Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[Edward Campbell]

Some China watchers fear this may be the result if Xi's anticorruption drive is "too successful" :

The Diplomat

Yanzhong Huang is certainly correct; there are risks, some big risks, to the anti-corruption campaign but it - corruption - was the key issue about which the late Lee Kuan Yew warned Chinese leaders over and over again. And I am certain that Lee was correct: corruption, which sucks the life out of productive people and creates mistrust in the whole state, is a bigger enemy than the barbarians could ever be.

If Xi Jinping wants to remake China, which I believe he does, if he wants to be another Deng Xiaping, which I also think is one of his aims, if he even wants to be one of the Chinese greats, remembered and even venerated for centuries to come, then corruption must be his target. He must take the risks and reach for the brass ring.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from BBC News, is an overview of the dispute in the South China Seas:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29560533

Tiny islands key to ownership of South China Sea

By Bill Hayton
BBC News

3 May 2015

South East Asia says it's "seriously concerned" about China's building of artificial islands in disputed parts of the South China Sea.

In response, China says it's "severely concerned" about the South East Asian nations' statement.

South East Asia says China's actions have "eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security and stability".

China retorts that what it's doing is "entirely legal and shouldn't be questioned".

Are the gloves coming off in the South China Sea disputes?

China has reacted angrily to a formal statement issued on Monday by the 10 countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations, criticising its huge island-building programme in the Spratly Islands.

China is using dredging ships and construction teams to turn at least six coral reefs into large bases with harbours.

One will have a 2,900-metre (1.8-mile) long runway.

There is widening concern that China will use these bases as springboards to assert control over the whole of the South China Sea.

China says it is just protecting its territorial rights and its fishing fleet.

It seems bizarre that some of the smallest islands on the planet now lie at the centre of one the world's biggest territorial disputes.

If they were just a couple of metres lower, they wouldn't even qualify as islands but because they stick up above the surface of the South China Sea, countries can claim them and, more importantly, the territory and the resources in the waters around them.

China is carrying out land reclamation in the Spratlys  Source: BBC Article

Whoever controls the islands will have the strongest claim to the 1.4 million sq miles of the South China Sea and all the fish in it and oil under it.

That's why, for the six countries bordering the sea (seven if you count Taiwan separately), these 250 or so rocks, reefs and islands, with a total area of just six sq miles, are worth all the money and effort they spend on them.

But it's actually about much more than even that.

Two disputes

To understand why American and Chinese ships and planes are confronting each other in the South China Sea it is important to realise that there are actually two different disputes taking place there.

One is about which country owns the features that dot its waters.

The other, more critical dispute is about the future of the international system that has run the world since the end of World War Two.

What international rules should countries follow and who should make them?

It's the overlap between these two disputes - between which country rightfully occupies which islet and which countries set the world's rules - that makes the South China Sea disputes so dangerous.
China has convinced itself that it is the rightful owner of almost the entire sea.

As a result, South East Asian countries with rival claims - Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines - are trying to bolster their position by involving the other big powers - primarily the US, but also Japan and India - on their side.

The US doesn't particularly care which country controls which island, but it's getting drawn into the disputes because of its wider interests.

The authorities in Beijing see things the other way around.

They think the US, anxious to remain the world's leading power, is corralling the countries of East and South East Asia to contain a rising China.

But what concerns the US, and many other countries, is not China's rise, as such, but Beijing's efforts to redefine international law to suit its own interests in the sea.

As a result, the US and its allies and friends are working together to "hold the line". This is where the danger lies.

International challenge

As China tries to extend its control over the water of the sea (as opposed to the islands), it is challenging both the other countries in the region and the international system.

Under current international law - laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - a country can only own a piece of sea if it owns the land next to it.

A country that owns an island also "owns" 12 nautical miles of seabed around the island and has the rights to the resources (but not the territory) up to 200 nautical miles around.

However, the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises (particularly oil companies and fishing enterprises) are trying to assert ownership of the South China Sea itself, plus its seabed and its resources, many hundreds of miles away from the Chinese coast.

This is a challenge to the other countries around the sea with claims of their own, to the US whose role as a global military and commercial power depends upon unimpeded access through the world's seas and to every other country that believes in the current rules of international law.

Chinese fort at the Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands  Source: BBC Article

They say (broadly) that the sea more than 12 nautical miles away from a coast doesn't belong to anyone and is therefore free for anyone to use in any way they see fit. (It's more complicated than that but that's the basic principle.)

Japan needs one oil or gas tanker to cross the South China Sea every six hours to keep its economy functioning; South Korea is similarly dependent on energy imports.

Both countries have other concerns about the way that China is rising too.

Japan has its own dispute with China over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands, sees common cause with Vietnam and the Philippines and has begun supplying both with coastguard ships and other equipment and training to help them defend their maritime claims.

South Korea is less vocal, but also concerned and also supplying weaponry to the Philippines and Indonesia.

India does not depend upon the South China Sea so much, but it fears the consequences if China comes to dominate Asia.

It has two disputes with China over border areas in the Himalayan Mountains.

It is also nervous about China's growing relations with countries around the Indian Ocean and has been developing security ties with Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan and Australia (among others) in response.

20th Century dispute

The Chinese authorities say they have been the historic "owners" of the sea "since ancient times".

The Chinese government's interest in the sea actually only began in the early 20th Century.

For all but the briefest periods of recorded history (one exception is a 30-year period from 1400-1430, during which time the so-called eunuch admirals, including Zheng He, voyaged as far as East Africa) the Chinese authorities were barely able to control their own coastline, let alone islands hundreds of miles away.

____________________________________________________________​

Zheng He: The Eunuch Admiral

Zheng He was born in the poor province of Yunnan in 1372 into a Muslim family from Central Asia who had fought for the Mongols.

Captured by the armies of the Ming dynasty, he was castrated at the age of 10.

He was sent to serve the emperor's son, and so distinguished himself in battle that he rose to the rank of admiral.

His armada, bigger than the combined fleets of Europe, featured giant treasure ships 400ft (122m) long and 160ft (50m) wide.

He sailed throughout South East Asia and the Indian Ocean, and on to the Persian Gulf and Africa, creating new navigational maps, and spreading Chinese culture.

He opened up trade routes that are still flourishing today, and gained strategic control over countries that are now once again looking to China as undisputed regional leader.

____________________________________________________________​

This version of history is not the one taught in Chinese schools.

This strongly held, but historically unjustified sense of ownership is what is putting China on collision course with its neighbours and the US.

It is the reason why China behaves with such high-handedness when sending oil rigs to drill in disputed waters, for example.

To protect themselves against China's encroachments, other countries are forming new security relationships.

These overlapping interests have the potential to turn a local dispute into a regional or even a global one.

At a time of so many international crises, the South China Sea disputes appear relatively small - but they could get big very quickly.

Changing this behaviour will require the countries of the region to come to a better understanding of the shared history of the South China Sea.

That will be hard but it will be easier than the alternative of escalating conflict and the increasing risk of superpower confrontation.

Bill Hayton is the author of The South China Sea: The struggle for power in Asia, just published by Yale University Press.

One additional bit: in my opinion, China is trying to establish "facts on the ground" which they (and Israel) maintain matter in both realpolitik theory and international law practice.

 

[CougarKing]

Serve non-halal food. Earn the ire of locals. Call in the People's Armed Police. Repeat as necessary.

Shanghaiist

Muslims in Qinghai discover non-halal products at halal cake shop, proceed to smash up the shop

A group of Muslim residents smashed up a halal cake shop in Xining city, Qinghai province after they found non-halal products in a delivery van belonging to the shop.

When the Muslim residents discovered no-halal food in the van, they believed that the store was selling non-halal products and became rather angry about the whole affair.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[Edward Campbell]

People who haven't spent much time in China may think that China is rather like us ... it's not. The Chinese do not accommodate. Someone, probably a Han Chinese business owner, somewhere, likely in Xinjiang province, has made some Muslimish products and labelled them Halal; they aren't and no one cares; no one checks, either; there are not accommodations for Muslims; there is, just barely, some, limited toleration. The people in the Zhongnanhai, the HQ of the Party in Beijing, are probably happy this is going on: it creates unrest which allows the PLA to go in and bang heads, which pleases the overwhelming majority of Chinese who think Muslims are backwards and, somewhat, less that civilized.

I actually feel somewhat sorry for the Uyghurs, even though I, too, think they are backwards and a wee bit less than civilized: they have been dealt a bad hand; they cannot win; how painfully they choose to lose is up top them, but lose they will. This is China ... eventually, the Chinese always win in China.

 

[CougarKing]

Something that may have lessons for South China Sea encounters as well, between China and Vietnam, or between China and the Philippines, to prevent escalation:

Diplomat

Improving Order in the East China Sea

The accidental escalation of interstate incidents at sea has the potential to pose a serious threat to maritime security and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. Competing territorial claims and disputes over freedom of navigation have generated a growing number of standoffs at sea involving military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels. With aircraft playing chicken, fishing vessels ramming coast guard ships, and naval forces intimidating one another’s auxiliaries, there is a growing potential for an accident that could escalate into conflict.

Statesmen in the region have sought to reduce this risk through a maritime security order undergirded by confidence-building mechanisms. The most recent development in this order is the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). Adopted a year ago in April 2014 by the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), CUES institutionalizes a set of suggestions for prudent behavior and clear communication at sea. As highlighted at a recent CSCAP meeting, however, the CUES agreement has some significant limitations.

(...SNIPPED)

In fact, the PLA-N and USN recently conducted a CUES exercise this year:

USS Fort Worth conducts first CUES activity with Chinese warship

IHS Jane's 360

The activity was conducted in international waters in the South China Sea, beginning on 23 February, with the Type 054A Jiangkai II-class guided-missile frigate Hengshui (572).

CUES was ratified unanimously by 25 Asia-Pacific countries at the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in 2014. The set of protocols, designed to improve understanding and build confidence between navies, consists of standardised phrases for naval vessels and aircraft to use in unexpected encounters, with the aim of preventing any tensions from escalating into conflict.

The US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) is seen here operating near where the tail of AirAsia Flight QZ8501 was discovered. The aircraft crashed into the Java Sea on 28 December 2014. Source: US Navy

 

[CougarKing]

This shouldn't come as a surprise, considering most Wai-shengren/外省人/ (Taiwanese whose predecessors only came to the island in 1949) are more likely to vote for the KMT/GMD and still want reunification, albeit on their terms rather than Beijing's terms.

Shanghaiist

Taiwan party leader voices support of reunification with China

Taiwan's Nationalist Party leader reaffirmed the party’s support of the eventual reunion with China when he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.
In an ongoing effort to alleviate the tension between the two sides, Nationalist Party Chairman Eric Chu met with Xi Jinxing on Monday to discuss the future of Taiwan and China, marking the highest-level talks between both sides in six years.
Chu also affirmed Taiwan’s desire to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as "China's Taipei", after its initial application, which implied that Taiwan was an independent nation, was rejected.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[Edward Campbell]

This shouldn't come as a surprise, considering most Wai-shengren/外省人/ (Taiwanese whose predecessors only came to the island in 1949) are more likely to vote for the KMT/GMD and still want reunification, albeit on their terms rather than Beijing's terms.

Shanghaiist

And that brings me back to why Beijing is making a serious strategic blunder in Hong Kong.

The reunification of China ~ bringing Taiwan 'back' into the Chinese state ~ is China's main, central, strategic aim: more important than the South China Seas; more important than shoving America off the Asian mainland; more important than making Japan into a 'younger brother;' it's what drives many, many, many Chinese leaders.

The reunification of China ought to be easy: a significant share of the Taiwanese Chinese (as opposed to the native, ethnic Formosans), probably a solid majority, wants to rejoin China but, as you say, on their own terms.

"One country-two systems," is the bare minimum that Taiwan can accept. One country-two systems can be made to work for Taiwan but, and it's a Big BUT, only if it can be made to work in Hong Kong, first. I used to think that "one country-n systems" was the right answer but a very wise Chinese friend explained to me that one country-two systems is as much as the leadership in Beijing can tolerate now and that it is as much as they can swallow in the future. (There are, still, some real hardliners in Beijing who believe that force (of arms) is the best, only 'good' way to manage the reunification of Taiwan and the governing of Hong Kong.) One country-two systems can, in my opinion, be made to work for China, too. The Chinese are experimenting with various governing techniques, including local elections: Hong Kong and Taiwan should be, can be good "test beds," better than small, polyglot Singapore, for democracy with Chinese characteristics (to paraphrase Deng Xiaoping).

But, and it's an even Bigger BUT, the "second system" has to be something more than Hong Kong has now, IF the Chinese want Taiwan without a fight ~ and only a lunatic fringe wants to fight. The leadership in the Zhongnanhai need to loosen the control on HK, not strengthen them, and allow HK to become more and more like Taiwan. HK is, I think, more conservative, more Victorian English liberal and more Confucian than Taiwan; my guess is that HK wants something akin to 'pure' John Locke and is less concerned with "legislative democracy" and more concerned with good government and, above all, the rule of law. My suspicion is that China can incubate, in HK, a "second system" that can be readily adapted to suit Taiwan.

It must be noted that Xi Jinping is not, in any respect "soft," on HKJ; he is not a fan of parliamentary democracy. He is supported by hardliners (in and out of government) like Zhang Dejiang, Chen Zuoer and, above all, Li Fei.

Another but: BUT Xi Jinping must outgrow Zhang, Li and Chen and see that the way to reunify China, peacefully, is by using HK as a model of what Taiwan can, reasonably and confidently, expect.

 

[CougarKing]

Another link in China's "New Silk Road" project: the fact that the Russian invasion of Georgia is still fresh in the memories of Georgians probably would have made this easier for China.

Diplomat

China’s Growing Presence in Georgia
China looks set to become a genuine player in Georgia and the South Caucasus

There is perhaps no less comfortable place for a struggling democracy than the blurry space between the hardening frontiers of the liberal democratic West and an increasingly expansionist, militant Russia. For states like Georgia, well beyond NATO’s fortified border in a region where even neutrality is considered a lot cast for Moscow, taking a side is not so much a choice as it is a necessity for state survival. But the rapidly growing presence of China, for the first time, opens up the possibility of a Sino-Georgian third way just as local confidence in Western alignment hits new lows.

China’s interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus is neither new nor particularly unexpected. Though flying under the radar, Chinese investment has been rising in the region for at least several years, in search of investment opportunities and low-cost diplomatic dividends. But Beijing’s appreciation for the South Caucasus as a strategic region worthy of genuine attention is a more recent phenomenon, driven in large part by Beijing’s ambitious multi-billion dollar bet on the New Silk Road (NSR), for which Georgia and the South Caucasus are set to play a critical role. Though its location may be geopolitically unenviable, Georgia’s position as a connector state between the Eurasian interior and Europe has caught Chinese interest.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[CougarKing]

Resistance within the PLA to Xi's anti-graft fight:

Reuters

China military says some not taking graft fight seriously

BEIJING (Reuters) - There are some in China's armed forces, the largest in the world, who are not taking the fight against corruption seriously, brushing problems under the carpet and not daring to go after senior officers, its official paper said on Thursday.

Weeding out graft in the military is a top goal of President Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission, which controls China's 2.3 million-strong armed forces.

Serving and retired Chinese military officers have said military graft is so pervasive it could undermine China's ability to wage war, and dozens of senior officers have been taken down.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from BBC News, is an overview of the dispute in the South China Seas:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29560533

One additional bit: in my opinion, China is trying to establish "facts on the ground" which they (and Israel) maintain matter in both realpolitik theory and international law practice.

And, according to photographs, shared with Reuters by Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Vietnam is also building artificial islands on Sand Cay and West London Reef in the Spratly archipelago and some buildings have been erected. The report says they are far smaller projects than the ones undertaken by China.

 

[Edward Campbell]

And, to further stir the pot, Reuters reports that Japan, Philippines to hold first naval drill in South China Sea. The article says that,

    "Japan and the Philippines will hold their first joint naval drill this month in the South China Sea near a disputed shoal claimed by Beijing, sources in Tokyo and the Philippines said.

      The May 12 maritime safety exercise, which will practice the code for unplanned encounters at sea, known as CUES, is part of an agreement signed by Japan and the Philippines in January aimed at tightening security cooperation.

      The nature of the training is unlikely to worry China unduly, as it has conducted similar exercises with the United States in the past."

 

[CougarKing]

Another group, predominantly from Shaanxi province, to watch in Chinese politics alongside President Xi:

Diplomat

In China, Xi Jinping's Shaanxi Clique on the Rise
Politicians with ties to Shaanxi, Xi’s home province, have fared well since Xi came to power.

(...SNIPPED)

The home province of Xi Jinping, Shaanxi has become an important training ground for top leaders in China. In addition to Xi, one may also find Wang Qishan with extensive links to the province. A native of Shanxi who was born in Shandong and grew up in Beijing, Wang Qishan spent 10 years in Shaanxi. He started off as a “sent-down youth” in Yan’an Prefecture in January 1969, just as Xi did, but in a different county. Wang was soon recruited by the Shaanxi Museum and then began his studies at the Northwest University in Xi’an.

Among Politburo members, one may also find three other individuals with work experiences in Shaanxi. Li Jianguo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, was party secretary of Shaanxi for a decade, from 1997 to 2007. Li Zhanshu, director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, was a standing member and deputy secretary of Shaanxi under the leadership of Li Jianguo, from 1998 to 2003. Zhao Leji, director of the Central Organization Department, was Li Jianguo’s successor as party secretary of Shaanxi. A native of Shaanxi, Zhao grew up in Qinghai. He was the top party boss of his home province from 2007 to 2012.

At the age of 69 in 2015, Li Jianguo will have to retire in two years. But both Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji are strong candidates for the membership of the Politburo Standing Committee in 2017. Li Xi, an alternate member of the 18th Central Committee, will become at least a full member of the 19th Central Committee. If he can turn Liaoning’s economy around in the next two years, Li would even have a chance for a seat at the Politburo.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Economist is a useful overview of Sino-Russian relations ~ and uneasy coupling:

http://www.economist.com/news/china/21650566-crisis-ukraine-drawing-russia-closer-china-relationship-far-equal
My emphasis added

Russia and China
An uneasy friendship
The crisis in Ukraine is drawing Russia closer to China. But the relationship is far from equal

May 9th 2015 | From the print edition

THE celebrations in Moscow on May 9th to commemorate the capitulation of Nazi Germany 70 years ago will speak volumes about today’s geopolitics. While Western leaders are staying away in protest against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine (and the first annexation of sovereign territory in Europe since the second world war), China’s president, Xi Jinping, will be the guest of honour of his friend, Vladimir Putin. Western sanctions over Ukraine, and what looks set to be a long-term chilling of relations with America and Europe, has given Russia no option other than to embrace China as tightly as it can.

Next week, in a further symbol of the growing strategic partnership between the two countries, three or four Chinese and six Russian naval vessels will meet up to conduct live-fire drills in the eastern Mediterranean. The exercise, which follows several similar ones in the Pacific since 2013, aims to send a clear message to America and its allies. For Russia the manoeuvres signal that it has a powerful friend and a military relationship with a growing geographic reach. For China even a small-scale exercise of this kind (its ships are coming from anti-piracy duty in the Gulf of Aden) speaks of increasing global ambition in line with Mr Xi’s slogan about a “Chinese dream”, which he says includes a “dream of a strong armed-forces”.

At a more practical level, the exercise provides a shop-window for China’s Type 054A guided-missile frigate, which it would like to sell to the Russians. It also offers operational experience in an unstable region in which it has an expanding economic presence. In 2011 China organised the evacuation of more than 38,000 Chinese from Libya during that country’s upheaval. Last month its navy pulled several hundred of its citizens out of Yemen, which is being torn apart by civil war. There are thought to be at least 40,000 Chinese working in Algeria and more than 1m across Africa.

Relations between China and Russia have been growing closer since the end of the cold war. Both, for different reasons, resent America’s “hegemony” and share a desire for a more multipolar world order. Russia, a declining great power, is looking for ways to recover at least some of its lost status; whereas China, a rising power, bridles at what it sees as American attempts to constrain it. As fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council, both with autocratic governments, Russia and China find common cause in sniping at Western liberal interventionism. The two countries settled all of their long-standing border disputes in 2008, just a month before the Russian-choreographed war in Georgia. Russia saw the deal as a way for it to concentrate more of its military forces in the west as a deterrent against the further expansion of NATO.

But there have been occasional tensions. Russia played a key role during the 1990s in helping China to modernise its military forces. Russia was able to preserve a defence-industrial base that would otherwise have withered from lack of domestic orders. But since the middle of the last decade, irked by China’s theft of its military technology and its consequent emergence as a rival in the arms market, Russia’s weapons sales to its neighbour have slowed.

Russia is also wary of becoming little more than a supplier of natural resources to China’s industrial machine—a humiliating position for a country that until recently saw China as backward. As long as Russia could sell to Europe all the gas required to keep the Russian economy growing, it could put deals with China on hold. These included plans for two gas pipelines from Siberia into China that were announced in 2006 and then quietly dropped as the two sides bickered over prices.

All that has changed. The Ukrainian crisis is, as Russian media put it, forcing Russia to “pivot” its economy towards Asia in an effort to lessen the impact of Western sanctions by finding alternative markets and sources of capital. For China it is a golden opportunity to gain greater access to Russia’s natural resources, at favourable prices, as well as to secure access to big infrastructure contracts that might have gone to Western competitors and to provide financing for projects that will benefit Chinese firms.

In theory, Russia’s incursions into Ukraine and its seizure of Crimea violate two of China’s most consistently held foreign-policy tenets: non-interference in other states and separatism of any kind. But China abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolutions condemning Russia, while Chinese media have given Russia strong support. China has quietly welcomed a new cold war in Europe that might distract America from its declared “rebalancing” towards Asia.

Striking evidence of the new closeness between China and Russia was a $400 billion gas deal signed in May last year under which Russia will supply China with 38 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas annually from 2018 for 30 years. At China’s insistence, the gas will come from new fields in eastern Siberia and will pass through an as yet unbuilt pipeline—the better for ensuring that it will not be diverted elsewhere. Other deals have followed. The biggest was a preliminary agreement signed in November for Russia to sell an additional 30 bcm a year through a proposed pipeline from western Siberia. In every instance it is probable that China was able to drive a hard bargain on price.

Russia’s weakness was also clear in its recent decision to resume high-tech arms exports to China. In April it agreed to sell China an air-defence system, the S-400, for about $3 billion. This will help give China dominance of the air over Taiwan and the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu to the Chinese, who dispute Japan’s claim to them). In November Russia said it was prepared to sell China its latest Sukhoi-35S combat aircraft. Initially it had refused to sell any fewer than 48, in order to make up for losses it calculated it would suffer as a result of China’s inevitable pilfering of the designs. Now it has meekly agreed to sell only 24.

But problems ahead are discernible. One is that both countries are competing for influence in Central Asia, once Russia’s backyard (Mr Xi was due to head there before proceeding to Moscow). Mr Putin wants to establish his Eurasian Economic Union partly to counter growing Chinese economic power in Central Asia, through which China wants to develop what it calls a Silk Road Economic Belt. China is using the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), of which Russia and Central Asian nations are also members, to boost its security ties in the region as well: it often holds counter-terrorism exercises with its SCO partners. Another difficulty is Russia’s military and energy links with countries such as India and Vietnam, both of which are rivals of China. But the biggest problem of all may be Russia’s irritation with being forced into an increasingly subservient role in its relations with China. For Russia the partnership with China has become painfully necessary. For China it is nice to have, but far from essential.

The balance, it appears to me, is all in China's favour ...

 

[Kirkhill]

China now has a "Near-Abroad" that extends to the Ukrainian border.....

How much of the Old Soviet would China be willing to sacrifice for good trade relations?

And with Russia's high tech WW2 arsenal stalling on parade and bursting into flames .... well, while I don't like Chinese manufactured industrial goods because they are shoddy, many people do like them and they work.  I would expect the Chinese arsenal to work.

 

[Edward Campbell]

My sense of the the Chinese is that many are quite isolationist: I have heard, several times, educated Chinese people suggest that, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Qing dynasty bit off more than China needed to chew by annexing Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. Many Chinese appear to believe that they would be a lot better off if both Autonomous Regions were independent (client) states like Mongolia.

I've mentioned this before, but maybe it helps illustrate what I mean: in most Chinese schools there is a large world map in the main hallway; often these maps are mosaic representations or paintings and not to wholly accurate scale. Chine is always in the very centre - detailed in bright red with gold highlights. The lands bordering China are shaded in lighter reds and then orange and yellow as one gets into European Russia and the Middle East. Great Britain and Western Europe are, usually, a nice, pleasant green, and Canada, Australia and America are often blue or blue-green. The maps indicate that China is, indeed, the centre of the world, but it also indicates that everywhere else is foreign and, most likely, barbarian or, at least, less civilized than China.

I think China wants to dominate Asia, but I doubt it has any real expansionist ambitions. The Chinese will be wiling to pay a fair, but toughly negotiated price for Russia's natural resources and the Chinese will not tolerate any failures to deliver. They want tribute, but in a soft power sense, from all of Sinic Asia which includes, if the maps on the school walls are any indication, Central and Eastern Siberia ~ remember what I've said before about the Yenisey River being the border between Central Asia and East Asia and the Himalayas being the border between South Asia and East (Sinic) Asia. Geography make life fairly simple for the Chinese as long as everyone understands that Sinic Asia extends from Singapore all the way up to the Laptev Sea.

 

[CougarKing]

The reunification of China ought to be easy: a significant share of the Taiwanese Chinese (as opposed to the native, ethnic Formosans), probably a solid majority, wants to rejoin China but, as you say, on their own terms.

Not so fast, take note that Taiwan's benshengren (native, non-aboriginal, ethnically Han Chinese "Formosans") still outnumber the waishengren on the island, which explains why Taiwan parties who distrust the mainland, like the DPP, still have influence in the legislative yuan. 

The ff. article also points out the history of the post-war Sunflower student movement, which helped to shape a distinct Taiwanese identity separate from China.

Diplomat

Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations and the 2016 Elections

Both the ruling and opposition parties need to navigate some tricky waters ahead of next year’s presidential elections.

(...SNIPPED)

Third, Ma’s policy of engaging China also produced two outcomes that many found disturbing. On the one hand, the promotion of cross-strait exchange over the past seven years created the unintended consequence of accelerating people’s detachment from the Mainland. The frequent cross-strait exchanges – more than 10 million Chinese tourists have visited Taiwan since 2008 – have allowed people in Taiwan to personally witness the difference between themselves and Mainland Chinese. On the other hand, some Taiwanese have started to worry that the Ma administration is leaning “too close” to Beijing: The rapid pace of exchanges that started with economic and people-to-people interactions seven years ago appear to portend an early start to Taiwan’s political negotiations with the Mainland. To hold the government in check, Sunflower student protesters called on the government to halt the enforcement of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement before the government creates and passes a uniform supervisory bill covering all cross-strait agreements.

Finally, the Sunflower Student Movement reflected the rise of a Taiwanese national identity. According to a recent poll conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust in February 2015, if given the option of being “Taiwanese” or “Chinese,” 89.5 percent of the respondents would identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese.” This result is not just fallout from the March protest, but is part of a steady trend over recent decades. Annual polls by National Cheng-chi University’s Election Study Center in Taiwan shows that the number of people who would identify themselves as Chinese has dropped from 10.5 percent in 1992 to 3.5 percent in 2014, while the number of people identifying themselves as Taiwanese has grown from 17.6 percent to 60.4 percent in 2014. In contrast to public doubts about the KMT’s engaging China policy, the rising Taiwanese identity and dwindling Chinese identity in Taiwan appear to accord with the DPP’s pro-independence policy, which potentially expands the DPP’s public support for the presidential election in 2016.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[Kirkhill]

My sense of the the Chinese is that many are quite isolationist: I have heard, several times, educated Chinese people suggest that, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Qing dynasty bit off more than China needed to chew by annexing Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. Many Chinese appear to believe that they would be a lot better off if both Autonomous Regions were independent (client) states like Mongolia.

I've mentioned this before, but maybe it helps illustrate what I mean: in most Chinese schools there is a large world map in the main hallway; often these maps are mosaic representations or paintings and not to wholly accurate scale. Chine is always in the very centre - detailed in bright red with gold highlights. The lands bordering China are shaded in lighter reds and then orange and yellow as one gets into European Russia and the Middle East. Great Britain and Western Europe are, usually, a nice, pleasant green, and Canada, Australia and America are often blue or blue-green. The maps indicate that China is, indeed, the centre of the world, but it also indicates that everywhere else is foreign and, most likely, barbarian or, at least, less civilized than China.

I think China wants to dominate Asia, but I doubt it has any real expansionist ambitions. The Chinese will be wiling to pay a fair, but toughly negotiated price for Russia's natural resources and the Chinese will not tolerate any failures to deliver. They want tribute, but in a soft power sense, from all of Sinic Asia which includes, if the maps on the school walls are any indication, Central and Eastern Siberia ~ remember what I've said before about the Yenisey River being the border between Central Asia and East Asia and the Himalayas being the border between South Asia and East (Sinic) Asia. Geography make life fairly simple for the Chinese as long as everyone understands that Sinic Asia extends from Singapore all the way up to the Laptev Sea.

Very interesting.

Back in Mao's day the discourse coming out of China often included the word hegemony.  Both in terms of the US and China.  I never understood the niceness of the work back then.  It was for me just a synonym for empire. Now, after reading your explanation, I believe I see the reason for the nicety.  I wonder if China differentiates between the eras of the Honourable East India Company - Jardine & Matheson - Raffles and the later Victorian era of Gladstonian Empire (post-1857)?

Also, with respect to colour, I understand that colour in China hold specific significance.  White for Death and Red for Prosperity come to mind.  Do Blue and Green hold any particular meaning?  Do they reflect merely the absence of Chinese Prosperity?  Or are they perceived as something more inimical?  Yin and Yang?

Any chance you can turn up one of these maps and post it?

 

[Edward Campbell]

Not so fast, take note that Taiwan's benshengren (native, non-aboriginal, ethnically Han Chinese "Formosans") still outnumber the waishengren on the island, which explains why Taiwan parties who distrust the mainland, like the DPP, still have influence in the legislative yuan. 

The ff. article also points out the history of the post-war Sunflower student movement, which helped to shape a distinct Taiwanese identity separate from China.

Diplomat

I acknowledge and agree that there is considerable resistance to reunification in Taiwan. But, that being accepted, I believe it, reunification, is going to happen ... peacefully.

I think that part, not a huge part but a part, all the same, of the rationale for the anti-corruption campaign is to purge the hardliners, especially from the military, who are tied, closely, to Jiang Zemin and the Shanghai Gang. (Now, it's important to understand that Xi Jinping was associated with, but not considered part of, Jiang's faction within the CCP ~ but it was Hi Jintao who made him party chief in Shanghai (2006) and then appointed him Party Secretary (2007).) I suspect that purging the hardliners is a necessary precondition to reforming (liberalizing) HK's political system and offering it as a model to Taiwan.

 

[tomahawk6]

I acknowledge and agree that there is considerable resistance to reunification in Taiwan. But, that being accepted, I believe it, reunification, is going to happen ... peacefully.

I think that part, not a huge part but a part, all the same, of the rationale for the anti-corruption campaign is to purge the hardliners, especially from the military, who are tied, closely, to Jiang Zemin and the Shanghai Gang. (Now, it's important to understand that Xi Jinping was associated with, but not considered part of, Jiang's faction within the CCP ~ but it was Hi Jintao who made him party chief in Shanghai (2006) and then appointed him Party Secretary (2007).) I suspect that purging the hardliners is a necessary precondition to reforming (liberalizing) HK's political system and offering it as a model to Taiwan.

I don't see reunification with a communist China.This is not Hong Kong after all.Perhaps if the CP collapses in favor of a democratic system there could be reunification.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I don't see reunification with a communist China.This is not Hong Kong after all.Perhaps if the CP collapses in favor of a democratic system there could be reunification.

The chances of the CCP collapsing are poor.

Democracy, as we think of it, is bit of a delicate, hothouse flower. It can transplant (Japan, Taiwan and Singapore all have local variants) but it's not natural for a Confucian culture.

Hong Kong has, in many, many respects a qualitatively "better" government than does the USA: more open, much more honest, supremely more competent and fully respectful of civil and property rights. Taiwan is still "too American:" too much political chicanery, too much bureaucratic corruption, too little "peace, order and good government," to quote our Constitution.*

Democracy is a wonderful system but many, many well educated Chinese believe, firmly, that it is not the best system; they think (just hope?) that their 2,500 year old quest for a meritocracy can be brought to fruition with a sufficiently well educated, socially cohesive and well educated population.

_____
* See § 91:

                91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all
                      Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces ...