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CF Transformation & the Operational Commands (Merged)

Cdn Blackshirt

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Have to give credit to Hillier so far....

Very impressive indeed.



Matthew. :salute:
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http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050605.wmili0605/BNStory/National/


Military Begins Major Overhall

Sunday, June 5, 2005 Updated at 3:24 PM EDT

Canadian Press

Ottawa â ” Canada's military command structure is about to be turned upside down so the Armed Forces can deal more quickly with natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.

In the biggest restructuring in four decades, Gen. Rick Hillier has ordered a transformation that will see control of domestic military assets turned over to integrated regional centres, known as Canada Command.

Since the mid-1960s, the army, navy and air force have worked together to a certain extent. But each section has independent control over ground forces, ships, aircraft and other equipment.

Mr. Hillier, the chief of defence staff, wants the command structure to be more â Å“top down,â ? with regional commanders in control of all military personnel and hardware.

â Å“They'll now come under an integrated commander at a regional level,â ? said a spokeswoman for Mr. Hillier.

â Å“So we don't have army only and air force only and navy only and they each have their separate stove pipes up to Ottawa,â ? Maj. Rita Lepage said.

â Å“You can see how much quicker you can respond . . . when you've got one person owning air and sea and land elements.â ?

The military also wants certain equipment assigned to specific units. As an example, the JTF2 â ” Canada's elite commando unit â ” might want full control over aircraft that could see the unit deploy faster, instead of having to wait for approvals from the air force to use a plane.

â Å“It's an evolution that's necessary,â ? says Brig.-Gen. Daniel Gosselin, named chief of staff over the Canadian Forces Transformation Team.

â Å“The command and control structure that we have, because of its nature, might not be responsive enough if something happens,â ? Mr. Gosselin said in an interview.

â Å“(Hillier) doesn't want to take a chance that something happens and we are not prepared at a level that we need to be prepared,â ? Mr. Gosselin added.

â Å“It's consistent with the level of preparedness that we're trying to (achieve) in the post-9/11 era.

â Å“It has to do with the domestic situation from a disaster point of view. But it has to do also with . . . potential crises related to an airliner or some other kind of (terrorist attack) situation.â ?

Britain and Australia adopted similar changes during the last two years. The Americans are restructuring as well, although their plans have faced budget hurdles in Washington.

Canadian top brass began preliminary work on the overhaul last week. Four teams have responsibility for specific areas where reforms are needed.

For example, the first will recommend how to change the military's command structure, both for domestic and international operations. Another is looking at how to better recruit, train and deploy people.

The Paul Martin government has said it wants to increase the size of the military by 8,000 people during the next five years.

They'll be needed if the overhaul is to work. Getting the military to move faster â ” the goal for some units being deployment within 10 days â ” means you need more people, Mr. Gosselin said.

â Å“This is very high readiness,â ? he says.

â Å“When you increase readiness, it's taxing. It's fairly demanding in terms of people, in terms of the training you have to do, how you prepare.â ?

Two other teams are reviewing what new equipment the Forces need, and how to better work with other government departments and non-governmental agencies. Their work is expected to take longer, perhaps up to five years.

A main priority of the restructuring should be to streamline the military, cut the size of defence headquarters and not to simply create another chain of command, says one military analyst.

â Å“We are very top heavy in terms of our command structure,â ? says David Rudd, director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

â Å“If they do that, the money that can be saved . . . can be thrown back into the organization and hopefully pay for a lot more privates and corporals,â ? Mr. Rudd said.

â Å“It would be absolutely unconscionable for us to emerge from this process with even more people at headquarters. That must be avoided at all cost.â ?
 
Well, gotta give the generals and colonels that we seem to have a lot something to do
 
It seems that General Hillier is accomplishing what Hellyer tried and didn't quite succeed at doing 40 years ago.
 
It makes you wonder why this wasn't put in place years ago. IMHO theres too many political fingers keeping us from effectively and efficiently doing what we are paid to do.
 
SHELLDRAKE!! said:
It makes you wonder why this wasn't put in place years ago. IMHO theres too many political fingers keeping us from effectively and efficiently doing what we are paid to do.

From what I understand, there is an institutional "tug-of-war" in the CF between a strong-service idea and that of unification or its new incarnation, jointness (which I feel is a slightly different approach to the same concept).   This is not a uniquely Canadian thing; you see it in our Allies' forces as well - one only has to look at the arguments surrounding the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to see it.

Anyways, the way I read things, in the 1990's, with the Liberal government chopping big bucks all over the place, a program came out of the 1994 White Paper that was called the Management, Command, and Control Re-engineering (MCCR) initiative, which basically sliced and diced the unified headquarters and deconstructed much of what Unification had engineered in the CF.   The benefactors of this were the Environmental Commands - which were essentially the old Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force in all but name.

My take is that the 80's and early 90's were a distinct period of "anti-unification" in the CF (thus why, as Shelldrake asked, this wasn't in place years ago).   I feel this has had some negative effects on the CF, such as the elimination of Army and Naval Aviation in the interest of pre-Unification empire building by the Services.   However, with the growth of the importance of the DCDS and the primacy of "Jointness" in the CF right now, we are seeing the idea of a Unified defence force regaining momentum (possibly for good?).   The unification of regional headquarters which are based along functional/territorial lines rather than service based ones is a good indicator of this.

There are many good papers on this topic at the Canadian Forces College website.   Among others, Colonel Gosselin's NSSC paper is an excellent intro to the topic (you'll find much of what I've said in here):

http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/nssc/nssc6/gosselin.htm

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Some good points, Infanteer, but I think the linkage between unification and jointness isn't all that you make it out to be.

Unification required a single service, with a common operating and training structure, common traditions and a joint operational focus.

Jointness leaves force generation in the hands of each service (including much of the training program), but provides a tri-service operational capability.

I love jointness, but hated unification...

A couple of points:  first, IMHO the CDS is reflecting a distinctly American point of view with the Command structure.  In the US Army, FORSCOM force generates for the combatant commands (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, etc.), who are the force employers.

A Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is normally organized on a geographical basis into regions known as "Areas Of Responsibility" (AORs).
(Sound familiar?  From the CENTCOM website.)

In our context, CANADACOM (even the terminology is the same) will be the force employer, through a series of regional HQs.  The Army will still force generate for that component command.  We'll also have an overseas component command (MAPLE LEAF COM?) that will do the same thing.

Secondly, this isn't as radical as it sounds.  At present, each of the Army's LF Areas have the responsibility for domestic operations within boundaries. Each one of them could be required to generate a joint TF HQ in support of domestic operations.  We did this for OP PEREGRINE, for example, and employed forces from the Army, Navy and AF under one HQ.  What the CDS' plan does is institutionalize this process and make it permanent, thus reducing response times (at least on the command and control level).  Permanently assigning capabilities to units like JTF-2 will further increase readiness.  This, in part, explains why this was not done before - it wasn't deemed necessary pre-9/11 when the readiness requirements were somewhat less than they are now.  The US component command structure has evolved over a fairly long period of time

RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
Well, gotta give the generals and colonels that we seem to have a lot something to do.

Never worked in a HQ, have you?  ;)

Cheers,

Teddy
 
Teddy Ruxpin said:
Some good points, Infanteer, but I think the linkage between unification and jointness isn't all that you make it out to be.

Hence why I said "which I feel is a slightly different approach to the same concept".   To me, it appears that Unification is a bottom up procedure while Jointness is a top down one.   Unification has a single basic training school and a common uniform, while Jointness doesn't require this.   I think the dominance of Jointness (which is, as I said, a bit different then Unification) in the current defence environment is reviving and reinforcing many of the key themes of Unification which Hellyer originally intended; this is one of them.

There are many things I didn't like about Unification (attacking service culture and identity is one of them) but, in general, I think Hellyer's motives were good and his general concept was sound (unified source for military advice and command).

Teddy Ruxpin said:
Secondly, this isn't as radical as it sounds.   At present, each of the Army's LF Areas have the responsibility for domestic operations within boundaries. Each one of them could be required to generate a joint TF HQ in support of domestic operations.

Just curious, who did the previous Land Force Area Commanders report to?  I am assuming to the Land Staff?  Is this how the other forces operated as well - Pacific and Atlantic Fleet answering to the Maritime Staff and 1 Canadian Air Div reporting to the Air Staff?

If these changes are truely functional, are these Unified regional commands answering to the DCDS now?
 
Gee I wonder how the AF and Navy are taking this.

Perhaps its my ARMY bias and history - but to me it sound like we are finally "Either your Infantry or you support the Infantry"

I can dull that down to Support the Army for the tracktoads and Herbie's  :-*

I just hope Hillier does not make to many more enemies that try to plot to make this fail.


 
"Either your Infantry or you support the Infantry"

It's interesting to see everyone reading different things into this. 
I am extremely cynical. The more I look at the original article
the more I cringe.

For example I look at
so the Armed Forces can deal more quickly with natural disasters
and;
how to better work with other government departments and non-governmental agencies.

and I read less infantry, less everything.  More pretending to be the peace corps and
fire fighters.

Perhaps after years of cut after cut I'm jaded. Or perhaps it's specific words in the article:

the restructuring should be to streamline the military

I always associate that word streamline with "budget cut" or worse yet: " lost capability ".

Of course, given the makeup of the committee I suspect the recommendations are already
a foregone conclusion.

Time will tell.

Sorry all, just an aside:

<RANT>
When did the Canadian Press change the honourifics for General ranks to Mr.?
</RANT>




 
Well, I was intimately involved in slapping together a joint HQ for OP PEREGRINE and can say that having something in place will make things much, much easier.  As was explored on another thread a long time ago, the CF has no hesitation in saying it is the absolute force of last resort when it comes to assistance to civil authorities.

Reading between the lines, a lot of the "domestic" part of the restructure is a direct result of Bi-National Planning Group activity and our relationship with USNORTHCOM.  NORTHCOM was very anxious to have the CF as a direct reporting agency, as it is very concerned with control of airspace and sea approaches to the continent. At my level, I was beat on several times by Americans wanting information on force structure, joint planning, and "direct liaison" with Canadian units.  Having a CANADACOM will allow us to deal with NORTHCOM on a bi-lateral level without giving NORTHCOM control over Canadian assets - a cunning plan, IMHO, given the current political climate.  It isn't all about shovelling snow in TO...

Cheers,

Teddy
 
Teddy Ruxpin said:
We'll also have an overseas component command (MAPLE LEAF COM?) that will do the same thing.
Does that not (more or less) already exist within the DCDS office?

 
"Another is looking at how to better recruit, train and deploy people.

The Paul Martin government has said it wants to increase the size of the military by 8,000 people during the next five years."


So, can we expect efficiency within the recruiting and training process? Or should we continue to enjoy anywhere from approx. >6mo (if your ducks are in a row, you haven't done anything to raise an eyebrow and you're lucky) to 2-3 years before one swears their oath.
 
I am still unsure of the lines of Command - do these new Regional Commands report to the DCDS, along with the functional commands?  Can anyone fill this in for me?

PS.  I suggest "Expeditionary Forces Command" for the name of Joint HQ controlling, for the CDS through the DCDS, Canadian Forces deployed overseas - it sounds cool.... :warstory:
 
MCG said:
Does that not (more or less) already exist within the DCDS office?

Yes and no.   I believe that the idea of the deployable "expeditionary command" (I like that name too) is to act as the NCE for any Roto 0s.   The idea may well be to divorce the operational HQ from NDHQ - not a bad thing in my view - but we'll have to wait out and see what the actual plan is.   You could well see J3 Intl staff embedded within the expeditionary HQ and the JOG go by the wayside.

I am still unsure of the lines of Command - do these new Regional Commands report to the DCDS, along with the functional commands?   Can anyone fill this in for me?

As for command and control, it should be fairly simple and reflect what we actually do when deploying a TF domestically.   That is:

Regional HQ ------->CANADACOM-------->DCDS-------->CDS

It appears that there's another layer of HQ here, but there really isn't.   I gather (educated guess) that CANADACOM would assume the operational functions of the four LF Areas, MARCOM, CANR, and 1 CAD, splitting the responsibilities between itself and the regional HQs.   It might even include the J3 Continental staff from the DCDS' shop, reducing staffing further.   This would take us from eight HQ's to five - not bad.
 
Interesting thread, does anybody know how the commands and regions are breaking down? Combat teams are out and task forces are in......
 
Perhaps this means we will be able to do Herc jumps on less than 6months notice....

The AF and Navy must be shuddering, a military with the Infantry in command YES  ;D
 
Why the Air Force and the Navy should be shuddering, I am unsure of - in the joint environment, all three Services have an equal role to play.   What Unification means is that the independent interests of the Services are subordinated to a cohesive plan for National Defence.   In my view, we need to take a view similar to the Australians and look to a unified and joint maritime strategy.

Canada is essentially, like Australia, an island.   We are bounded on 3 sides by oceans and on the fourth by a neighbour with which we share a symbiotic relationship that is unique within the world - if Canada is going to use its Forces to pursue its National Interest and Foreign Policy it will be doing so, as we have for the last century, away from our shores and through the sea.

As well, conflict is and will be dominated by the large populations that flock to urban environments and the littoral - if we prepare ourselves with a proper maritime strategy, we can use the mobility of Naval power to allow us to "punch above our weight".   The Aussies are exploring and developing this concept with "Maneuver Operations in a Littoral Environment" (MOLE) - I feel we should do the same.   Conflict is a human affair, and humans live not under water or in the air but on the land.   If we are to have efficient and effective military, we must have the Navy and the Air Force to project and sustain the Army while it does the job on land.

As LtCmdr Bob Moyse writes in his excellent article on a Maritime Strategy:

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2004_W/AAJ_Winter_2004_AmphibWarfare.pdf

"any operational concept developed must be tri-service both in tone and character.   An intellectual and philosophical recognition of interdependence is vital because neither the Navy nor the Air Force can control the maritime environment without the Army."

Likewise, the Army cannot do without the Air Force and the Navy; same for the Air Force.   Without the Navy, the Army is just a bunch of guys running around that are a LONG way from Canada.   Without the Air Force, we are a two-dimensional Army, lacking the flexibility and reach that the force multiplier of Air Power brings to the table.   Jointness is a top down approach that must factor what each Service can best bring to the table.   Deriding the Navy and the Air Force is quite unproductive in Defence structure where we can't do anything without them....
 
ArmyRick said:
Interesting thread, does anybody know how the commands and regions are breaking down? Combat teams are out and task forces are in......

Actually, the waters are pretty muddy terminology-wise and this was just clarified.  We're using the term "task force" slightly incorrectly.  A TF is the deployed element - TF Kabul, etc..  It might include combat teams, battle groups (both terms now back in vogue), helicopters, ships, etc..  Thus a theoretical TF Kandahar might consist of a PRT, Bde HQ, Battle Group and other supporting units.

The AF and Navy must be shuddering, a military with the Infantry in command YES

Infanteer has already engaged on this, but you do know that the CDS is a black hat, right?  And that the current head of his action teams is Air Force?

Teddy
 
GO!!! said:
Perhaps this means we will be able to do Herc jumps on less than 6months notice....

The AF and Navy must be shuddering, a military with the Infantry in command YES   ;D

I never understood why some people constantly gloat over the fact that capabilities of the air force and navy might be weakened to prop up the army....  ::)
 
I believe the last Infantry Forum stated that the term Task Force may be on its way out and Combat Teams are coming back.  Watch and shoot.
 
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