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Oh well. But then again, an extended layover at Hong Kong's Chep Lap Kok airport isn't a bad thing... got to love Cathay Pacific or Eva Air's airline lounges. ;D
Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread
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Something worth mentioning from the "WTF News files" thread:
A man becomes Australia's version of "Da Shan" after coma
A man becomes Australia's version of "Da Shan" after coma
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In the wake of recent anniversary ceremonies that commemorated China's part in the victory against Japan in World War II...
Tokyo and Beijing are again wary of each other over competing claims to territory. How long till an incident similar to the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge clash will see these two regional powers at each others' throats again?
Tokyo and Beijing are again wary of each other over competing claims to territory. How long till an incident similar to the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge clash will see these two regional powers at each others' throats again?
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I could see Hong Kong as a future city-state like Singapore considering they have the economic capacity to do so, not to mention their own HKD currency which is still being used, but I doubt Beijing would be willing to let them go so easily.
Last time I visited Hong Kong in 2012, a money changer said that Hong Kong dollars were better even though some say Ren Min Bi/Yuan is starting to be used. When I tried to use Ren Min Bi in Hong Kong, the stores I went to didn't take them.
Reuters
Last time I visited Hong Kong in 2012, a money changer said that Hong Kong dollars were better even though some say Ren Min Bi/Yuan is starting to be used. When I tried to use Ren Min Bi in Hong Kong, the stores I went to didn't take them.
Reuters
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A few shops will take RMB, most think it's too much bother ... there are automatic teller machines that accept RMB all over the place, now.
HK has a strategic problem: water. Most water is provided by pipeline from Guangdong province.There is not enough 'domestic' water in Kowloon and the New Territories to supply the whole Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; it's China's "ace in the hole."
I reiterate: I think we are seeing a political struggle, in Beijing, between (at least) two factions of the Communist Party hierarchy: my guess (maybe only a hope?) is that the leadership inside the Zhongnanhai can see that suppressing democracy in HK is counterproductive when the prize is Taiwan, but they will let the hard liners win a few rounds before they make a final decision ... that, it seems to me, is the Chinese way.
HK has a strategic problem: water. Most water is provided by pipeline from Guangdong province.There is not enough 'domestic' water in Kowloon and the New Territories to supply the whole Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; it's China's "ace in the hole."
I reiterate: I think we are seeing a political struggle, in Beijing, between (at least) two factions of the Communist Party hierarchy: my guess (maybe only a hope?) is that the leadership inside the Zhongnanhai can see that suppressing democracy in HK is counterproductive when the prize is Taiwan, but they will let the hard liners win a few rounds before they make a final decision ... that, it seems to me, is the Chinese way.
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E.R. Campbell said:
I remember hiking by the massive reservoir and dam in Tai Tam in the southeastern part of Hong Kong island; I never realized that it and the other reservoirs on Kowloon weren't enough to supply the water needs of the territory.
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Every few months the idea of building a HUGE desalinization plant, after expanding one of HK's remaining rocks into another island,* gets raised ~ usually as a way of "freeing" HK from China's grip.
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* E.g:
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E.R. Campbell said:
How did Singapore manage independence from the Malaysian Federation? I don't suppose they have a water supply problem?
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Actually, Singapore does have a water supply problem, too. It buys some of its water from Malaysia, but there is an official plan to be water independent when the currently remaining agreement expires in 2061.
Hong Kong's problem is that it gets over ⅔ of its water from China, proper.
Now, as to Singapore's independence: it was, actually, expelled from the original Malaysia federation. There were serious, deadly, race riots in 1964 ~ the tensions, which still exist between the majority (60%) ethnic Malays, who enjoy special "affirmative action" privileges that are enshrined in the constitution, and the minority (<25%) Chinese who do not ~ were too strong in Singapore and the consensus that the Brits had brokered between the ethnic Malays and the ethnic Chinese broke down. (The problem, today, is that the minority Chinese account for nearly half of Malaysia's GDP.)
Modern Singapore is about 85% Chinese (Hong Kong, by contrast, is 95% Chinese) but the only racial tensions I have seen appear to involve Indonesian housemaids who become less and less observant of Muslim cultural norms when they are in Singapore, something that appears to really annoy the (fairly large number) of Indonesian male, Muslim migrant workers (someone has to do all the manual labour).
Hong Kong's problem is that it gets over ⅔ of its water from China, proper.
Now, as to Singapore's independence: it was, actually, expelled from the original Malaysia federation. There were serious, deadly, race riots in 1964 ~ the tensions, which still exist between the majority (60%) ethnic Malays, who enjoy special "affirmative action" privileges that are enshrined in the constitution, and the minority (<25%) Chinese who do not ~ were too strong in Singapore and the consensus that the Brits had brokered between the ethnic Malays and the ethnic Chinese broke down. (The problem, today, is that the minority Chinese account for nearly half of Malaysia's GDP.)
Modern Singapore is about 85% Chinese (Hong Kong, by contrast, is 95% Chinese) but the only racial tensions I have seen appear to involve Indonesian housemaids who become less and less observant of Muslim cultural norms when they are in Singapore, something that appears to really annoy the (fairly large number) of Indonesian male, Muslim migrant workers (someone has to do all the manual labour).
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Replying to myself, but here is a very detailed and informative (and official) report about HK's new desalinization plant at Tseung Kwan O.
HK plans to get 50 million cubic metres (m3)/year (eventually be expanded to 90 million m3/year) from the TKO plant but bear in mind, please that HK imports 820 million m3 from the Dongjiang river basin in Quandong province.
Singapore already has two (larger) plants, now, and has plans for more.
Edit: corrected figures to show 820 million m3
HK plans to get 50 million cubic metres (m3)/year (eventually be expanded to 90 million m3/year) from the TKO plant but bear in mind, please that HK imports 820 million m3 from the Dongjiang river basin in Quandong province.
Singapore already has two (larger) plants, now, and has plans for more.
Edit: corrected figures to show 820 million m3
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From The American Interest, a disturbing report that suggests the Chinese see conflict as being "inevitable". Perception is reality, so if this actually is a common attitude in China, then we have much to worry about:
http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/09/12/chinese-see-war-with-japan-as-inevitable/
http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/09/12/chinese-see-war-with-japan-as-inevitable/
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Chinese antipathy towards Japan has a long, sad history, going back to at least the 1st century when the Chinese began to extract tribute from Japan. True, enduring enmity began after Kublai Khan's unsuccessful attempts at invasion, but the events of the 1930s, especially the Rape of Nanjing, which, at least, rivals anything done by Hitler, Stalin, Mao or Pol Pot, and so on, created a level of hatred which runs strong, today.
What grates on the Chinese, especially, is that successive Japanese leaders insist on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine where, especially, Iwane Matsui, who was (very properly) hanged as a war criminal for overseeing the Rape of Nanjing was 'enshrined' as a hero. (Can you imagine our reaction if a German Chancellor visited a shrine to Adolf Eichmann? (not that one exists ... I hope.))
The Japanese have refused to properly and publicly acknowledge that they committed the gravest crimes against humanity, acts of barbarism that are unsurpassed in history, in China, especially in Nanjing; in fact, several times, as recently as 2012, very senior Japanese officials have denied that the Rap of Nanjing even occurred. That ordinary Chinese people, especially educated Chinese who have read and traveled, hate the Japanese, does not surprise me.
What grates on the Chinese, especially, is that successive Japanese leaders insist on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine where, especially, Iwane Matsui, who was (very properly) hanged as a war criminal for overseeing the Rape of Nanjing was 'enshrined' as a hero. (Can you imagine our reaction if a German Chancellor visited a shrine to Adolf Eichmann? (not that one exists ... I hope.))
The Japanese have refused to properly and publicly acknowledge that they committed the gravest crimes against humanity, acts of barbarism that are unsurpassed in history, in China, especially in Nanjing; in fact, several times, as recently as 2012, very senior Japanese officials have denied that the Rap of Nanjing even occurred. That ordinary Chinese people, especially educated Chinese who have read and traveled, hate the Japanese, does not surprise me.
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China's soft power campaign is in the spotlight in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Economist:
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21616988-decade-ago-china-began-opening-centres-abroad-promote-its-culture-some-people-are-pushing
Caveat lector: I have a good friend who is on the board of the Confucius Institute at the University of Texas in Dallas and I have attended events sponsored by the Institute.
As the article notes, such soft power tools, often under the guise of language learning/promotion, are fairly common. In America's case the spread of "American Universities," beginning in Beirut, were, originally Christian missionary tools but, more recently have become more overtly political.
Is the Confucius Institute trying to whitewash China in the eyes of gullible, idealistic young Americans? YES. Is that what e.g. l'Alliance Française does, too? YES. Is it part of a Chinese government funded soft power campaign aimed at changing foreigners' perceptions of China? YES. Should they be banned? NO ... unless you believe that young American, British and Canadian men and women are terminally bloody stupid, unable to think for themselves ...
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http://www.economist.com/news/china/21616988-decade-ago-china-began-opening-centres-abroad-promote-its-culture-some-people-are-pushing
Confucius says
A decade ago China began opening centres abroad to promote its culture. Some people are pushing back
Sep 13th 2014 | BEIJING AND EUGENE, OREGON | From the print edition
“HARMONY is the most valuable of all things,” said the Chinese philosopher Confucius two and a half millennia ago. There is little of it in evidence in the frosty relationship between the woman who was the founding director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Oregon, Bryna Goodman, and her fellow historian, Glenn May. Their offices are separated by a ten-second walk, but the scholars do not exchange visits. Their palpable ill feeling reflects growing discord among Western scholars about a decade-old push by China to open government-funded cultural centres in schools and universities abroad. Intended to boost China’s “soft power”, the centres take the name of the peace-espousing sage. They tap into growing global demand for Chinese-language teaching. But they are also fuelling anxiety about academic freedom.
In America the Confucius programme has been widely welcomed by universities and school districts, which often do not have enough money to provide Chinese-language teachers for all who need them. But critics like Mr May believe China’s funding comes at a price: that Confucius Institutes (as those established on university campuses are known) and school-based Confucius Classrooms restrain freedom of speech by steering discussion of China away from sensitive subjects.
In June the American Association of University Professors called for universities to end or revise their contracts with Confucius Institutes (America has 100 of them) because they “function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom”. Mr May has been asking the University of Oregon to close its institute, to no avail. Ms Goodman (who is no longer the institute’s director) says that in funding its interests China is like any other donor to American universities. She says that the institutes have become lodestones of what she calls a “China fear”.
When China opened its first Confucius Institute in 2004 in Seoul, it hoped the new effort would prove as uncontroversial as cultural-outreach programmes sponsored by Western governments, such as the British Council, the Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut. The idea was to counter fears of China’s rise by raising awareness of a culture that is often described by Chinese as steeped in traditions of peace.
Through the Hanban, a government entity, China provides the centres with paid-for instructors and sponsors cultural events at them. Its spending is considerable, and growing rapidly. In 2013 it was $278m, more than six times as much as in 2006. China’s funding for Confucius Institutes amounts to about $100,000-200,000 a year on many campuses, and sometimes more (Oregon received nearly $188,000 in the last academic year). By the end of 2013 China had established 440 institutes and 646 classrooms serving 850,000 registered students. They are scattered across more than 100 countries, with America hosting more than 40% of the combined total. There are plans for another 60 institutes and 350 classrooms to be opened worldwide by the end of 2015.
Chinese officials express satisfaction. In June Liu Yunshan, who is in charge of the Communist Party’s vast propaganda apparatus, said Confucius Institutes had “emerged at the right moment”. He described them as a “spiritual high-speed rail”, promoting friendship by connecting Chinese dreams with those of the rest of the world.
Others are less sanguine, however. In America criticism has recently grown stronger. Earlier this year more than 100 members of the faculty at the University of Chicago complained that Confucius Institutes were compromising academic integrity. In an article published in 2013 by Nation magazine, one of the university’s academics, Marshall Sahlins, listed cases in several countries involving what appeared to be deference to the political sensitivities of Confucius Institutes. These included a couple of occasions when universities had invited the Dalai Lama to speak and then either cancelled the invitation or received him off-campus.
In one case, at North Carolina State University in 2009, the provost said after the cancellation of a Dalai Lama visit that the Confucius Institute had indicated the exiled Tibetan’s presence could cause problems with China. This year Steven Levine, an honorary professor at the University of Montana, wrote to hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world asking them to mark the 25th anniversary in June of the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests. None of them agreed. Global Times, a Beijing newspaper, recently called the protests of foreign academics “a continuation of McCarthyism”.
Ms Goodman argues that the study of China needs all the funding it can get, even if that means taking money from countries with vital interests at stake—whether China, Taiwan, or the United States. She says that if China were ever to meddle politically in Oregon’s institute, the Confucius programme would be quickly shut down.
Such assurances do not address a big concern of critics—that the political influence of Confucius programmes is often subtle and slow-acting. If the critics are right, it is very subtle indeed. Surveys suggest that in many countries China’s image has not markedly improved over the past decade. The Pew Research Centre, an American polling organisation, says 42% of Americans viewed China favourably in 2007. Last year only 37% did. The political dividends of China’s soft-power spending are far from obvious.
Caveat lector: I have a good friend who is on the board of the Confucius Institute at the University of Texas in Dallas and I have attended events sponsored by the Institute.
As the article notes, such soft power tools, often under the guise of language learning/promotion, are fairly common. In America's case the spread of "American Universities," beginning in Beirut, were, originally Christian missionary tools but, more recently have become more overtly political.
Is the Confucius Institute trying to whitewash China in the eyes of gullible, idealistic young Americans? YES. Is that what e.g. l'Alliance Française does, too? YES. Is it part of a Chinese government funded soft power campaign aimed at changing foreigners' perceptions of China? YES. Should they be banned? NO ... unless you believe that young American, British and Canadian men and women are terminally bloody stupid, unable to think for themselves ...
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In spite of what this article says, Canada just lost the opportunity to benefit from the next wave of wealthy Chinese immigrants by closing the investor-class immigrant visa recently:
Business Insider
Business Insider
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Ian Bremmer, a fellow with some good insights into Chinese policy, explains the apparent contradictions between Xi Jinping's broad, general policies and his government's treatment of HK in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Reuters:
http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2014/09/08/chinese-leaders-reforms-are-bad-news-for-hong-kong/
But: remember Taiwan; Taiwan is watching. Beijing wants to bring Taiwan back into the fold and it wants to do it peacefully; Taiwan is watching how China manages "one country - two systems" with HK ... or not.
http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2014/09/08/chinese-leaders-reforms-are-bad-news-for-hong-kong/
Chinese leader’s reforms are bad news for Hong Kong
By Ian Bremmer
SEPTEMBER 8, 2014
In 1997, Britain returned Hong Kong to China after some 150 years of colonial rule. In exchange, China agreed to a set of principles: Hong Kong would maintain its capitalist system for half a century, by which point its chief executive and members of the legislature would be elected by universal suffrage. As the thinking went, “one country, two systems” would suffice in the interim; Hong Kong and the Mainland would surely converge on democracy in the half-century to come.
Not so fast. Recently, Beijing has been systematically moving in the other direction. The decision on August 31 to rule out democratic elections for Hong Kong in 2017 was just the latest example. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s transformational reform agenda is driving this shift—and it does not bode well for Hong Kong.
Xi’s reform agenda has two parts: the first is economic liberalization. The Chinese leadership recognizes that it cannot rely on state-driven investment and cheap labor to provide growth indefinitely. Xi wants to make China’s economy more sophisticated and competitive. He is overhauling inefficient state-owned enterprises and focusing on changes in the financial sector in particular. It’s a top priority of the new leadership, and a requirement for a sustainable and dynamic Chinese economy going forward.
But a prosperous economy is simply a means to an end-goal. Xi is opening up the economy because, above all else, he wants to ensure the long-term survival and stability of the Communist Party leadership. He thinks economic reforms are a good bet despite the risks they will usher in. Over time, reform will require an enormous transfer of wealth from large domestic companies to demanding citizens and it will threaten the vested interests of many powerful elites who have prospered off the status quo. It will inject necessary competition into the economy, which could put jobs, companies, and sectors at risk.
So as Xi opens the economy and the Pandora’s Box that comes along with it, he is simultaneously clamping down on political dissent and consolidating power. Some Chinese citizens may think (or hope) that economic reform will usher in moves toward democracy. Make no mistake: Xi is engaged in political reform…it just doesn’t resemble our Western notion of what that entails. Xi has absolutely no interest in domestic political competition; in a time of economic change, political unity needs to be at its absolute strongest. This is the basis for his anti-corruption campaign, which has already led to some 40 powerful officials with the rank of vice minister or above being detained or investigated. Xi wants to scare China’s political and commercial elite into falling in line with his economic reforms, all while building popular support for his initiatives by attacking perceived corruption.
Hong Kong finds itself on the wrong end of Xi’s reform plan: Hong Kong used to matter to Beijing economically, now it matters politically. That’s absolutely the wrong way around. To the extent that economic liberalization bears fruit, Hong Kong will no longer serve such a useful role as the Western face and gateway into China. As China pushes forward with a Free Trade Zone in Shanghai, it will cannibalize many of Hong Kong’s unique offerings for foreigners looking to do business. And Hong Kong is no longer as integral to the Chinese economy: in 1997, it accounted for 15.6 percent of China’s national GDP. Last year, it fell below 3 percent.
Of even greater importance, Hong Kong matters more to Beijing politically—for all the wrong reasons. In the context of Xi’s sweeping reforms where he needs all hands on the same deck politically, dissent in Hong Kong is more salient, dangerous, and intolerable. Xi will push back against a pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong for two main reasons.
First, Hong Kong’s Westernized nature makes it a threat. Xi is very concerned with the dangers of Western values and mores undermining his country’s political system, something he shares in common — and regularly discusses — with Vladimir Putin. Hong Kong’s citizens are globally connected, politically savvy, and have the ability to mobilize. They are geared for diversity of political opinion. Beijing will clamp down on that, with a willingness to use its surveillance capacities (and even the legal system or force as necessary).
Second, taking a hard line on Hong Kong meshes with both of Xi’s political consolidation goals. Like the politicians he has targeted in his anti-corruption campaign, Xi can make an example out of Hong Kong, demonstrating the consequences for voicing opposing views. And that hard line will be largely popular: Many Chinese mainlanders view Hong Kong citizens as widely discriminatory against them and actively campaigning to keep them out of Hong Kong. Xi has support for teaching Hong Kong a lesson.
What we are witnessing in Hong Kong will prove problematic for China as Xi’s reforms really begin to shake up the system. The risk is not as much that protests in Hong Kong could be contagious and spread to the Mainland (given the mainlanders’ general dislike for the citizens of Hong Kong). Rather, Beijing’s heavy-handed response is significant because it reveals just how far the leadership will go to root out any domestic instability that arises on the Mainland.
In the context of Britain’s 50-year bet on Chinese democracy, this is precisely the wrong moment for a pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong to flourish. The 50-year dream for “one country, one system” has not been entirely shattered, but it feels awfully remote. If reforms succeed over the long run, it will put all of China — Hong Kong included — in a great position. It would bring newfound prosperity and economic sustainability to China. But only then might the Chinese leadership even consider opening up the political system.
As with so many things in China, the situation will get worse before it could get better.
But: remember Taiwan; Taiwan is watching. Beijing wants to bring Taiwan back into the fold and it wants to do it peacefully; Taiwan is watching how China manages "one country - two systems" with HK ... or not.
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The Economist cover and lead story, both of which are reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that newspaper, feature Xi Jinping and his concentration of power to himself:
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21618780-most-powerful-and-popular-leader-china-has-had-decades-must-use-these-assets-wisely-xi
I don't agree with all of The Economist's prescriptions but I do agree that Xi Jinping does have an unprecedented opportunity to effect real change, change which can be for the greater good of China and the region and, indeed, the whole world.
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21618780-most-powerful-and-popular-leader-china-has-had-decades-must-use-these-assets-wisely-xi
The rise and rise of Xi Jinping
Xi who must be obeyed
The most powerful and popular leader China has had for decades must use these assets wisely
Sep 20th 2014 | From the print edition
THE madness unleashed by the rule of a charismatic despot, Mao Zedong, left China so traumatised that the late chairman’s successors vowed never to let a single person hold such sway again. Deng Xiaoping, who rose to power in the late 1970s, extolled the notion of “collective leadership”. Responsibilities would be shared out among leaders by the Communist Party’s general secretary; big decisions would be made by consensus. This has sometimes been ignored: Deng himself acted the despot in times of crisis. But the collective approach helped restore stability to China after Mao’s turbulent dictatorship.
Xi Jinping, China’s current leader, is now dismantling it. He has become the most powerful Chinese ruler certainly since Deng, and possibly since Mao. Whether this is good or bad for China depends on how Mr Xi uses his power. Mao pushed China to the brink of social and economic collapse, and Deng steered it on the right economic path but squandered a chance to reform it politically. If Mr Xi used his power to reform the way power works in China, he could do his country great good. So far, the signs are mixed.
Taking on the party
It may well be that the decision to promote Mr Xi as a single personality at the expense of the group was itself a collective one. Some in China have been hankering for a strongman; a politician who would stamp out corruption, reverse growing inequalities and make the country stand tall abroad (a task Mr Xi has been taking up with relish—see article). So have many foreign businessfolk, who want a leader who would smash the monopolies of a bloated state sector and end years of dithering over economic reforms.
However the decision came about, Mr Xi has grabbed it and run with it. He has taken charge of secretive committees responsible for reforming government, overhauling the armed forces, finance and cyber-security. His campaign against corruption is the most sweeping in decades. It has snared the former second-in-command of the People’s Liberation Army and targeted the retired chief of China’s massive security apparatus—the highest-ranking official to be investigated for corruption since Mao came to power. The generals, wisely, bow to him: earlier this year state newspapers published pages of expressions of loyalty to him by military commanders.
He is the first leader to employ a big team to build his public profile. But he also has a flair for it—thanks to his stature (in a height-obsessed country he would tower over all his predecessors except Mao), his toughness and his common touch. One moment he is dumpling-eating with the masses, the next riding in a minibus instead of the presidential limousine. He is now more popular than any leader since Mao (see article).
All of this helps Mr Xi in his twofold mission. His first aim is to keep the economy growing fast enough to stave off unrest, while weaning it off an over-dependence on investment in property and infrastructure that threatens to mire it in debt. Mr Xi made a promising start last November, when he declared that market forces would play a decisive role (not even Deng had the courage to say that). There have since been encouraging moves, such as giving private companies bigger stakes in sectors that were once the exclusive preserve of state-owned enterprises, and selling shares in firms owned by local governments to private investors. Mr Xi has also started to overhaul the household-registration system, a legacy of the Mao era that makes it difficult for migrants from the countryside to settle permanently in cities. He has relaxed the one-child-per-couple policy, a Deng-era legacy that has led to widespread abuses.
More muscle needed
It is still far from clear whether Mr Xi’s economic policies will succeed in preventing a sharp slowdown in growth. The latest data suggest the economy is cooling more rapidly than the government had hoped (see article). Much will depend on how far he gets with the second, harder, part of his mission: establishing the rule of law. This will be a central theme of the annual meeting next month of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. The question is whether Mr Xi is prepared for the law to apply to everyone, without fear or favour.
His drive against corruption suggests that the answer is a qualified no. The campaign is characterised by a Maoist neglect of institutions. It has succeeded in instilling fear among officials, but has done little to deal with the causes of graft: an investigative mechanism that is controlled entirely by the party itself, a secret system of appointments to official positions in which loyalty often trumps honesty and controls on free speech that allow the crooked to silence their critics.
Mr Xi needs to set up an independent body to fight corruption, instead of leaving the job to party investigators and the feuding factions they serve. He should also require officials to declare all sources of income, property and other assets. Instead, he has been rounding up activists calling for such changes almost as vigorously as he has been confronting corruption. In the absence of legal reform, he risks becoming a leader of the old stripe, who pursues vendettas in the name of fighting wrongdoers. That will have two consequences: there will be a new wave of corruption, and resentments among the party elite will, at some point, erupt.
Mr Xi is making some of the right noises. He says he wants courts to help him “lock power in a cage”. Reforms are being tinkered with to make local courts less beholden to local governments. But he needs to go further by abolishing the party’s shadowy “political-legal committees”, which decide sensitive cases. The party should stop meddling in the appointment of judges (and, indeed, of legislators).
The effect of such reforms would be huge. They would signal a willingness by the party to begin loosening its monopoly of power and accepting checks and balances. Deng once said that economic reform would fail without political reform. Mr Xi last month urged foot-dragging officials to “dare to break through and try” reform. China’s leader should heed his own words and those of Deng. He should use his enormous power for the greatest good, and change the system.
I don't agree with all of The Economist's prescriptions but I do agree that Xi Jinping does have an unprecedented opportunity to effect real change, change which can be for the greater good of China and the region and, indeed, the whole world.
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I find it surprising that there's actually some sentiment in Hong Kong for returning to UK rule...but they should realize that it's TOO LATE.
Hong Kongers who still wanted to have some allegiance to the UK should have applied for their BDTC (British Dependent Territory Citizen) passports before the 1997 Hong Kong handover. Oh well.
Here's their facebook page:
本版，跟貼行動：https://www.facebook.com/HongKongandUK
EDITED TO ADD: Seems the facebook page above was taken down.
Hong Kongers who still wanted to have some allegiance to the UK should have applied for their BDTC (British Dependent Territory Citizen) passports before the 1997 Hong Kong handover. Oh well.
Here's their facebook page:
本版，跟貼行動：https://www.facebook.com/HongKongandUK
EDITED TO ADD: Seems the facebook page above was taken down.
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Here's more to add to what I said earlier about Canada missing out on the next wave of wealthy Chinese immigrants by ending the investor class immigrant visa category recently:
New York Times
New York Times
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The US, and Australia and Canada, too, want to be very careful about admitting these rich Chinese. Some, maybe even many, are already or are going to be targets of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign which will go after many of the super wealthy ... as it should.
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