Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[Snakedoc]

Yeah I just saw this doing the rounds on facebook today.  Too funny.  It was apparently a 55 page photo spread too LOL  :rofl:

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 1 of 2

Some folks, including some at the Heritage Foundation think that we, the USA anyway, is already at war with China and they worry that China has a plan to win that war without firing a shot. In fairness, some Chinese think the same: they believe the war is on  and they believe they can win without firing a shot. Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Heritage Foundation website is an interesting article about that proposition:

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/winning-without-fighting-chinese-public-opinion-warfare-and-the-need-for-a-robust-american-response

Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response

By Dean Cheng

November 26, 2012

Abstract: Over the past decade, the People's Republic of China has exhibited a growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare. The purpose of this interest is chilling: to enable the PRC to win a war against the U.S. without firing a shot. To this end, the PRC is expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i.e., involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. Such expansion will be fueled by manipulation of public opinion, legal systems, and enemy leadership. It is essential that the United States counter the PRC's new soft-power surge not only by rebutting political attacks, but also by taking the offensive and promoting America's positions to a global audience.

Over the past decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has exhibited a growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare. To this end, the PRC released an initial set of regulations regarding political warfare in December 2003, before updating them in 2010. These "political work regulations" for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) address the importance of waging "the three warfares": public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.

The "three warfares" represent the PRC's commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i.e., involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. Such expansion will be fueled by manipulation of public opinion, legal systems, and enemy leadership. But unlike more traditional military conflict, the foundation for political warfare must be established during peacetime so as to create beneficial conditions and context for the military conflict and, in turn, precipitate an early end to a conflict on terms favorable to the PRC. Indeed, if waged successfully, political warfare allows one side to win without fighting.

In hopes of being able to alter the strategic context of any future U.S.-PRC confrontation, the PRC is improving its ability to influence both global and Chinese public opinion. If the United States does not counter Chinese political warfare efforts, it may well find that its access to the Western Pacific is endangered by a lack of regional support—long before American forces even begin moving toward the area. In order to avoid being outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot, the U.S. must strengthen its strategic communications, public diplomacy, and media outreach capabilities.
Comprehensive Power and Cultural Security

When the Chinese write about their conception of security, it is often couched in terms of "comprehensive national power [zonghe guojia liliang]." This concept argues that a nation should be judged not simply by its military, economic, or diplomatic power, but by a combination of all of three, as well as its scientific and technological base and its cultural influence.

Consequently, the PRC considers many seemingly unrelated activities essential to Chinese security. China's space capabilities, for example, contribute to Chinese comprehensive national power, not only by placing Chinese satellites and astronauts into space to obvious military and political effect, but also by fostering scientific and technical expertise and enhancing China's economy. Space capabilities also serve as evidence of China's growing technological prowess and scientific, industrial, and military capability and are therefore considered an important element of public diplomacy.

At the same time, however, China's growing interaction with the rest of the world has given rise to concerns about the PRC's "cultural security." In late 2011, Chinese leader Hu Jintao gave a speech in which he noted that on the international scene, one characteristic of the competition in comprehensive national power is the growing prominence of culture: "Many major nations have sought to expand their range of cultural soft-power as a means of increasing core national competitiveness.&#8221[1] As the speech goes on to note, this has meant that "international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.&#8221[2] The cultural competition is seen not simply as the proliferation of Western videos and entertainment, but as an aspect of ideological struggle.

This question of "cultural security" is fueled by two elements. The first issue is the residue of what the Chinese term "the Century of Humiliation," during which China was bullied and exploited by foreign powers. There is a concern that, despite its economic rise and growing military prowess, China remains subject to foreign influences that will undermine its culture. As one Chinese observer has noted, "as an importer of cultural products, ideas, and technologies since the 19th Century, China has every reason to worry about its cultural identity.&#8221[3] China has long demonstrated less confidence in its cultural security and identity than, for example, its Japanese neighbors.

The second issue driving these concerns about "cultural security" is the PRC's belief that Chinese cultural products are not given a "fair shake." For example, Chinese articles lamented that Zhang Yimou's "Flowers of War," starring Christian Bale and believed to be the most expensive movie yet made in China, was not even nominated for the Oscar for best foreign film[4] Some believe that this was because of pressure to deny China its due recognition. Conversely, awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo is seen as using the award to criticize China.

The Three Warfares: Winning Without Firing a Shot

There is a military aspect to the PRC's focus on public opinion, embodied in the concept of "the three warfares." Chinese military writings emphasize the importance of influencing global public opinion so as to coerce opponents into compliance without having to go to war and to influence an enemy's leadership, domestic population, and military in the event of conflict, as well as to garner international support.
Chinese writings suggest that Beijing has accorded ever greater importance to public opinion since the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, when NATO's aerial bombardment and public diplomacy combined to undermine Slobodan Milosevic—a combination that was equally as effective during the 2003 Iraq war. Indeed, the ability of coalition forces to undermine popular support for the Milosevic and Saddam Hussein regimes, influence global views, and preserve domestic support are seen by the PRC as key factors in the outcome of each conflict.

Such an ability to influence popular will and shape perceptions, according to PLA writings, constitutes political combat styles under informationalized conditions (xinxi tiaojian xia de zhengzhi xing zuozhan yangshi). These styles are codified for the PLA in the "People's Liberation Army Political Work Regulations" as the "three warfares": public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare[5] They employ the range of national resources, including military, civilian, and hard and soft power, guided by the overall military strategy, to secure the political initiative and psychological advantage over an opponent, debilitating one's opponent while strengthening one's own will and securing support from third parties[6]

The "Three Warfares"

As noted in a previous Heritage Foundation Backgrounder on legal warfare, public opinion warfare is one of the "three warfares" (san zhan), the third being psychological warfare[7] Chinese analyses almost always link these three types of combat together, as they are seen as interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Specifically, the "three warfares" seek to influence the public's understanding of a conflict by retaining support from one's own population, degrading it in an opponent, and influencing third parties. Public opinion/media warfare is the struggle to gain dominance over the venue for implementing psychological and legal warfare. It is seen as a form of warfare independent of armed confrontation or actual hostilities. Indeed, it is perhaps understood most accurately as a constant, ongoing activity aimed at long-term influence of perceptions and attitudes.
One of the main tools of public opinion/media warfare is the news media, including both domestic and foreign entities. The focus of public opinion/media warfare is not limited to the press, however; it involves all of the instruments that inform and influence public opinion (e.g., movies, television programs, books). Psychological warfare seeks to disrupt an opponent's decision-making capacity by creating doubts, fomenting anti-leadership sentiments, and generally sapping an opponent's will. Legal warfare seeks to justify a nation's own actions legally while portraying an opponent's activities as illegal, thereby creating doubts, both among adversary and neutral military and civilian authorities and in the broader population, about the wisdom and justification of an opponent's actions. In essence, both psychological warfare and legal warfare require the use of public opinion warfare in order to have greatest effect. Public opinion warfare and legal warfare require psychological warfare guidance so that their targets and methods can be refined. Public opinion warfare and psychological warfare require legal warfare information in order to be their most effective[8]

Public Opinion Warfare: Chinese Definitions

Public opinion warfare (yulun zhan) refers to the use of various mass information channels, including the Internet, television, radio, newspapers, movies, and other forms of media, in accordance with an overall plan and defined objectives to transmit selected news and other materials to the intended audience. It is directed primarily at an opponent's military forces and is intended to complement national political, diplomatic, and military operations.

The purpose of public opinion warfare is to shift the overall balance of strength between a nation and that nation's opponents[9] Such an impact demands more than just securing exposure for a particular point of view or a set of facts. Rather, the goals are to preserve friendly morale, generate public support at home and abroad, weaken the enemy's will to fight, and alter the enemy's situational assessment. Public opinion warfare is both a national and a local responsibility, and it will be undertaken not only by the PLA, but also by the People's Armed Police.

Pillars of Public Opinion Warfare

Chinese writings on public opinion highlight certain themes that provide a conceptual starting point and framework that govern all related military operations. These themes include:

Follow top-down guidance. Public opinion warfare must support national political, diplomatic, and military objectives. Its actions must be consistent with the larger national strategy as laid out by the top levels of leadership (i.e., the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission). Consequently, public opinion warfare measures must follow higher-level guidance on content and timing.

Emphasize preemption. In undertaking public opinion warfare, the side that plants its message first enjoys a significant advantage. Chinese analyses of public opinion warfare emphasize that the "the first to sound grabs people, the first to enter establishes dominance (xian sheng duoren, xianru weizhu)." Essentially, the objective is to establish the terms of the debate and define the parameters of coverage. By presenting its message first, the PLA expects to underscore the justice and necessity of its operations, accentuate national strength, and exhibit the superiority of its forces—all in an effort to undermine an opponent's will to resist[10]

Be flexible and responsive to changing conditions. Under the unified leadership structure and consistent with the requirements of unified, joint operations, commanders should implement public opinion warfare in a flexible manner, taking into account shifts in the political and military situation. At the same time, these commanders should also tailor their methods with respect to specific operations rather than pursuing a one-size-fits-all approach. Thus, when engaging in public opinion warfare against what the PRC considers "secessionist elements," for example, it is important to use different propaganda activities, depending on the audience. "One must make distinctions between the more stubborn elements and the general populace.&#8221[11]

Exploit all available resources. Chinese military writings regularly invoke the ideals of combining peacetime and wartime operations, civil-military integration, and military and local unity (pingzhan jiehe, junmin jiehe, jundi yiti). This emphasis is especially pronounced in public opinion warfare, as civilian resources for public opinion warfare vastly outweigh military ones. Civilian and commercial assets—news organizations, broadcasting facilities, Internet users, etc.—are seen as an invaluable resource in getting China's message before both domestic and global audiences. Moreover, the use of civilian assets could uncover better techniques and information than might be available through purely military channels[12]

Within this construct, Chinese writings suggest that, like any other military operation, there are both offensive and defensive components of public opinion warfare. For instance, offensive public opinion warfare seeks to undermine the enemy's will and weaken any external support while garnering friends and allies. In the first Gulf War, the U.S. used its considerable advantage in information dissemination to bombard the Iraqi military and civilian population with various messages that undermined both Iraq's will to fight and the people's faith in Saddam Hussein. In the U.S. war with Afghanistan, Washington employed public opinion warfare mechanisms to create an anti-terrorism coalition, gain support from other major nations, and allay concerns in Arab and Muslim nations[13]

On the other hand, defensive public opinion warfare is waged to counter enemy public opinion warfare. It entails strong education and news management efforts designed to ensure that the domestic population is not exposed to enemy messages and that, even if they are, those messages will not take root. Defensive public opinion warfare requires prompt, credible responses to enemy criticisms and charges.

This latter aspect can be achieved only through careful preparation of the public opinion battleground in peacetime. That is, there must be extensive research into tactics and methods for undertaking public opinion warfare, understanding potential opponents' psychology and national moods, and the nurturing of public opinion warfare specialists. For this reason, PLA writings consistently invoke the saying, "Before the troops and horses move, public opinion is already underway (bingma weidong, yulun xianxing)," emphasizing that the preparation for public opinion warfare must begin far in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities[14]

Public Opinion Warfare in the Second Gulf War

For PLA analysts, the second Gulf War provided a demonstration of public opinion warfare under informationized conditions[15]

According to Chinese analyses, Coalition public opinion warfare efforts began long before the outbreak of overt hostilities in March 2003. Indeed, one Chinese analysis suggests that the United States was waging public opinion warfare against Iraq at least from the time of 9/11, if not the end of the first Gulf War, constantly demonizing Saddam Hussein and Iraq[16] Such a protracted period of public opinion preparation acclimatized both the American and global audience to the idea that Iraq posed a threat to the world. Consequently, when President George W. Bush labeled Iraq part of the "Axis of Evil," the ground had been prepared for that characterization to take hold.

Once the decision to go to war had been made, the United States then sought to maintain this early advantage by exploiting its enormous media strength to shape national and global public opinion. According to Chinese writings, this advantage was heightened because Western media, especially American and British news organizations, were aligned with, if not actively subordinate to, the Anglo-American authorities. In an example of how a nation's own system shapes its perceptions of others, Chinese writings describe the U.S. government as employing CNN and NBC to influence both American and global public opinion in support of the war with Iraq[17] Other Chinese writings suggest that the American media were complicit in claiming that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, because they were "under the control of the government and the military [meiguo meiti you zai zhengfu he junfang de caokong xia].&#8221[18]

From the Chinese perspective, the "embed" program for journalists was an especially effective means of influencing the global perception. By allowing reporters onto the front lines, it allowed the U.S. to broadcast its operations directly to a global audience, underscoring the power of American military forces. Moreover, Chinese analyses conclude that by incorporating foreign journalists into the program, including ones drawn from China and other nations skeptical of the U.S., American public opinion warriors were able to project an image of objectivity and transparency. If American journalists could be dismissed as being naturally pro-U.S., it would be harder to make the same accusation against journalists from non-Coalition countries[19]

Meanwhile, to further support its public opinion warfare campaign, in August 2002, with the help of Iraqi dissident groups and exiles, the U.S. created a satellite television station[20] Coupled with a military decision to leave Iraqi communications and broadcasting infrastructure intact (unlike in the Balkan conflicts), the U.S.—as perceived by the PRC—was able to transmit a range of false messages and inaccurate information to undermine Iraqi resistance, using both Iraqi and other frequencies.

End of Part 1

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 2 of 2

American Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy Policy

The PRC's interpretation of basic press coverage reflects a fundamentally different view of the relationship between the media and the government. That the PRC would see the major news networks as adjuncts, never mind agents, of American policy suggests that an underlying Chinese assumption is that the press exists to influence rather than inform the audience. This is obviously a fundamental misreading of the role of the Fourth Estate.

Yet it is ironic that the PRC should express such concern about American public diplomacy, strategic communications, and media policy, given the restrictions and limitations imposed on the ability of the U.S. government to inform as well as influence global opinion.

First, the American strategic communications effort is declining amid a global information explosion. Despite the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, which called for such programs as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia to be part of the "world's leading international news agency" by 2016, the BBG's offerings are shrinking. Efforts to reach audiences in Pashto and Dari (key languages in Pakistan), Tibet, and Bangladesh, among others, are being scaled back even as Chinese investment, broadcasts, and overall presence increases in each region.

This decrease in America's strategic communication channels, coupled with the spike in PRC broadcasts, has sparked bipartisan concerns. For example, Representative Zoe Lofgren's (R-CA) recent letter to the BBG questions the decision to consolidate Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, echoing concerns expressed by Representatives Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)[21]

Second, even these limited efforts are hampered by outdated restrictions, such as the Smith-Mundt Act. The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, first enacted in 1948, was intended to counter Communist propaganda. Specifically, it codified how the United States could engage in public diplomacy, authorizing international broadcasting efforts such as the Voice of America and promoting cultural and educational exchanges with the rest of the world through the State Department.

Concerned about the potential for governmental misuse of this set of powers, Smith-Mundt prohibited the domestic dissemination of any materials intended for foreign audiences; in short, U.S. public diplomacy was not to be employed where it might feed back to an American audience. While this was viable in an age of radio and TV broadcasts, the rise of the Internet and a global information system effectively stymies most forms of strategic communications and public diplomacy, at least in the context of Smith-Mundt.

Meanwhile, military psychological operations, or what is now termed military information support operations (MISO), are also facing possible budget cuts. In May of this year, for instance, Representative Hank Johnson (D-GA) tabled an amendment to reduce MISO-related funding by nearly one-third[22] In the face of Chinese public opinion warfare efforts, such massive reductions cripple the U.S.'s ability to influence others.
Chinese Lessons and Possible Approaches

As a result of their observations of the second Gulf War, as well as their own views of the principles of public opinion warfare, PLA analysts now advocate that such warfare must be considered within the larger context of the overall goals of a conflict.

An essential lesson that the PLA seems to have derived from the second Gulf War is that to truly rival the U.S., it must attempt to counter the American advantage in global access and coverage. As one Chinese article puts it, propaganda guidelines should seek to establish news dominance (xinwen quan) and information dominance (xinxi quan) on the path to obtaining psychological dominance (xinli quan)[23] In this regard, the Chinese seem to be committed to developing a much more efficient strategic communications infrastructure. Starting in September 2011, for example, the Chinese Foreign Ministry began to offer daily press briefings instead of the twice-weekly ones that were begun in 1995. Earlier that year, the Defense Ministry began holding monthly press conferences for the first time[24]

In this context, China's expansion of its global news coverage should be seen as part of the peacetime preparation for public opinion warfare. These developments include the creation of a 24-hour English-language global news service under the aegis of the government news agency Xinhua, as well as the expansion of state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) to a more global presence[25] Given the concern about shaping public opinion and the belief that such news organizations as CNN and Fox News are in the service of the U.S. government, it may well be that these new news entities are intended to counter Western news coverage by providing a Chinese view of global developments.

Similarly, although at a more subtle level, the expansion of the Confucius Institutes around the world may be seen as an attempt to alter the world's image of China[26] These institutes are often embedded within universities or secondary schools and are funded by the hosting institution and the Office of Chinese Language International, which is affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Confucius Institutes promote Chinese language training but focus on "providing information about China's education, culture, economy, and society, as well as facilitating research on China."[27]
Countering the PRC Soft-Power Surge

Chinese security planners are concerned that they are vulnerable to strategic communications and public diplomacy aimed at the general populace. Consequently, Chinese leaders warn about "cultural security" and are intent on building Chinese "soft power," both as a peacetime response to foreign pressure and as a potential tool in wartime.

America's response to this surge of Chinese "soft power," therefore, must take into account both peacetime and possible wartime applications. American efforts to shape and influence public opinion must be prepared not only to defend the United States by rebutting attacks, but also to take the offensive and promote America's positions to a global audience. Public diplomacy efforts will be essential in both cases[28]
Like the PRC, then, the United States needs to influence foreign leaders and populations on a daily basis. This cannot be accomplished through momentary, ad hoc efforts; rather, the U.S. must present itself as a reliable source of information, available on a regular basis. The PRC, like other regimes, seeks to limit discussion and avoid the dissemination of information; the American interest is best served by the free flow of information, both in times of peace and in times of war.

In the event of a conflict, though, the U.S. needs to have available additional methods by which it can project American messages to an adversary's population and decision makers and rebut efforts to influence American allies and friends, as well as neutral states. In order to meet this requirement, current public diplomacy efforts should be overhauled and expanded. This reform should be a priority for the next Administration.
In the meantime, there are steps that can and should be taken in the near term to show China and the world that the U.S. is serious about competing in the global marketplace of ideas. Specifically, the U.S. should:

Demand visa parity for U.S. journalists and public access for U.S. broadcasters. The PRC has several hundred journalists operating in the United States, most of whom work for state-owned media outlets. Yet Beijing is unwilling to grant reciprocal access to foreign journalists, including Americans. It should be American policy to demand comparable access for American journalists or else to reduce the size of the Chinese presence in the U.S.

Fill public diplomacy leadership positions promptly. The U.S. government needs officials who are accountable for carrying out a new public diplomacy strategy. The Broadcasting Board of Governors, for example, is currently operating with most of its members still serving on expired terms.

Improve strategic communications and public diplomacy training for military public affairs officers. The Chinese see public opinion as playing a key role in shaping the global and operational environment, and during any military conflict, they likely will strive to influence such sentiment. American military public affairs officers (PAOs) need to be cognizant of this and be suitably trained and prepared both to respond and, when possible, to seize the initiative.

Sustain funding for MISO operations. A review of Chinese assessments of American psychological warfare/MISO operations in recent conflicts indicates that the PLA and Chinese decision-makers in general are very concerned with the West's ability to propagate its message to both senior leaders and the broader populace in wartime as well as peacetime. For the United States to reduce spending in this area unilaterally, especially when total MISO-related spending is about $250 million (equivalent to the cost of two F-35 fighters), would seem to be penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Conclusion

The information era provides unparalleled access to both a nation's leaders and its population. The PRC has made clear that, in the event of a conflict, it will exploit that access to try to influence an adversary in hopes of winning a war without firing a shot. Even today, during a time of peace, the PRC is laying the groundwork for such soft-power operations. It is therefore essential that the United States counter that influence now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise.

— Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

I agree, broadly, with Mr. Cheng's characterization of how the Chinese see both public opinion and propaganda and how they see the permanent mix of civilian and military aims and resources. I take no issue with his prescription for US action.

But we must remember that the Chinese attack on public opinion is not confined to the USA or the US led West. I call the Chinese attack the "global charm offensive"; so do some Chinese officials.

 

[a_majoor]

I am curious if the Heritage Foundation has done a similar analysis on Chinese Soft Power offenses vs the Islamic world, Europe or Africa. If the Chinese really are effectively targeting other civilizations (in the Samuel Huntington sense) then perhaps the Heritage Foundation is on to something. Robert Kaplans writing on the String of Pearls strategy may be an example of this.

OTOH, the Chinese have also pulled a lot of ham handed moves. People as varied as Diane Francis in the National Post and Kirkhill on Army.ca have commented on how predatory Chinese companies and policies alienate the very people they are working with.

Over all, I expect the Chinese to discover the world is far more varied and unpredictable than they would like, and the Chinese leadership will have their share of success, failure and just plain WTF moments as the future unfolds.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I'm not sure about Heritage Foundation scholars but there are several pretty good books out there including:

Generally, Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, Li, (ed), Chen et al (contributors); and,

More to the point, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World, Kurlantzick

 

[Edward Campbell]

channelnewsasia.com (a Singapore TV superstation covering (by satellite) the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Australia) reports that China will participate in RIMPAC 2014. They quote US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who is visiting China, as saying that the US "welcomes" the Chinese decision to accept the US invitation ~ something the PLA Navy has yet to announce, formally ... in English, anyway.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Ian Bremner speculated on a Sino-American Cold War is this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Time:

http://world.time.com/2012/11/28/what-if-there-was-a-cold-war-between-the-u-s-and-china/

What If There Was a Cold War Between the U.S. and China?

By World Economic Forum

Nov. 28, 2012

This is a “what if” interview from the World Economic Forum’s Risk Response Network. To view the rest of the series, click here.

We’re already seeing a return to Cold War era containment strategies as the relationship between the world’s two largest economies deteriorates, argues Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group and author of Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World. The World Economic Forum, in collaboration with TIME, quizzed Bremmer on the nature of U.S.-Chinese tensions and what can be done to soften them.

Why is the specter of U.S.-China confrontation so real?

We’re in a situation where the world’s largest economy is not doing so well, the world’s second largest economy is still growing very strongly, albeit at a slower rate, and the two countries have totally incompatible economic and political systems. The relationship between China and America is only becoming more problematic. In the foreign policy debates ahead of the US presidential elections, Obama referred to China as an “adversary” for the first time. It’s not just about political posturing. China is the single biggest challenge to US foreign policy, in that Americans mostly see foreign policy in terms of how it impacts the American economy, and China is increasingly a market that many people believe is not playing by the rules, from intellectual property to state capitalism to cyber attacks.

Similarly, in Chinese state media, you’re seeing much more assertiveness, more talk of the Americans trying to contain China, the Americans “not wanting us to be world beaters”, “not wanting us to be number one”. There’s no question that the Americans and the Chinese at the highest level do understand that it’s dangerous for both countries to allow their relationship to be a disaster, so they’re trying to avoid unnecessary conflict. But the problem isn’t really unnecessary conflict—it’s that the necessary conflict over huge structural issues like currency and trade is building up.

What warning signs have you seen?

There’s the massive increase in tensions between China and Japan: in the last few weeks, there were anti-Japan demonstrations in about 100 cities in China, Japanese car sales in China were down 49% last month, and every CEO I spoke to at the recent IMF meeting in Tokyo said that this issue would dramatically change their view on doing business in China. This is significant because, ultimately, America is Japan’s defence policy: they have a strategic alliance, so if there is a problem between Japan and China, we know where the US is going to come down.

How does China’s holding of U.S. government debt affect the relationship?

The Japanese are actually on track to become the largest holder of US debt, externally, not China. China is trying to decouple from the dollar. If you look at what they’re doing in building domestic consumption and expanding South-South trade, then it’s clear they want to be in a position where there’s less mutual dependence with America. But that’s a long way off, and China is still very much America’s banker.

What about China’s political succession?

In China, you don’t have strong individual leaders, you have government by consensus, so as a consequence the actual composition of the leadership is not going to influence foreign policy too much. What you do have are a lot of moving pieces. There’s the Bo Xilai scandal, there’s the way Xi Jinping disappeared off the scene for a couple of weeks: these things cause all kinds of rumours, and then the government becomes more risk averse as a result. Both because of the political transition and the slowdown – globally and in China – Chinese government officials are less willing to take risks, and those risks include the transition of their economy and their  political system towards more structural reform. That’s what’s needed for China to have a better relationship with the US, and it’s absolutely not happening.

If the relationship were to deteriorate further, how would this happen?

It’s already becoming a new kind of cold war. What this means is that the Americans and the Chinese will be frenemies. They’re not going to become enemies, because that’s not possible, but they’re not friends any more, either. All of America’s allies are very much afraid of China’s rise, so they’re begging the US to play a more significant role in Asia. You can see what the Americans are doing in response: in South Korea, they sign a new ballistic missile deal, in Indonesia they send over fighter aircrafts, in Australia they send a whole bunch of marines to Darwin, and on and on. There have been lots of joint military exercises in Vietnam and the Philippines. Then there’s also the question of cyber attacks: China is America’s principle enemy in this area, and vice versa.

The big question is to what extent all this is going to bleed over directly into the economic relationship. It’s already starting to, in that a lot of American firms are saying “We don’t have the access we used to into China, and furthermore the Chinese are stealing all our stuff.” As the Chinese firms get larger, that will start to have a greater impact on trade. The Doha round of international trade talks was meant to include China, but that’s dead, and China isn’t part of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. On a big strategic level, all this is increasingly looking like cold war, like containment.

What would be the next phase?

You’d start to see more tit for tats on new trade tariffs, and new sanctions between the two countries. America would press its allies much harder to align their investment policies with the US. You’d start to see US corporate leaders publicly coming out and taking an anti-China perspective, while the Chinese would be more aggressive about the need to work away from the dollar as the reserve currency.

On a cultural level, in America you would see fewer Chinese students, fewer Chinese people buying properties there. And Lord knows, there is always the potential for xenophobia: you only have to think back to the Japanese internment camps. Anti-Chinese sentiment would be a dangerous and an ugly thing, especially if you continue to have this growing divide between the rich and poor. On the other side, it’s not unthinkable that a Chinese government under pressure domestically would push anti-American sentiment as a palliative.

The original Cold War was a clash between two clearly opposed ideologies. Is that the case here?

America’s ideology has not fundamentally changed, though it’s not as palatable or powerful as it used to be. It’s all about individual freedoms and liberties, democracy and free market enterprise. Over recent years, the U.S. has taken many hits on this, whether you look at the financial crisis, or human rights abuses at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, or the incredible power of corporate interests in its elections. But having said all that, you still can’t compare where the U.S. stands on these issues and where a country like China does.

China has no rule of law. It is an authoritarian political system and a state capitalist system. It’s not as if the Chinese are publicly promoting the notion that everyone should be authoritarian or that everyone should be state capitalist: Chinese ideology is about the Chinese state. It does not develop allies based on shared values; it develops allies based on shared interest. This is not true for the US: of course it has allies based on interest, but historical allies based on shared values play an oversized role, whether we’re talking about Britain and the US, or Israel and the US.

In this context, what would be the equivalent of a Cuban missile crisis?

Either a massive cyber attack, or the United States stepping in to defend the Japanese if they got into a conflict with China over contested territories. But there we’re talking about a cold war spilling over into a hot war, and I think the likelihood of that is very, very low, because national security today is driven much more by economics rather than geopolitics.

How well prepared are we for the challenges of a new cold war?

We’re not. The old, US-driven institutions like the G20 are no longer functioning adequately.

What are the solutions?

Don’t allow the great to be the enemy of the good. Allow more manageable, smaller organisations with more like-minded countries and more like-minded actors (like corporates, NGOs and individuals) to provide some form of leadership to respond to these issues. Ultimately, if the US is going to have a productive relationship with China, which is what everyone wants, you have to have strong baseline organisations that the Chinese want to join. When the WTO was created, nobody thought that China would ever be a member, but it became so strong and inclusive that the Chinese decided that the opportunities of joining outweighed the risks. We need institutions in place that will become attractive to the Chinese government, as their population gets wealthier and more people would support the rule of law. Ultimately, you need to create the kinds of clubs that the Chinese feel they need to join.

It must be remembered that China is not ideologically driven. It acts and reacts based on its own assessment of its own interests. We, the rest of the world, can engage with China based upon a balance of interests ... or not.

It should also be remembered that there are factions in the USA - the famous military-industrial complex, for example - for whom a new cold war would be a good thing. The Chinese equivalent doesn't need external pressure; China is committed to strategic power growth in its region and globally.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This is a long and fairly technical report from the respected Conference Board - it's too long to post here - but the message is "Economic activity may pick up a bit in short term, but downward trend in growth appears intact."

No one, no on in their right mind, anyway, ever thought that China could sustain 10%+ growth year after year and, indeed, decade after decade, but the questions are:

1. In the longer term ~ how low can Chinese growth go without losing the all important, for government, social harmony and, consequently risking a revolt? and

2. In the short term ~ hard or soft landing?

My guesses:

1. With better governance China can survive like most developed countries with modest growth (3-4%) in good years, punctuated by occasional recessions, but the "better governance" is a lot more complex and difficult than it looks; and

2. Soft landing ... this time.

BUT: if either of my guesses is wrong, and there is a very good chance that either or both will be, then revolution and civil war is the most likely outcome.

Maybe some near term good news: according to a report in the Globe and Mail that "two separate purchasing managers’ indices ticked up last month: an official state measure released over the weekend reached 50.6, a seven-month high, while a separate tally by HSBC hit a 13-month high, at 50.5."

Over the years PMIs have proven to be pretty good indicators of economic performance and, despite the Chinese propensity to fudge data for domestic political purposes, these two are close enough to inspire a little bit of confidence in the notion hat China will, indeed, be able to manage the desired "soft landing."

 

[The Bread Guy]

CNOOC-Nexen deal OK'ed in late Friday afternoon announcement.....

"The federal government is severely limiting any future investment by foreign state-owned enterprises in the Canadian energy sector despite approving two long-awaited takeovers Friday evening.

The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, better known as CNOOC, will be allowed to buy Calgary-based Nexen after agreeing to a strict set of requirements demanded by Ottawa exclusively by this bid.

CNOOC, which offered to buy Nexen for $15.1 billion, will have to keep certain parts of its operations in Canada and agree to rules on employing Canadian.

The Chinese oil giant will swear to work by “free market principles” as well as file an annual compliance report to Industry Canada, the department responsible for handling foreign takeovers.

“Under existing guidelines, (CNOOC’s) proposed transaction to acquire control of Nexen is likely to be of net benefit to Canada,” said Industry Minister Christian Paradis in a statement issued Friday.

Petronas Carigali Canada Ltd, another petroleum behemoth but this time owned by the Malaysian government, will also be able to follow through on its purchase of Progress Energy Resources Corp, Paradis stated Friday.

Petronas has to agree to conditions similar to CNOOC’s – they include rules around governance, transparency and commercial orientation – but they will not have to file a report every year like the Chinese company ....

.... with some possible effects south of the border?

China's biggest offshore oil and gas producer may have to give up control of drilling platforms 80 kilometres from a major US military base to win government approval for its US$15.1 billion purchase of Canada's Nexen.

A US panel reviewing the national security implications of the deal might be seeking to curb access by CNOOC to those Nexen platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, said Stewart Baker, a former Department of Homeland Security official.

"Typically, the national security concern is if the target company is within close proximity of a military installation where there is training or testing conducted," said Farhad Jalinous, a lawyer specialising in deals that are reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS).

In the past three years, the committee has blocked at least three transactions that would have resulted in Chinese companies gaining control of assets near military facilities.

CNOOC and Calgary-based Nexen said last month they had agreed to withdraw and resubmit their application to the committee on the US part of what is mostly a Canadian transaction.

Discussions with the interagency committee, headed by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, were continuing, Nexen said ....

PM's 5:15pm statement (links to media advisory alerting media of statement time/place) on this attached - more from Google News here.

 

[a_majoor]

Given the prominence of Chinese State Owned enterprises in the news lately, here is a look at how nominally "private" Chinese companies operate. The fact that a Chinese company is investing in an American "State Owned Enterprise" is somewhat ironic, but the more interesting thing to me is the underlying structure of the Chinese company in question, and their relationship to the State:

http://opinion.financialpost.com/2012/12/10/terence-corcoran-obamas-fisker-cliff/

Terence Corcoran: Obama’s Fisker cliff

Terence Corcoran | Dec 10, 2012 8:19 PM ET | Last Updated: Dec 10, 2012 8:27 PM ET
More from Terence Corcoran | @terencecorcoran

Battle of U.S. SOE vs. Chinese SOE

As Canada struggles with Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), U.S. President Barack Obama is looking at his own SOE problem: state-operated entrepreneurialism.

The perfect case-study for the battle of the SOE economic models may well be Fisker Automotive Inc., the California-based electric car maker that is now desperately searching for more cash to stay afloat. The maker of the flashy US$110,000 Karma sports car has received almost US$200-million through Mr. Obama’s economic stimulus program, but the company burned through that money long ago. Fisker was originally tagged to receive US$529-million in loans as part of the administration’s electric car push, but the government has cut funding.

So if Fisker needs money, could a Chinese buyer be the answer? It appears to be for a Fisker-related enterprise, lithium battery maker A123 Systems — another Obama-based enterprise — apparently sold over the weekend to Wanxiang Group, a Chinese conglomerate.

A123 received US$133-million of promised US$250-million in U.S. grants in part to help it build a battery plant that would supply Fisker with batteries. Once valued on the market at US$2-billion, A123 now is said to be worth less than Wanxiang is paying for it. It ran into numerous problems, including a recall of the lithium batteries it supplied to Fisker.

The recall was a blow to both companies, although it was not the only cause of their rapid decline. A Wall Street Journal story summarized Fisker’s numerous challenges, including suspension of production of the Karma and delays in starting up another electric vehicle. “If A123 doesn’t start shipping batteries, Fisker’s inventory of vehicles on dealer lots will disappear by spring.”

The Fisker and A123 corporate meltdowns are two in a growing list of failed Obama ventures into state-operated entrepreneurialism. Many are related to green energy and environmental enterprises that have proven to be uneconomic. Other U.S.-funded battery and solar technology firms, including high-profile ventures such as Solyndra, have lost billions.

The arrival of Wanxiang as A123’s buyer is ironic, to say the least, an rare international mating of enterprises that have depended on state backing. While not state-operated enterprises, they both grew out of dependence on government support and financing.

Wanxiang Group is headed by Lu Guanqui, a rags-to-riches entrepreneur who — according to official company history — began the business as a tractor-repair shop in rural China in the late 1960s. A PowerPoint on the corporate website shows a 1969 photo of a small building described as “A view of Ningwei People’s Commune Agricultural Machinery Repair Factory.”

Today, with Mr. Lu as chairman, the Wanxiang Group is China’s largest automotive parts supplier and counts Ford, General Motors and other major auto firms as customers.

Wanxiang’s expansion into the United States, with headquarters in Chicago, began in the 1980s, according to a Harvard Business School profile of the company, Wanxiang Group: A Chinese Company’s Global Strategy. Its first link to America was through Zeller Corp., but it now has several plants — including solar facilities that are dependent on U.S. government grants and aid.

Early this century, however, Wanxiang began to see its future in electric vehicles, a plan that dovetailed with the Obama administration’s state policy objectives.

Like A123 and Fisker, Wanxiang is also locked in as a state-backed enterprise, receiving low-rate loans from the Chinese government to help it expand abroad. But Mr. Lu is said to have realized that China’s state-owned enterprise system would be unproductive. He became a pioneer what the Harvard paper calls the “contract system.” According to the Harvard profile, Mr. Lu personally guaranteed to submit a fixed annual payment to the government of Ningwei village (with an annual incremental increase of 20%). In return he would have exclusive management rights over the factory for three years.

In the 1990s, Wanxiang embraced state influence. Wanxiang is a private giant conglomerate, with operations in many sectors of the Chinese economy. Here’s the Harvard paper’s description of what happened, under the subhead “Embracing State Influence.”

    Wanxiang had become a private enterprise in 1994 after spinning off its automotive-parts division, Wanxiang Qianchao, through an initial public offering on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. But the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was still evident in all aspects of the company’s operations. First, Lu had become a member of the CCP in 1984. Lu’s only son, Lu Weiding, who later became president of the company in 1994, was first admitted to the party as one of the alternate members of the central committee of the Communist Youth League around 2000 and then gained full membership in 2007. Also, CCP officials occupied prominent positions within management, particularly in the areas of human resources and corporate administration. Yang Yanle, general manager of the Work Office of the Party Committee, explained how the CCP organization worked in a private enterprise: “Enterprises operating on Chinese soil are under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The party is an advanced organization and represents the excellent staff and citizens of the society. We will try to gather all the “advanced members” as the core of the sub-branch of the party and make them contribute to the success of the ­enterprise.

It’s hard to know exactly how this structure is deployed at Wanxiang. Did the company, China’s biggest state-supported auto-parts maker, have to get approval from Communist party headquarters before it bid US$260-million to buy A123 Systems, the U.S. state-supported battery maker?

What appears to be playing out in these and other transactions involving Chinese and U.S. companies is a battle of state-owned entrepreneurialism. Mr. Obama, through his fixation on green power and electric vehicles such as Fisker, has pushed the state into the same business as the Chinese are getting into.

So far, one would have to conclude that China is winning the contest — but only on the assumption that Chinese government agents are better at picking economic winners than American government officials. The long-run history of Chinese government planning and decision-making under Communist party rule suggests the game isn’t over yet. It may be a battle between two versions of a disastrous economic model.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Diplomat, is a somewhat dated (summer 2012) but still interesting article by A. Greer Meisels of the Centre for the National Interest:

http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/27/what-china-learned-from-the-soviet-unions-fall/

What China Learned from the Soviet Union’s Fall

By A. Greer Meisels

Why the process of assessing blame for the collapse of the USSR is still a hot topic in Beijing

In a major speech on July 24, 2012 China’s President, Hu Jintao, called for the country to “unswervingly” carry out reform and opening up and to fight against rigidity and stagnation.  This follows on the heels of other calls (Premier Wen Jiabao’s being the most notable) to continue the reform process in China.

Why the increasing vociferousness?

China is gearing up for one of its historic leadership transitions which will culminate in the 18th National Party Congress some time this fall. This begs the question, how will the transition affect the future trajectory of China, its economy, and its people?

The ascendancy of China’s new “fifth generation” leaders has led me to ruminate on the topic of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resiliency. In spite of everything, the CCP has managed to stay in control, and I might dare say flourish, though most of its communist brethren have ended up in the dustbin of history. In fact as of today, there are (not including the PRC) only four remaining communist regimes – North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba.

But all has not been “smooth sailing” for the CCP… far from it. One of the Party’s favorite mantras is that it values stability above all else and seeks to build a harmonious society, yet official and unofficial statistics continue to show an exponential increase in the number of protests within China’s borders. This keeps questions regarding what is in store for the CCP at the forefront of discussions about China’s future.

What is China’s Secret?

I am not an alchemist and therefore cannot turn hypotheses into fact. However, I would hazard a guess that the secret to China’s success is that there is no secret; rather the Chinese Communist Party has simply been much more adept and successful at tweaking the foundations on which its present day legitimacy is based. And China’s neighbor to the north provided it with some of its most valuable lessons. By this of course I mean the former Soviet Union.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was one of the most pivotal events of the 20th century. Communism, as an ideology and as a form of government, and its manifestation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its Soviet satellites (particularly in Eastern Europe), was an “evil” which the Western world, led by the United States in the Cold War, could rally against. It was also a “model” which other communist countries and governments, particularly the CCP could use to bolster and legitimize their own communist experiment.  Therefore, it should come as no surprise that when the USSR’s decay led to outright collapse, few countries were as concerned by these events as the PRC. After all, the Soviet Union was the birthplace of the world’s first, and to date, still longest socialist experiment, and as such, China’s own modern political history and development were deeply influenced by it. It was, and still is, critical to the survival of the CCP to determine how to avoid a similar fate.

Last year was the 20th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s collapse and so it seemed to be an appropriate time to step back to analyze some of the different schools of thought that emerged in China during, and soon after, these tumultuous years. However, after reviewing many of these new materials and determining that there is not one uniform or monolithic view in China about the reasons why the Soviet Union became undone, three major viewpoints do seem to dominate the Chinese discourse. What I call “The Three Blames”: “Blame the Man,” “Blame the System,” and “Blame the West.” And it seems that everyone loves to play the blame game.

Blame the Man

For many in China in the late 1980s, early 1990s, and even until today, assessing blame for the Soviet Union’s collapse begins and ends with a single individual, Mikhail Gorbachev. This view seems to resonate most strongly with China’s more conservative leftists. During the height of Gorbachev’s reform efforts, there were people who argued that “within the CCP and within China intense ‘ideological struggle’ would be waged against Gorbachev’s ‘revisionism.’” Of course, since the Communist Revolution of 1949 few, if any, labels are more dreaded than “revisionist.” Even as recently as last year, the “Blame the Man” school of thought was en vogue. On March 1, 2011, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) released a new book, Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety: Recollections on the 20-Year Anniversary of the Collapse of the Russian Communist Party (居安思危: 苏联亡党二十年的思考), which concludes that the root cause of the collapse of the CPSU was not the Russian socialist system itself, but rather the corruption of the Russian Communists led by then-President Gorbachev.

The debilitating affects of corruption are manifesting themselves in China today, so it’s no wonder that the CCP certainly in word, if not always in deed, seems desperate to wage war against this dreaded foe.

Blame the System

A second influential camp comprised of more liberal or reform-minded individuals saw the impetus of the collapse as being systemic – not a flaw in the socialist model itself, but rather in how it was executed in the Soviet Union. These people blamed domestic causes such as economic stagnation, mismanagement, excessive dogmatism and bureaucratic ossification for the Soviet Union’s collapse. These problems were certainly not solely the result of Gorbachev-era policies, but like a cancer that had been allowed to metastasize, spread over time throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

One could see why this “Blame the System” idea would gain traction with reform-minded Party members in China. After all, many of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were an effort to combat just this sort of stale, stagnant thinking. It is interesting that Hu’s latest speech also cautions against such perils.

Blame the West

The “Blame the West” camp differentiates itself from the other two because it seems particularly consumed by fear of the United States’ policies and influence in the region. In fact one of this camp’s overriding concerns is that Washington would use its power to step up pressure on China to initiate regime change. Articles appeared in places like the People’s Daily and Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po stating that the CCP was fearful of growing influence by “aggressive” Western powers as well as of outward signs of Party disunity. (No doubt an issue that is on the leadership’s minds today given the recent events surrounding the now disgraced Bo Xilai.) These sentiments are still echoed and diatribes against American hegemony often find their way onto many a Chinese Op-Ed page.

“The Soviet Union’s Today will be Our Tomorrow”: Not if they can help it

Yet more interesting than mere identification of these “Three Blames” is determining to what extent they influenced CCP policymakers and policy. At one level, one of the major outcomes within China’s elite politics circles is that Deng Xiaoping and the reformist agenda were declared the de facto winners over China’s more conservative forces led by Chen Yun, the Chairman of the CPC Central Advisory Commission at the time.

However, in addition to this “factional” win, there were some very real policy shifts, or at the very least, policy adjustments, that took place because of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Some of these include China’s replacement of the Soviet model of multinational state-building with its “one nation with diversity” policy, and its institution of the patriotic education campaign to try to shore up CCP legitimacy. Another area where policies may have been implemented to quiet critiques from the “Blame the West” camp is in China’s increased development of its social welfare policies. Pensions, the minimum livelihood guarantee, the “New Socialist Countryside,” and healthcare reform in the form of medical insurance, are all intended to strengthen the “socialist” claims of the PRC as an alternative model to the unbridled capitalism of the West.

Looking at CCP reactions to the collapse of the Soviet Union and attempting to understand how they chose to intuit these “lessons learned” seems to demonstrate that the CCP has been engaged in a continual learning process culminating in a type of policy-planning plasticity. Each of the “solutions” the CCP came up with to militate against Soviet-style collapse addresses some area where they found the Soviet Union to be lacking. Perhaps China’s most important lesson was how to become an adaptive authoritarian regime when so many people had lost faith in Marxism-Leninism, the socialist economy, and communist orthodoxy.

My question is: How long will this tree continue to bear fruit for the CCP?

A. Greer Meisels is the associate director and research fellow for China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest.

First: I tend to fall into the Blame the [Soviet] System camp and, therefore, my answer to her question is: the "tree" will "bear fruit" as long as the Chinese can keep, gradually, reforming China in ways that directly benefit the Chinese people. That's what Deng Xiaoping did: he removed the obstacles that stood in the way of ordinary Chinese people's progress towards a better life for themselves and their children. To a greater oir lesser degree that's what Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did, too. See William Easterly's (pessimistic) comments in this video (first 10 minutes) about what might happen when or if the Chinese leaders stop reforming.

 

[Edward Campbell]

A good example of soft power at work in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Pulitzer Center:

http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/uganda-chinese-government-doctors-medical-teams-aid

Chinese Medical Teams Bring More Than Just Doctors to Uganda

Published December 21, 2012

KATHLEEN E. MCLAUGHLIN, FOR THE PULITZER CENTER

The acupuncture ward inside Kampala’s newest hospital does not have an open bed to spare.

A lone Chinese doctor busily scurries from bed to bed, inserting and turning the long acupuncture needles, checking placement and keeping a careful eye over her patients – most there for pain relief. With a wide grin creeping from behind her sanitary mask, Dr. Zhang Yu laughs when asked if she’s busy. She stops for about three minutes to remove her mask, pose for a photo, then hastens back to work.

The eight-member Chinese medical team sent to Kampala, Uganda's capital, a year ago by the Chinese government is booked solid, each routinely seeing 20 patients or more every day. They are specialists, led by urologist Cao Guihua, and their mission is more than medical. They are here to build goodwill among Ugandans for China.

“We are sent by the government,” says Cao. “It’s a kind of political mission by the Chinese government to African countries to build political friendship between the countries. Of course it’s working.”

“The Chinese teams started in 1963 – they started in Africa and Asia, several different countries,” explains Dr. Cao. “Africa is just one place China has doctors.”

There are 42 Chinese medical teams working in Africa today, and Cao’s is the 15th to work in Uganda.

“It’s a volunteer mission, some people enjoy the climate,” says Cao. “For me, the Chinese medical team sends different specialists and my specialty was needed here.”

“I like it,” he says simply. “So I came here. I like the country, I like my career.”

Cao and the other doctors are the foot soldiers in China’s soft power efforts in Africa. Their medical expertise, often more advanced than what can be found locally, is well-known and sought-after. For the doctors, working in Africa is a chance to see diseases they don’t normally deal with, but have only read about. Malaria, for example, has been all but eradicated in China but remains one of the top killers in Uganda. So the doctors make adjustments, hone their treatment skills, and as employees of the Chinese government offer treatment services for free.

The Chinese doctors at Naguru Hospital are part of China’s biggest yet medical donation to Uganda, a country sorely lacking in facilities and trained healthcare professionals. The hospital, built by China and donated to Uganda at an estimated cost of $10 million, remains largely understaffed and overcrowded since it opened earlier this year. Hospital administrators say one wing of the facility hasn’t opened yet, and they admit there were problems early on in making the equipment work with local electricity supplies.

As for the doctors, they may be bringing in more than just medical supplies. About an hour outside the Ugandan capital, in a city called Jinja, local radio advertises a private Chinese pharmacy that sells medications one can’t buy elsewhere. The original plan called for China to build a hospital in Jinja, but it was relocated to Kampala instead.

The building, tucked off of Jinja’s main road is basically a storeroom for medications carried in by Chinese medical workers and sold out the back door for profit, according to the pharmacy manager. He says associates of the Chinese medical team bring in potions, teas and full-strength pharmaceuticals for sale to the locals. Ugandan officials say it’s unclear whether the operation is actually legal, but it does add an element to the endeavor that goes beyond goodwill.

Ms. McLaughlin describes the Chinese medics as "foot soldiers in China’s soft power efforts in Africa." That's not completely accurate: they are one of the main forces along with teachers and film distributors. Soft power runs the whole gamut from images on TV of Shanghai skyscrapers to medical teams in rural areas. The AIM is to make the world see China as a leader, as a successful, sophisticated country that others admire and who "lesser" countries want as a friend, maybe even as a protector. Soft power is done best when, as with US sot power in the 1950s and early '60s, it is done unconsciously. US soft power after about 1965 and Chinese soft power today are not the "best" because they are contrived.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Yesterday, in a different thread (Grand Strategy for a Divided America) I posted an article from Global Asia by Michael McDevitt, RAdm (ret'd), USN, who is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in Alexandria, Virginia. That article assessed the US' Asian pivot strategy with particular attention to China.

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act, also from Global Asia, is a rebuttal of sorts:

http://globalasia.org/V7N4_Winter_2012/Wu_Xinbo.html

Not Backing Down: China Responds to the US Rebalance to Asia

By Wu Xinbo

December, 2012

Predictably, the last US presidential election campaign featured the usual competition between candidates over who would be “tougher” on China, a ritual political exercise that is almost always followed by even greater American engagement with China once the new presidential term begins.

Chinese officials know this well. But with its rebalancing toward Asia, could the US be on a path to conflict with China? Fudan University Professor Wu Xinbo examines China’s response to the new US strategy.

At the beginning of US President Barack Obama’s first term, China welcomed the US administration’s intention to pay more attention to Asia in the conduct of its foreign policy. China felt the policy adjustment signaled US recognition of Asia’s growing economic and political importance as well as Washington’s desire to develop closer relations with the region, particularly with China, given its growing economic power and international influence. This initial view in Beijing was confirmed during US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit in February 2009 when she stressed the need for more co-operation between the two countries. Beijing saw further positive signs at the first meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Obama in April 2009, when the two sides agreed to develop a “positive, co-operative and comprehensive” relationship.

However, as the Obama administration’s Asia strategy unfolded over the past four years, Chinese perceptions changed. China began to see in the so-called US pivot, or rebalance, toward Asia a shift of focus from economic and diplomatic engagement to one more centered on security issues. Beijing also could not help noticing what seemed to be a strong element of counterbalancing against China’s growing power and influence in the region. The concern peaked in the fall of 2011, when the Obama administration said that it would push the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a top priority of its trade agenda (China is not a member of the TPP), announced its rotating military deployment of US Marines in Australia and tried to insert a security agenda into the East Asia Summit (EAS).

Countering the Pivot

While concerned, Beijing was not alarmed or fearful. Instead, given the comprehensive rise in its national power in recent years, China feels more confident in confronting the US rebalancing strategy. Since 2012, China has taken a series of measures to deepen its dialogue with the US, launch diplomatic and economic initiatives in the region and dilute US political and security pressure.

When senior Obama administration officials — Clinton, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta — visited Beijing, their Chinese counterparts pushed them to explain the new US strategy and clarify American intentions. To be sure, the Chinese officials certainly didn’t believe all they were told, but the American explanations may have helped Beijing better understand the rationale behind the strategy and assess its possible impact on China.

At the same time, China has also tried to shape the future contours of Sino-US relations by proposing to build “a new type of relationship between major countries” based on “no confrontation, no antagonism, mutual respect, mutual benefit.” From Beijing’s perspective, if China and the US are going to avoid repeating the tragedy of destructive past major power politics, they need to adopt new thinking consistent with the changing international circumstances of the 21st century, as well as with the deep interdependence between the two countries. Beijing has also tried to convince Washington that China is serious in sticking to the path of peaceful development, a choice determined externally by a globalized and interdependent world, and internally by China’s culture, history and fundamental national interests.

In the face of the US push to accelerate TPP negotiations, China has so far neither expressed a willingness to join nor ruled out doing so in the future. Instead, Beijing has moved to enhance its economic co-operation with South Korea and Japan by launching negotiations for a China-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and a China-Japan-Korea FTA. Despite a flare-up of Sino-Japanese tensions over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and a cooling down of their bilateral relations since September, the three countries agreed in November to open negotiations for a trilateral FTA. Meanwhile, China has also joined hands with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which promises to become the world’s largest FTA, covering an area with a population of about 3 billion and combined economic output of $20 trillion.

Asserting Control in the South China Sea

Further irritating China-US relations, in the summer of 2010, the Obama administration took a hands-on approach to the maritime disputes in the South China Sea, citing its concern over freedom of navigation in these waters. China reacted by rejecting the involvement of non-claimants to the disputes, suggesting that would only further complicate the problem. Beijing also tried to reassure Washington that hindering freedom of navigation was not part of its agenda and stressed that freedom of commercial navigation had never been a problem, implying that US concerns were either groundless or disguised other intentions.

As both the Philippines and Vietnam try to take advantage of the US pivot to push their respective claims in the South China Sea, Beijing is applying a tit-for-tat strategy. For instance, in the spring of 2012, when a Philippine Navy ship harassed Chinese fisherman around Huangyan Island, which is known outside China as Scarborough Shoal, China reacted by taking a series of diplomatic, economic, law-enforcement and military measures against the Philippines and ultimately brought the island under its control. In the summer of 2012, when Vietnam passed its maritime law that claimed sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands, China responded by announcing the creation of Sansha City on July 24, a prefecture within Hainan Province that will administer the island groups and their surrounding waters in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China’s ocean surveillance ships carried out a regular cruise lasting more than 10 days in the South China Sea region, and 30 fishing boats from Hainan went to the Nansha Islands to fish and engage in other production activity. By standing firm against the Philippines and Vietnam, Beijing is sending a signal to Manila and Hanoi that they should not expect to push China around in the South China Sea with US assistance. Beijing is also alerting Washington that China won’t bow to US pressure, either direct or indirect, on the South China Sea issue.

From Beijing’s perspective, the US is also endeavoring, directly or through the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore, to push ASEAN countries to form a united front against China on the South China Sea. China is applying a two-pronged tactic to rebuff such attempts. On the one hand, it has urged ASEAN not to turn the South China Sea issue into a dispute between China and ASEAN as a whole, arguing that this is an issue only between China and some ASEAN member states who claim sovereignty over parts of the sea. Beijing has also reminded ASEAN that economic co-operation rather than the South China Sea disputes should be the main focus of China-ASEAN relations.

So far, ASEAN seems to be heeding China’s argument. For example, the Chair Statement issued at the ASEAN Summit held in Phnom Penh in November 2012 stated that “[W]e agreed to work together to enhance favorable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among the countries concerned,” suggesting that it is not interested in involving countries who are not parties to the disputes, such as the United States. In addition, Beijing has persuaded some ASEAN countries with which it has close economic and political relations, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, to work within ASEAN to stop the bloc from tackling the South China Sea issue with a united front. The effort appears to be working. In July 2012, the foreign ministers from the 10 ASEAN member nations couldn’t issue a joint statement after their annual meeting — for the first time in the history of the organization — due to disagreements over inclusion of the South China Sea issue in a final joint communiqué.

Power, Influence and the Future

In response to the US application of more diplomatic, security and economic resources to Southeast Asia, in part to undermine China’s growing influence, China has stepped up efforts to strengthen ties with ASEAN countries, especially Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Such efforts include offering economic assistance, engaging in economic, military and security co-operation, stepping up diplomatic contacts and promoting cultural exchanges. To some extent, it was the US pivot that caused China to give even higher priority and devote more resources to the region.

To be sure, an important element of the US rebalance strategy is to strengthen its military presence in the Western Pacific in order to cope with China’s growing military power and expanded naval activities in the region. China has responded by continuing to develop its “area-denial” and “anti-access” capabilities, so as to maintain a reliable deterrent against US forces within the so-called first island chain, which stretches from the Kuril Islands in the north to the Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia, mostly as a contingency in the event of conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese Navy is dispatching its ships more frequently in the area, extending the parameters of its operations and power projection capabilities.

Obviously, the Obama administration’s Asia pivot has brought more geopolitical and security pressure on China and intensified the competition between Beijing and Washington in the region. It has also encouraged other countries to assert their claims in territorial and maritime disputes with China, leading to more tensions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea over the past several years. Should the Obama administration in its second term continue to pursue an Asia strategy aimed at counterbalancing China’s rising power and influence, a heightening of Sino-US competition and regional instability will be inevitable.

Given the changing regional circumstances, a US Asia strategy focusing on countering a rising China is neither sustainable nor feasible. A wiser US strategy should be based on the following: First, as China continues to pursue a peaceful rise and becomes more interdependent with the rest of the region, including the US, Washington should not view China’s growing power and influence as a challenge or threat to its interests, but rather as a positive force for regional stability and prosperity. Second, almost all countries in the region prefer to live harmoniously with both China and the US; even though some may rely more on China economically and the US militarily, they don’t want to choose sides between the two giants. Finally, if the US can work with a rising China to develop a pattern of interactions in regional affairs marked by shared power and responsibility, it will help prevent their relations slipping into a zero-sum game, thus better serving US interests in Asia in the long run.

Wu Xinbo is Professor and Deputy Director, the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai.

This is an interesting point of view which assesses America as being seriously weakened in the East Asia/Western Pacific region. I think it is, from the Chinese perspective, too optimistic by half and I doubt the leadership shares it ... now. But I suspect that this reflects the situation Xi Xinping wants to hand over to his successor in about 2022.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, pens a somewhat pessimistic appreciation of the situation in East Asia in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Sydney Morning Herald:

http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/caught-in-a-bind-that-threatens-an-asian-war-nobody-wants-20121225-2bv38.html

Caught in a bind that threatens an Asian war nobody wants

December 26, 2012

Opinion

Hugh White

Creative diplomacy is urgently needed for a face-saving solution.

THIS is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically worthless. So don't be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don't assume the war would be contained and short.

Of course we should all hope that common sense prevails.

It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world's three richest countries - two of them nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial. But that is to confuse what starts a war with what causes it. The Greek historian Thucydides first explained the difference almost 2500 years ago. He wrote that the catastrophic Peloponnesian War started from a spat between Athens and one of Sparta's allies over a relatively insignificant dispute. But what caused the war was something much graver: the growing wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta.

The analogy with Asia today is uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in 431BC really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta's allies over a disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared that to step back in the face of Athens' growing power would fatally compromise Sparta's position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens.

The Senkakus issue is likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China's growing challenge to America's long-standing leadership in Asia, and America's response. In the past few years China has become both markedly stronger and notably more assertive. America has countered with the strategic pivot to Asia. Now, China is pushing back against President Barack Obama's pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus.

The Japanese themselves genuinely fear that China will become even more overbearing as its strength grows, and they depend on America to protect them. But they also worry whether they can rely on Washington as China becomes more formidable. China's ratcheting pressure over the Senkakus strikes at both these anxieties.

The push and shove over the islands has been escalating for months. Just before Japan's recent election, China flew surveillance aircraft over the islands for the first time, and since the election both sides have reiterated their tough talk.

Where will it end? The risk is that, without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us.

No one wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself. One side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to break the cycle of action and reaction. This will be difficult, because any concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic political costs and international implications.

It would therefore need real political strength and skill, which is in short supply all round - especially in Tokyo and Beijing, which both have new and untested leaders. And each side apparently hopes that they will not have to face this test, because they expect the other side will back down first.

Beijing apparently believes that if it keeps pushing, Washington will persuade Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in order to avoid being dragged into a war with China, which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US support for Japan, China will have no choice but to back down.

And in Washington, too, most people seem to think China will back off. They argue that China needs America more than America needs China, and that Beijing will back down rather than risk a break with the US which would devastate China's economy.

Unfortunately, the Chinese seem to see things differently. They believe America will not risk a break with China because America's economy would suffer so much.

These mutual misconceptions carry the seeds of a terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates how much is at stake for the other. For Japan, bowing to Chinese pressure would feel like acknowledging China's right to push them around, and accepting that America can't help them. For Washington, not supporting Tokyo would not only fatally damage the alliance with Japan, it would amount to an acknowledgment America is no longer Asia's leading power, and that the ''pivot'' is just posturing. And for Beijing, a backdown would mean that instead of proving its growing power, its foray into the Senkakus would simply have demonstrated America's continued primacy. So for all of them, the largest issues of power and status are at stake. These are exactly the kind of issues that great powers have often gone to war over.

So how do we all get out of this bind? Perhaps creative diplomacy can find a face-saving formula that defuses the situation by allowing each side to claim that it has given way less than the other. That would be wonderful. But it would still leave the deeper causes of the problem - China's growing power and the need to find a peaceful way to accommodate it - unresolved. That remains the greatest challenge.

Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at ANU and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute.

I share Prof. White's view that this is, in some large measure, Chinese "pushback" against President Obama's Asia pivot.

As our own Thucydides keeps reminding us: America is, at its base, a great sea power with a large army and China is a land power with a growing navy ~ that's why Gen Matthew Ridgway warned President Lyndon Johnson against further involvement in a land war in Asia: America cannot stretch it's land power too far without mobilizing the whole country. America can contain and even defend against any China territorial ambitions against Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines but it is not prepared (nor, possibly, can ever be prepared) to defeat China in a conventional land war in Asia ~ and the effort to defeat China with nuclear weapons would redefine phyrrhic victory.

 

[Edward Campbell]

And Walter Russel Mead provides another strategic wrinkle in this piece which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of his blog Via Meadia:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/12/25/checked-in-the-west-russia-and-gazprom-look-east/

Checked in the West, Russia and Gazprom Look East

December 25, 2012

Russia’s plans to use its energy reserves and the financial assets of Gazprom to establish greater control of the energy distribution in the EU have largely been checked, but that doesn’t mean an end to Russian ambitions. The buy-up of the state-owned gas monopoly in Kyrgyzstan is a significant step forward in Russia’s attempts to re-establish its authority in Central Asia.

At the peak of the Afghan War, the US was asserting a strong interest in countries like Kyrgyzstan which provided important logistical support for the war. But if and as the US presence in Afghanistan winds down, American interest in Central Asia is likely to subside. This part of the world is very remote from us, and neither its energy resources nor its geography make it vital to our interests once the Afghan War is concluded. We share many interests with both Russia and China in this part of the world: we’d like to see an orderly and successful development of its energy wealth and the establishment of capable governments and prosperous societies as a way to block radicalism.

The big question is whether Russia and China see eye to eye in the region, and if so for how long. Russia’s attempt to increase its influence to the west has been checked, increasing the allure of the old Soviet zone. And China’s attempts to establish its hegemony in the South China Sea seem to have backfired. Both countries have historical claims to influence in this part of the world, and both have strong incentives to network its energy resources into their own systems. The emergence of new political patterns in Central Asia is one of the things to watch in the next stage of the Game of Thrones. Will China and Russia manage to reach an accommodation in this region, or will their competition set them at odds on other questions? It is much to soon to tell, but the gas deal in Kyrgyzstan looks like a point scored for the Kremlin.

Other than the Palestinians (about whom the quip was coined) no country, it seems to me, is so consistently able to "never miss and opportunity to miss an opportunity" than Russia. While the Gazprom deal in Kyrgyzstan may be a "point" for Russia, I remain convinced that Russia will, sooner rather than later, manage to screw everything up and that Eastern, and maybe even Central Siberia will, by mid century, be de facto Chinese colonies and that the 'Stans and their resources will be in China's sphere of influence.

(Note: China doesn't want any more people ~ above all it doesn't want any Muslims or non-Sinic people. Are they racists? Yes!)

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 1 of 2

Kevin Rudd, who has been Australia's foreign minister and prime minister, too, brings an interesting perspective to the Sino-American strategic waltz in this speech, given to the Chinese National Defense University and reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Mr. Rudd's blog;

http://www.kevinruddmp.com/2012/12/its-time-for-new-shanghai-communique.html

IT’S TIME FOR A NEW SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGIC ROADMAP FOR CHINA-US RELATIONS
Address to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army National Defense University

Friday, 28 December 2012

It is a great honour to address the Chinese National Defense University.

I am aware of the deep historical connection between this university and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).  As a student of Chinese history, I am also aware of the extraordinary history of the PLA since 1927.  In particular the military feats of the Red Army during the Long March and later the Eighth Route Army during the Japanese occupation.

My father also was a professional soldier who fought in the Pacific War against Japan.  As a child, he told me many stories from the war.  These were terrible times in China's history, in Asia's history and in Australia’s history.

China has changed remarkably since I began studying Chinese at the Australian National University in 1976.  Chairman Mao was still alive.  The Cultural Revolution had not concluded.  And our Chinese language text books also taught us to study Dazhai, to study Daqing and to study Lei Feng and Dong Cunrui.

Since then I have lived in China, worked in China and visited here about 100 times over the years.  As a scholar, a diplomat, a businessman, a Secretary-General of a provincial government, a Member of Parliament, as a Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister.  I have personally seen the changes unfold in this country.  I have also seen these changes from these many different perspectives.  And my conclusion is that these changes have been overwhelmingly good both for China and the world.

China has now become a middle income country with rising living standards and hundreds of millions lifted out of poverty.  China has just brought about a successful leadership transition.  And increasingly China is regarded as a great power both in the region and the world.  This has all happened over the last 35 years.

It has been made possible because of strategic decisions taken by Deng Xiaoping.  Also because of a peaceful, stable and generally prosperous regional and global environment.  Our core challenge is to do what is necessary to preserve this international environment for the future.

The purpose of my address today is twofold.  First to discuss the future of the regional and global order as seen from different capitals: from Beijing, from Washington and from the other capitals of Asia.  Second, based on these different perspectives, can we build a new strategic roadmap for China US relations under President Obama and President-elect Xi Jinping?

The View from Beijing

The world and the region as seen from China is often very different from that which is seen from other countries.  This is not just because of different interests.  This is not just because of different values.  It is also because of different historical experiences and perspectives.

The beginning of wisdom is to understand the different worldviews of others.  And as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore recently said in his address to the Central Party School, the world now carefully scrutinizes China’s every action as its foreign and domestic policies invariably affect other countries in the region and the world.  For the rest of the world, this is not just of theoretical interest.  It is of real, practical interest.

This is because China in the next decade is likely to become the world’s largest economy.  It is because China is now pursuing a more assertive bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.  And because China's military modernization (conventional, nuclear and cyber-space) is relatively rapid.  So, given the rapid change in Chinese capabilities over the last several decades, the region and the world have a legitimate interest in China's worldview.

I am often asked about this around the world.  The ten points I make here today are the same as the ones I make in conferences around the world.

First, I believe China's worldview is shaped by the continuing central role of the Party in a political system which explicitly rejects the western democratic model.

Second, within that system, the PLA answers to the Party, not the government or the state.

Third, the fundamental responsibility of the Party and the army is to maintain the territorial integrity of the country.  This means a strong approach to separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan.  It also means asserting China's territorial claims along its disputed borders.

Fourth, the core task for the Party and the government for the decade ahead is to transform China's economic growth model.  This new model is outlined in the last Five Year Plan and the 18th Party Congress Work Report.  China recognizes that its economic success so far has depended on the internationalization of its own economy and access to global markets.  But for this next economic transformation to occur, China still needs a stable strategic environment.

Fifth, China also continues to need secure long term access to long term supplies of energy and raw materials.

Sixth, despite these clear economic objectives, and despite China's desire for a stable strategic environment to serve those objectives, China in fact has a difficult relationship with many of its neighbours.  This is seen in North East, South East and South Asia.  China also sees this as part of a pattern of US alliances and strategic partnerships both in Asia and beyond.

Seventh, China sees US actions as part of a de facto policy of containment.  China believes the intention of this policy is to frustrate China's peaceful rise.  China does not accept the "China threat" thesis.  China emphasizes the historical record that even when China has been powerful in the past, it has no history of invading other countries.  Instead, China argues that it wants to build a harmonious world based on the principle of mutual advantage.

Eighth, China's worldview is also driven by its historical experience.  Including its hundred years of foreign humiliation.  And its natural desire to resume its proper role as a great power, as in the past.

Ninth, China resents the fact that the current global order was created by the Anglo Saxon victors after the last World War.  China does not accept multilateral criticism on human rights and climate change.  China does not accept criticism of its relationship with states like North Korea, Syria and Sudan.  China does not believe this criticism is fair because of its longstanding policy of mutual non-interference in one another’s internal affairs.  China argues that the principles of mutual non-interference and national sovereignty are core parts of the UN Charter.  China argues its voting pattern in the UN Security Council is driven by these longstanding principles.

Finally, despite these difficulties with the UN system, China is under pressure to contribute more to the UN as a "responsible global stakeholder."  China argues that it is still a developing country.  Nonetheless, China is now doing more in the world in areas such as peacekeeping and in development of what it calls south-south cooperation.

It is, of course, impossible for a foreigner to attempt to describe the region and the world as seen from Beijing.  And this list is undoubtedly flawed and incomplete.  But I believe it gives some sense of China's view of the opportunities and obstacles it sees today in the current regional and global order.

US Perspectives on China's Rise

You will not be surprised to learn that the world as seen from Washington is a little different.  The United States is also profoundly shaped by its historical experience. 

America sees itself as the decisive power that determined the outcome of two World Wars in the last century.  The US sees itself as having paid a great price for this in "blood and treasure."  The US then built much of the post war order that has preserved the global peace.  And this strategic stability has underpinned the age of post-war economic prosperity.  The US then saw the collapse of the Soviet Union after a half century of Cold War.  For the last twenty years the US has seen itself, and been seen by the world, as the world’s only remaining superpower.  It may seem strange here in Beijing, but the US sees its global leadership role as both a privilege and a burden.

The US has been profoundly affected by the events of September 11.  The war against terrorism has dominated much of US domestic and foreign policy over the last decade.  The wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq have had a deep impact on America’s perception of its future global role.

American economic self-confidence was badly affected by the Global Financial Crisis.  Five years later, the United States is still recovering from this crisis.  Many now debate whether the financial and economic model that created the crisis is appropriate for the future.  But despite this there is still an overwhelming sense of American economic self-confidence; that economic renewal and recovery will occur.  There is little sense in the United States that its days as either economic or military superpower are coming to an end.

This is the broad framework in which the United States sees the rise of China.  The United States is very conscious of China’s strengths.  It is also very much aware of China’s weaknesses.  The United States deeply respects China’s formidable economic achievements over the last third of a century.  It respects the formidable work ethic of the Chinese people.  It respects China’s strategy in laying out basic economic infrastructure across the entire country.  It also respects the pace of China’s military modernisation.

Like China, however, the US questions the sustainability of China’s current economic growth model.  It questions the environmental impact of this model.  It also challenges China’s adherence to intellectual property rights and whether China is always playing by the international trade rules.

The United States, together with the rest of the West, also believes democracy is a universal value.  In the case of the United States, this is underlined by what is called “American exceptionalism”.  This is well described in Henry Kissinger’s latest book “On China”.  American exceptionalism is their belief they have a moral responsibility to propagate democratic ideas into the world.  For this reason, democracy and human rights will continue to be areas of disagreement with China.

In Asia, the US believes that China is now competing for traditional US strategic dominance.  The US is aware that China is the major trading partner of most of the economies of Asia.  America is also aware that China has obviously extended its scope of political, cultural and economic diplomacy across Asia, Africa and Latin America.  America has also looked with concern at the level of regional tensions arising from border disputes, both in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

In my view, by far and above, America’s greatest regional concern is North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  No one should underestimate the political and strategic significance of North Korea’s most recent long-range ballistic missile test.  This has focussed the minds of the entire region, most particularly Washington, Tokyo and Seoul but also more widely in the region, including in Australia.  The US will continue to ask China to do more to restrain North Korea’s nuclear weapons program because this program represents a fundamental challenge to long-standing regional stability.

The Obama administration has sought to redefine its strategic engagement in Asia in five different ways

    First, the so-called “rebalance” of its military assets to Asia.

    Second, the American decision to join the East Asia Summit.

    Third, America’s support for the extension of the trans-Pacific partnership to include Japan and possibly China.

    Fourth, under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, engaging in active bilateral diplomacy in all the capitals of Asia.

    Fifth, the continuation of the Bush Administration’s strategic engagement with India.

The goal of the Obama Administration is to demonstrate to the entire region that America intends to remain an Asia-Pacific power in the 21st century.

America recognises that the centre of global economic gravity has moved to Asia.  America also recognises that the centre of global strategic gravity will follow.  As the world’s remaining superpower, the US sees itself as responding naturally to these global shifts, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Europe to Asia.  The US also sees itself as having provided much of the underpinning strategic stability in both maritime and mainland Asia in the past.  This in turn is seen as fundamental to Asia’s great economic success story in recent decades.  The US also believes that its treaty relationships with Japan and Korea have prevented both from becoming nuclear weapon states in the face of the North Korean threat.

For these reasons, the United States sees itself as having a central role in underpinning the strategic stability of Asia for the future as well.  Importantly, the five measures I refer to above have been welcomed in practically all of the capitals of Asia.

The rise of China as seen from the rest of Asia

Asia’s economic and strategic future does not depend on China and the United States alone.  There are 18 member states of the East Asia Summit.  In South East Asia, China’s rise is seen as both an economic opportunity and a foreign policy challenge.

The economic opportunities speak for themselves.  The Chinese economy is now deeply integrated into most of the economies of East Asia.  If the Chinese economy was to stop tomorrow, economic growth across Asia would collapse the day after.  This is a simple statistical reality.

But on the foreign policy front, questions are asked in many Asian capitals about the foreign policy implications of the 18th Party Congress Work Report.  For example, will China seek to consolidate its broader influence in Asia? Also, does the protection of China’s interests in the maritime domain represent a new element in China’s foreign policy formulations?  Furthermore, does China intend to use its international influence to reform the current international order and if so in what direction? These are the questions asked in many Asian capitals today.

China’s foreign policy engagement across South East Asia had proceeded smoothly until about 2010.  From that time on, a number of South East Asian states have expressed concerns about China’s assertion of its territorial claims in the South China Seas.  For the record, Australia has always remained neutral on these questions.

North East Asia boundary questions have also emerged with both Korea and Japan.  This has also resulted in an increase in foreign policy tensions in the region.  Some have argued that the election of President Park and Prime Minister Abe provides a fresh opportunity for a fresh start.  Based on my understanding of Japanese domestic politics, the internal politics of the LDP and the stated positions of Shinzo Abe, I do not agree.

In fact, I am deeply concerned about a generational change in Japanese attitudes towards China and what that means for the future.  I’m also concerned about the possibility of Japan installing meteorological devices on the disputed islands.  I’m also concerned about the likely Chinese reaction to such a step.  Just as I am concerned about the temperature of public opinion in both countries.  I have studied the relationship between these countries for all of my professional life.  But I have never seen it as bad as this.

There is of course one major strategic bright spot in wider East Asia.  And that is the issue of Taiwan.  Decisions taken in both Beijing and Taipei over the last four years have contributed significantly to the stabilization of cross-strait relations.  In fact, cross-strait relations are in better shape now than at any time since 1949.  And this is excellent news for regional stability.

But despite the good news on Taiwan, what we tend to see as the general trend across Asia is two competing forces at work.  One is the force of globalisation.  The second is the force of nationalism.  The force of globalisation brings economies, peoples and countries closer together.  The forces of nationalism tend to tear economies, peoples and countries apart.  Globalisation is the force of the 21st century.  Nationalism is the leftover force of the 19th and 20th centuries.  Globalisation has become a positive force.  Nationalism has increasingly become a negative force.  And nationalism is spreading across Asia.

But if we in Asia want to have a different future to the European experience of the 19th and 20th centuries, then we will need to do things differently.

End of Part 1 of 2                         

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 2 of 2

Future directions for the Asian hemisphere

So what then is to be done?

What I have attempted to do in this address so far is to describe different perspectives on strategic reality from Beijing, Washington and the rest of Asia.  I have not tried to define who is right and who is wrong.  That does not help anybody.  Nor does it help solve common challenges.

So how could we craft a common future together as opposed to a future based on conflict?

The end of 2012 has seen three very different electoral processes take place for the world's three largest economies.  President Obama was re-elected in the United States and will hold office until early 2017.  Xi Jinping was appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission where he will remain until at least 2017.  He is also likely to retain those positions, as well as the Presidency of China, until 2023.  And then on 16 December in Japan, nationalist LDP leader Shinzo Abe was elected in a landslide as Prime Minister.  This will Japan’s eight Prime Minister since 2001.  But given the size of his super majority in the Japanese lower house, he now has a reasonable prospect of serving a full four-year term.

I argue that much of the future of East Asia will be determined by the decisions taken in Beijing, Tokyo and Washington over the next four years.  There are two broad strategic approaches available.

The first is what I call “strategic drift”.  Under the “strategic drift” scenario, Beijing, Washington and Tokyo will simply seek to “manage” each issue as it arises.  This is both a passive strategy and a reactive strategy.  Also, because the issues in these relationships are increasingly difficult, issue management will become increasingly difficult.  Issue management is also likely to increasingly overwhelm the strategic fundamentals of China-US relations in particular.

The alternative is an active strategy of strategic cooperation.  Some argue that the core problem in China-US relations is an absence of trust and that trust must be re-established before cooperation can occur.  I believe in the reverse logic.  The only way to build trust is by undertaking active projects of cooperation and concluding them successfully.  That way, trust is built on cooperation and success.

I believe there is some interest in Washington in using these next four years to develop a new strategic framework for the China-US relationship.  I have also noted very carefully what General Secretary Xi Jinping has said about the need for a “new type of great-power relationship”.  In particular with the United States.

This was emphasised by Xi Jinping during his visit to the United States in February this year.  Specifically, China has emphasised that this “new type of great-power relationship” should not be based on the old types of great-power relationships that we have seen in Europe in the past.  These old style great-power relationships were based on hegemonic relations which often ended in conflict and war.

Instead, Xi Jinping argued in the United States that a new relationship with the United States should include increased strategic trust, deepened mutually beneficial cooperation, and enhanced cooperation and coordination on global issues – as well as respecting one another’s core interests.  Furthermore, at a Tsinghua University forum in July this year, Xi Jinping noted that “a country must let others develop as it seeks its own development; must let others feel secure as it seeks its own security; must let others live better when it wants to live better itself”.

I would argue that these also represent useful concepts for the further development of China-US relations.  I therefore believe there is an opportunity to try and bring US and Chinese strategic thinking together on this subject.

I argue that President Obama and President Xi need to outline a five year US-China strategic roadmap.  In the absence of such a strategic roadmap, there is a real danger of strategic drift.  Such a strategic roadmap could provide both central organising principles as well as a practical work program within both administrations.

The Chinese often complain about United States’ policy being inconsistent both within and between administrations.  The United States often complains that the Chinese government does not always speak or act with the full engagement or compliance of the Chinese military.  A US-China Strategic Roadmap would assist in removing some of these uncertainties and ambiguities.

Further, I would recommend seven elements to such a roadmap for the future.  These are virtually the same as those I argued in Washington last week when I addressed the Brookings Institution.

First, President Xi and President Obama need to meet regularly with all the key members of their respective staff.  These individuals need to become highly familiar with each other. At present they are not. This should involve three to four sets of substantial engagements scheduled regularly throughout each calendar year.

Fortunately the G20, APEC, the UN General Assembly (and possibly the East Asia Summit) provide opportunities for regular engagement.  But these need to be substantive half or full day engagements around a long term structured agenda – that is a strategic roadmap – not just the protocol requirements of the day or, for that matter, the issue management of the day.  As these regular summits tend to occur in the second half of the year – there should also be agreement for a regular bilateral summit in one another’s capitals in the first half of the year.

Second, both President Xi and President Obama need to have an undisputed “point person” to be the ultimate “go to” person on the relationship.  At the United States end, this should mean the National Security Advisor or a senior official within the National Security Council (NSC) who can speak comfortably across the Administration, and with authority. At this critical juncture of US-China relations, America needs the next Henry Kissinger for all the back-channelling that is necessary, both behind and between official Presidential meetings. 

Similarly China needs its own Henry Kissinger as well.  The Chinese system does not have a NSC. It needs one.  In the absence of an NSC, it needs a senior official who can speak across the political, security and economic agenda with authority.  Trust between these two individuals on the United States and China sides is critical.

Third, globally, the United States and China should embark on a realistic program to make the current global rules-based order work.  Increasingly it doesn’t. We are all familiar with the impasse over Syria which is not likely to be resolved in the near term.  But in other critical blockages in the UN System (e.g. the Doha Round, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation) both the United States and China have an interest in demonstrating that the rules-based order can work – and can deliver real results.

Furthermore, a new period of Sino-US strategic cooperation will also make the G20 work more effectively given the complex array of global financial and global macroeconomic challenges that lie before us.  As China becomes the world’s largest economy, a properly functioning G20 becomes even more important.  Both China and the United States should identify at least one of these areas of potential global cooperation which together they can drive to a successful global conclusion.  This would also demonstrate to one another and the world that they can in fact make the global rules-based order work.

Fourth, regionally, a new US-China Strategic Roadmap should embrace the principles of how to build a new rules-based security order for East Asia.  I outlined this in an address to the Asia Society in New York earlier this year and again in late September at the Singapore Global Dialogue.  The latter in particular details a range of specific measures of how we can create a new Pax Pacifica which is neither a new Pax Americana by another name, nor a Pax Sinica.  This involves working and agreeing on the strategic and conceptual language of such a regional rules-based order.

Language is particularly important so that strategic concepts are made comprehensible in both countries and the rest of the region.  For example, western concepts of collective, multilateral security cooperation can be made compatible with Chinese concepts of strategic harmony and balance.  Almost a foreign policy equivalent of the “The Golden Mean” (Zhong Yong).

Apart from language, however, a Pax Pacifica should also include basic principles of regional security cooperation.  As well as specific confidence and security building measures that help facilitate dispute resolution as well as prevent conflict through miscalculation.  The East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting +8 provides a readily available mechanism for doing this work.

Fifth, bilaterally, the US and Chinese militaries need a much closer working relationship.  At present, there is a formal strategic and security dialogue at Deputy Defence Minister, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Deputy Foreign Minister level.  This should be elevated to ministerial and Chief of General Staff level.  The purpose of this bilateral, security dialogue should be to develop confidence and security-building measures between these two important militaries.  This should focus on service-wide protocols for avoiding and managing incidents at sea and incidents in the air.

Sixth, beyond political and security cooperation, at the economic level a new US-China strategic roadmap should include a trans-Pacific partnership that should seek to include Japan, and in time, China and India.  A genuine free trade area in the Pacific would help harness all the positive forces of economic globalisation that has helped change much of the region for the better so far.

APEC has made extraordinary progress over the last 25 years.  Nonetheless APEC does not include India.  We now need to go to the next stage with regional economic integration.  Here the East Asia Summit may also be useful because it includes India and also has a political, security and economic agenda.  This would also provide a further, proactive positive agenda of work for the US-China relationship to focus on.

Finally, a new US-China strategic roadmap should also be consolidated into a new “Shanghai Communique” between China and the United States. It is now almost a third of a century since the last communique was produced.  This occurred at the very beginning on Deng Xiaoping’s program of reform and opening.  China’s economic and strategic circumstances have changed significantly since then.  The Cold War that underpinned US and Chinese strategic collaboration in the 1970s and 1980s is now over.  Therefore, the time has come to frame a new communique which deals with the new economic and strategic circumstances of the 21st century.

Conclusion

Foreign policy priorities are always a choice between the urgent and the important.  The challenge of China-US relations represents both.

I have recently been reading a book by Christopher Clark entitled The Sleepwalkers – How Europe Went to War in 1914.  It is a cautionary tale of how the Europeans drifted into a conflict that slaughtered millions, brought down empires and destroyed an entire civilisation.  The book chronicles how the leaders of Europe, “who prided themselves on their modernity and rationalism, in fact behaved like sleepwalkers, stumbling through crisis after crisis and finally convincing themselves that war was the only answer”.

I sometimes wonder whether we in Asia have properly reflected on the centuries of large-scale killing that Europe endured.  And on Europe’s conclusion 1945 that enough was enough and that it was time for a new European and global order.  I for one do not believe there is anything determinist about history.

What we now need is unprecedented foreign policy creativity.  The purpose of this foreign policy creativity is to place the China-US relationship in a new strategic framework.  We need to reconceptualise problems we face into opportunities which will benefit us all.  And then develop a concrete program of policy action to give these ideas practical effect.

The reengineering of strategic mindsets is arguably our core challenge.  If we and our friends in America just simply conclude that conflict is somehow inevitable in the long-term, then the prospects are grim indeed.  If, however, we are capable of engineering an alternative mindset which is neither utopian nor delusional, but instead seeks to maximise cooperation and minimise conflict, within the overall principles of an agreed strategic framework, then we are capable of changing the course of history.

Australia is a country whose most important economic partner is China and a country whose oldest continuing ally is the United States.  As former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia, my purpose today is to leave these proposals with you in the hope that the United States, China and Australia, in partnership with the other countries of our wider region, can in fact build a truly Pacific century together.

Posted by Kevin Rudd

First: I agree, wholly, with Mr. Rudd's ten point "view from Beijing." That is, as far as I understand it, how China a) operates and b) sees the world.

Second: while I agree, broadly, with his "view from Washington," when he says e.g. that "America's respects China's rise" what really means to say is that "America fears China's rise and its newfound power because both challenge American hegemony and because, in 2012/13, America is unable to move decisively to counter China." China is a challenge to America's strategic position in Asia and, perhaps more importantly, to America's own self perception. But, China is also an excuse for some factions in America to continue with a ruinously expensive defence procurement regime.

Third: I agree, again broadly with his "view from Asia."

Fourth: I agree that America and Japan are "drifting," passively, from crisis to crisis, in a reactive mode; but I don't think China is any of adrift, passive or reactive.

I think his seven "prescription" points are fair enough but, in my opinion, based more on wishful thinking than reality.

All that being said: there's lots of food for though in Mr. Rudd's speech.

 

[Nemo888]

If you are a Sinophile this site is a great read IMO.

http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.ca/

 

[Ignatius J. Reilly]

If you are a Sinophile this site is a great read IMO.

http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.ca/

Seems rather harsh  and confrontational upon first glance, but thanks for the link. Definitely worth some perusing.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Xinhua reports that China will build a new, higher capacity, four lane bridge to North Korea in 2013/14.

My understanding, which my be wrong, is that the DPRK has held up construction for many, many years ~ fearing that a new bridge would make it too easy for China to invade.  :-\