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CH-148 Cyclone Progress

As an aside, if we could get more aircraft, then the first thing I would add is a "heavy" det on each coast. As a rectal pluck, 3 aircraft, 5 crews, 24/7 maintenance and servicing. With a proper pack up; ie work out of the pack up even when at MOB, close the shipping container doors, and go. Not with host support (either ship or airbase dependant for security, feeding, supply, etc). Editted to add: it would include operations support (ie planning), it support (ie connecting helo support systems for planning and data sharing to forward infrastructure), and possible standards and readiness support.

It's purpose would be three fold:
  • immediately available for emergency deployment (disasters, emergent threats, etc)
  • ability to deploy on allied large decks (ie carriers) to support Canadian single deployers (like on Prince of Wales to Support VDQ right now)
  • if a large deck not available, deploy to a nearby host nation for the same reason

It would provided a limited alternative to Canada probably never going to have a through deck.
 
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If you can get the people, would having a ASW helicopter and a logistic/SAR helicopter on the JSS make sense. So the JSS can contribute to ASW defense or swap helicopters with the RCD and conduct maintenance onboard the JSS. meanwhile the logistic helicopter covers off resupply and SAR duties?
That's exactly what I would do. Accept that your probably only going to have 4 ASW birds in the CTG (1 on the tanker and three on the escorts), which will routinely cause you to go to only one airborne or on alert at any given time. The other one on the tanker is a support bird, which is available 1/2 - 2/3 of the time. Plus up the maintenance to 24/7, with 12 hour deck servicing cycles.

Then see my other comment for deeper support. Possibly go to a 4 bird heavy det, with 2 of each. The can fly support form ashore and swap out broken birds.
 
If you can get the people, would having a ASW helicopter and a logistic/SAR helicopter on the JSS make sense. So the JSS can contribute to ASW defense or swap helicopters with the RCD and conduct maintenance onboard the JSS. meanwhile the logistic helicopter covers off resupply and SAR duties?
And it would work even better if the SAR and ASW were the same type.
 
I was part of the math review somewhere around 2002ish.

It wasn't based on ships per se. It was based on keeping the White Paper mandated fleet available.

The mandate was (and still is, on paper) to keep two CTG (Canadian Task Groups) available at all times, plus one ship (NATO) continuously deployed. In that, you would be surge ships out of the task group to cover other deployments.

The task group needs to be able to keep 2 aircraft airborne at all times. That means you need 6 aircraft in the group. You fly 2 for 12, 2 for 12, with 2 in maintenance, any given day. If your lucky, you have a tanker with deeper maintenance capabilities (hasn't been the case for a long time) and you swap aircraft with them to keep it going. So, let's call it 1 tanker det (2 aircraft with 1 or 2 crews), 1 280 det (2 aircraft with 3 crews), 2 330 dets (1 aircraft with 2 crews each).

To keep the single det going, due to how Canada would like to deploy, it should be 4 dets (1 in 4, so preparing, deployed, post deploy, rest), but for various reasons (not the least was depth from the task groups) call it 3. So that's 3 330 dets with 1 aircraft and 2 crews in each.

So:
  • CTG East, 6 aircraft, 8 crews, in 4 dets
  • CTG West, 6 aircraft, 8 crews, in 4 dets
  • Single deployer, 3 aircraft, 6 crews, in 3 dets
Total is 15 aircraft, 22 crews, in 11 dets. Add in some sustainment crews (hopefully over and above squadron standards, readiness, and ops crews, but normally filling those positions) and call it 30 crews worth of deployers. So, the bottom line statement that everybody at 12 Wing should have been able to regurgitate when required of "15 det equivalents in 11 dets." When ashore they can use there own helos for currency, etc.

For training, you need to pump out 10 pilot's and 5 ACSOs and AESOPs per year at steady state just to produce enough to backfill all the at sea positions every three years. So call it 16 pilots and 16 backenders. 4 courses a year; with say (I don't have the training sylabbus right in front of me) 20 flights for pilots and maybe 12 for backenders (assuming a healthy sim). That's ~500 flights a year. Add ~300 for check rides, currency, etc. So your sustaining, 15ish flights a week, with all the cancellations. So call it a 3x3 program, 3 aircraft needed, but the reality is 7 or 8 in the hangar.

In a perfect world 1 for OT&E permanently assigned.

4 or 5 in heavy maintenance, which is why 12 AMS has the number of bays it has.

15 (423/443) + 7 (406) + 1 (HOTEF) + 5 (12 AMS) = 28. Add 7 for attrition, like the original contract = 35.

(There's then a whole bunch of stuff to get enough maintainers, in the right place, at the right time.)

What actually happens in reality is there are dets assigned to the high readiness (HR) ships and not the other ones. So, in the early 90s we were manning 7 or 8 dets at 423, 3 to 4 (in a pinch, but never when there was 8 on the other coast) at 443 (there's that 11 dets). Coincidentally (not) 2 of the 3 tankers, 2 of the 4 280s, and 7 of the 12 330s were at high readiness at any given time (hopefully).


However:

2 things don't add up, and to my knowledge the numbers have never been updated:
  • 280s are gone. So they only two aircraft dets are the tankers. So, let's assume we only put 5 in the CTG, and accept the risk of non-availability (pretty much the certtainty with the Cyclone right now).
  • There's more single ship deployments, and that chews up dets (and ships).
OK. Let's simplify it, let's say 15 det equivalents in 15 dets. If you want to sail a plus'd up tanker, just put on most of two dets. Gives us more flexibility, but we need to get a few more remars for a few extra aircrew (and maintainers).

That leaves the AOPS. Everyone you man comes at the cost of not manning a River. Only option, more aircraft, which equals more dets, which equals more people, which means plussing up 406. Reality is, for every aircraft you add going to sea, you need 1.5 - 2 added to the fleet.

So, yep, you could easily make an arugument for 50-60 of something in the current world (the original Sea King buy was 41) but I'm not sure how palatable that would be. If it was 60s, I could also make an argument to throw a few 60Ss into the mix.


By the way, if you want, I could do the same exercise for the USN, or RN, and the relative numbers would be somewhat similar (larger, but in the same general proportions).

How do you feel about a USV Bras d'Or now? Wouldn't it, or a XLUUVs with towed sonar, give the CTG more persistent coverage?
 
How do you feel about a USV Bras d'Or now? Wouldn't it, or a XLUUVs with towed sonar, give the CTG more persistent coverage?
I think the struggle with large autonomous vehicles in the marine environment, will be long endurance ops in moderate to heavy sea states. Doing a North Atlantic convoy escort, you will likley not always be able to replenish or resolve any issues onboard and trying to patrol and maintain position around the convoy may suck up all it's battery/fuel capacity and you may be unlikely to recover it.
 
… Wiki suggests less than 8 ft, would it be viable to change the airframe out to a non folding tail, given the River Class could theoretically have the hangar altered to fit the non folding frame?…
Don’t even think about changing a thing on the River class. Banish that thought. We don’t need to give Irving and Lochmart any excuse to drag out delivery or raise the cost (it’s already eye watering).
 
How do you feel about a USV Bras d'Or now? Wouldn't it, or a XLUUVs with towed sonar, give the CTG more persistent coverage?
I don't know that I'm the right person to answer that question, but I do have some thoughts:
  • it does seem that the "two airbrone all the time" needs to be revisited, and that persintent ASW may be best satisified with tails and active projectors, and to provide that resource effectively unmanned seems the best answer
  • MH is a naturally reactive vehicle; maintenance cycles and tactics should be tuned up to keep it on an alert state until needed, which many countries have done for a long time
  • the need for MH to have a C2 capability may have permanently wained, given the current ubiquitous C2 links available, especially Link-16
  • there is a need for HALE electronic surveillance which is both active (radar) and passive (ESM), and it seems that is best provided by unmanned (either heavier or lighter than air); eg Triton.
  • it's always best to use expendables (weapons and search stores) from ashore first; do we need something (manned or unmanned) to augment the LRPA (again Triton)?
  • likelise, what are the options for self deploying expendables at sea (ie ASROC plus some way to remotely fly out search stores, and relay their info back)
  • what is the role for expendable UAVs (weapons delivery (eg HAWK kit), EO/IR, MAD, sono delivery)?
  • but at the end of the day, there is still a place for manned fixed and rotary wing due to the flexibility they bring to the fight

All of that begs the question, what is the right short, medium, and long term mix? Sounds like doctrine to me. I've already expressed my opinion that this type of force development is beyond the capability of the RCN and RCAF to figure out right now. So let's follow our allies.

Which brings up another question... it seems that the P-8 is best employed in conjunction with Triton (see above); which is supported by what I learned at NATO AGS. Why is Triton not part of our force structure thoughts?
 
And it would work even better if the SAR and ASW were the same type.
I think he's talking embarked SAR, which is a secondary role. Although there may be benefits for the RCAF to having primary SAR and the embarked helo the same type, I don't think it should be a driving factor for how we organize embarked aviation. For reference, there were significant differences between the CH-148 Petrel and CH-149 Chimo. That included no tail ramp on the Petrel, unlike the Cyclone.
 
I think he's talking embarked SAR, which is a secondary role. Although there may be benefits for the RCAF to having primary SAR and the embarked helo the same type, I don't think it should be a driving factor for how we organize embarked aviation. For reference, there were significant differences between the CH-148 Petrel and CH-149 Chimo. That included no tail ramp on the Petrel, unlike the Cyclone.
The UK even operates 2 different shipborne ASW helicopters.
 
I think he's talking embarked SAR, which is a secondary role. Although there may be benefits for the RCAF to having primary SAR and the embarked helo the same type, I don't think it should be a driving factor for how we organize embarked aviation. For reference, there were significant differences between the CH-148 Petrel and CH-149 Chimo. That included no tail ramp on the Petrel, unlike the Cyclone.
Excuse my ignorance, but what is a petrel and chimo? I thought the Sikorsky CH148 was named Cyclone and the Augusta CH149 was named Cormorant? I understand that the some VH71 Kestrel are being converted to Cormorants.
 
I don't know that I'm the right person to answer that question, but I do have some thoughts:
  • it does seem that the "two airbrone all the time" needs to be revisited, and that persintent ASW may be best satisified with tails and active projectors, and to provide that resource effectively unmanned seems the best answer
  • MH is a naturally reactive vehicle; maintenance cycles and tactics should be tuned up to keep it on an alert state until needed, which many countries have done for a long time
  • the need for MH to have a C2 capability may have permanently wained, given the current ubiquitous C2 links available, especially Link-16
  • there is a need for HALE electronic surveillance which is both active (radar) and passive (ESM), and it seems that is best provided by unmanned (either heavier or lighter than air); eg Triton.
  • it's always best to use expendables (weapons and search stores) from ashore first; do we need something (manned or unmanned) to augment the LRPA (again Triton)?
  • likelise, what are the options for self deploying expendables at sea (ie ASROC plus some way to remotely fly out search stores, and relay their info back)
  • what is the role for expendable UAVs (weapons delivery (eg HAWK kit), EO/IR, MAD, sono delivery)?
  • but at the end of the day, there is still a place for manned fixed and rotary wing due to the flexibility they bring to the fight

All of that begs the question, what is the right short, medium, and long term mix? Sounds like doctrine to me. I've already expressed my opinion that this type of force development is beyond the capability of the RCN and RCAF to figure out right now. So let's follow our allies.

Which brings up another question... it seems that the P-8 is best employed in conjunction with Triton (see above); which is supported by what I learned at NATO AGS. Why is Triton not part of our force structure thoughts?

Putting together these three thoughts.

The persistent very small usvs employed by Task Group 59.1

The recent BAE proposal of a Multi-Mission Frigate with lots of room for containers and ramps.
1757443670061.png
The vessels on the ramp are the Cetus XLUUV (12m) and the ARCIMS USV (11m). Either one will fit in a TEU-40.
1757443852966.png1757443932555.png

And Atlantic Bastion
1757444301378.png

As far as delivering rounds on target from shore
My cheap favourite

1757444406183.png

1800 lbs of weapons to 5600 km at 1048 km/h for <3 MUSD. Disposable if necessary.
 
The UK even operates 2 different shipborne ASW helicopters.
Or look south.
Two different ASW Hawks then
Two more different Hawk variants (albeit same airframe just different mission sets)
Plus USMC CH-46, CH-53, AH-1Z, UH-1Y and the CV-22 (when it isn’t grounded).
 
I think he's talking embarked SAR, which is a secondary role. Although there may be benefits for the RCAF to having primary SAR and the embarked helo the same type, I don't think it should be a driving factor for how we organize embarked aviation. For reference, there were significant differences between the CH-148 Petrel and CH-149 Chimo. That included no tail ramp on the Petrel, unlike the Cyclone.
What I was getting at is replace the Cyclone with the AW101. But more than 28. And get more Cormorants.
 
What I was getting at is replace the Cyclone with the AW101. But more than 28. And get more Cormorants.
I get that... you have made that position abundantly clear. I'm not 100% sure why you seem to have a personal stake in it, but that's cool. I'll also fully admit I have biases, being as I've been involved in the decision making, as a staff officer or corporate equivalent, since somewhere around 1997.

However, I'm not convinced of your seemingly simple solution to a complex problem. Right of the bat, anybody that is involved in any internal discussions, or discussions with Sikorsky, aren't talking; and if they were, we'd have bigger problems. There is a signed contract in place between Sik andthe GoC, and that has reprecussions.

I'm also not convinced that the Wing could have aborbed the Petrel easily in the mid '90s, much less in the late 2010's. So, I'm intrigued as to what this AW101 looks like? Is it a Merlin? Would the RN allow us to buy a Merlin (probably)? Could AW produce a Merlin (I have my doubts, given that every time the RN talks about bringing the non-upgraded Mk1s outof storage there is push back)? Could the RN help us transition to a Merlin if we could get it (probably not, they are stretched to the limit as well)?

Given all that, if the Cyclone is beyond repair, I'm not convinced the AW101 is the answer. Is it the best operational fit for Canada... yes. Should we have continued with the original purchase... probably, but there were challenges to overcome. Should we have listened to direction when told "not the cadilac..." absolutely. Is it the easiest path to solve the problem... highly debatable.
 
I get that... you have made that position abundantly clear. I'm not 100% sure why you seem to have a personal stake in it, but that's cool. I'll also fully admit I have biases, being as I've been involved in the decision making, as a staff officer or corporate equivalent, since somewhere around 1997.

However, I'm not convinced of your seemingly simple solution to a complex problem. Right of the bat, anybody that is involved in any internal discussions, or discussions with Sikorsky, aren't talking; and if they were, we'd have bigger problems. There is a signed contract in place between Sik andthe GoC, and that has reprecussions.

I'm also not convinced that the Wing could have aborbed the Petrel easily in the mid '90s, much less in the late 2010's. So, I'm intrigued as to what this AW101 looks like? Is it a Merlin? Would the RN allow us to buy a Merlin (probably)? Could AW produce a Merlin (I have my doubts, given that every time the RN talks about bringing the non-upgraded Mk1s outof storage there is push back)? Could the RN help us transition to a Merlin if we could get it (probably not, they are stretched to the limit as well)?

Given all that, if the Cyclone is beyond repair, I'm not convinced the AW101 is the answer. Is it the best operational fit for Canada... yes. Should we have continued with the original purchase... probably, but there were challenges to overcome. Should we have listened to direction when told "not the cadilac..." absolutely. Is it the easiest path to solve the problem... highly debatable.


I have no idea how they make decisions about this kind of stuff, but do we have to wait for the Cyclone to kill more (of our own) aviators?
 
I have no idea how they make decisions about this kind of stuff, but do we have to wait for the Cyclone to kill more (of our own) aviators?
That's an oversimplifcation of what happened:
Flight safety investigation report for stalker 22 accident
The investigation concluded that during a complex turning manoeuver at low altitude, when the helicopter was returning to the ship, the aircraft did not respond as the crew would have expected due to a Command Model Attitude Bias Phenomenon. This phenomenon develops under a very specific and narrow set of circumstances where manual inputs to the primarily flight controls override the aircraft’s automation system, referred to as the Flight Director, while it is engaged and set to fly at a fixed airspeed or pitch attitude. The bias that developed in this instance resulted in insufficient aft cyclic controller authority, resulting in a high-energy descent and impact with the water.

A series of other causal factors were highlighted in the report, to include:
  • Control inputs when flying with the Flight Director engaged were not verbalized in the cockpit,
  • Flying publications contained information that may have been confusing or misleading,
  • The Statement of Operating Intent for the CH-148 did not specify the operational requirement to fly the manoeuver involved in the accident,
  • Standard operating procedures for this manoeuver were undocumented,
  • It was common practice to manually override primary flight controls while the Flight Director was engaged, and
  • The mode annunciation may not have sufficiently drawn the pilot’s attention to the fact the Flight Director was engaged during the manoeuver.
Some of that can very easily be interpreted to say "thank god the Sea King was very forgiving of this type of maneuver, or we would of learned it's implications a long time ago."

I respectfully submit, that if the community does not get the path forward correct, especially under pressure from people like the Comd RCN, incidents like this are more likely to happen, regardless of the platform flown.

Editted to add: some of us, both in the Wing and looking in, we're very worried that the GoFos were calling the Cyclone "the best MH in the world," when the crews had obviously not been given the time nor support to develop that capability. The worry is what pressure do the ship's COs put on the crews to fulfil that promise?
 
417, 439 and 444 Combat Support Squadrons

413, 424, 435 and 442 Transport and Rescue Squadrons

103 SAR Squadron

440 Transport Squadron

435 is a tanker squadron.

Beyond that all the rest of them paint their aircraft yellow.

Them plus the Rangers to the Coast Guard?
What would be gained transferring the Rangers to the Coast Guard?
 
it's always best to use expendables (weapons and search stores) from ashore first; do we need something (manned or unmanned) to augment the LRPA (again Triton)
The Triton/Global Hawk family doesn’t employ dropped stores. The SeaGuardian version of the MQ-9, however, shows promise. It has long endurance, can carry an impressive amount of sonobouys, and acts as a rebroadcaster for sonobouy data. I don’t think anyone’s dropped a torpedo yet from a Reaper variant, but that capability might be coming soon.
 
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