Canadian River Class Destroyer Megathread

[Underway]

First confirmation of Mk38 Mod 4 that I've seen anywhere. Possibly missed it elsewhere.

We will see. In my opinion, it's not the size that matters, but the composition.

It appears the RCN is making a conscious effort to improve upon the crewing compositions models used for the AOPS and MCDVs, and that's a positive development.

From a sustainment perspective, the key will be ensuring that leadership and command teams understand that you cannot achieve CPF-level service and support with fewer resources. Overall, however, based on the numbers and positions I have seen, I am encouraged and optimistic.

I'm concerned that they didn't take maintenance into account properly for the Combat Systems side. USN divisional setup is that most sections are their own operator maintainers (like the MSE Dept is now, the operate and maintain the ships engines...). So Sonar would be responsible for both operating the Sonar and maintaining/repairing it.

Our current organization has those responsibilities split. CSE Dept keeps the equipment working and OPS fights using that equipment. But if Sonar is in OPS and are now responsible for the equipment who plans the work period, reports the operational deficiencies and briefs the CO on capability losses. Who speaks to the shore authorities for parts and support?

On USN ships this is all coordinated through a dedicated Maintenance Dept, made up of 6 people (4 techs, 1 supply and 1 supervisor) who liaise with shore, get parts and track maintenance and problems for the entire ship (MSE and CSE). We won't have this part.

And if the CSEO is responsible for this equipment still they are going to have to reach into another department to enforce maintenance routines and repair? That doesn't make sense to me.

Because ashore logistics in Halifax totally addresses all your issues when you're mid Atlantic or south Pacific.

Enter Protecteur Class. Like sea training, we're here to help. Lol

 

[dapaterson]

Enter Protecteur Class. Like sea training, we're here to help. Lol

Two ships. Three oceans. Limited availability due to time / space / maintenance cycles.

Good luck with that.

 

[FSTO]

First confirmation of Mk38 Mod 4 that I've seen anywhere. Possibly missed it elsewhere.

I'm concerned that they didn't take maintenance into account properly for the Combat Systems side. USN divisional setup is that most sections are their own operator maintainers (like the MSE Dept is now, the operate and maintain the ships engines...). So Sonar would be responsible for both operating the Sonar and maintaining/repairing it.

Our current organization has those responsibilities split. CSE Dept keeps the equipment working and OPS fights using that equipment. But if Sonar is in OPS and are now responsible for the equipment who plans the work period, reports the operational deficiencies and briefs the CO on capability losses. Who speaks to the shore authorities for parts and support?

On USN ships this is all coordinated through a dedicated Maintenance Dept, made up of 6 people (4 techs, 1 supply and 1 supervisor) who liaise with shore, get parts and track maintenance and problems for the entire ship (MSE and CSE). We won't have this part.

And if the CSEO is responsible for this equipment still they are going to have to reach into another department to enforce maintenance routines and repair? That doesn't make sense to me.


Enter Protecteur Class. Like sea training, we're here to help. Lol

Have you read the massive occupational review that was just recently completed? I was involved in the very beginning of the process but I was gone before the final report and recommendations were delivered to CRCN.

 

[MJP]

On USN ships this is all coordinated through a dedicated Maintenance Dept, made up of 6 people (4 techs, 1 supply and 1 supervisor) who liaise with shore, get parts and track maintenance and problems for the entire ship (MSE and CSE). We won't have this part.

Ship stuff aside, I have a buddy who did something similar at the unit level and it is amazing when you bake in a control shop mentality that manages and finesses the linkages between all the key depts and the supply chain. Used a bit of analytics and a couple of strong folks and turned around a situation where everyone was guessing to an informed production meeting that reduced VOR and overall outstanding demands. It is not something the RCLS Log world teaches well at any level.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

First confirmation of Mk38 Mod 4 that I've seen anywhere. Possibly missed it elsewhere.

I'm concerned that they didn't take maintenance into account properly for the Combat Systems side. USN divisional setup is that most sections are their own operator maintainers (like the MSE Dept is now, the operate and maintain the ships engines...). So Sonar would be responsible for both operating the Sonar and maintaining/repairing it.

Our current organization has those responsibilities split. CSE Dept keeps the equipment working and OPS fights using that equipment. But if Sonar is in OPS and are now responsible for the equipment who plans the work period, reports the operational deficiencies and briefs the CO on capability losses. Who speaks to the shore authorities for parts and support?

On USN ships this is all coordinated through a dedicated Maintenance Dept, made up of 6 people (4 techs, 1 supply and 1 supervisor) who liaise with shore, get parts and track maintenance and problems for the entire ship (MSE and CSE). We won't have this part.

And if the CSEO is responsible for this equipment still they are going to have to reach into another department to enforce maintenance routines and repair? That doesn't make sense to me.


Enter Protecteur Class. Like sea training, we're here to help. Lol

I've had this funny feeling for a while that warships have gotten so complicated that two things need to happen. First, the Engineering departments should be brought together under a single E.O., but you make it a LCDR on a third sea tour, and give him/her two assistant EO, one for machinery and one for systems. Second, the supply department has to come up with a sub-specialty just for naval engineering and run that side of the house at arms length from the general stores, so that those log techs are intimately familiar with all of the steps required for the maintenance and repair of the specific equipment of the (now unified) engineering department and have familiarity with the actual parts and associated stores.

 

[Stoker]

The subs will or will not be there?

Not that I'm aware of. You maybe thinking of the rumour of the sub builder buying the former Imperial Refinery site and turing it into a mainteance facility.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Not that I'm aware of. You maybe thinking of the rumour of the sub builder buying the former Imperial Refinery site and turing it into a mainteance facility.

Yes!
That’s it!

 

[Stoker]

Yes!
That’s it!

Yes different refinery site. There's two in Dartmouth, ones often confused with the other.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Yes different refinery site. There's two in Dartmouth, ones often confused with the other.

Which is the one that has ‘Main Rd’ running through it?

 

[Underway]

I've had this funny feeling for a while that warships have gotten so complicated that two things need to happen. First, the Engineering departments should be brought together under a single E.O., but you make it a LCDR on a third sea tour, and give him/her two assistant EO, one for machinery and one for systems. Second, the supply department has to come up with a sub-specialty just for naval engineering and run that side of the house at arms length from the general stores, so that those log techs are intimately familiar with all of the steps required for the maintenance and repair of the specific equipment of the (now unified) engineering department and have familiarity with the actual parts and associated stores.

You sort of hit it. The plan is for two Engineering officers (CSE and MSE). Both LCdrs. This will be their second sea tour. Their first will be done as Divisional Officers (two each dept) who report to the HOD. The DivO tour is 2 years, as is the HOD tour. Which is the same amount of sea time as current for PHVI + AHOD. Whether this survives implementation of the new ship org charts I'm unsure. There's a lot more to it than I'm writing, including courses, sub occupations, changes to CSE responsibilities among other things.

Have you read the massive occupational review that was just recently completed? I was involved in the very beginning of the process but I was gone before the final report and recommendations were delivered to CRCN.

I've been to the presentations and am invited sometimes to the working groups. I also get sent documents for review, mainly due to my big mouth in asking questions during presentations... lol.

Not a lot of definition on the processes, more on who does what. How maintenance implementation is covered is what I'm concerned about. They may have covered it and just aren't saying anything. Problem is processes are not owned by the career/occupation shops. Those are owned by the RCN through the various organizations (NFR, Sea Training, FTA, FER, FMF, FEO, Maritime Commands etc...) and may require complete rewrites of some publications which are approved at the CDS level (Naval Engineering Manual, Naval Material Management System etc...).

Two ships. Three oceans. Limited availability due to time / space / maintenance cycles.

Good luck with that.

You know I was trolling you. Lol.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I fear they have learned the wrong lessons, but hope to be pleasantly surprised...

I'm interested to hear your opinion. Feel free to DM.

Before I left Ottawa, the talk for sustainment of the ships was to have robust shore support coupled with extensive (in a Canadian sense, not a USN version) FLS for deployed units.
Don't know where they are on that idea now.

This idea is still out there... The current FSU is probably a reasonable trial.

My goal was to ensure the composition of RCD crewing was correct, as I see it, and I was pleasantly surprised when the RCN surpassed my goal.

Rumour has it and of course I may be wrong is that 300 acre parcel of land in Eastern Passage will be a refuelling dock on the ocean side for the ships including the river class and across the main road will be buildings to support the river class which I assume is probably stores.

Its called the Halifax Gate project. Its not a rumor. And its much much more than a fueling station. BLog is already in the planning stages for its relocation.

I'm concerned that they didn't take maintenance into account properly for the Combat Systems side. USN divisional setup is that most sections are their own operator maintainers (like the MSE Dept is now, the operate and maintain the ships engines...). So Sonar would be responsible for both operating the Sonar and maintaining/repairing it.

Our current organization has those responsibilities split. CSE Dept keeps the equipment working and OPS fights using that equipment. But if Sonar is in OPS and are now responsible for the equipment who plans the work period, reports the operational deficiencies and briefs the CO on capability losses. Who speaks to the shore authorities for parts and support?

We are going Operator/maintainer. And what I took from it is a much expanded Ops Dept. And I suspect you will see a maint watch in there. W&SB haven't been finalized yet.

No in Dept Log though. Still have to come to my office

On USN ships this is all coordinated through a dedicated Maintenance Dept, made up of 6 people (4 techs, 1 supply and 1 supervisor) who liaise with shore, get parts and track maintenance and problems for the entire ship (MSE and CSE). We won't have this part.

I have a great deal to say about how Navy Logistics approached and sioled this effort. To help address those shortcomings, I developed several proposals aimed at capturing lessons learned from our allies and incorporating best practices from the Royal Navy in the areas of hull and machinery support, as well as from the United States Navy Combat Systems community, all through a logistics lens.

Nothing was ever done.

And if the CSEO is responsible for this equipment still they are going to have to reach into another department to enforce maintenance routines and repair? That doesn't make sense to me.

Out of my lane, sorry.

Enter Protecteur Class. Like sea training, we're here to help. Lol

Guess who PRE's first Log Chief is ?

I've had this funny feeling for a while that warships have gotten so complicated that two things need to happen. First, the Engineering departments should be brought together under a single E.O., but you make it a LCDR on a third sea tour, and give him/her two assistant EO, one for machinery and one for systems. Second, the supply department has to come up with a sub-specialty just for naval engineering and run that side of the house at arms length from the general stores, so that those log techs are intimately familiar with all of the steps required for the maintenance and repair of the specific equipment of the (now unified) engineering department and have familiarity with the actual parts and associated stores.

All we have to do is institutionally let go of our death grip on Purpleness and the last vestiges of unification. Thats all.

 

[oldcpu]

I would like to re-vist this.

One thing I am puzzling over is the apparent absence of any dedicated fire-control radar for the BAE Mk-45 5"/62 gun on the River-class.

The Congressional record that mentions Canada procuring the BAE Mk45 itemizes four (4) Next Generation Surface Search Radars, described only in generic terms as the U.S. Navy's multi-mission navigation, which is a surface search and periscope detection radar replacing multiple legacy surface radar systems — no AN/SPS designation given. I note though NGSSR is often associated in U.S. Navy documentation with the AN/SPS-73(V)18 program, although the Congressional notification does not actually identify a specific AN/SPS designation.

Unlike later-Flight-III Burkes, which are getting AN/SPQ-9B as a purpose-built track-while-scan (TWS) radar feeding the Mk 160 GCS for anti-ship-missile-defense gunnery, nothing in the public River-class documentation points to an SPQ-9B-class system. So is the Mk-45 BAE gun for the River Class not getting a dedicated FC radar?

The public sketches suggest that.

One possibility is in the past with the Mk 34 GWS baseline on the USN Arleigh Burke class it may have been shown that the older SPS-67(V)3 (which the NGSSR will replace) had a useful digital automatic target detection, track while scan, and moving target indicator capability from Arleigh Burke Flight I. It is plausible that SPS-67 contributed surface-target tracking data to the Mk 34/Mk 160 architecture, alongside the original SPY-1D, although the exact integration details are not well documented in open sources.

The Arleigh Burke’s current SPQ-9B fire control radar is a later-generation upgrade of that same architectural slot, not the introduction of a function that never previously existed.

If that assessment is correct, then the more interesting question may not be Mk 45 fire control at all, but what is lost—or what is not lost—in the ship's inner-layer anti-ship missile defense architecture by the apparent absence of an SPQ-9B-class firecontrol radar."

If NGSSR (whatever its exact AN/SPS designation turns out to be) is a software-defined, track-capable surface-search radar feeding the Gunnery Control system (GCS) the way I assume that SPS-67(V)3 may have done, then SPY-7(V)3/AEGIS + NGSSR may reproduce the original Burke gun fire-control chain reasonably faithfully — just without the SPQ-9B refinement that more recent Arleigh Burke hulls are getting.

With this in mind, if the River Class NGSSR's TWS performance (possibly the SPS-73(v)18 ) against a fast, low-RCS sea-skimmer near the horizon is closer to the original SPS-67(V)3 baseline than to SPQ-9B's enhanced ASMD-tuned performance, that could translate into a somewhat thinner inner-layer radar picture feeding both the 30mm and the Mk-45 in defending against an “attacking missile leaker scenario” — with SPEIR/EOSS picking up more of the terminal-engagement load, than it would had there also been a dedicated SPQ-9B fire control radar on the ship.

To be clear, all of this is massive speculation from a Congressional record (re: FMS), together with RCN River Class sketches/information, that doesn't actually describe combat-system integration — "NGSSR" could turn out to be a more capable system than its US Navy program description suggests, and SPEIR's panoramic IRST-like characteristics may compensate for a lot of this in practice.

Further to this ... I note a Naval news article ( Canada pivots River-class Destroyer combat system to Aegis and MOTS solutions to reduce program risk ) that claims the RCN is to include the AN/SPS-73(V)18 in the River Class destroyer. This has also been speculated on various internet sites and provides more support to earlier speculations. My understanding is as follows :

The AN/SPS-73(V)18 Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) is a software-defined, X-band multi-mission radar, developed (I believe) by Ultra Maritime. The NGSSR is an official U.S. Navy program of record designed to replace up to five legacy, obsolete, or commercial radar systems, including the AN/SPS-67 series, with a single, modernized architecture. By utilizing a software-defined framework, the program allows for future modifications to the radar’s signal processing, waveforms, and electronic counter-countermeasures digitally to counter evolving threats without altering the physical antenna.

I read that when operating in a "Standard Tactical Mode," the system processes multiple tasks simultaneously, enabling high-fidelity navigation, surface threat tracking, and advanced Periscope Detection and Discrimination (PDD).

While the AN/SPS-73(V)18 is fundamentally a 2D surveillance and navigation radar rather than a dedicated 3D fire control tracker, its high data-refresh rates and digital signal processing enable it to generate fire-control quality tracking data to support surface gunfire. The US Navy's Major Program Manager for Above Water Sensors (Captain Jason Hall in an April 2023 DefenseScoop interview) explicitly confirmed this capability. In a littoral or swarm combat environment involving Fast Attack Craft (FAC) or Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs), the radar can provide high-fidelity 2D tracking metrics directly to weapon computers, reducing traditional target-designation latency.

For surface engagements, target elevation data is generally not required to establish the firing solution, as the target is assumed to be at sea level. Consequently, the NGSSR can provide bearing and range information to support the BAE Systems MK 45 Mod 4 5-inch main gun and I speculate also to the MSI-Defence MK 38 Mod 4 30mm secondary gun mount. This capability aids these weapon loops in operating against surface threats even in the absence of a dedicated fire control radar or if primary 3D illumination systems are heavily degraded by electronic jamming.

The AN/SPS-73(V)18 interfaces with the Aegis Weapon System, allowing its refined target tracks to contribute to the ship's wider defensive suite. It complements the SPEIR electro-optical/infrared function function as independent sensors that feed into the ship's centralized command and data-fusion backbone (such as Aegis), which helps correlate the optical and radar pictures at the command level.

The AN/SPS-73(V)18 is being introduced across various U.S. Navy surface combatants through new construction and backfits:

• Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) Guided-Missile Destroyers: Backfits have been documented on Flight I and Flight IIA ships, with further installations believed planned across the fleet.
• Gerald R. Ford-class (CVN 78) Aircraft Carriers: Installed as the baseline surface navigation/search array on newer units,
• San Antonio-class (LPD 17) Amphibious Transport Docks: Installed on active flight variants.
• River-class Destroyers (Royal Canadian Navy): The AN/SPS-73(V)18 has been identified by Naval News as a likely component of Canada's revised Aegis combat-system configuration. The NGSSR is explicitly included in the US Congressional notification of the proposed Foreign Military Sale to Canada, although the precise installation configuration has not been officially confirmed.