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CF Transformation & the Operational Commands (Merged)

In the briefing I received, the LFA HQs will be the basis for the new regional HQs being set-up. It doesn't appear like the LFA HQs will survive... we won't need them anyway. Some people just want to keep their empires.
 
Gents,

You have to get your minds around the CDS's intent (a command centric institution) and difference in responsibilities for Canada COM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM and the future Support Command with the traditional roles of the army, navy and air force. 

Canada COM and CEFCOM are "force employers".  They will receive units, ships, task forces, etc under command once they are trained and declared OPRED by their respective ECS's.  Once these forces are placed under OPCOM they will be employed in domestic and international environments.  This has a distinct advantage as the CDS has commander's that he can turn to who is solely focused on North America or operations around the world.  These organizations will have units, etc allocated to them depending on their tasks. 

Examples

International.  The army prepares (force generation) 1 CMBG HQ and 1 PPCLI BG for deployment to Afghanistan.  The CLS declares these forces as OPRED to the CDS for deployment.  In Jan/Feb the deployment commences.  1 CMBG HQ (MNB (S) and 1 PPCLI BG are commanded (force employment) by CEFCOM while deployed in Afghanistan.  Upon their return in August or December, they revert back to CLS control for reconstitution.

Domestic.  Canada COM and JTF's maintain planning and liaison with Federal, Provincial (and potentially municipal) governments.  A severely dry Spring results in considerable wild fires occurring throughout western Canada.  Provincial resources are quickly expended fighting the blazes and a call is made through an LO who has been deployed to the provincial emergency management organization.  The JTFW may or may not have prepositioned forces (CDS intent to be proactive) and rapidly begins moving units into the affected areas.  Comd JTFW directs air force wings within his AOR to begin developing composite company's for deployment to afflicted areas.  Canada COM recognizing that JTFW land resources are rapidly diminishing, directs JTFP and JTFC to bring their IRU's to a higher state and begins contingency planning for moving these forces into the afflicted areas.  Note - this is not that different from how things happen now with the exception that the JTF's have more staff capability, have direct control of assets within their AOR and there is Canada COM above them maintain overwatch and coordinating national resources.

Force Generation.  95% of what the Army (and lesser extent navy and airforce) does is termed force generation.  We reequip ourselves, train (collectively and individually), administer, garrison, etc are all done within the framework of the army.  These responsibilities will NOT be given over to Canada COM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM, etc.  If the CDS's intent is to be realized, we really don't want to burden each of these organizations with the byzantine force generation problems inherent in the army.  More on this in a second.
There was much discussion in the CAT reports about the role of the army, navy and airforce (from status quo to disbanding them completely).  Remember that the CAT reports were only reports and they were not the CDS's direction (at least for now).  It is currently been decided that force generation tasks cannot be taken away from the army, navy and air force.  Having said this, one of the CDS's tenets is to get the army, navy and airforce working together (and capable of working together) within a 3 block war scenario.  Although the intent in the late 60s and early 70s was for the army navy and air force to begin working together, this really wasn't accomplished and we saw each service developing their own pet projects without the requirements of the other services in mind. 

JTFs.  The stand up of the 6 JTF's (JTFA has already stood up) will occur on 1 Feb 06.  The army LFA's have had responsibility for domestic operations on land (Vancouver Island to Newfoundland) since 1990/92 when they were stood up.  We (LFA's) have conducted dom ops on a as required basis using the mantra of a force of last resort.  Emergency Management is a provincial responsibility and we provide forces based on what they think they may need. This may be part of a gradual build up (Op ASSISTANCE) or it may be very quick (OP RECUPERATION or OP PEREGRINE).  Having said this, the LFA's spent limited time on preparing and training for dom ops as it was almost a secondary duty.  The J Staff had relatively little resources focused on domestic matters.  The main problem with the LFA dom ops set up was that we did not own anything in our AOR.  Hence, if Comd LFWA required 17 Wg to provide cots to the local Red Cross, he would have to ask/beg Comd 17 Wg to assist or go up through the DCDS shop and task 1 CAD to provide the support. Not very efficient if you are given the responsibility for dom ops but no authority for them.

On 1 Feb 06, when Canada COM, CEFCOM, and the remaining JTF's stand up, they are standing up as "force employer's", not "force generators".  In the JTF's this is a double hatting as 95% of the staff will remain focused on traditional force generation issues and some of the new PY's being added to the HQs will be focused on JTF activities. LFWA, LFCA, LFAA, SQFT will all still exist.  In the West, 39 CBG will remain under command of Comd LFWA for force generation activities but Comd 39 CBG will be double hatted as the Land Component Comd for JTFP and will respond to Comd JTFP (a double hatted Comd MARPAC) for force employment tasks.

Hope this make sense.



 
Gunner said:
On 1 Feb 06, when Canada COM, CEFCOM, and the remaining JTF's stand up, they are standing up as "force employer's", not "force generators".

So, the Regional JTF's are merely subordinate units to CANADACOM?

It seems as if this is only a half-baked measure.  The regional commands should be THE unified joint-force generators of the CF.  CANADACOM should be THE force joint-force employer for Fortress North America (including Dom Ops).  This should allow CANADACOM to take available forces from any Regional Command that it requires to accomplish the mission.  If we are moving to a functional/territorial based organization, there is no need to retain outdated service based structures at that high of a level.

I'll have to hash this out with General Hillier next time we get together for the hockey game.... :blotto:

Ideally, there is 6 Regional Commands - Pacific, Praire, Northern, Central, Eastern and Atlantic.  It seems logical that MARFORPAC and MARFORATL take the two coastal commands and Prarie, Central, Northern and Eastern taken up by LFWA, LFCA, CFNA, and SQFT respectively.  This means that 1 CDN Air Division and LFAA can be folded up?  The next step would be to integrate these commands - there needs to be tri-service representation at each level.  It should be entirely possible to see an Officer from any service background holding key positions (including command) of these joint organizations.  As well, there is CANSOFCOM, which has national control of (and is responsible for generating) all strategic SOC-units (regardless of region).  CANADACOM and the Expeditionary command are the two "Force Employers" (for North America and overseas, respectively) and should have "Component Commands" for the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces) contained within them.

Can't get easier then that.
 
Gunner, are you hearing that MARCOM, LFC and AIRCOM will still exist after 1 Feb 06?  Although I was a CAT 2 guy, I saw not only the development of CAT 1 material but other issues not contained in their Report that were still part of the CDS' "solution space".  Command relationships are important to the Chief and unless the three environmental "Commands" remain, vice three environmental staffs to help administer sailors, soldiers airmen and women, and supporters generate forces "Comanded" by Canada COM, I don't see as the Chief's intent will be met.  I don't think I'm out to lunch on this one, but my understanding was that the Chief was heading to four and four only Commands in the future: Canada COM, CEFCOM, CANSOFCOM and (as yet to be formalized) [support command]...

p.s.  rumblings are that Comd 1 CAD becomes the CF Air Component Commander (CFACC).

Cheers,
Duey
 
So, the Regional JTF's are merely subordinate units to CANADACOM?

Yes.  The double hatted JTF/LFA will be responsive to Canada COM for domestic operations (force employment matters) and to CLS for force generation matters.

It seems as if this is only a half-baked measure.  The regional commands should be THE unified joint-force generators of the CF.  CANADACOM should be THE force joint-force employer for Fortress North America (including Dom Ops).  This should allow CANADACOM to take available forces from any Regional Command that it requires to accomplish the mission.  If we are moving to a functional/territorial based organization, there is no need to retain outdated service based structures at that high of a level.

Infanteer, we are too small (and too fragmented) to have joint - force generation structures within the CF.  Canada COM is the joint force employer for North America and will take resources from the army, navy and airforce to accomplish its mission.  Remember that ops have primacy over training.  The force generation problem is not easy to solve within our current environment.  Do you want to saddle JTFP with all of the Army Reserve individual training problems?  No, of course not.

Ideally, there is 6 Regional Commands - Pacific, Praire, Northern, Central, Eastern and Atlantic.  It seems logical that MARFORPAC and MARFORATL take the two coastal commands and Prarie, Central, Northern and Eastern taken up by LFWA, LFCA, CFNA, and SQFT respectively.  This means that 1 CDN Air Division and LFAA can be folded up?  The next step would be to integrate these commands - there needs to be tri-service representation at each level.  It should be entirely possible to see an Officer from any service background holding key positions (including command) of these joint organizations.  As well, there is CANSOFCOM, which has national control of (and is responsible for generating) all strategic SOC-units (regardless of region).  CANADACOM and the Expeditionary command are the two "Force Employers" (for North America and overseas, respectively) and should have "Component Commands" for the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces) contained within them.

It's not Prairie, it West.  1 CAD will form the CFACC under 1 CAD.  LFAA still must exist unless you want to saddle MARLANT with militia force generation responsibility.  I don't think you fully understand the force generation puzzle that exists within the army, navy and airforce.  Why have component Command under Canada Com and CEFCOM?  Isn't that an additional level of HQ that is not required? 

Gunner, are you hearing that MARCOM, LFC and AIRCOM will still exist after 1 Feb 06?

Yes, for all of the force generation reasons stated in the above posts and I agree with it (for now...wait for MGen Leslie's report).

Command relationships are important to the Chief and unless the three environmental "Commands" remain, vice three environmental staffs to help administer sailors, soldiers airmen and women, and supporters generate forces "Comanded" by Canada COM, I don't see as the Chief's intent will be met.

I think the CDS has focussed on getting the new Commands sorted out is the first priority.  Changes to the Army, Navy and Airforce will come at a later date (is that 6 months from now or 2 years from now I don't know).  Canada COM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM are all very good things for the CF and the CDS is moving us in the right direction.  The key is not to break us in the process! 

p.s.  rumblings are that Comd 1 CAD becomes the CF Air Component Commander (CFACC).

This is a done deal.  The original plan was for air assets to be partioned out to the regional commands but this did not make sense as you are penny packeting a limited resource.  So I agree with this approach.   This does't mean AIRCOm will disappear as it will retain all of its force generation responsibilities.

 
Infanteer, we are too small (and too fragmented) to have joint - force generation structures within the CF.

Are you saying we need MORE officers?  :o  GO!!! will be knocking on the door pretty quickly.... ;)

Gunner said:
It's not Prairie, it West.

My bad.  Western Command makes more sense.

LFAA still must exist unless you want to saddle MARLANT with militia force generation responsibility.

Well, neither should have responsiblity; it should be the unified regional command responsible for generating joint forces in its area.  FWIW, Reserve issues seem to be a mess no matter who has control of it.

I don't think you fully understand the force generation puzzle that exists within the army, navy and airforce.

Well, it definately is a puzzle - that's for sure.... :blotto:

Why have component Command under Canada Com and CEFCOM?  Isn't that an additional level of HQ that is not required?

That would be an additional level of HQ that would be required.  I would assume that these service based components would provide unique advice and background to a unified command that employs CF forces.  No point having CEFCOM commanded by a bunch of Air Force guys and undertaking a Naval Task Force mission with which they have no experience.  My thinking is that Component Command for both CEFCOM and CANADACOM wouldn't neccesarily be large and they could form the basis for deployed TF headquarters (we are still calling the NCE, right?).  CEFCOM/CANADACOM would have small standing NCE's that could be plugged into with force generated assets when situations arise.

I still maintain that having competing territorial/functional and service based organizations is inefficent at best.
 
Are you saying we need MORE officers?    GO!!! will be knocking on the door pretty quickly....

I'll give GO!!! a heart attack yet. 

Well, neither should have responsiblity; it should be the unified regional command responsible for generating joint forces in its area.  FWIW, Reserve issues seem to be a mess no matter who has control of it.

I think you are narrowly defining force generation as the provision of force packages for employment.  This is not the broad definition of force generation.

That would be an additional level of HQ that would be required.  I would assume that these service based components would provide unique advice and background to a unified command that employs CF forces.  No point having CEFCOM commanded by a bunch of Air Force guys and undertaking a Naval Task Force mission with which they have no experience.  My thinking is that Component Command for both CEFCOM and CANADACOM wouldn't neccesarily be large and they could form the basis for deployed TF headquarters (we are still calling the NCE, right?).  CEFCOM/CANADACOM would have small standing NCE's that could be plugged into with force generated assets when situations arise.I still maintain that having competing territorial/functional and service based organizations is inefficent at best.

The three ECS are responsible for commanding the force generation aspects of the army, navy and airforce for employment by CEFCOM, CANADA COM, SOFCOM, etc and providing advice to the CDS.  Comd CEFCOM (engr army guy) will have command of a Naval Task Force while it operates in the Persian Gulf.  Remember that the Naval Task Force or Army Task Force, or Air Task Force, or Task Force Maple Leaf (Joint) will be under OPCON of some strategic or operational force in theatre.  When you deployed with 1 PPCLI to Bosnia, you were under OPCOM to Comd TFBH and OPCON to Comd MND SW.  CEFCOM would still have a requirement for an NCE deployed with the deployed assets. In the immortal words of the intelligentsia, you can't suck and blow at the same time.  NDHQ has learnt this error with the DCDS organization and the CDS is trying to rectify it with  the new Commands. 
 
Gunner said:
we are too small (and too fragmented) to have joint - force generation structures within the CF.
Could we atleast plug the helicopters into the enviroments for which they provide tactical support (land & sea)?

I also wonder: if we cannot have structures, can we have one FORGENCOM (which would include component staffs but no component commands)?
 
MCG,

I believe this is the way the CDS is pushing us toward this (or something of similar nature).  Even though we are the "CF", I believe that the army, navy and air force have maintained too much independence and need to be brought into the CF fold.  Unification was done to reduce costs and overlapping resources however it did not go far enough in terms of forcing the army, navy and airforce working together in a joint atmosphere.  Decisions were not always made with the good of the CF in mind by each of the ECS's.  We are such a small military and our ability to interoperate is minimal.  The army purchases radio's that can't talk to the air force, the air force spends huge amounts of money on CF18s without being capable of supporting land forces, and the navy has traditionally been forcused on ASW and has limited ability to support the army when it needs to go somewhere.  Too many rice bowls that need to be over turned and refocussed on interoperability.  This is a good thing for the army who has shouldered the majority of international deployments and it is good for the CF.

My 2 cents.
 
MCG said:
Could we atleast plug the helicopters into the enviroments for which they provide tactical support (land & sea)?

I also wonder: if we cannot have structures, can we have one FORGENCOM (which would include component staffs but no component commands)?

MCG, as of 1 Feb 06, 427 SOAS will be OPCOM to CANSOFCOM...that's a huge change to the SOA status quo!  That's as plugged in as it will ever get.

Cheers,
Duey

 
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