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Canadian River Class Destroyer Megathread

This is the only way you get to have extra hulls in the water in a speedy way. Otherwise you go into battle with what you have and what you can scrounge and when all your allies are scrounging the same stuff, except the cupboards to be bare. So how would you square this circle?
You square the circle by first deciding what you actually want the navy to do, instead of pretending every ship has to do everything, everywhere, all at once. That means a serious new white paper, not another exercise in ambiguity, that lays out Canada’s real naval priorities in plain language: continental defence, Arctic sovereignty, NATO escort work, trade protection, domestic presence, expeditionary support, and what matters most when resources are finite. Once that is nailed down, the rest should follow logically, force structure, readiness, reserve capacity, crewing, logistics, industrial planning, and which ships need to be high end combatants versus which can be simpler, faster supplementary hulls. If Canada wants extra hulls in the water quickly in a crisis, the answer is not “scrounging” after the shooting starts, because by then like you said every ally is chasing the same steel, engines, missiles, electronics, and yard space, and the cupboards will already be bare. A far more serious approach would be to hold reserve stocks of the steel and other critical long lead materials we know we would need in wartime and the capability to build these systems and consumables so Canada is not just trying to supply itself at the last minute, but is actually in a position to help supply its allies as well. That is how you make it believable: define the missions honestly, write policy to match them, protect industrial inputs in peacetime, and build a mobilization plan before the emergency arrives, because once war starts it is too late to begin pretending preparation can be improvised.
 
Or a catastrophic failure during a critical time, particularly if during a tasking that has wide popular support.

No government is going to say 'we fucked up' - they might say 'they', meaning a previous government of a different colour.

The number of Canadians who still maintain we are 'peacekeepers' (and have a rosy image of that) is less than before but still way above zero.
yet to garner voter support they have to somehow admit that their previous plan was all wrong.
 
You square the circle by first deciding what you actually want the navy to do, instead of pretending every ship has to do everything, everywhere, all at once. That means a serious new white paper, not another exercise in ambiguity, that lays out Canada’s real naval priorities in plain language: continental defence, Arctic sovereignty, NATO escort work, trade protection, domestic presence, expeditionary support, and what matters most when resources are finite. Once that is nailed down, the rest should follow logically, force structure, readiness, reserve capacity, crewing, logistics, industrial planning, and which ships need to be high end combatants versus which can be simpler, faster supplementary hulls. If Canada wants extra hulls in the water quickly in a crisis, the answer is not “scrounging” after the shooting starts, because by then like you said every ally is chasing the same steel, engines, missiles, electronics, and yard space, and the cupboards will already be bare. A far more serious approach would be to hold reserve stocks of the steel and other critical long lead materials we know we would need in wartime and the capability to build these systems and consumables so Canada is not just trying to supply itself at the last minute, but is actually in a position to help supply its allies as well. That is how you make it believable: define the missions honestly, write policy to match them, protect industrial inputs in peacetime, and build a mobilization plan before the emergency arrives, because once war starts it is too late to begin pretending preparation can be improvised.
I talking about a naval/air/land conflict, lets say China with a bit of Russian tossed in with a 4 year timeframe and no nukes (for now) and starts in a few years and you lose some of your CFP's in the first year. How do you get hulls in the water and into the fight in that time?
 
I talking about a naval/air/land conflict, lets say China with a bit of Russian tossed in with a 4 year timeframe and no nukes (for now) and starts in a few years and you lose some of your CFP's in the first year. How do you get hulls in the water and into the fight in that time?
You don't and you can't, and anything you could put in the water would be effectively useless in modern warfare. Perhaps a ship that has nothing but basic civilian level systems plus a large mission bay and flight deck for drone warfare, but that thing isn't going to survive very long once you get it to Guam.
 
You don't and you can't, and anything you could put in the water would be effectively useless in modern warfare. Perhaps a ship that has nothing but basic civilian level systems plus a large mission bay and flight deck for drone warfare, but that thing isn't going to survive very long once you get it to Guam.
While I understand what you are saying, we might be expected to send ships, any ship.
 
You square the circle by first deciding what you actually want the navy to do, instead of pretending every ship has to do everything, everywhere, all at once. That means a serious new white paper, not another exercise in ambiguity, that lays out Canada’s real naval priorities in plain language: continental defence, Arctic sovereignty, NATO escort work, trade protection, domestic presence, expeditionary support, and what matters most when resources are finite. Once that is nailed down, the rest should follow logically, force structure, readiness, reserve capacity, crewing, logistics, industrial planning, and which ships need to be high end combatants versus which can be simpler, faster supplementary hulls. If Canada wants extra hulls in the water quickly in a crisis, the answer is not “scrounging” after the shooting starts, because by then like you said every ally is chasing the same steel, engines, missiles, electronics, and yard space, and the cupboards will already be bare. A far more serious approach would be to hold reserve stocks of the steel and other critical long lead materials we know we would need in wartime and the capability to build these systems and consumables so Canada is not just trying to supply itself at the last minute, but is actually in a position to help supply its allies as well. That is how you make it believable: define the missions honestly, write policy to match them, protect industrial inputs in peacetime, and build a mobilization plan before the emergency arrives, because once war starts it is too late to begin pretending preparation can be improvised.
Would you judge the recent DIS and other moves by the government setting the conditions for a serious defence policy review to compliment the serious direction and money being allocated?
 
You don't and you can't, and anything you could put in the water would be effectively useless in modern warfare. Perhaps a ship that has nothing but basic civilian level systems plus a large mission bay and flight deck for drone warfare, but that thing isn't going to survive very long once you get it to Guam.

I am always amazed at how little people outside the navy realize how complex naval warfare and naval warfare systems have gotten. Many of them have this romantic notion of ships being ships, the way they were in WWII, when hull structures were basically nearly the same whether you were a merchant ship or a warship , and the weapons were just bolted on to a hull and individually manned and fought - and where a merchant seaman knew about 70% of what a naval officer did (and in some cases, like navigation and seamanship, knew more) and could step in to the job with a little training.

That is not the world we live in today (or for the last 25-30 years) A merchant officer would be at a complete loss onboard a warship and couldn't handle much unless trained right back from scratch, almost as a new recruit. And the ships are so complex hat it has been said (correctly) that a warship is the second most complex piece of engineering in the world, right after the international Space Station.
 
When your high end ships get sunk, damaged or run out of missiles, you are going to need some sort of 2nd tier option. If your navy is getting degraded, so is the other sides navy. It may be those with the larger 2nd tier control the seas afterwards.
 
When your high end ships get sunk, damaged or run out of missiles, you are going to need some sort of 2nd tier option. If your navy is getting degraded, so is the other sides navy. It may be those with the larger 2nd tier control the seas afterwards.
Ok so lets take your example of a war with China as a baseline. Let's say it kicks off in 2028, and Canada decides to get involved on the US side (use whatever reason you want). So it's the US, Canada, Australia (NZ sits this one out), SK, Japan and Taiwan vs China. The other regional players (Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, etc) sit it out. West coast Canadian warships deploy as convoy escorts for runs between Everett, San Diego, Pearl, Guam, and Sydney. Over the course of the war, all the serviceable frigate on the west coast get taken out of action, possibly from PLAN submarines. Maybe we shift a frigate from the east coast, but more likely we leave them where they are as a backstop in case the Russkies decide to use the distraction to start their own shit. What do we do at that point? Most likely, nothing. We pull out of the naval portion of the war and continue to focus on building the RCDs. Whatever we could conceivably build in a reasonable time-frame wouldn't be of much use to helping the US or the other allied participants. If we could build a "civilianized" drone carrier, we'd probably be better off just building the drones and handing them over to the Americans. If we take this hypothetical scenario to the extreme end, and China is now threatening the west coast of NA directly, then that would mean that they've establish maritime dominance over the entire USN, in which case what could we possibly build that could threaten them? We'd be better off at that point building drones, CDCMs, and air defense systems.
 
I am always amazed at how little people outside the navy realize how complex naval warfare and naval warfare systems have gotten.
I think people understand that a Modern Warship is a complex platform. What they di not understand is how a complex system that is suppose to have efficiencies requires as much or more crew then a WWII ship of similar class/ size.
Many of them have this romantic notion of ships being ships, the way they were in WWII, when hull structures were basically nearly the same whether you were a merchant ship or a warship ,
Honestly I think your over simplifying modern ship building and the tech that goes into not only Warships but also Merchant ships.
Warships should be built as simple as possible for easier repairs to be made incase of damage. As we have seen with the degradation of the Halifax class ships in inaccessible areas of its hull. It has to make one wonder if they did suffer damage how or can we perform battlefield repairs to get them back into the fight. Or are they write-offs?
and the weapons were just bolted on to a hull and individually manned and fought
Again this is simplifying the systems from WWII. Many of the ships had sophisticated fire control direction equipment at time along with ASD.
Again the modern warship was suppose to be more sophisticated requiring less user input, less crew to man the guns and systems. But we actually just moved the crewing around.
- and where a merchant seaman knew about 70% of what a naval officer did (and in some cases, like navigation and seamanship, knew more) and could step in to the job with a little training.
I find that an interesting observation. The question to be asked is who operates the equipment, who fixes the equipment and who makes the decisions? The Officers bring the information together and make the decisions. I would not say they have any more knowledge then the Sonar operators, Rad Techs etc.
That is not the world we live in today (or for the last 25-30 years) A merchant officer would be at a complete loss onboard a warship and couldn't handle much unless trained right back from scratch, almost as a new recruit. And the ships are so complex hat it has been said (correctly) that a warship is the second most complex piece of engineering in the world, right after the international Space Station.
This statement is worrying in some respects but also sends some assurance that we are getting well trained Officers. From the website it takes four plus years to turn out a MARs Officer. Are there streamlines that can be done? Can we and do we have a modified training plan in case of major war where we can train Merchant Marine Officers and Crew in a shorter timeline?

Have we have made operations/ expectations so complicated that they are unrealistic for sustainment in operations?
 
I happened to be watching a video by Curious Marc on YouTube called Apollo Lunar Module FDAI Restoration - Part 1 yesterday (FDAI is the Flight Director Attitude Indicator). In it he makes the point that, like many pieces of the Apollo program, there were two completely different FDAIs, one for the Command Module and one for the Lunar Module, even though they looked very similar and performed the same function. The reason is that the CM and LM were built by completely different contractors to different requirement specs.

So, do I have a relevant (to this thread) point? The point is that we do a very poor job of identifying different requirements that are in fact the same, identifying that each of these warships actually shares many characteristics with others, and controlling the complexity. So, each is defined as if it has never been done before, with a bespoke requirement and solution, and then it takes a massive intergration and V&V (validation and verification) effort to make it work.

I'm convinced (possibly wrongly) that a group of middle power nations could develop a set of "standards" for a combat system that would be plug and play, greatly simplifying that integration and V&V. Then it would be easier to turn out hulls and put the weapons in them. It would also be easier to manage the fact that, systems wise, no two of those ships are ever going to be the same.
 
<snip> And the ships are so complex hat it has been said (correctly) that a warship is the second most complex piece of engineering in the world, right after the international Space Station.
And yet there are things that are massively more complex than either of those, each both distributed yet completely interdependant, and we just expect them to work (and whine on social media when they don't):
  • power grids
  • telecommunications networks
  • air transport
  • logistics networks
In some sense, some of a warships complexity comes from being a compact versian of those very things. Is there anything to be learned by how they do it?

The argument that "yes, but a warship is safety critical" also doesn't hold up. If any of those systems fail, many more people die than if a warship fails.
 
I am always amazed at how little people outside the navy realize how complex naval warfare and naval warfare systems have gotten. Many of them have this romantic notion of ships being ships, the way they were in WWII, when hull structures were basically nearly the same whether you were a merchant ship or a warship , and the weapons were just bolted on to a hull and individually manned and fought - and where a merchant seaman knew about 70% of what a naval officer did (and in some cases, like navigation and seamanship, knew more) and could step in to the job with a little training.

That is not the world we live in today (or for the last 25-30 years) A merchant officer would be at a complete loss onboard a warship and couldn't handle much unless trained right back from scratch, almost as a new recruit. And the ships are so complex hat it has been said (correctly) that a warship is the second third most complex piece of engineering in the world, right after submarines and the international Space Station.

IMHO, 3rd.

When your high end ships get sunk, damaged or run out of missiles, you are going to need some sort of 2nd tier option. If your navy is getting degraded, so is the other sides navy. It may be those with the larger 2nd tier control the seas afterwards.

I agree with you.

I predict our fancy and expensive munitions, stores and equipment will get chewed up at rates that are unreplaceable. And we (everyone really) will be looking for easy (or easier) to produce, in volume solutions.

In essence we will need to create the modern iteration of the Flower Class corvette.

Or we just withdraw from the fight and go home.
 
I happened to be watching a video by Curious Marc on YouTube called Apollo Lunar Module FDAI Restoration - Part 1 yesterday (FDAI is the Flight Director Attitude Indicator). In it he makes the point that, like many pieces of the Apollo program, there were two completely different FDAIs, one for the Command Module and one for the Lunar Module, even though they looked very similar and performed the same function. The reason is that the CM and LM were built by completely different contractors to different requirement specs.

So, do I have a relevant (to this thread) point? The point is that we do a very poor job of identifying different requirements that are in fact the same, identifying that each of these warships actually shares many characteristics with others, and controlling the complexity. So, each is defined as if it has never been done before, with a bespoke requirement and solution, and then it takes a massive intergration and V&V (validation and verification) effort to make it work.

I'm convinced (possibly wrongly) that a group of middle power nations could develop a set of "standards" for a combat system that would be plug and play, greatly simplifying that integration and V&V. Then it would be easier to turn out hulls and put the weapons in them. It would also be easier to manage the fact that, systems wise, no two of those ships are ever going to be the same.
apropos of nothing nautical, every time that I read the expression plug and play I shudder. Up until very recently I still had my old Windows 5 computer complete with WordPerfect (still the best word processing programme I have found for creative writing). We are now on Windows 11 yet if you compare the two, most of the improvements have been designed to create obsolescence not ease of function. Yes it is faster but the computer's taking over certain functions from me have made me dumber not more efficient. The same is true of many of the more recent auto improvements to the point where care mfg. is going back to more basic installations. Perhaps our military purchases are reflecting the same trend: adding tech. where it isn't really necessary that will make maintenance and repair more difficult and make the equipment more vulnerable to failure.
 
I happened to be watching a video by Curious Marc on YouTube called Apollo Lunar Module FDAI Restoration - Part 1 yesterday (FDAI is the Flight Director Attitude Indicator). In it he makes the point that, like many pieces of the Apollo program, there were two completely different FDAIs, one for the Command Module and one for the Lunar Module, even though they looked very similar and performed the same function. The reason is that the CM and LM were built by completely different contractors to different requirement specs.

So, do I have a relevant (to this thread) point? The point is that we do a very poor job of identifying different requirements that are in fact the same, identifying that each of these warships actually shares many characteristics with others, and controlling the complexity. So, each is defined as if it has never been done before, with a bespoke requirement and solution, and then it takes a massive intergration and V&V (validation and verification) effort to make it work.

I'm convinced (possibly wrongly) that a group of middle power nations could develop a set of "standards" for a combat system that would be plug and play, greatly simplifying that integration and V&V. Then it would be easier to turn out hulls and put the weapons in them. It would also be easier to manage the fact that, systems wise, no two of those ships are ever going to be the same.
We did develop such a standard combat system for middle powers- CMS 330.
 
My old-school whole-house diesel generator enters the chat to say “ simplicity and core basics have advantages all their own.”
 
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