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Canadian River Class Destroyer Megathread

This is the only way you get to have extra hulls in the water in a speedy way. Otherwise you go into battle with what you have and what you can scrounge and when all your allies are scrounging the same stuff, except the cupboards to be bare. So how would you square this circle?
You square the circle by first deciding what you actually want the navy to do, instead of pretending every ship has to do everything, everywhere, all at once. That means a serious new white paper, not another exercise in ambiguity, that lays out Canada’s real naval priorities in plain language: continental defence, Arctic sovereignty, NATO escort work, trade protection, domestic presence, expeditionary support, and what matters most when resources are finite. Once that is nailed down, the rest should follow logically, force structure, readiness, reserve capacity, crewing, logistics, industrial planning, and which ships need to be high end combatants versus which can be simpler, faster supplementary hulls. If Canada wants extra hulls in the water quickly in a crisis, the answer is not “scrounging” after the shooting starts, because by then like you said every ally is chasing the same steel, engines, missiles, electronics, and yard space, and the cupboards will already be bare. A far more serious approach would be to hold reserve stocks of the steel and other critical long lead materials we know we would need in wartime and the capability to build these systems and consumables so Canada is not just trying to supply itself at the last minute, but is actually in a position to help supply its allies as well. That is how you make it believable: define the missions honestly, write policy to match them, protect industrial inputs in peacetime, and build a mobilization plan before the emergency arrives, because once war starts it is too late to begin pretending preparation can be improvised.
 
Or a catastrophic failure during a critical time, particularly if during a tasking that has wide popular support.

No government is going to say 'we fucked up' - they might say 'they', meaning a previous government of a different colour.

The number of Canadians who still maintain we are 'peacekeepers' (and have a rosy image of that) is less than before but still way above zero.
yet to garner voter support they have to somehow admit that their previous plan was all wrong.
 
You square the circle by first deciding what you actually want the navy to do, instead of pretending every ship has to do everything, everywhere, all at once. That means a serious new white paper, not another exercise in ambiguity, that lays out Canada’s real naval priorities in plain language: continental defence, Arctic sovereignty, NATO escort work, trade protection, domestic presence, expeditionary support, and what matters most when resources are finite. Once that is nailed down, the rest should follow logically, force structure, readiness, reserve capacity, crewing, logistics, industrial planning, and which ships need to be high end combatants versus which can be simpler, faster supplementary hulls. If Canada wants extra hulls in the water quickly in a crisis, the answer is not “scrounging” after the shooting starts, because by then like you said every ally is chasing the same steel, engines, missiles, electronics, and yard space, and the cupboards will already be bare. A far more serious approach would be to hold reserve stocks of the steel and other critical long lead materials we know we would need in wartime and the capability to build these systems and consumables so Canada is not just trying to supply itself at the last minute, but is actually in a position to help supply its allies as well. That is how you make it believable: define the missions honestly, write policy to match them, protect industrial inputs in peacetime, and build a mobilization plan before the emergency arrives, because once war starts it is too late to begin pretending preparation can be improvised.
I talking about a naval/air/land conflict, lets say China with a bit of Russian tossed in with a 4 year timeframe and no nukes (for now) and starts in a few years and you lose some of your CFP's in the first year. How do you get hulls in the water and into the fight in that time?
 
I talking about a naval/air/land conflict, lets say China with a bit of Russian tossed in with a 4 year timeframe and no nukes (for now) and starts in a few years and you lose some of your CFP's in the first year. How do you get hulls in the water and into the fight in that time?
You don't and you can't, and anything you could put in the water would be effectively useless in modern warfare. Perhaps a ship that has nothing but basic civilian level systems plus a large mission bay and flight deck for drone warfare, but that thing isn't going to survive very long once you get it to Guam.
 
You don't and you can't, and anything you could put in the water would be effectively useless in modern warfare. Perhaps a ship that has nothing but basic civilian level systems plus a large mission bay and flight deck for drone warfare, but that thing isn't going to survive very long once you get it to Guam.
While I understand what you are saying, we might be expected to send ships, any ship.
 
You square the circle by first deciding what you actually want the navy to do, instead of pretending every ship has to do everything, everywhere, all at once. That means a serious new white paper, not another exercise in ambiguity, that lays out Canada’s real naval priorities in plain language: continental defence, Arctic sovereignty, NATO escort work, trade protection, domestic presence, expeditionary support, and what matters most when resources are finite. Once that is nailed down, the rest should follow logically, force structure, readiness, reserve capacity, crewing, logistics, industrial planning, and which ships need to be high end combatants versus which can be simpler, faster supplementary hulls. If Canada wants extra hulls in the water quickly in a crisis, the answer is not “scrounging” after the shooting starts, because by then like you said every ally is chasing the same steel, engines, missiles, electronics, and yard space, and the cupboards will already be bare. A far more serious approach would be to hold reserve stocks of the steel and other critical long lead materials we know we would need in wartime and the capability to build these systems and consumables so Canada is not just trying to supply itself at the last minute, but is actually in a position to help supply its allies as well. That is how you make it believable: define the missions honestly, write policy to match them, protect industrial inputs in peacetime, and build a mobilization plan before the emergency arrives, because once war starts it is too late to begin pretending preparation can be improvised.
Would you judge the recent DIS and other moves by the government setting the conditions for a serious defence policy review to compliment the serious direction and money being allocated?
 
You don't and you can't, and anything you could put in the water would be effectively useless in modern warfare. Perhaps a ship that has nothing but basic civilian level systems plus a large mission bay and flight deck for drone warfare, but that thing isn't going to survive very long once you get it to Guam.

I am always amazed at how little people outside the navy realize how complex naval warfare and naval warfare systems have gotten. Many of them have this romantic notion of ships being ships, the way they were in WWII, when hull structures were basically nearly the same whether you were a merchant ship or a warship , and the weapons were just bolted on to a hull and individually manned and fought - and where a merchant seaman knew about 70% of what a naval officer did (and in some cases, like navigation and seamanship, knew more) and could step in to the job with a little training.

That is not the world we live in today (or for the last 25-30 years) A merchant officer would be at a complete loss onboard a warship and couldn't handle much unless trained right back from scratch, almost as a new recruit. And the ships are so complex hat it has been said (correctly) that a warship is the second most complex piece of engineering in the world, right after the international Space Station.
 
When your high end ships get sunk, damaged or run out of missiles, you are going to need some sort of 2nd tier option. If your navy is getting degraded, so is the other sides navy. It may be those with the larger 2nd tier control the seas afterwards.
 
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