navigation radar tech, etc. While each one of those technician knows the sole system it is there to fix like the back of their hand, none of these techs would be able to step into the next one's shoes, so redundancy is made by having more techs of all types than needed. A Canadian NWT would be a little slower at fixing things, but can do them all.
There was a mini-series a few years ago called 'Carrier' that followed a US a/c carrier on a deployment. At many points it did seem like adult daycare.
 
Some interesting points coming out of Australia's decision to buy 11 frigates from Japan in a VERY quick timeline.

The stated capabilities of these frigates from Japan are second to none.

With a full-load displacement of 6,200 tonnes, it’s much larger than and has important technical advantages over its German competitor, the 3,700-tonne TKMS Meko A-200. Most notably, the upgraded Mogami has 32 vertical-launch system (VLS) missile cells, double the number in the Meko A-200. Each of the seven remaining ships of the 3,600-tonne Anzac class has only eight VLS cells.
The Mark 41 VLS cells on the upgraded Mogami frigate are of a large type, called ‘strike length’. This means the ships can potentially carry Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, though, officially, Australia plans to load such weapons only on Hobart-class destroyers. Again, having lots of cells is helpful.
Another advantage of the upgraded Mogami frigate is the smallness of its crew, just 90 people, thanks to extensive automation. The A-200 needs 120, and the Anzac class, which the upgraded Mogami class will replace, about 180. As the Royal Australian Navy struggles to recruit and retain personnel, the leaner complement of the upgraded Mogami design will help keep ships ready for service.
The Mogami also has a longer design operational life of 40 years versus 30 years for the Meko A-200—though making use of that will depend on how naval technology will develop during the ships’ years of service.
Currently, the Navy operates seven Anzac-class frigates after one was decommissioned in May 2024. These ships, built between 1996 and 2006, have recently undergone modernisation but are nearing the end of their operational life.
To accelerate the programme, the first three Mogami frigates for Australia will be built in Japan, with the first expected to be delivered in 2029 and entering service in 2030. Subsequent ships will be constructed at the Henderson Maritime Precinct in Western Australia.

Australia ups defense spending amid China's military buildup

Australia announced a major restructuring of its military in 2023, turning towards long-range strike capabilities to better respond to China's military expansion.

It is striving to expand its fleet of major warships from 11 to 26 over the next 10 years.


The deal is Japan's first warship export since before World War II and only its second major defense package sold abroad.

Australia says the first three general-purpose frigates will be built offshore, with the remainder built in Western Australia.

Misubishi Heavy Industries has never built warships in a foreign country, The Australian wrote.


The government's decision is a major victory for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and for Japan, which has thrown substantial political resources into securing the bid.
It is also a vote of confidence in MHI, which has never built warships overseas before.

"This is clearly the biggest defence industry agreement that will ever have been struck between Japan and Australia. In fact, it's really one of the biggest defence exports that Japan has ever engaged in."

Mr Marles said the first would come into service by the end of this decade, closing a gap that would have otherwise meant Australia would not receive a new surface combatant until 2034, when the first of the Hunter Class vessels would arrive.
While the government insists it was making the decision on capability alone, Japan has leaned heavily on the blossoming strategic and defence relationship between the two countries as it lobbied for the contract.

The United States is also believed to have backed Japan's bid, and Mr Conroy said on Tuesday the decision to select MHI would "reassure our allies, deter our adversaries and make Australia safer".

Japan's prime minister welcomed the decision on social media, promising the two countries would "work together — across both government and industry — to move toward the conclusion of the contract".

I find that sentence above telling - as the Japanese specifically stated that they had zero interest in bidding on our Sub contract for a dozen new subs, a contract that would have been substantially much more lucrative in terms of time/money when compared to this frigate contract. Maybe the Japanese didn't want to share their IP on the subs with us or anyone, maybe the timelines don't line up in terms of deliveries, maybe the US specifically told the Japanese NOT to bid on our contract or maybe the Japanese don't take us as being serious about this project, knowing that the Australians are actually serious about defence and have been actively upgrading/expanding their capabilities over the last 5-8yrs.


 
Once upon a time, we had to cross-deck two of our RADAR techs over to a USN Frigate that was sailing in company with us on a NATO deployment. Their "SPS-49 RADAR Tech" was sent home sick so they were unable to trouble-shoot or repair a fault on it. Our guys were sent over, fixed it in an hour or two and came back. We had the SPS-49 as well, so it worked out well.

I ended up chatting with a USN "SONAR" Tech once upon a time in Puerto Rico. He was actually an AN/SQR-19 Towed Array Tech. That's all he fixed.

As a RCN SONAR Tech (NET(A)) I was responsible for fixing:
  • Hull Mounted SONAR
  • Towed Array SONAR
  • Sonobouy System
  • OPS room Displays
  • CCS Computers, Data Bus, etc
  • Gyro Compass
  • Nav Distribution System
  • Speed Log
  • Echo Sounder
  • Bathythermograph
  • Compass Repeaters
  • SHINNADS (Digital Nav System)
  • etc...

He was responsible for a single one of those systems - and there was no redundancy if he was sick/etc. Their Technical department was larger than ours, but each tech fixed one thing.

Our NET(A) Department had 5 techs (we were overborne by 1) but all of us had skill/experience with the above systems and were capable of fixing most anything that came up.

That said, this was under the NET/NWT construct - I spent over 32 months in the Training System between my QL3 and my QL5 courses. That same training is practically halved in the interests of getting maintainers out to the fleet faster, and there is a much greater emphasis on training in-situ while on ships in the fleet with the W Eng Tech program.

As a result, there is much less knowledgebase, and after 14 years of W Eng Tech, the number of former NET/NWTs is tiny, and I suspect the Navy has discovered that there is a linkage between training technicians versus training maintainers.
 
Another advantage of the upgraded Mogami frigate is the smallness of its crew, just 90 people, thanks to extensive automation. The A-200 needs 120, and the Anzac class, which the upgraded Mogami class will replace, about 180. As the Royal Australian Navy struggles to recruit and retain personnel, the leaner complement of the upgraded Mogami design will help keep ships ready for service.
Everything in your post is very interesting, but I cannot fathom how a ship that size, with that many weapons and sensors, can operate on a crew of just 90.

Every time I heard about 'reduce crew sizes', they justification is always "due to increased automation". Automation of what exactly? I still have a very good ear to what's in development in the naval world, and I'm not aware of any type or level of automation that would allow you to cut the crew requirement by half.
 
As an uninitiated in the naval ways, something keeps sticking out to me. How does the USN do screwing different than any other navy on Earth, more crew? Less crew? All crew members can only use their left hands on Thursdays? What is unique about it?
Many have discussed the technician/maintainer side of things, but they've haven't addressed the operator side of things. And, it's similar. Whereas in the RCN we training junior sailors (NCIOPs) to manage the "picture" that includes contacts provided to our CMS by multiple different sensors, the USN will have operators trained to focus on the picture provided by just one single sensor. They have one person who is responsible for nothing more than monitoring the health/state of their missiles in their silos, while for us, that job is simply one aspect of several other peoples jobs (the FC team and the AWWD). Part of this is for the same reasons stated above, the culture of the USN and how they train/progress, but part of it is due to the level of integration that our systems are capable of. No one on a Halifax class needs to actually "operate" our radars; they simply "work" and provide all their information directly into our CMS, and that information is consolidated, fused, and presented to the operator for analysis.
 
I find that sentence above telling - as the Japanese specifically stated that they had zero interest in bidding on our Sub contract for a dozen new subs, a contract that would have been substantially much more lucrative in terms of time/money when compared to this frigate contract. Maybe the Japanese didn't want to share their IP on the subs with us or anyone, maybe the timelines don't line up in terms of deliveries, maybe the US specifically told the Japanese NOT to bid on our contract or maybe the Japanese don't take us as being serious about this project, knowing that the Australians are actually serious about defence and have been actively upgrading/expanding their capabilities over the last 5-8yrs.
I would be careful about baseless assumptions such as the US somehow interfering with a Japanese bid for Canada, when it seems fairly evident that Japan just wasn't interest in making a bid and competing against other nations who had far better chances than themselves.
 
Everything in your post is very interesting, but I cannot fathom how a ship that size, with that many weapons and sensors, can operate on a crew of just 90.

Every time I heard about 'reduce crew sizes', they justification is always "due to increased automation". Automation of what exactly? I still have a very good ear to what's in development in the naval world, and I'm not aware of any type or level of automation that would allow you to cut the crew requirement by half.
I'm only speculating here, but Japan seems to be the leader in automation and robotics. With an aging population and a falling population, they are trying to do the same with less live people. Maybe this is something along those lines.
 
I would be careful about baseless assumptions such as the US somehow interfering with a Japanese bid for Canada, when it seems fairly evident that Japan just wasn't interest in making a bid and competing against other nations who had far better chances than themselves.
Why? The article clearly calls out that the US may be favourably influenced the Japanese in pushing to put forward a bid for the Australian frigates. Based on this, why couldn't the same hold true for the inverse?
 
Everything in your post is very interesting, but I cannot fathom how a ship that size, with that many weapons and sensors, can operate on a crew of just 90.

Every time I heard about 'reduce crew sizes', they justification is always "due to increased automation". Automation of what exactly? I still have a very good ear to what's in development in the naval world, and I'm not aware of any type or level of automation that would allow you to cut the crew requirement by half.
The Japanese also retire ships sooner than we do, likley to avoid the intense maintenance and repair issues that we face.
 
I would be careful about baseless assumptions such as the US somehow interfering with a Japanese bid for Canada, when it seems fairly evident that Japan just wasn't interest in making a bid and competing against other nations who had far better chances than themselves.
The US has a long history of interfering with defense contracts around the world, for various reasons. So not out of the realms of possible.
 
Why? The article clearly calls out that the US may be favourably influenced the Japanese in pushing to put forward a bid for the Australian frigates. Based on this, why couldn't the same hold true for the inverse?
There is absolutely zero rhyme or reason for the US to push the Japanese away from a major defence contract with Canada.
 
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