Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[PPCLI Guy]

-- To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains;

Comment: Less ambiguity here.  What new domains?  Hong Kong?  Or a broader reach? The Spratlys? The Stans? Siberia?  I think this refers to the South China Seas. While I think China wants to dominate the Stans and Siberia I do not believe it sees them as "new domains."

I am fairly certain that this is about the cyber, space, and information domains....

 

[Edward Campbell]

I am fairly certain that this is about the cyber, space, and information domains....

Yes, of course ... more likely than any new physical domains.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am fairly certain that this is about the cyber, space, and information domains....

That makes sense.  Thanks for that.

 

[Edward Campbell]

And some of the fallout from Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign is already being feli according to this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the nFinancial Times:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e15a7de6-ff83-11e4-bc30-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3bS9ZD5Sj

Asia casinos hedge their bets amid China corruption crackdown

Ben Bland in Macau

May 27, 2015

Casino investors are divided over the regional impact of the corruption crackdown in China, with some hoping to pick up business from struggling Macau while many fear an industry slowdown across Asia.

After a decade of breakneck casino expansion, Macau saw its first annual fall in gaming revenue last year as President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive scared off many of the Chinese high rollers who had been pumping up gaming profits in the tiny, former Portuguese territory.

Pressure on gaming groups in Macau will grow as they open more than $20bn of long-planned casino resorts over the next two years, starting with the launch of the $3.2bn Galaxy extension on Wednesday.

Analysts at Morgan Stanley expect gross gaming revenue in Macau to fall 24 per cent this year to $33bn, and many industry executives are concerned that this drop will crimp ambitious growth plans in other Asian nations.

“This challenge doesn’t help anyone,” says Thomas Arasi, the president of Bloomberry Resorts, which operates the Solaire casino resort in Manila, the capital of the Philippines. “It’s a general downdraft.”

Mr Arasi comments came at an industry conference in Macau, where the debate about the fallout from the Chinese anti-graft campaign overshadowed talk about the 20-plus large casino projects planned across Asia.

Japan, South Korea and Vietnam are considering legalising casino gambling for citizens, after seeing how Singapore did so without generating the same concerns about corruption and money-laundering that plague Macau.

Praveen Choudhary, a gaming analyst at Morgan Stanley, says that while “a year ago people were jumping up and down” about the possibility of Japan and South Korea legalising casino gambling, investors have become much more cautious.

“In the long term, the Asian gaming industry should be seen in a positive light but we need to see Macau hit the bottom first and I have no idea when that will be,” he adds.

Morgan Stanley says that the fallout could even reach the US, cutting its forecast for Las Vegas gaming revenue this year by 2 per cent to $6.2bn because of a predicted drop in gamblers from China.

Geoff Freeman, the president of the American Gaming Association, which represents companies including Las Vegas Sands, MGM Resorts and Wynn Resorts, argues that the Macau slowdown will make US casino groups more reluctant to invest in other Asian countries unless regulations are eased.

“There’s going to need to be, in a more constrained market, probably a different approach on the regulatory side as well,” he says.

With several large casinos scheduled to open in Macau and around the region in the coming two years, competition is heating up at a time when demand is shrinking.

Vitaly Umansky, a gaming analyst at Sanford Bernstein, says that in this tougher climate, there is a real danger of new supply cannibalising the existing market.

“If Japan or South Korea legalise local gaming it will be bad for the Philippines,” he says, because many Japanese and Korean gamblers have been frequenting the Southeast Asian nation’s casinos.
Some Asian casino developers are putting on a brave face, claiming that they can attract Chinese gamblers who no longer feel comfortable in Macau.

Matt Hurst, executive vice-president of casino operations at the under-construction $2bn Tiger Resort in Manila, says that some of the junket operators who lend to high-stakes Chinese VIP gamblers have begun to bring their clients to the Philippines since the Macau crackdown began.

“Once that business becomes established in the Philippines, I think it’s going to stay,” he says.

Robert Soper, president of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, a Native American group that runs a casino in the US state on Connecticut, is equally bullish.

He is bidding to build a $1.6bn casino resort in Incheon, South Korea, even though local gamblers will not be allowed to bet under current rules.

“What’s happening in Macau is not a deterrent for our plans in Korea,” he says. “China is still a remarkable market and there’s still a large opportunity to draw Chinese customers for gaming and non-gaming.”

But Aaron Fischer, an analyst at CLSA, wrote in a recent report that while Australia, Cambodia, the Philippines and South Korea all saw marked increases in VIP business in the second half of last year, “this is not nearly enough to offset the full decline in Macau”.

When China sneezes Asia catches a cold.

 

[tomahawk6]

China's attempt to turn the South China Sea into part of China will increase the likelihood of armed conflict.

http://theweek.com/articles/557430/what-china-dangerously-underestimates-about-americas-interest-south-china-sea

 

[Edward Campbell]

This article, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Financial Times, suggests to me that island building will go ahead for the simple reason that no one has the will and the means to stop it:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c5e1443a-0773-11e5-a58f-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fworld_asia-pacific_china%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz3beNAfCRv

China defends island building in disputed seas

Charles Clover in Singapore

May 31, 2015

China has vigorously defended its effort to dredge new islands in the South China Sea, and said features such as deep water harbours and a 3km airstrip capable of accommodating fighter jets are for peaceful purposes.

Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo told the audience at the International Institute for Strategic Studies summit in Singapore, known as the annual Shangri-La dialogue, that the islands are aimed at providing “international public services” such as search and rescue and meterological forecasting. China had “no ulterior motives” he said.

Few experts believe the assurances, and the Chinese delegation was peppered with questions on why the country has dredged over 2,000 new acres of reclaimed land in the last year and a half — more than 400 times any other claimant in the South China Sea, according to one US official. Other regional powers such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia claim remote coral atolls in the area as well.

Despite sharp disagreements, analysts judged the tone of the remarks by US defence secretary Ashton Carter and his counterpart Adm Sun to be more restrained than on previous occasions when the two sides have clashed over China’s claims.

Mr Carter on Saturday reiterated a US call for an immediate halt to island building by all countries in the region and pledged that the US would continue “freedom of navigation activities” such as sailing ships and planes near the disputed islands, which China considers to be a violation of maritime law.

However, he did not give any further detail on how the US would seek to challenge China or prevent the further development of the islands into military facilities, though the US has said it is considering air and sea patrols .

Members of the Chinese delegation said they were pleased Mr Carter had not taken a more confrontational tone, and Adm Sun’s remarks on Sunday appeared to have been moderated accordingly.

“This shows the Chinese are not trying to raise the temperature, which is good news,” said Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at the Australian National University.

Fen Osler Hampson, of the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Ottowa, called Mr Carter’s speech a “Pivot Kumbaya” referring to the US strategy known as the Asia Pivot. The speech emphasised the US would work together with all regional powers with interests in the South China Sea, and appeared wary of showing the US acting unilaterally to challenge China. “He was in effect saying ‘Let’s all sing from the same songbook’”, said Mr Hampson.

Washington raised the temperature in May when a P-8 Poseidon spy aircraft carrying a TV crew from CNN flew over islands claimed by China and received radio challenges from Chinese military telling them to leave.

Mr Carter said international law does not recognise China’s claims. “Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit,” he told the audience on Saturday.

The goals of China’s accelerated island building programme, say diplomats and experts, remain elusive. Over the past 7 months, according to one US official, China has created more acreage of dredged sand on formerly submerged coral reefs than all other claimants in the south China sea combined have over the past 60 years.

China may be seeking “de-facto control of the South China Sea in such a way that all neighbours will have to maintain good relations with China or else put their prosperity at risk,” said the US official. Roughly $7tn in international trade passes through the Sea every year.

Experts have been at pains to explain the rapid acceleration of China’s dredging programme over the past year. Mr Medcalf said China’s island building strategy represents a “passively assertive approach” that does not necessarily require putting its airforce or navy in risky high seas or air confrontations with US jets and ships.

“The island building is actually quite provocative but the difference is that it puts the burden of risk on other countries. In any incident that occurs, China will be able to say ‘you started it, proximate cause of this was you’. It’s a clever strategy and it leaves the rest of the region with no risk-free options.”

Most analysts assume the ultimate goal of building fighter capable airstrips is to be able to enforce a claim to airspace over the Sea as an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), similar to one China claimed over islands disputed with Japan in the East China Sea in 2013.

Adm Sun said the question of an ADIZ “will depend on whether our security in the sea and in the air will be threatened”.

It appears that both China and the USA want to avoid "raising the temperature."

As with the Philippines marines on a derelict warship, "facts on the ground" matter, they are indisputable and they can only be changed by mutual agreement or force. The Chinese have threatened to tow the hulk away, but that might (should) provoke a real US reaction: maybe giving the Philippines a better, armed, platform with which to stake their claims and providing air cover, too; that would be the sort of escalation that would harm China's interests, but, simultaneously, would drag the US into a confrontation it desperately wants to avoid. (China doesn't want a confrontation either, in my opinion, but it has less to lose.)

Here is a graphic reminder of what's in contention:

The red line is China's claim (wholly unsupported by e.g. UNCLOS) the other lines are
competing claims from e.g. Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and others.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Prof Timothy Garton Ash, a European specialist from Oxford University, discusses China's near future prospects in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/chinas-xi-is-conducting-the-worlds-greatest-political-experiment/article24779895/

China’s Xi is conducting the world’s greatest political experiment

TIMOTHY GARTON ASH
Special to The Globe and Mail

Published Wednesday, Jun. 03, 2015

Timothy Garton Ash is professor of European studies at Oxford University and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

-------------------------------------------------------

Can Xi do it? This is the biggest political question in the world today. “Yes, Xi can,” some tell me in Beijing. “No, he can’t,” say others. The wise know that nobody knows.

There is a great debate going on in Washington about whether the United States should change its China policy in response to Beijing’s more assertive stance under President Xi Jinping. This includes the reported stationing of artillery on the extraordinary artificial islands it is building on underwater reefs in the South China Sea.

It also matters to everyone everywhere whether China can sustain its economic growth as it exhausts its ready supply of cheap labour, and can avoid the traps into which some middle-income economies have stumbled.

Yet, even more than in other countries, the future of China’s foreign policy and of its economy depend on the quality of decision making produced by the political system. It’s the politics, stupid.

By now, it is clear what Mr. Xi is aiming to do. He is trying to steer a complex economy and society through difficult times by top-down changes, led and controlled by a purged, disciplined and reinvigorated Leninist party. He is doing this in unprecedented conditions for such a party, consciously trying to combine the “invisible hand” of the market with the “visible hand” of the party-state.

The “great helmsman” Mao Zedong is clearly one inspiration, but the pragmatic reformer Deng Xiaoping is another. A commentary from the official news agency Xinhua declared, “To Reignite a Nation, Xi Carries Deng’s Torch.”

Much of the reignition so far been about establishing control over the party, state, military and what there is of civil society, after the Bo Xilai affair made apparent an internal crisis of party rule. Yet, as a hereditary Communist, the President may genuinely believe that enlightened, skillful authoritarian rulers can handle things best: Lenin’s wager, but also, in different variations, Plato’s and Confucius’s.

Sinologist Ryan Mitchell notes that in a 1948 article, a veteran Chinese Communist called Xi Zhongxun was quoted as saying that “the most lovable qualities of us Communist Party folks are devotion and sincerity.” Speaking to party members in 2013, his son, Xi Jinping, said that “leading cadres must treat the masses with devotion and sincerity.”

This experiment is life-changing for the thousands of purged officials who have disappeared into the tender embrace of the relevant party and state organs. Being a senior FIFA official is light entertainment by comparison, even if some of them may have missed their five-star Swiss breakfasts.

It is also extremely uncomfortable for those Chinese who believe in free and critical debate, independent civic initiative and non-governmental organizations. Here, I found a striking contrast with earlier visits to Beijing. It’s not just the exacerbated difficulty of accessing Gmail, Google Docs and so much else on the Internet. More seriously, I felt a real nervousness among intellectuals who a few years ago were so outspoken.

The boundaries of what can be said publicly seem to be narrowing all the time. Leading activists, civil-rights lawyers and bloggers have been arrested, charged and imprisoned. A new draft law proposes almost Putinesque restrictions on NGOs. Another extends the definition of “national security” to include ideology and culture, with formulations like “carrying forward the exceptional culture of the Chinese nationality and defending against and resisting the infiltration of harmful culture.”

Yes, that’s all true, say analysts of the “yes, Xi can” persuasion – and, if they are outside the system, they usually add that it is most regrettable. But, they say, look at the reform program that is being pressed through with similar determination. Its key features are not easily summarized in familiar political and economic terms, because the Chinese mix is unique. For example, complex measures to address a dangerous overhang of local government debt, the introduction of property rights for agricultural land and changes to the household registration (hukou) system may be as consequential as anything that can be captured in a Western headline.

If all this were to succeed as intended, Western liberal democratic capitalism would have a formidable ideological competitor, with worldwide appeal, especially in the developing world. For the West, there would be a silver lining: Competition keeps you on your toes. Western hubris in the early 2000s, both abroad, plotting regime change in Iraq, and at home, indulging the turbo-charged excesses of financial capitalism, surely had something to do with the sense of facing no serious ideological competition.

Now, this outcome is obviously not what I, as a liberal and a democrat, would wish for Chinese friends. But I do emphatically wish for them, and for ourselves, a China that experiences evolutionary and not revolutionary change.

There are many reasons for that view, not least that most Chinese embrace it themselves, but the most important concerns nothing less than war and peace. A Communist regime in crisis would probably find it impossible to resist the temptation of playing the nationalist card more aggressively somewhere in its neighbourhood, building on decades of indoctrination, a selective interpretation of the recent past and a narrative of 150 years of national humiliation.

If China is already warning off U.S. surveillance planes from overflying its artificial islands, imagine how it might lash out if it faced a systemic crisis at home. An armed conflict would not need to be directly between China and the United States in order to be dangerous. However clear the “red lines” drawn by the United States – and those lines should certainly be clearer than President Barack Obama’s have been, in China’s interest as well as everyone else’s – the risk of miscalculation would be high.

Therefore, I conclude that, while this is not the evolutionary path that I and many others discerned and welcomed in China around the time of the Beijing Olympics, we must still hope that Mr. Xi will manage to “cross the river by feeling the stones.”

My greatest concern flows not from a personal belief in liberal democracy as a realization of individual freedom, although it would be dishonourable to pretend that doesn’t matter, but from the insights of political analysis that lead us to liberal democracy. Insights such as this: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.” (James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 51).

Yes, dear comrades, it might be true, even though it was an American who said it.

In the short to medium term, my hunch is that Mr. Xi’s brand of smart authoritarianism will keep not just his party in power but also the whole show on the road. That medium term could certainly span the two five-year periods that are all that is allowed for the President’s formal tenure of power – the Chinese Communist Party having learned a lesson from the Soviet era of Leonid Brezhnev in a way that FIFA plainly has not.

There are so many significant power resources still at his disposal, including some genuine personal popularity and widespread national pride. I would, therefore, take a (small) bet that, in this narrow sense, “yes, Xi can” will prove correct. But in a broader sense and in the longer term? Watch out for a rocky 2020s.

I think Timothy Garton Ash is correct on three things:

    1. Xi Jinping is going to try to emulate Deng Xiaoping in making quite funbdamental changes in Chinese society;

    2. Xi Jinping is inspired by Confucius far more than Lenin or Mao; and

    3. Xi Jinping has a much firmer grip on China than did either Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin and is likely so "succeed" ... what's less clear is just what it is that he intends to do.

 

[a_majoor]

Long article from The American Interest on China's involvment with Burma. This should also alarm India, since Burma also is close enough to be in her sphere of influence as well :

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/09/burma-in-play/

(Part 1)

Burma in Play
Rena Pederson

Burma is newly enmeshed in Asia’s Game of Thrones, a development far more important than the topics Western media typically choose to focus on.


Some say it is more of a “Winter Thaw” than a “Burma Spring”, but what used to be a pariah nation—the darkened house in the neighborhood—is changing. Just down the road from where Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi was held prisoner in her home for more than 15 years, a luxury development with penthouses, a swimming pool, restaurants, and indoor golf is now opening. Rangoon street kids who used to tap on car windows to sell strands of flower necklaces can now be seen hawking real estate listings. Though most people in the country are still scraping by on barely $2 a day, Burma now boasts gastro bars with wi-fi and satellite television. You can rent a cellphone at the airport and drink an iced latte at a copycat Starbucks.

Burma, renamed Myanmar by its military rulers, is making up for temps perdu. At the pricey new French restaurant Agnes I discovered that you can now order a respectable foie gras while enjoying a view of the magnificent Shwedagon Pagoda. After years of isolation, Burma is indeed open for business. MasterCard, Ford, and Chevrolet have raced into the market. Coca-Cola jumped in quickly and had to add another bottling site to meet demand. More than 500 businesses are taking a chance on what used to be a blacklisted backwater, investing more than $50 billion since the military started liberalizing the economy in 2011. The growth rate for 2015 is projected to be almost 8 percent.

The Southeast Asia Games in Burma in 2013 were a coming-out party of sorts to celebrate the partially relaxed military rule. The opening ceremony was a lavish extravaganza with Olympic-level fireworks, largely paid for and stage-managed by China. The Chinese not only subsidized the opening and closing ceremonies; they also trained 200 Burmese athletes in China and provided 700 coaches to help make the local team look good. The $33 million in support was a tangible example of Beijing’s new efforts to enhance its soft power in Burma, where Chinese megaprojects have stirred increased resentment.
China is still a major player in this rapidly emerging country, despite steps the new, nominally civilian government has taken to show independence from the colossus to the north. Billions of dollars are at stake, but an even weightier question is which model will have the most influence in Burma’s evolution: China’s authoritarian state capitalism or a Western-style marriage of democracy and open markets?
While much of the news about regional tensions has focused on territorial disputes in the Pacific, an important new venue in Asia’s Game of Thrones is also emerging to the south, in Burma. Why Burma?

•Burma has oil and gas, and China wants to reduce the risk of transporting oil through the Malacca Straits chokehold.
•Burma has vast potential for hydropower resources, thanks to the mighty rivers that flow down from the Himalayas. China wants that electricity to meet its voracious energy needs, and is pursuing some 63 hydropower projects.
•Burma offers a market of more than fifty million people. China currently dominates trade, but the United States wants in on the action.
•Burma is strategically located next to India, the world’s largest democracy and China’s rival for dominance. The United States would be happier if Burma were a more democratic presence in mainland Southeast Asia; China would be happier if Burma did its bidding.

The United States, along with most Western nations, turned away from Burma in 1988 when the military dictatorship cracked down on student protests by killing more than 3,000 people in the streets. Having gunned down its own share of local protesters, China had no qualms about dealing with the brutal generals. Over the years, Chinese investment jumped from $1 billion to nearly $20 billion, nearly half of Burma’s GDP.

That doesn’t mean the Burmese grew fonder of their Chinese benefactors. To the contrary, they have a longstanding fear of being overrun. Burma and China share a 1,300-mile border and have long been uneasy neighbors. There is a history of conflict, from Manchu invasions across the mountains in the 18th century to Chinese Communist incursions in the 20th century. Resentment against Chinese influence sparked riots in 1967. More recently, concern has grown about Chinese military support for ethnic Chinese enclaves in northern Burma. China has provided backdoor military support to the Wa State, a former Communist stronghold that has become a narco-state with its own militia of 30,000 quasi-soldiers. China denies directly providing arms to the Wa, but Jane’s Intelligence Review has reported Chinese assistance in the form of surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and armed helicopters.

Most Burmese also resent the fact that ethnic Chinese dominate commerce in border areas and cities such as Mandalay. They are aware that much of the country’s jade, gems, and teak is being trucked off to China. Burma produces some $4.3 billion per year in high quality jade, and at least half of that is probably spirited over the border into China with little or no taxation. Burma has the world’s only remaining golden teak forest, but the acreage has shrunk dramatically thanks to illegal teak shipments to China. Global Witness reported in 2009 that one truck carrying 15 tons of illegal logs crossed the border into China’s Yunnan province every seven minutes.Global Witness reported in 2009 that one truck carrying 15 tons of illegal logs crossed the border into China’s Yunnan province every seven minutes.

Many Burmese also blame the Chinese for the drug trade that seeped in from China after World War II and resulted in the rise of the notorious poppy-growing “Golden Triangle” in northern Burma. Recent reports say opium production rose 26 percent in 2014. Heroin abuse has become so prevalent in northern Burma that syringes reportedly are being used in some villages to make change. Farmers in the border area also complain that human traffickers from China brazenly lure Burmese women to their country with promises of good jobs, only to trap them in slave labor conditions or in the sex trade. Many never return.

So there are plenty of reasons for Burmese to be wary of Chinese, and welcome closer ties to the West. As part of a “normalization” of relations with Burma, the Obama Administration has eased economic sanctions that were beefed up during the Clinton and Bush Administrations. A knowledgeable Burma hand, Derek Mitchell, is now serving as the first U.S. Ambassador to Burma in 22 years. Joint military exercises are in the works. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an historic visit in 2011, followed by President Obama in 2012 and again in 2014.

U.S. diplomats downplay the idea that this courtship is in any way an attempt to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. They maintain that the “pivot to Asia” is a founding precept of the Obama Administration and is simply “in the American interest.” A senior diplomat told me, “We are interested in a stable region, a cohesive region. A stable ASEAN means more economic potential in the region.” Translation from diplospeak: A stable region is less vulnerable to Chinese domination.

Initially, the quasi-civilian government headed by former general Thein Sein moved with surprising speed to open Burma’s society and economy. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest ended finally in November 2010 and she soon won a seat in Parliament. Restrictions on the press and unions were relaxed.

Those were all welcome changes, but the generals in top leadership positions have balked at further reform. Corruption is systemic. Most of the country still lacks electricity. Religious intolerance has flared up. Journalists are being arrested. One was beaten and shot to death; five others got ten-year sentences at hard labor for reporting on a suspected chemical weapons plant. And on a host of key issues—often complicated by Chinese interests—progress has been slow. Four such issues are key.
Peace talks in conflict areas: Despite the recent approval of a draft for a ceasefire, widespread peace has yet to be achieved with ethnic groups that have been fighting for greater autonomy for more than six decades. The fighting in the northern Kachin state has displaced more than 100,000 predominantly Christian villagers; Chinese officials promptly sent refugees who had fled across the Chinese border back to the combat zone. Border tensions flared again this year after clashes between the Burmese military and rebels in the Kokang region, which is largely ethnic Chinese. As a result, China beefed up its presence on the border. When a Burmese plane mistakenly dropped a bomb inside Chinese territory that killed five farm workers, China testily deployed fighter jets.

Political repression: The generals ordered the release of hundreds of political prisoners in 2011, some announced with digital savvy on Facebook. But hundreds more have been arrested since then for peaceful protests. Many are poor farmers whose only offense was protesting the confiscation of their land, often for sweetheart deals benefiting business cronies of the military and Chinese investors.
Religious strife: Recent eruptions of sectarian violence in Rakhine State in western Burma have left hundreds of Muslims dead in a region that includes the nation’s premier beach destinations and a major Chinese oil and gas entrepôt. The attacks have displaced more than 140,000 people, who are now stranded in squalid camps. Human rights organizations say the persecution of these Muslims, known as “Rohingya”, is tantamount to “ethnic cleansing.”Human rights organizations say the persecution of these Muslims, known as “Rohingya”, is tantamount to “ethnic cleansing.” When the new U.N. Human Rights Rapporteur, Yanghee Lee, complained about treatment of the Rohingya, an ultra-nationalist monk named U Wirathu publically called her a “bitch” and a “whore.” Instead of apologizing, the Burmese government accused the envoy of meddling.

North Korean affairs: The U.S. government has strongly urged Burma to stop its illicit dealings with North Korea, but sub rosa arms exchanges apparently continued and resulted in new American sanctions against a high-ranking procurement officer. Troubling questions remain about North Korea’s role in Burma’s nascent missile and nuclear programs. In the past, North Korean technicians reportedly entered Burma via flights from China, and military equipment has been transported overland into Burma through China.

Constitutional reform: Although it may appear that the military has relinquished its control, the truth is that the constitution rigged and rammed through by the military perpetuates its control through a “Praetorian Democracy.” An 11-member National Defense and Security Council, composed largely of former generals, is the ultimate authority. The military allotted 25 percent of the seats in the parliament to itself, and controls even more seats through a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Defense Party (USDP).

Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party have collected more than five million signatures, nearly 10 percent of the population, on petitions calling for constitutional revisions to reduce military control. High-level discussions have started with the leadership about revisions, but they haven’t happened yet. And the NLD has little leverage to make them happen.

A key stumbling block is Article 59f, which effectively bars Suu Kyi from serving as President. It stipulates that anyone who is married to a foreigner or has children with a foreign passport cannot serve in the top office—and it just so happens Suu Kyi’s late husband was British and her children have foreign passports.

Against this tangled backdrop, Congress expressed bipartisan concern when the Obama Administration sought approval for greater assistance to the Burmese military in 2014. Senior officials wanted support for non-lethal assistance to the military, such as training on human rights. But both Republicans and Democrats were reluctant, citing the abuses committed against ethnic and religious minorities and continued commerce with North Korea. “I personally don’t believe that the Burmese military needs to be trained to stop killing and raping and stealing lands from people within their own country”, Joe Crowley (D-NY) protested.

In defense of the military outreach, senior U.S. Defense official Vikram Singh contended that engagement would be an opportunity to shape the military’s outlook and dilute its reliance on old partners and arms suppliers, notably China. “Burma is finding itself having, for the first time in many years, to actually figure out where it wants to place its bets, where it wants to put its cards, who it wants to deal with”, Singh said. “We want to shape the kind of choices that Burma makes.”

 

[a_majoor]

Part 2:

The Chinese have not taken the revived U.S. interest in the region lightly. In recent months they have criticized U.S. government policy in harsh terms. The Communist Party-supported Global Times hit back hard when the New York Times ran an editorial in January saying China was responsible for the wholesale looting of Myanmar’s natural resources, often by “outright theft.” The Global Times accused the American newspaper of trying to drive a wedge between Myanmar and China, saying:

The West may believe China is as greedy as their ancestors were, who traded slaves and stripped as much wealth from their colonies as they could. . . . Institutions like the New York Times consider Myanmar a pawn. They don’t care about Myanmar’s progress but rather how the country will help to drag China down. As long as Myanmar stays independent, it will see through the tricks of Western media such as the New York Times.

So the Great Game is indeed on in Burma, and the U.S. government is racing to get even more commercial and cultural ties in place as well as establish military connections. Companies like GE, Hilton, Gap, and even Kentucky Fried Chicken are establishing beachheads. The Fulbright academic exchange program is again up and running. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Bush Presidential Center have started leadership-training programs.

For its part, China sees Burma as a key part of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” of rejuvenation and regional hegemony. China needs Burma’s resources to make that dream a reality. Burma is an important link in the ambitious new “Silk Road Economic Belt” of rail and road connections linking China with Europe via Central and Western Asia. Burma is also part of the companion “Maritime Silk Road”, which would connect China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa, and Europe. These projects are sometimes described as a “Marshall Plan with Chinese Characteristics.” They will bring billions in infrastructure to emerging economies. In the process, they will provide new markets and resources to China.

While the U.S. government is trying to put out fires in the Middle East, China is moving forward aggressively with new ports, high-speed rail links, and fiber-optic cable connections to Eurasia and Africa. If fully embraced by the European Union and other Eurasian actors, the new versions of the ancient Silk Road could connect 65 percent of the world population to China, with increased trade ties to Nairobi via Mombasa, Istanbul, Athens, Rotterdam, Moscow, and Tehran.

Yes, the U.S. government proposed its own “New Silk Road Initiative” in 2011 to stimulate commerce between Afghanistan and Central and South Asia, but progress has been slow. China claims that fifty countries have stepped up to participate in its plan, although some have expressed private reservations about the political price they may pay for financial ties that bind. In particular, countries next door in Southeast Asia worry that they will become tributaries in greater China’s sphere of influence. Indeed, the Burmese are concerned their country “could become a second Crimea.”Indeed, the Burmese are concerned their country “could become a second Crimea.” That’s how U Than Htut Aung, the chief executive of Eleven Media, explained why his newspapers campaigned vigorously against the $20 billion railroad project in Burma that is part of the Chinese Silk Road plan.

The Kyaukphyu-to-Kunming railway was supposed to follow pipelines that began carrying oil and gas across Burma to energy-hungry China in 2014. That $2.5 billion pipeline deal pumped lucrative sums into the pockets of Burmese leaders, but the companion rail project gave them pause. Did they really want to be bound to another mega-deal that mostly benefitted China? In the end, the Burmese decided “no”; the government allowed a three-year Memorandum of Understanding to expire during the summer in 2014.

Two other controversial projects illustrate the billions of dollars in resources that the Chinese have at stake in Burma: the giant Myitsone Dam and the Letpadaung Copper Mine. Both deals were finalized between December 2009 and June 2010, when China pushed the closure before Burma’s leadership changed in 2011. Both have run into local resistance. One of incoming President Thein Sein’s first acts was to temporarily suspend work on the $3.8 billion Myitsone Dam, which had sparked demonstrations around the country.

Tensions continue to flare at the Letpadaung copper mine, which is jointly operated by the giant Wanbao company of China and a Burmese military conglomerate. When farmers protested land seizures to expand the mine, police officers opened fire. A 56-year-old woman died from a gunshot wound to the head. The assault triggered a loud public outcry. Two Chinese contractors were later briefly kidnapped.
Such controversy has created major uncertainty for Chinese investors. China’s investments in Burma during 2012–13 declined to $407 million after years of billion-dollar growth. China’s current priority seems to be protecting its legacy investments from further damage with ostentatious support for events like the Southeast Asia Games and political charm campaigns.

Future relations may hinge on Burma’s general elections this November. All the seats in parliament will be up for grabs, and leadership could change at the top. President Thein Sein, the deceptively mild-mannered acolyte of the old regime, has said he will not seek another term, but he has been consolidating his power and might bow to requests from his military brethren to stay the course. Other contenders might include House Speaker Shwe Mann, another former general who is a sometime ally of Suu Kyi, and Commander in Chief Min Aung Laing, a hard-line general who has openly thwarted democratic reforms.

And what about Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been at the forefront of the democracy movement in Burma for 27 years? The Nobel Laureate will turn seventy on June 18. Though her health is sometimes fragile, she is expected to lead her party to significant gains, unless she decides to boycott the elections over the generals’ refusal to seriously address constitutional reform. If she abjures a boycott, several questions remain. Will the NLD be able to overcome government roadblocks to become more of a force in Parliament? Will minority-ethnic regions be allowed to gain more representation? How much power will the military insist on retaining? Might even a fairly nasty military government faking a democratic system still lean closer to the United States than to China? If so, are we in for more of the oldest debate in town, this time with Burmese characteristics: the compulsions of raison d’état versus the missionary call of human rights and democracy promotion? It could be.

In some ways, the current situation echoes that of the 1950s, when newly independent Burma had a weak democracy and a large and rising Chinese neighbor. Faced with the choice of allying with the growing Communist bloc or the Western democracies, President U Nu proclaimed Burma a non-aligned nation determined to stay buddies with everyone. The idea was to give Burmese independence room to grow and to force both power blocs to seek Burma’s favor.

Today, Burmese leaders are attempting to chart an independent course again by zig-zagging away from the relationship with China to date other countries. Regional powers India, Thailand, and Japan are on Burma’s dance card, as well as the United States and Russia.Regional powers India, Thailand, and Japan are on Burma’s dance card, as well as the United States and Russia. When tenders were awarded for offshore oil and gas exploration, the winners included Royal Dutch Shell, U.S.-based ConocoPhillips, Oil India, Italy’s Eni Myanmar, and France’s Total. Top telecommunications contracts have gone to Norway and Qatar.

That doesn’t mean Burma has thrown China into the river delta, or that China won’t dominate Burma’s future. That could be, too. Beijing has continued currying favor by hosting a steady stream of red carpet visits for Burmese government leaders as well as key members of the NLD.
China’s moves to insinuate itself into its neighbor’s economic and political affairs reflect a traditional strategy. As Henry Kissinger has observed, the Chinese play foreign affairs like they play their ancient game of Wei qi (known in the West by its Japanese name, Go.) Wei qi works as a test of wills. Players take turns placing stone pieces on a board, building up positions of strength, while working to surround and capture the opponent’s stones. The balance of power may shift back and forth as each player reacts and plans ahead. By game’s end, the winner may not be apparent to the untrained eye but will have the margin of dominance the players will recognize. As Kissinger describes it, wei qi is about patient, subtle encirclement. China’s leaders, he observes, were brought up on the concept of shi: the art of understanding matters in flux. They understand that wei qi is about a long campaign. Their time horizons are decades or even centuries, not presidential terms. They are banking that their web of interests in Burma’s economy will be difficult to untangle.

China also has carefully courted Burma’s favor in ASEAN, which Burma chaired in 2014. Five ASEAN nations—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—claim sections of the South China Sea, where China is asserting its own claims. In the past, China has insisted on negotiating the disputed boundaries with other claimants individually, while ASEAN members have proposed negotiating collectively. Burma’s support has gained even more value to China. At a recent meeting of ASEAN leaders in Kuala Lumpur, Burma kept mum about the South China Sea controversy, to China’s advantage.

Mizzima, a pro-democracy publication published in India, voiced its concerns about the power struggle in Burma in this way:

When the history books on Myanmar are written a generation from now, will President Thein Sein’s political and economic reform era go down as the point when the West sold out or woke up? When the history books are written, will President Thein Sein’s reform process be portrayed as a genuine attempt by the Myanmar military to come in from the cold and bring real democracy to their troubled people? Or will it be described as a silent coup in which the military was able to con the West and maintain their grip on power while holding on to their ill-gotten gains and avoiding retribution?

The magazine might well have added, “Which of the great powers contending for treasure in Burma will have the greatest influence on what comes after the Burma Spring? Which country will bend the arc of history in a positive direction in the region—or not?” And so, the Asian Game of Thrones moves to a new level.

Rena Pederson, a former adviser on strategic communications at the U.S. Department of State, is the author of The Burma Spring: Aung San Suu Kyi and the New Struggle for the Soul of a Nation (Pegasus, 2015).

 

[Underway]

Gwynn Dyer's take on the South China Sea.

Yes, stupid things do happen
Is China willing to go to war over reefs in South China Sea?

By:  Gwynne Dyer

"If the United States' bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a U.S.-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea," said an editorial in the Global Times last week. The Global Times is an English-language daily paper specializing in international affairs that is published by the People's Daily, the Chinese government's official newspaper. So we should presumably take what it says seriously.

But really, a U.S.-Chinese war in the South China Sea? Over a bunch of reefs that barely clear the water at high tide, and some fishing rights and mineral rights that might belong to China if it can bully, persuade or bribe the other claimants into renouncing their claims? The GDP of the United States is $16.8 trillion each year, and China's GDP is $9.2 trillion. All the resources of the South China Sea would not amount to $1 trillion over 50 years.

Great powers end up fighting great wars. Counting a pre-war arms race, the losses during the war (even assuming it doesn't go nuclear), and a resumed arms race after the war, the long-term cost of a U.S.-Chinese war over the South China Sea could easily be $5 trillion. Are you sure this is a good idea?

Yet, stupid things do happen. Consider the Falklands War. In 1982, Britain and Argentina fought a quite serious little war (more than 900 people were killed, ships were sunk, etc.) over a couple of islands in the South Atlantic that had no strategic and little economic value.

Maybe that's not relevant. After all, Argentina had never been a great power, and by 1982 Britain was no longer really one either. The war in the Falklands was, said Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges, "a fight between two bald men over a comb." Yet it is a bit worrisome, isn't it? It didn't make strategic or economic sense, but they did it anyway.

Let's look at the question from another angle. Who is the messenger that bears such alarming news about a U.S.-Chinese war? The Global Times, although published by the Chinese Communist government, is a tabloid newspaper in the style of the New York Post or the Daily Mail in Britain: down-market, sensationalist and not necessarily accurate.

But it has never published anything that the Chinese authorities did not want published. So the question becomes: WHY did the Chinese authorities want this story published? Presumably to frighten the United States enough to make it stop challenging the Chinese claims in the South China Sea. This is turning into a game of chicken, and China has just thrown out the brakes.

Would Beijing really go to war if the United States doesn't stop overflying the reefs in question and carrying out other activities that treat the Chinese claim as unproven? Probably even the bosses in Beijing don't know the answer to that. But they really do intend to control the South China Sea, and the United States and its local friends and allies (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan) really will not accept that.

The Chinese claim truly is astonishingly brazen. The "nine-dash line," an official map published by the Beijing government in 1949, claims practically ALL the uninhabited reefs and tiny islands in the shallow sea as Chinese territory, even ones that are 700 km from the Chinese coast and 150 km from the Philippines or Vietnam.

Since the islands might all generate Exclusive Economic Zones of 300 km, China may be planning to claim rights over the entire sea up to an average of about 100 km off the coasts of the other countries that surround the sea. It hasn't actually stated the details of that claim yet, but it is investing a lot in laying the foundations for such a claim.

It's as if the United States built some reefs in the middle of the Caribbean Sea, claimed them as sovereign territory, and then said that the whole sea belonged to the U.S. except for narrow coastal strips for Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, etc.

China is actually building islands as part of this strategy: taking low-lying reefs and building them up with enormous quantities of sand, rock and cement to turn them into (marginally) habitable places. Then it acts astonished and offended when other countries challenge this behaviour, or even send reconnaissance flights to see what the Chinese are up to.

The veiled threats and the bluster that accompany this are intended to warn all the other claimants off. It's been going on for years, but it's getting much more intense as the Chinese project for building military bases all over the South China Sea (it denies that that's what they are, of course) nears completion. So now the rhetoric steps up to actual warning of a Chinese-U.S. war.

The Global Times is right, whether its writers know it or not. If China keeps acting as if its claims were universally accepted and unilaterally expanding the reefs to create large bases with airstrips and ports, and the U.S. and local powers go on challenging China's claims, then there really could be a war. Later, not now, and not necessarily ever, but it could happen.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here are two articles that may shed some light on what's happening in the Soiuth China Seas:

http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/intelligence-check-just-how-preposterous-are-chinas-south-china-sea-activities/?utm_content=buffer65f9c&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Intelligence Check: Just How 'Preposterous' Are China's South China Sea Activities?
It’s time for the Pentagon to issue a sober and balanced public assessment on the South China Sea territorial disputes.

By Greg Austin

June 11, 2015 (It's already early morning on 11 Jun 15 is East Asia)

On 27 May 2015, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr, the newly promoted Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said that one of his main challenges, alongside a nuclear armed and erratic North Korea, would be “China’s preposterous claims to and land reclamation activities in the South China Sea.” So now a coral reef with an airfield is as dangerous as a nuclear weapon?

Harris’ statement was widely interpreted as meaning that China was engaged in an unjustified land grab, tantamount to coercion of or even aggression against the country’s southern neighbors. Three days later, a Chinese general repeated to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that China has shown “great restraint” in defending its territorial claims against unreasonable derogation by its southern neighbors. China sees its actions as defensive and in no way constituting aggression. There is a highly significant discrepancy between the two assessments. If Harris is wrong about the Chinese motivation, this must represent a significant intelligence failure by the United States. There is nothing more essential to national security intelligence than a correct assessment of a potential adversary’s motivations (intent) in the military sphere.

For the record, China is a country with more than 4,000 km of coastline in the South China Sea. Under international law, it is entitled to claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nm from the baselines of its territorial sea. On a rough estimate, it is entitled to around one million sq km of EEZ in the South China Sea based just on its mainland coast and the coast of Hainan Island.

A country’s international law claims to territory or maritime jurisdiction are only those articulated by its government in a formal manner. Beyond its South China Sea coast and Hainan (and minor islands close to these coastlines), and associated territorial sea and contiguous zones, China’s claims in the South China Sea have the following elements.

Territorial Claims

    1. A claim to Pratas islands which is identical in character with the claim of Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

    2. A territorial claim to the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands which is identical in character with the claims of Vietnam and Taiwan and which, as a claim, is fully compatible with international law. Someone must own the islands. (Scarborough Shoal,
        which has rocks above sea level of a type that other countries have claimed as subject to sovereignty, is part of the Spratly group in Chinese claims. It is not claimed by Vietnam.)

    3. A territorial claim to the Macclesfield Bank, a small submerged featured known in Chinese as Zhongsha Islands, which does not qualify as land territory under international law and cannot be subjected to territorial sovereignty.

Of these, only the claim to Macclesfield Bank would not be in conformity with international law. Otherwise, China’s claims to territory are nor more or less preposterous than those of Vietnam. Based on research for my 1998 book, China’s Ocean Frontier, China’s claims to at least some of the islands are less preposterous than those of Vietnam and the Philippines, but that China’s claims to the entire Spratly group are probably not, in respect of each and every natural island, superior to those of other claimants.

One unusual problem about sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands is that Taiwan, a political entity not recognized as a state, is an active claimant.  This is further complicated by the likely implication that states which recognize Taiwan as part of “one China” are probably obliged to recognize Taiwan’s territorial rights as also adhering to “one China,” although that entity has an indeterminate status in international law.

Maritime Resource Jurisdiction

    1. A 200 nm EEZ jurisdiction from the baselines of its land territory in full conformity with international law.

    2. A claim to continental shelf jurisdiction from its land territory in full conformity with international law.

In addition, China has used the so-called nine-dashed line enclosing almost the entire South China Sea on many official maps since 1947 but it has not yet decided what, if any, legal force to ascribe to it. If it did ascribe any legal force, that would not be compatible with international law (verging on “preposterous”). Chinese officials have from time to time referred to China’s historic rights within this area but have not clarified what these might be beyond the territorial claims. The only possible historic right China could claim compatible with international law would be related to traditional fishing in another state’s recognized economic jurisdiction.

Preposterous or Not?

On balance, it is hard to see how Admiral Harris would justify use of the undiplomatic term “preposterous” in respect of the China’s current claims in the South China Sea. He may be justified in using it (in private) if China did go ahead and claim legal force of any kind to the u-shaped line.  China went close to this (being “preposterous”) by including the line without any explanation or discussion in a sketched map attached to its submission on the extent of its claimed resource jurisdiction on the continental shelf which it submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.  Since the line bears no relationship to the legal criteria outlined in the required submission, it would only be fair to leave open any suggestion as to what it means. The State Department made plain in December 2014 that “China has not clarified through legislation, proclamation, or other official statements the legal basis or nature of its claim associated with the dashed-line map.” The Philippines has brought a case against China in the Court of Arbitration to seek clarification of the Chinese intent behind the dashed-line in that submission.

It is now widely known that the nine-dashed line was first used (in a slightly different form) in a map released by China in 1947 (before the Communist Party came to power). What is not widely discussed is that the Chinese move followed by less than two years the Truman Declaration in which the United States broke with pre-existing international law by claiming resources jurisdiction in the seabed of the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea. Perhaps China in 1947 was staking out a similar claim as other states rushed to emulate the revolutionary and expansionary U.S. claim.

Sources in China close to the government say that it has been unable to decide what to do about this nine-dashed line left over from history. Some constituencies in China have argued that China has “sovereignty” over all of the sea areas enclosed by the line, but the government has not endorsed this view–ever. So it has become a sensitive domestic political matter in which leaders face the accusation of being a traitor if they surrender the line. Such a charge has been publicly levied by Chinese hawks against former President Jiang Zemin for his border agreement with Russia. At the same time, there are more than a few Chinese official statements that appear to limit China’s claims to maritime resource jurisdiction to those embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention.

Land Reclamation

Admiral Harris also characterized China’s land reclamation activities as “preposterous.” By contrast, it should be noted, China regards these reclamations as examples of its “great restraint.” What significance should we attach to the reclamations?

For the record, to my knowledge, all of China’s current land reclamation is on submerged features in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands that have been the subject of Chinese physical presence for over two decades, so China has not permanently occupied new features in the last eighteen months, or even the last 20 years. A list of these features was noted in my 1998 book on the subject, China’s Ocean Frontier, as follows:

Between 1987 and 1996, the PRC occupied eight features in the Spratly group. These included Fiery Cross Reef, a totally submerged feature where the PRC in early 1988 conducted major engineering works to construct an 8000 square metre platform of concrete and steel rising two metres above the sea. It erected structures on Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Subi Reef, Dongmen Reef and Johnson Reef in 1988 and 1989 and on Mischief Reef in late 1994.

In September 2014, when new construction was revealed on Johnson Reef, a Chinese commentator echoed the Foreign Ministry by saying that the country needed to improve facilities there to make the lives of its occupants easier, but he added that China also needed an airbase to prepare for emergencies. He noted that this would be a breach by China of the 2002 Code of Conduct but that Vietnam and the Philippines had consistently breached it, and that China had shown great restraint by not using force to evict their forces form the islands and submerged features they occupied. On 9 April 2015, as CSIS in Washington observed, China acknowledged for the first time an unspecified military purpose to the reclamations which was almost certainly intended to mean a defensive position.

It is hard however to credit the extreme view published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that a 10,000 ft. runway that China appears to be building on Fiery Cross Reef “could enable China to monitor and potentially control the airspace over the South China Sea, which would provide greater capability to exert sea control.” This to me is hypothetically possible (in terms of monitoring) but preposterous in terms of practical realities (controlling all South China Sea air space from one reef airfield against the might of the United States and its allies). This sort of  overblown assessment reflects the mood in Washington and in U.S. Navy circles that borders on rage at what they see (mistakenly) as China’s destabilization without any willingness to consider that actions of Vietnam, the Philippines or the United States itself might be contributing to the instability.

The Philippines has expressed concern in 2015 that China may be planning reclamation activity in Scarborough Shoal, an underwater feature that China took control of in 2012 after repeat confrontations with Philippines vessels.

Propaganda and Intelligence

The propaganda tactic being repeatedly used by those who see China as the only provocateur is to blur complex matters of law, dates and sequencing of events to paint China in the worst possible light. China is not blameless but the hysteria coming from the anti-China camp might be seen as laughable were it not so serious. It has been well summarized by a Chinese commentator in 2014: “Manila and its Western supporters have a rather ludicrous logic that the Philippines and Vietnam can do anything on the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and China can’t take any countermeasures.” The U.S. State Department position has consistently been relatively measured and restrained. It needs to reassert some control over PACOM’s public diplomacy.

But this is not simply an institutional coordination problem in Washington. It is a serious intelligence failure on the part of the U.S. Navy leaders in the Pacific. They are expert in the Law of the Sea but they have far less expertise on the law of territorial acquisition and sovereignty. The Pentagon, and PACOM in particular, have appeared on too many occasions deeply inexpert or biased on China. In public and in private, PACOM officers too often rush to ascribe the most silly intentions to China without offering any sort of reasoned and empathetic assessment of how the Chinese might see the problem.

A new and more empathetic study of the issue from the United States government might also evaluate the reliability of the repeated reassurances from Chinese leaders that their activities in defence of the Spratly claim represent no threat to international commercial shipping. The U.S. intelligence community is capable of such a balanced study. It may exist already. The world would be a safer place if it could see such a balanced study by the U.S. intelligence community in the public domain.

                        And

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a301aa60-0dcf-11e5-aa7b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3caj7WUd6

US v China: is this the new cold war?

David Pilling

June 10, 2015

Strange things are happening in the South China Sea. In the past 18 months, Beijing has reclaimed 2,000 acres of land, converting several submerged reefs and rocks into fully fledged “islands”. Beijing’s land-reclamation efforts have dwarfed those of other countries, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, which have rival claims to the nearby Spratly Islands. China is also constructing piers, harbours and multistorey buildings (though there is no Fifa football stadium yet). On Fiery Cross Reef, in the Spratly Islands, it has built a 3km runway capable of handling all the military aircraft at Beijing’s disposal.

The splurge of activity has set alarm bells ringing. This month, in a speech in Tokyo, Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino, president of the Philippines, likened China’s activity to Nazi Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia. Ashton Carter, US defence secretary, called Chinese actions “out of step” with international norms. The US, he said, would “fly, sail and operate” wherever international law allowed. He explicitly denied that the act of “turning an underwater rock into an airfield” conferred any rights of sovereignty or restricted any other nation’s right of sea or air passage. China and other claimants, he said, should immediately cease all land reclamation.

Chinese construction at Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea

That begs the question: what is the US going to do about it? The short answer may be not much. The US continues to fly military planes near the new islands. It and other nations are stepping up military co-operation in an effort to show a united front. Yet China’s island reclamation programme has proceeded apace. Mr Carter’s words sound like President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria. If Beijing continues to call Washington’s bluff, the truth will be out: the US speaks loudly but carries a small stick.

Why is it so hard for Washington to act? For one thing, though Beijing’s actions may not be in the spirit of co-operation, neither are they overtly illegal. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have also reclaimed land. China has merely done so on an industrial scale. Nor is China’s claim to the Spratlys entirely spurious, say legal experts. True, the islands are closer to the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, three of the other claimants (along with Brunei). Yet proximity is not always decisive as Argentina can testify in relation to its dispute with the UK over the Falklands/Malvinas. Finally, China is not obviously threatening freedom of navigation. It does seek to restrict military activity within claimed territorial waters. That may contravene international law, although the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea says military activity — such as surveillance — should be carried out with “due regard” to the rights of the relevant coastal state. Where China is clearly trying it on is its effort to extend such restrictions to artificial islands. When the US flew a P-8 Poseidon aircraft near a new island recently, the Chinese navy told it to clear off.

Again, it boils down to what the US is prepared to do about it. It says it is considering sending warships within 12 miles of China’s new creations. Having made that threat, it may very well feel obliged to carry it through. China, though, is not powerless to respond. It could send in its own warships. If it really wants to up the ante, it could declare an air defence identification zone over all or part of the South China Sea, theoretically obliging incoming aircraft to report their presence to Beijing.

If China and the US are engaged in a game of bluff, the suspicion is that China may have more stomach for the fight. Its tactic is to pick quarrels over seemingly small-bore matters that individually are not worth shedding blood over. Yet collectively, almost imperceptibly, they advance China’s ambition to challenge US “primacy” in the region. Hugh White, an Australian academic, says China is cutting “very thin slices of a very long sausage”. Xi Jinping has already told us what the sausage looks like. China’s president has pressed for a new type of “great power relationship” that would bring Beijing greater respect — and power — in Asia. That does not threaten US primacy globally, but it does challenge it in Asia, where China wants to be treated as an equal, at least.

Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea are an important part of that strategy. As Carl Thayer, a security expert at the University of New South Wales, writes: “China has changed ‘facts on the ground’ and presented the region with a fait accompli”. The problem with faits accomplis — as Washington is discovering — is that you can’t do anything about them.

So, what is it? Is Gwynne Dyer right? Are we drifting towards a real, hot war? Is Greg Austin right? is America misreading both recent history (since 1980) and Chinese intentions and making a mountain out of a molehill? Or is David Pilling right? is this all just part of a Chinese strategy to "rebalance" the regional power relationships, and is the US (and it's Pacific allies) powerless to respond?

All three cases have merit.

Mostly, I agree with Mr Pilling: China is following a well considered regional strategy ~ it is not challenging America globally ... yet ~ and the US cannot do much about the new "facts on the ground" except dig itself (and its allies) a deeper hole.

I also agree with Mr Austin that America, not China, is the one being "preposterous."

But I fear that Mr Dyer may be right and 'strategists' and 'leaders' in Washington (and I deeply mistrust the judgment of both groups) may provoke a war that no one in their right minds really wants and which America cannot win.


Edited to add:

CSIS has added some good photos of the reclamation work here.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The New York Times reports that " Zhou Yongkang, China’s former domestic security chief, was sentenced to life in prison Thursday for accepting bribes, abuse of power and revealing state secrets ... He is the highest-ranking Chinese official to be convicted of corruption ... Mr. Zhou, 72, was tried in secret in the northeastern city of Tianjin ... he [said he] admitted guilt and would not appeal his conviction."

Zhou Yongkang looking his age at his sentencing ... without his hair dyed jet black

Zhou Yongkang was a real power in China; Xi Jinping is, indeed, a "giant killer" and I suspect he will have less and less opposition for whatever he has in mind for China.

 

[tomahawk6]

China has a successful test of their hypersonic nuclear capable missile .This is a game changer which will accelerate US development.No doubt Russia is alarmed as well.

http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/06/china-tests-wu-14-amid-us-tensions/

China's Wu-14 can penetrate the U.S. missile defense systems

The hypersonic nuclear delivery vehicle can travel up to ten times the speed of sound or 7,680 miles per hour. That means, if launched from Shanghai, it can hit San Francisco in about 50 minutes. The even bigger cause of worry for the United States is that it is fully capable of penetrating the U.S. missile defense systems. The test was carried out in Western China last week.

 

[Harrigan]

Is there any independent proof backing up the twice-stated claim that "it is fully capable of penetrating the U.S. missile system"?  As this system has been in development for some time I suspect that:

a) the US is keeping well ahead technologically, and
b) the US would never comment on whether weapon "x" can or cannot penetrate its missile defence systems

Seems a bit sketchy to me.

Harrigan

 

[tomahawk6]

The US program is called Waverunner and has achieved Mach 5.We still need to see the technical results of the Chinese test.The Chinese test vehicle was launched from an ICBM.The US test vehicle was launched from a B-52.The Chinese have zero anti missile capability.It wouldnt do to discuss capabilities of the US defensive shiled vs a hypersonic weapon.

 

[Harrigan]

I agree.  That is why I am skeptical of claims that System "X" is fully capableof penetrating the U.S. missile defence systems.  WAAAY too early to be suggesting that, IMHO.

Harrigan

 

[tomahawk6]

Not an air defense guy,but I would think you would need need a hypseronic kill vehicle or launch a salvo of missiles at the target.

 

[Brasidas]

Not an air defense guy,but I would think you would need need a hypseronic kill vehicle or launch a salvo of missiles at the target.

Or something along the lines of a Bomarc?

 

[tomahawk6]

Safeguard.I suspect the current defensive missile system is capable of intercepting the few hypersonic missiles that China can produce.Throw in the potential of HEL and you could probably defeat a limited attack.Such an attack would cause an almost immediate retaliatory strike on the PRC.I just dont see that happening but one never knows.

http://srmsc.org/

 

[Edward Campbell]

Prof Daniel Bell of Tsinghua University (a Canadian, by the way), with whom I often agree, posits in this article, which is reproduced under the fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Financial Time, that the Chinese Communist party will morph over the next decades into something more suitable to its real role in society:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/855dc7b2-16aa-11e5-b07f-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3dj47KobK

For China the end of the Communist party is nigh — but in name only
Organisation’s appellation will soon be obsolete as it is not communist or a party, writes Daniel Bell

Daniel Bell

June 21, 2015

China’s economic troubles and increasingly rigid ideological controls have led prominent China watchers to forecast the crack-up of its political system. I share the view that the Chinese Communist party may soon be extinct — but the extinction will be in name only.

In fact, the CCP is neither communist nor a party. Few Chinese believe it will abolish the market economy and lead the march to higher communism. It is “Leninist” in the sense that it is vertically organised and rules supreme over the state apparatus but it lacks other vital features, such as the idea that class conflict is the motor of history, a commitment to the idea of communism at home, and support for revolutionary overthrow of capitalist regimes abroad.

And the days of Leninist-style political mobilisation are long gone because the party must be sensitive to public opinion. The CCP can mobilise around causes such as its anti-corruption drive if there is already social demand; but no longer around hare-brained schemes such as the Great Leap Forward, which radically conflict with what people want and what most scholars see as sensible.

Nor is the CCP a political party. In the past three decades, it has (re-)established a meritocratic system similar to that of imperial China: government officials are selected using exams, then promoted based on performance on lower rungs. With 86m members, the CCP is a pluralistic organisation that co-opts leaders of different sectors of society, including keen capitalists, and it aims to represent the whole country.

It is puzzling that the CCP should cling to its name given widespread antipathy in China to communism. Even party members distrust Marxism, and most students dread their compulsory Marxism classes. The very idea of a party that represents part of the population also has negative overtones. Confucius criticised quarrelsome people who associate along party lines, and surveys in China show a preference for “guardianship discourse” with elites responsible for the good of the whole society.

So why does the CCP stick with the name? It makes sense to change it to something — say, the Chinese Meritocratic Union — that better corresponds with the reality of the organisation, as well as to what it aspires to be.

In informal political talk in Beijing, there is often agreement that the name should be changed. It is also recognised that it cannot be changed now because the organisation still draws on CCP history for its ideological legitimacy.

Yet the past 30 years have on balance been positive; and furthermore the CCP is increasingly looking to the long run of Chinese history for ideological legitimacy. The more it identifies with pre-revolutionary history, the more it can distance itself from the recent past.

The days of Leninist-style political mobilisation are long gone because the party must be sensitive to public opinion

Most important is to improve political meritocracy. The CCP does not need a unifying ideology, so long as people agree that the political system does a good job of selecting public officials with superior qualities.
The pressing problem of corruption casts doubt on the question of virtue. So the anti-corruption campaign is essential to buttressing the legitimacy of the CCP, though we will not see results for a few years.

Another reason the name cannot be changed now owes more to Confucianism than to communism. Revolutionary heroes who fought to establish a great nation are still attached to the name. Filial piety is a core value in China, and dutiful sons and daughters should not upset the elderly — especially those who sacrificed for the country. Sometimes harmony matters more than truth.

In a couple of decades, however, the generation of revolutionary heroes will have sadly left this world. At that point, there will be less reason to stick to an obsolete name that needlessly casts the ruling organisation in a negative light.

So here is my prediction. In 2035, the CCP will still be in power but it will not be called the CCP.

The writer is a professor at Tsinghua University and author of ‘The China Model’

I have mentioned several times, in this thread, that the CCP, post Mao, is trying to re-invent the Confucian state. Prof Bell and I are not the only ones who hold this view ... but, in the West, in America especially, scholars and policy makers persist in misunderstanding what the CCP is and how it thinks.

Of course there are legitimate contrary views ... but those, including many, many important US officials and admirals and generals who persist in believing (or just (dishonestly) claiming) that the Chinese government is communist are doing a disservice to informed debate.


Edited to add:


I think it's important to understand three things about Xi Jinping:

    1. He wants China to be a thoroughly modern, sophisticated, 21st century society ~ with all that implies;

    2. He, equally totally, rejects the Western, liberal, democratic model; he is convinced that our socio-political model has sown the seeds of our own destruction and he will not allow China to follow. Notwithstanding
        his, and many other Chinese leaders', affection and admiration for Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore model, he (and they) recognize that what works in a tiny, homogeneous city-state which inherited excellent socio-political institutions
        may not, likely will not work in the HUGE, diverse, Chinese state; and

    3. He is a Confucian by education and instinct.

In my considered (and I believe informed) opinion, those are FACTS and need to taken into account whenever we consider what to do with, about, to or for China.


Edit: spelling  :-[