Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[CBH99]

I think he's being advised to walk gently until they can secure the release of the 2 Canadians currently in Chinese custody...

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think he's being advised to walk gently until they can secure the release of the 2 3 Canadians currently in Chinese custody...

FIFY

 

[The Bread Guy]

Chinese cyberespionage--statement by Canada (just from CSE, fairly technical) hardly compares with US, UK and Australia:

1) AP news story:

2) UK gov statement:

3) Australian news:

4) CP story:

5) CSE statement:

6)  U.S. DoJ statement:

The unsealing of an indictment charging Zhu Hua (朱华), aka Afwar, aka CVNX, aka Alayos, aka Godkiller; and Zhang Shilong (张士龙), aka Baobeilong, aka Zhang Jianguo, aka Atreexp, both nationals of the People’s Republic of China (China), with conspiracy to commit computer intrusions, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft was announced today.

The announcement was made by Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein, U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman for the Southern District of New York, Director Christopher A. Wray of the FBI, Director Dermot F. O’Reilly of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) of the U.S. Department of Defense, and Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers.

Zhu and Zhang were members of a hacking group operating in China known within the cyber security community as Advanced Persistent Threat 10 (the APT10 Group).  The defendants worked for a company in China called Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company (Huaying Haitai) and acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security’s Tianjin State Security Bureau.

Through their involvement with the APT10 Group, from at least in or about 2006 up to and including in or about 2018, Zhu and Zhang conducted global campaigns of computer intrusions targeting, among other data, intellectual property and confidential business and technological information at managed service providers (MSPs), which are companies that remotely manage the information technology infrastructure of businesses and governments around the world, more than 45 technology companies in at least a dozen U.S. states, and U.S. government agencies ...

More in indictment here.

 

[tomahawk6]

Article dubbed "Princess Meng" who has a lot of Chicom connections,someone they want back.

https://www.foxnews.com/tech/how-arrest-of-chinese-princess-exposes-regimes-world-domination-plot 

Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou’s arrest in Vancouver on Dec. 6 led to immediate blowback.
Furious Chinese Communists have begun arresting innocent Canadians in retaliation. So far, three of these “revenge hostages” have been taken and are being held in secret jails on vague charges. Beijing hints that the hostage count may grow if Meng is not freed and fast.

But to say that she is the CFO of Huawei doesn’t begin to explain her importance — or China’s reaction.
It turns out that “Princess” Meng, as she is called, is Communist royalty. Her grandfather was a close comrade of Chairman Mao during the Chinese Civil War, who went on to become vice governor of China’s largest province.
She is also the daughter of Huawei’s Founder and Chairman, Ren Zhengfei. Daddy is grooming her to succeed him when he retires.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Another Canadian arrested in China, this time for smuggling drugs.

Canadian accused of smuggling ‘enormous amount of drugs’ into China: state media

By Rahul Kalvapalle National Online Journalist  Global News

December 26, 2018 9:24 pm
Updated: December 26, 2018 9:27 pm

A Canadian citizen is set to be tried on drug charges in the Chinese port city of Dalian, Chinese state media reported amid already-heightened tensions between Beijing and Ottawa.

Global Times, a tabloid operated by the Communist Party of China, identified the suspect as Robert Lloyd Schellenberg.

Schellenberg was scheduled for an appeal hearing for Saturday, Dec. 29 after he was earlier found to have smuggled “an enormous amount of drugs” into China, according to Dalian.runsky.com, a news portal operated by Dalian authorities.

The Dalian government news portal stated sarcastically that Schellenberg’s audacity was to be admired given that he “actually dared to smuggle drugs into China.” It pointed out that Chinese criminal law offers “no sympathy” for drug crimes.

Global News reached out to the Canadian government for comment, but a response was not forthcoming.

China has some of the harshest drug laws in the world.

People found guilty of smuggling large quantities of drugs face sentences ranging from 15 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment and even the death penalty, the Global Times reported.

In 2009, China executed British citizen Akmal Shaikh after he was caught smuggling heroin. Shaikh’s death prompted outrage in the U.K. over the apparent lack of any mental health assessment.

The following year, Chinese authorities executed Japanese national Mitsunobu Akano for smuggling drugs.

Schellenberg’s reported detention comes as Canada and China spar over the fate of Canadian nationals Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, who were detained in China on suspicion of endangering national security.

Their detention came shortly after Canadian authorities arrested Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Chinese tech giant Huawei, in Vancouver at the behest of U.S. authorities who are seeking her extradition.

China has demanded that Canada release Meng immediately, but neither country has drawn a direct connection between her arrest and the detention of Canadians in China.

Follow @Kalvapalle

© 2018 Global News, a division of Corus Entertainment Inc.

Article Link

 

[The Bread Guy]

Nice port you have there, Kenya - shame if anything ever happened to it ...

Will China seize prized port if Kenya can’t pay back its belt and road loans?
Kristin Huang, South China Morning Post, Sunday, 30 December, 2018, 5:25pm

The prospect that China might at some point be able to seize Kenya’s prized port of Mombasa has caused public confusion and alarm and again raised questions about the risks of participating in China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta has strongly denied a local media report that the East African nation was at risk of having China seize the strategic port in compensation for unpaid debt related to belt and road infrastructure development projects.

According to online news portal African Stand, Kenya may soon have to hand over control of its largest and most developed port, while other assets related to the inland shipment of goods from Mombasa, on the Indian Ocean coast, may also be affected ...

Soft Power:  Soft, until it isn't anymore ...

 

[CBH99]

This has become a more publically aware issue in recent years, and there are a few examples already in Eastern Europe.


China provides loans for development, specifically targeting countries and POLITICAL LEADERS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY POOR economic policies/controls.  Then, when the loans aren't repaid, China seizes airports, highways, ports, or other infrastructure as "repayment" for the loan -- meanwhile giving China access to important infrastructure in countries it may not otherwise have.


Smart, but sinister.

 

[MarkOttawa]

More on growing PLA Air Force capabilities (e.g. refueling), note RAND report:

China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights Pose New Threat to Regional Powers and U.S.
...
China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has sent its Xian H-6K strategic bombers on an increasing number of long-range flights in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years.

Before 2015, China’s bombers stayed relatively close to its coast and were regarded almost exclusively as a means of deterrence and self-defense. However, the bombers now routinely travel beyond the First Island Chain. The H-6K bombers have traveled 1,000 km from China’s coast during some of these flights, which brought them within striking distance of potential U.S. military targets in the Second Island Chain, most notably Guam.

The flights are another example of how China’s military doctrine is shifting away from relying primarily on “active defense” and toward developing greater offensive capabilities, enhanced power projection, and achieving strategic goals well beyond its traditional sphere of influence. The flights are also another indicator that China increasingly believes it will be able to effectively compete with the U.S. military in the near future.

A new report from the RAND Corporation [ https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2567.html ] chronicles the history of China’s long-range bomber flights in the Asia-Pacific region and places them within the context of the “remarkable strategic transformation” that the PLAAF has undergone over the last two decades. “Once viewed as a backward force equipped with antiquated aircraft flown by poorly trained pilots, the PLAAF has gradually stepped out of the shadow of China’s ground forces and emerged as one of the world’s premier air forces,” the report asserts [read on]...
https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=34922

Mark
Ottawa

 

[a_majoor]

This has become a more publically aware issue in recent years, and there are a few examples already in Eastern Europe.


China provides loans for development, specifically targeting countries and POLITICAL LEADERS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY POOR economic policies/controls.  Then, when the loans aren't repaid, China seizes airports, highways, ports, or other infrastructure as "repayment" for the loan -- meanwhile giving China access to important infrastructure in countries it may not otherwise have.


Smart, but sinister.

One thing I always though a bit short sighted about that is what happens when the "owing" party decides to seize and "nationalize" the property, tossing the Chinese out of the country? This happened to Western powers during the "de colonialization" period, and China can't simply box up the property and take it back to China, nor does it have the sort of Force Projection capabilities to go around garrisoning every mine, sea port, road project that some third world government seizes.

I'm sure at some point some third world nation is going to do the cost/benefit calculations, or simply reach a point where their national pride is pushed too far. I expect a great deal of ...excitement... in the markets when and if that occurs.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

yes I do look forward to China experiencing life as the Colonial Master in this modern day. Already in one African country Chinese nationals are not allowed inland for fear of retribution. China apparently supplies "armed security" at some of it's African/Asia sites. Sooner or later they are going to heavy hand it and that will ignite the fire that spark a nationalistic pushback.

 

[a_majoor]

Mark Steyn says "I told you so" about the effects of China's one child policy and its aftermath. The essay points out that China is facing a population decline, and Chinese society has been radically transformed by the decades of the one child policy, making recovery extremely difficult. In economic terms, Styne believes China will grow old before it grows rich.

https://www.steynonline.com/9128/a-forest-of-bare-branches

A thought provoking essay.

 

[Journeyman]

A thought provoking essay.

Indeed; I agree with his demographic views of China 'getting old before it gets rich,' and lashing out as it does.

However, it's a pretty gutsy move for such an arch-conservative American to state "Weak powers behave more irrationally than strong ones."  Again, indeed.
#EndofEmpire?

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Interesting analysis from Donald Clarke at the LawFare blog on the detention of Robert Schellenberg by the Chinese government.

China’s Hostage Diplomacy
By Donald Clarke

Friday, January 11, 2019, 10:54 AM

An obscure Chinese drug case has been pushed to the center of China’s relations with Canada—and, by implication, with the rest of the world. The case appears to reinforce the message, previously suggested by the detentions of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, that China views the holding of human hostages as an acceptable way to conduct diplomacy.

Canadian Robert Schellenberg entered China in November of 2014 and was detained the following month on charges of planning to smuggle almost 500 pounds of crystal methamphetamine from China to Australia. Sentenced just last November to 15 years’ imprisonment, he effectively lost—indeed, more than lost—his appeal in the Liaoning Provincial High Court on Dec. 29, 2018. The High Court sent his case back for retrial, suggesting a harsher sentence would be appropriate. That could include the death penalty.

Several unusual features of the Schellenberg case suggest that it may be connected to China’s efforts to get Meng Wanzhou, the Huawei executive detained in Canada on Dec. 11, released before she is extradited to the United States to face charges of bank fraud related to Iran sanctions.

1. Extraordinary delay in trial and sentencing. The original trial was on March 15, 2016. Given that Schellenberg was detained more than a year earlier, on Dec. 3, 2014, that already represents an unusual delay in China’s usually speedy criminal procedure system. (In the case of Yang Jia, for example, in which the defendant was charged with premeditated murder of six police officers, less than two months elapsed between the date of the offense and the date of the trial, and those proceedings were actually delayed because of the Beijing Summer Olympics.) And the sentence was not pronounced until more than 32 months later, on Nov. 20, 2018. China's Criminal Procedure Law says that sentencing should normally be within two months of the trial, and at most three months. That period may be extended a further three months for various reasons with the permission of the court above the one that conducted the trial. Any further extension requires the sentencing court to apply to and receive specific permission from the Supreme People's Court, China’s top judicial body. Was that obtained? And why was there a delay in the first place, both before the trial and between trial and sentencing?

Usually this kind of delay is a sign of internal controversy within the judicial system, and suggests that the case in question is not open-and-shut. Perhaps the evidence of Schellenberg’s guilt was weak. In such cases, the court doesn't want to embarrass police and prosecutors by acquitting, but it is also reluctant to convict, so it just sits on the case. This is happening, for example, in the extraordinary case of Mark Swidan, tried in 2013 by the Guangdong Jiangmen Intermediate People's Court. Swidan has consistently maintained his innocence, and over five years after the trial, the court has yet to issue a judgment.

2. The decision to send back for retrial. The outcome of the appeal (announced after only twenty minutes of deliberations, suggesting that it was decided in advance) is very unusual. The court, instead of deciding the appeal one way or the other by itself, sent the case back down to the original trial court for a re-trial (chongshen 重审). On the basis of a quick-and-dirty calculation using available statistics, I found that in 2017, re-trials were ordered in at most two percent of criminal appeals.

The circumstances of this particular retrial order make it even more of an outlier. When cases are sent back for retrial, it is generally because clearing up unclear facts is expected to benefit the defendant. A knowledgeable colleague agreed that he had never heard of a case being sent back for retrial on the grounds that clearing up unclear facts might show that a heavier punishment was merited. (I should note that I have no statistics on this and am relying only on impressions gathered over the years. I cannot affirm that no such cases exist.)

Why the highly unusual outcome in the Schellenberg case? It might be random chance. But it might be something else. China’s Criminal Procedure Law does not allow an appeals court to increase the sentence when a defendant appeals. It can increase it if the procuracy (China’s prosecuting body) also appeals. So may be that the procuracy did not formally appeal Schellenberg’s sentence—remember that any decision about this would have been made in November, before China had any interest in politicizing cases involving Canadians. If it did not, then the original sentence of 15 years could not be increased by the appeals court.

But there is a loophole in the law. If, as in this case, the appeals court doesn't make a decision and instead sends case back down for retrial, there is no rule that says the original court cannot impose a harsher sentence on retrial. And during the appeal hearing, the procuracy alleged new and more serious facts that would justify a death sentence. Thus, sending the case back for retrial gives China the opportunity to threaten death and to drag out that threat for as long as necessary. Schellenberg could, for example, be sentenced to death with a two-year suspension. Even though such sentences are virtually always commuted when the two-year period expires, everyone would understand that the Chinese authorities could always find a reason not to commute.

3. Extraordinary speed in scheduling the retrial. Schellenberg’s retrial has been scheduled for Jan. 14, a mere 16 days after the appeal decision. This is barely time for the minimum 10 days’ notice of trial required by China’s Criminal Procedure Law (Art. 187), and it is not clear that notice was in fact provided on or before Jan. 4 as required. Given that the prosecution apparently plans to make new allegations that would justify the imposition of a death sentence, such a brief time is utterly inadequate for the preparation of a meaningful defense.

4. Why invite the international press? China’s State Council Information Office laid on a special trip to Dalian for the international press to observe the appeal hearing. Why? China had 1.3 million criminal cases in 2017, of which about 110,000 were drug cases. No doubt the numbers for 2018 are roughly similar. What was so special about this case? China’s attitude toward media observation of trials seems to be that if the media want to observe, they cannot, but they may be invited to observe proceedings in cases that had previously garnered little or no publicity.

Two possible hypotheses suggest themselves: (1) China wished to show the international community that Chinese criminal proceedings give full due process to defendants and fully protect their rights; (2) China wished to show Canada that it is deadly—literally deadly—serious about getting Meng Wanzhou released.

The account of the hearing provided in a Twitter thread by Wall Street Journal reporter Eva Dou effectively rules out the first hypothesis. The combination of unusual circumstances—inviting the press to observe, the rarity of the outcome and the haste of the retrial—all point to the second as more plausible.

If this hypothesis is correct, then China has moved from merely detaining Canadians as hostages to actually threatening—subtly, to be sure—to kill a Canadian who would otherwise not have been executed if it does not get what it wants.

To be sure, this is only a hypothesis. Schellenberg’s original conviction and sentencing cannot be connected to the Meng case, having preceded it. And no doubt Canadians are among those who have in the past committed, and in the future will commit, crimes in China. Not every detention of a Canadian is necessarily connected with the Meng case.

But the Kovrig and Spavor detentions, together with the opacity about their cases and the recent extraordinary admission, even proclamation, by China’s ambassador to Canada that the two were in fact detained as part of China’s “self-defense” in the Meng case, mean that it is now legitimate for Canadians in China—along with any citizen of a country that might in the future offend China—to wonder whether all these unusual circumstances are really just a coincidence.

Article Link

 

[tomahawk6]

China seems to be interested in commercial/naval shipyards as a way to establish naval bases across the globe including Subic Bay.

https://www.stripes.com/news/pair-of-chinese-firms-eye-subic-bay-shipyard-causing-alarm-in-the-philippines-1.564337

The Chinese are seeking a commercial foothold in a strategic port that was once the United States’ largest naval facility in the Far East.
A pair of Chinese firms are in the running to buy a massive shipyard in Subic Bay from South Korea’s Hanjin Group, local media reported Saturday.
The harbor, once known as Naval Base Subic Bay, was home to thousands of U.S. sailors and their families before the Navy left in 1992. It’s still a regular port call for U.S. warships and Marines who practice beach landings nearby in Zambales province.
Subic’s importance has grown in recent years amid Chinese efforts to build military facilities on artificial islands and claim sovereignty over territory to the west in the South China Sea.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Public DIA report on on PLA etc.:

DIA Chinese Military Power Report

The following is the Defense Intelligence Agency report, China Military Power that was published on Jan. 15, 2019

From the Report’s Introduction

The Defense Intelligence Agency—indeed the broader U.S. Intelligence Community—is continually asked, “What do we need to know about China?” What is China’s vision of the world and its role in it? What are Beijing’s strategic intentions and what are the implications for Washington? How are the PLA’s roles and missions changing as it becomes a more capable military force?

Since Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution in October 1949 brought the Chinese Communist Party to power, China has struggled to identify and align itself with its desired place in the world. Early factional struggles for control of party leadership, decades of negotiations to define territorial boundaries, and continued claims to territories not yet recovered have at times seemed at odds with the self-described nature of the Chinese as peace-loving and oriented only toward their own defense. Chinese leaders historically have been willing to use military force against threats to their regime, whether foreign or domestic, at times preemptively. Lack of significant involvement in military operations during the last several decades has led to a sense of insecurity within the PLA as it seeks to modernize into a great power military.

Still, the United States has at times found itself in direct conflict with China or Chinese forces. China supported two major conflicts in Asia after the Second World War, introducing Chinese volunteer forces in Korea and providing direct Chinese air and air defense support to Hanoi in Vietnam. In addition, China fought border skirmishes with the Soviet Union, India, and a unified Vietnam. In all three cases, military action was an integral part of Chinese diplomatic negotiations. Since then, China has concluded negotiations for most of its land borders (India and Bhutan being the outliers) but remains in contention with Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam over maritime borders, which may in part explain motivation for the PLA Navy’s impressive growth and the new emphasis on maritime law enforcement capabilities.

China’s double-digit economic growth has slowed recently, but it served to fund several successive defense modernization Five-Year Plans. As international concern over Beijing’s human rights policies stymied the PLA’s search for ever more sophisticated technologies, China shifted funds and efforts to acquiring technology by any means available. Domestic laws forced foreign partners of Chinese-based joint ventures to release their technology in exchange for entry into China’s lucrative market, and China has used other means to secure needed technology and expertise. The result of this multifaceted approach to technology acquisition is a PLA on the verge of fielding some of the most modern weapon systems in the world. In some areas, it already leads the world.

Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great power status. Indeed, China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests. With a deeper understanding of the military might behind Chinese economic and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range of options for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world.

This report offers insights into the modernization of Chinese military power as it reforms from a defensive, inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security responsibilities to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary, and power-projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe...[lots more]
https://news.usni.org/2019/01/15/dia-chinese-military-power-report

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Stealth bomber developments in particular:

Intelligence Report Confirms Two Chinese Stealth Bombers

A new report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) offers the first official acknowledgment of the existence of two stealth bomber development programs by China’s air force.

A previously-confirmed Chinese strategic bomber and a newly acknowledged stealth “fighter-bomber” are both now under development, the DIA says in a China Military Power report released Jan. 15.

The Pentagon first acknowledged a strategic bomber program exists in a 2017 report to Congress. The admission came a year after a senior Chinese air force official publicly confirmed the effort to develop a new strategic comber variously called H-X and H-20 [emphasis added].

For several years, Chinese and foreign media have speculated about the existence of a separate stealth bomber development project sometimes called the JH-XX, a replacement for the Mach 1.8-class Xian JH-7 fighter-bomber.

The new DIA report also describes the second project as a “medium”-range stealth bomber. In a chart showing the “aircraft systems characteristics” of the Chinese air force fleet, a “next gen” fighter bomber is shown as a development project [emphasis added] with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, long-range air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions.

The same chart also describes the “long-range bomber” now in development as equipped with an AESA and precision-guided munitions, but not long-range air-to-air missiles.

“These new bombers will have additional capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets, and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design,” the DIA report states.

The initial operational capability for both bombers is expected “no sooner” than 2025, the DIA reports, although it caveats that forecast by adding “probably [emphasis added].”

China has unveiled two stealth fighters—the J-20 and FC-31—and numerous designs for radar-evading unmanned aircraft systems over the last decade. China also has introduced a series of fourth-generation fighters, including the J-10, J-16 and newly acquired Sukhoi Su-35, over the same period.

Although a previous Pentagon report to Congress in August described the Chinese fighter fleet as possessing about 2,000 combat aircraft, the new report by the DIA lowers the estimate by 15% to around 1,700 aircraft.

By contrast, China’s bomber fleet has relied upon Xian’s JH-7 and H-6 bombers for decades, with recent upgrades adding to the range and weapons mix of the H-6. AVIC also displayed a model of a JH-7 at Airshow China in November. It was displayed with the designation “JH-7E,” which appeared to indicate a new configuration or perhaps an export variant.

As the H-20 and JH-XX enter service in the next decade, the DIA expects China’s next-generation bomber force to perform a nuclear strike mission and complete a Western-style nuclear triad by augmenting the capabilities of Chinese submarines and ground-based rocket forces [emphasis added].

“As of 2017, the Air Force had been reassigned a nuclear mission, probably with a developmental strategic bomber,” the DIA report says.

China’s stealthy new fighter-bomber also could introduce a unique capability among world air forces. The DIA indicates that China’s air force is developing a medium-range aircraft with stealth characteristics.

The U.S. Air Force has analyzed similar concepts such as the FB-22 and the initial design of the Long Range Strike-Bomber, but never launched development of such an aircraft. Since the retirement of the medium-range General Dynamics F-111, Western and Russian air forces have depended on comparatively short-range fighter-bombers with little passive ability to avoid radar detection, such as the Boeing F-15E and Sukhoi Su-34.
http://aviationweek.com/defense/intelligence-report-confirms-two-chinese-stealth-bombers

Mark
Ottawa

 

[a_majoor]

Interesting article published by the NYT. Doubly remarkable since the NYT is usually reliably "Liberal", but is essentially publishing an article in support of the policies of this Administration. How much traction it will get and how far the Administration is actually prepared to go are two questions which will be worth looking at in a few months time to see how much the needle has moved:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/opinion/us-china-trade.html

From the article:

After years of unsuccessful talks and handshake deals with Beijing, the United States should change course and begin cutting some of its economic ties with China. Such a separation would stop intellectual property theft, cut off an important source of support to the People’s Liberation Army and hold companies that are involved in Chinese human rights abuses accountable.

This will be no easy task. Some industries will have problems finding new suppliers or buyers, and there are entrenched constituencies that support doing business with China. They argue that any pullback could threaten economic growth. But even if American exports to China fell by half, it would be the equivalent of less than one-half of 1 percent of gross domestic product. The cost of reducing Chinese imports is harder to assess, but there are multiple countries that can substitute for China-based production, none of them strategic rivals and trade predators.

The United States economy and its national security have been harmed by China’s rampant theft of intellectual property and the requirement that American companies that want to do business in the country hand over their technology. These actions threaten America’s comparative advantage in innovation and its military edge.

 

[ModlrMike]

Not such an outrageous idea. There are any number of the "smaller dragons" that could step into the void, as well as countries such as India. In addition, South and Central America could also be good ground for this. The upshot would be to improve the standard of living in these areas, which in turn might reduce some pressure on the US southern border.

 

[a_majoor]

China ramping up the pressure on Canada.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/chinas-plan-to-break-off-us-allies/

China’s Plan to Break off US Allies
There’s a reason Beijing is pressuring Canada – not the US – over Meng Wanzhou’s arrest. Australia and New Zealand could be next.

From the article:

The commentary added, “We need to select counter-targets and make those countries be beaten very painfully. We argue that in this complex game, China should focus on the Five Eye alliance countries, especially Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. They follow the United States to harm China’s interests, especially in a step-by-step manner. Their performance is radical, and they are some of the targets that China should first hit.”

This was a public declaration that Beijing is set for retaliation against U.S. allies such as Canada and will adopt specific measures to implement the strategy of removing America’s friendly partners. In that sense, China’s measures against Canada are an example of the Chinese idiom “killing a chicken to scare the monkeys.” The goal is to deter other countries from angering China at the United States’ behest.
China’s strategy of forcing U.S. friendly forces to choose to stand on the Chinese side has achieved some results already. For example, since 2012, China has succeeded in forcing some Southeast Asian countries to stand on the Chinese side in the South China Sea disputes through its sharp strength and other means. Then, China impounded Singapore’s armored vehicles in Hong Kong in November 2016, which convinced Singapore to no longer echo U.S. views over the South China Sea. Even Japan has shifted a bit to China’s side. In October 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went to Beijing and said that Japan would no longer confront China. Since then, he has been more cautious in using the term “free and open Indo-Pacific strategy” as coined by the Trump administration.

In fact, Beijing believes that China has already settled the western Pacific in this sense. Now, China’s strategy of forcing U.S. allies to choose to stand on its own side is set to expand to the  eastern Pacific. The Global Times editorial firmly believes that “achieving this goal or doing it to a considerable extent is very likely to be done.”

 

[YZT580]

That is not the manner in which trusted trade partners converse with one another.  Perhaps it is time to clear the Made in China products from the shelf and pursue other markets.  Although China represents 1/6 of the global population there are enough folks in S.America, India, Viet Nam and the Philippines to more than make up the difference and we don't have to sell our souls to deal with them either.