Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[CougarKing]

Just a couple of updates on China's newly commissioned aircraft carrier Liaoning ( 瓦良格号航空母舰):

China’s “Liaoning” aircraft carrier to go “Blue Water”
‎Yesterday, ‎March ‎07, ‎2013, ‏‎4:53:32 AM | admin

Sea Waves magazine link

2013-03-07 — China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, would be deployed on preliminary trial on the high seas this year before acquiring full combat capability within two years time.

The 990ft Liaoning, named after the province where it was refitted, is likely to have its preliminary trial on the high seas this year, a necessary step before it possesses full combat capability, said ship commander-in-chief Zhang Yongyi.

“Before every aircraft carrier truly matures and becomes capable of fighting in a war, it must go through trials on the high seas,” Zhang, who is also a deputy to the legislature the National People’s Congress, told China Central Television.

The ship is currently anchored at its homeport in Qingdao, China’s eastern Shandong Province.

< Edited >

It is the first time for the aircraft carrier to anchor at its homeport, meaning that the base for aircraft carrier in Qingdao is operational after four years of construction, People’s Liberation Army Navy said in a statement.

On Saturday, the carrier moved from China’s northern port of Dalian, where it was retrofitted and later commissioned, to the port of Qingdao.
Prior to that, Liaoning had undergone 12 sea trials.

Carrier-based fighters also completed take-off and landing tests on Liaoning late last year.

A trial on the high seas is much tougher than Liaoning’s previous tests, because it requires the carrier to be fully independent of on-shore protection, said Lan Yun, the editor of Modern Ships, a magazine run by a research institute related to the shipbuilding industry.

< Edited >

Liaoning had travelled hundreds of km away from China’s coast before. But this time, Lan said, it may have to reach waters near Japan’s Okinawa Islands and even Guam, both located more than 1,000 kilometres away from Qingdao.

Such trials often require a vessel to remain at sea for one to three months, he said.

If Liaoning’s first high seas trial is successful, many more will follow, Lan said.

That means the vessel may take another two years before reaching its full fighting capacity, he said.

< Edited >

China conducts flight landing on first aircraft carrier

(check the link for photos..)
Global Times link

Video link of Liaoning's flight deck trials with J15 fighters

J-15 jet pioneer dies on new aircraft carrier

A high-ranking researcher of China's J-15 fighter jet died after suffering a heart attack on the country's aircraft carrier on Sunday, China Central Television reports.

Luo Yang, general director of the J-15 fighter jet research team and also board chairman of Aviation Industries of China Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, died at the noon after he suffered a cardiac arrest during a training mission aboard the ship in Dalian of Northeast China's Liaoning province. He was 51.

China Daily link

link from The Hindu

 

[CougarKing]

China's PLA to participate in US RIMPAC 2013
China Defense Mashup link


2013-03-24 - China's Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has accepted an invitation to participate for the first time in a major US-hosted naval drill, but legal restrictions will limit its role to less sensitive exercises, like disaster relief, US officials say.

Beijing's agreement to join the drills being held next year comes at a moment of heightened tensions between China and US ally Japan over disputed East China Sea islets, and unease in the US about China's rapid military buildup and its cybercapabilities.

The Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC) is billed as the world's largest international maritime exercise, with 22 nations and more than 40 ships and submarines participating the last time it was held off Hawaii last year.

Not all the participants are treaty allies with the US. Last years participants included Russia and India.

However, China has never participated in the event, although it did send observers to RIMPAC in 1998, the Pentagon said.


<edited>


At the time, Panetta said he asked China to send a ship to the exercises. Beijing said later it would give the offer positive consideration.

We seek to strengthen and grow our military-to-military relationship with China, which matches and follows our growing political and economic relationship, Carter said, according to prepared remarks on the defense departments Web site.

US law prohibits the Pentagon from any military contacts with the PLA if it could create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure to activities, including joint combat operations.

There is an exemption for operations or exercises related to search-and-rescue and humanitarian relief, and China participated with the US last year in a counterpiracy drill.

Lieutenant Colonel Catherine Wilkinson, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said China's participation in RIMPAC would adhere to US law and said that precautions had been taken by the Navy in drills to avoid revealing sensitive information.

Full Article

 

[Edward Campbell]

Just to remind members that the situation in the South China Seas remains tense, complex and multi-faceted, I note this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the South China Morning Post:

http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1200564/pla-navy-amphibious-task-force-reaches-james-shoal-near-malaysia

PLA Navy amphibious task force reaches Malaysia 'to defend South China sea'
A Chinese amphibious task force sparks jitters around the region by reaching the southernmost waters of its claimed domain

Greg Torode Chief Asia Correspondent

Wednesday, 27 March, 2013

A fully equipped PLA amphibious task force has reached China's southernmost claimed possession in the South China Sea in an unprecedented show of force that is raising eyebrows across the region.

The four-ship flotilla headed by the landing ship Jinggangshan visited James Shoal - some 80 kilometres from Malaysia, less than 200 kilometres from Brunei and 1,800 kilometres from the mainland coast - close to the outer limits of China's "nine-dash line", by which it lays claim to virtually the entire South China Sea.

   

Chinese Navy's amphibious landing ship Jinggangshan is seen during a training with a hovercraft    Chinese navy vessels at James Shoal yesterday. Photo: SCMP Pictures
in waters near Hainan Province on March 20, 2013. Photo: Xinhua 

                                     

                                                                            Area of operations

A Xinhua report yesterday described marines and crew gathering on the deck of the Jinggangshan - one of the PLA Navy's three 200-metre landing ships - to pledge to "defend the South China Sea, maintain national sovereignty and strive towards the dream of a strong China".

"It was a surprisingly strong message in sending out this task force, on such a new operational role from previous PLAN [PLA Navy] patrols in the region," said Gary Li, a senior analyst with IHS Fairplay in London.

"It is not just a few ships here and there, but a crack amphibious landing ship carrying marines and hovercraft and backed by some of the best escort ships in the PLAN fleet," he said, adding that jet fighters had also been used to cover the task force.

"We've never seen anything like this that far south in terms of quantity or quality ... it is hard to know whether it is just coincidence, but it does seem to reflect [President] Xi Jinping's desire for more practical operationally based exercises."

The landing ships are considered some of the most sophisticated vessels in the PLA and are thought to be key to any strategy to invade Taiwan. Their deployments are closely watched by regional rivals. The first of the landing ships, Kunlunshan, has been used in anti-piracy work off the Horn of Africa.

Photos circulating on mainland websites show marines storming beaches, backed by hovercrafts and helicopters dispatched from the Jinggangshan during several days of exercises that saw them visit all of China's holdings in the Spratly Islands.

The PLA took six Spratlys reefs and shoals from Vietnam in a sea battle 25 years ago this month.

The ships are due to head back north, crossing into the western Pacific for further drills via the Bashi channel between Taiwan and the Philippines, Xinhua said.

News of the Jinggangshan's appearance off James Shoal last night sparked chatter among military officials in the region.

"That is quite a show of sovereignty - an amphibious task force," said one military attaché monitoring developments. "It has got everyone talking.

"The Spratlys is one thing, but turning up at James Shoal is quite another. Once again, China is showing it is quite unafraid to send a message to the region - and in a year when Asean is chaired by Brunei, turning up down there in such a fashion is pretty strong symbolism."

PLA deployments into the South China Sea in 2009 and 2010 sparked fears across the region of a new assertiveness by Beijing. Those concerns in turn prompted fresh moves by several Southeast Asian nations to force the long-simmering South China Sea dispute back on to the regional agenda - and forge closer ties with the US.

This article first appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition on Mar 27, 2013 as Daring show of force by PLA Navy

As the original print headline suggested, this is a "daring" show of force. As many members here will know amphibious task forces are big and complex - just mounting this operation was a HUGE risk for the PLA(N) and it suggests that China is making real, measurable progress in naval operations.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Some speculation, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Foreign Policy, about what may be the catapult system design for China's next family of aircraft carriers:

http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/28/is_this_the_prototype_for_chinas_first_aircraft_carrier_catapult

Is this the prototype for China's first aircraft carrier catapult?

Posted By John Reed

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Does this satellite image of a facility outside Shanghai provide evidence that China is trying to developing catapults for its next generation of aircraft carriers?

The image shows what may be a catapult test track similar to those used by the U.S. Navy at its Lakehurst New Jersey research site. Killer Apps spotted the picture above posted on numerous defense forums while researching a different story about old Soviet aircraft carriers.

(Click here to see the facility on Bing Maps. Click here to see the site compared to the U.S Navy's test catapults.)

Keep in mind that China is reported to be working on two to three new carriers that some speculate may be based on the design for what would have been the Soviet Union's first catapult-equipped carrier -- the Ulanovsk. (Others claim the new ships will be based on China's first carrier, the Liaoning, a ship that used to be the Soviet ship, Varyag.)

Remember the Liaoning uses a ramp on its bow -- dubbed a ski jump -- to help fighters get airborne in a short amount of space. This design has obvious drawbacks since only a relatively small fraction of aircraft have the power-to-weight ratio necessary to perform such a take-off.

The Ulanovsk was scrapped in 1992 when it was only 20 percent complete, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Ulanovsk's design called for two catapults that could launch heavily-laden fighters, attack planes, and larger aircraft such as prop-driven radar planes similar to the U.S Navy's E-2 Hawkeye.

These satellite images might be of a short version of a high-speed test track, however, similar to the ones the U.S. Air Force has in New Mexico and California, not a prototype catapult. Still, it would make some sense for China to develop a catapult system for its future carriers, especially because it appears to be developing its own version of the Hawkeye. Planes of that size require catapults to take off from carriers.

Rumors abound that China is working on developing both a traditional steam-powered catapult and an electromagnetic system -- similar to the one the United States is developing, called EMALS -- for its next generation of carriers. Electromagnetic catapults are supposed to be easier to maintain and take up far less space than steam powered catapults.

 

[CougarKing]

The head of Japanese Self-Defense Force, General Iwasaki, comments on the state of their relations with China:

(From another article at the F35 superthread)

<EDITED>

CHINA HOTLINE

On Japan's tense ties with China, Iwasaki urged Beijing to agree to reopen talks with Tokyo on the establishment of a hotline and other maritime communication channels to avoid any unintended military clash between Asia's two biggest economies.

Japan has been locked in a territorial dispute with China over a group of East China Sea islets, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China.

The island row has escalated in recent months to the point where both sides have scrambled fighter jets while patrol ships shadow each other in nearby seas, raising worries that an unintended collision or other incident could lead to a broader clash.

Talks between Japan and China aimed at establishing the so-called maritime communication mechanism have been halted since last fall, despite Japan's call for resumption, Iwasaki said.

"We need to set up a system to eliminate any misunderstanding at both the working level and at higher levels ... We have not heard from China but I believe the talks need to be restarted."

Japan said last month that a Chinese frigate had locked its targeting radar on a Japanese destroyer on January 30 - a step that usually precedes the firing of weapons.

Iwasaki said the crew of the destroyer handled the situation well by not taking any retaliatory measures and that type of level-headedness should prevail in the future.

Asked about media reports that the United States and Japan have begun talks on military plans to cope with armed conflict over the East China Sea islets, Iwasaki said that a meeting with Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific, last week was a scheduled event.

"I cannot comment on details because it involves the other side, but it was a regular meeting," he said.

(Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)

 

[a_majoor]

More on the balancing act the rulers of the Red Dynasty need to do. Scrubbing history (Tiananmen Square), showing a human face without showing too many of the perques of leadership and maintaining a consistent message; a lot of work just to maintina the image of one person. Now extend that to the legion of "Red Princes" with their flashy cars and conspicuous consumption, and all the other issues that need to be dealt with without arousing the population too much...

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/03/29/tiananmen-photo-shows-chinas-first-lady-in-a-different-light/

Tiananmen photo shows China’s first lady in a different light
Republish Reprint

Araminta Wordsworth | 13/03/29 | Last Updated: 13/03/28 4:30 PM ET
More from Araminta Wordsworth

Full Comment’s Araminta Wordsworth brings you a daily round-up of top-quality punditry from around the globe. Today: There’s an image Peng Liyuan, China’s new first lady, would probably prefer the world didn’t see.

In contrast to the soft power she supposedly exemplifies, it shows her in military uniform, her hair scraped back in a pony tail, serenading the troops who crushed the 1989 student revolt in Tiananmen Square.

The photograph, taken from the back cover of a People’s Liberation Army handbook, popped up briefly on the Internet this week. Predictably, it didn’t stay there long as China’s hyper-alert censors quickly scrubbed the offending image. After all, Ms. Peng is now the wife of Xi Jinping, the country’s paramount chief.

Nonetheless, the incident highlights her continuing military connections, a part of her life that has been generally ignored in the West. She remains, for example, leader of the Chinese Song & Dance Ensemble in the PLA’s general political department.

It also contrasts with the admiring coverage she’s enjoyed as she visited Russia and South Africa with her husband. She was hailed as “the new first lady in fashion” by The Daily Telegraph, while The New York Times pronounced her “glamorous, fashionable and one of her nation’s best-known singers, a startling contrast to her dour-looking predecessors.”

Reporting from Beijing for The Associated Press, Gillian Wong adds some shadow to this sunny picture.

    [The 1989] image — seen and shared by outside observers — revived a memory the leadership prefers to suppress and shows one of the challenges in presenting Peng on the world stage as the softer side of China.The country has no recent precedent for the role of first lady, and also faces a tricky balance at home. The leadership wants Peng to show the human side of the new No. 1 leader, Xi Jinping, while not exposing too many perks of the elite. And it must balance popular support for the first couple with an acute wariness of personality cults that could skew the consensus rule among the Chinese Communist Party’s top leaders.

Ms. Peng’s new prominence has also led to a uniquely Chinese response — tight control over such seemingly innocuous information as who designed her clothes.

Censors blocked searches for “Peng Liyuan” and “First lady” on microblogging site Sina Weibo, along with traditionally more sensitive searches such as “Huangpu River and dead pigs,” China Digital Times reported.

Similarly, at The Wall Street Journal Josh Chin and Yang Jie note,

    [R]ather than capitalize on the excitement, Chinese websites are instead moving to contain it, highlighting the enormous sensitivity around discussion of the country’s ruling elite — and Ms. Peng in particular.
   
Most of the censorship has focused on the first lady’s wardrobe, noteworthy because she appears to have shunned the foreign luxury brands once preferred by China’s elite in favor domestic labels …
   
[As a result] the designers of Ms. Xi’s clothes have not been able to take advantage of the exposure the same way [Jason]. Wu has with [U.S. first lady Michele] Obama. Indeed, there has been some confusion as to who the designers even are, with Internet users arguing for days over whether the black jacket she wore on the tarmac in Moscow came from the Chinese label Exception or a different label, Useless, started by a former Exception co-founder.

At the International Business Times, Michelle FlorCruz says the information about Ms. Peng’s military past could play well at home.

    Bill Bishop, a Beijing-based China-watcher isn’t surprised to see Peng in such a role — she is, after all, part of the military.
   
“Peng Liyuan was/is a soldier,” he said. “Soldiers follow orders. Why should we [be] surprised she did her assigned job in entertaining troops in 1989?
   
“Still, seeing Peng dressed in military garb in Tiananmen Square has conjured feelings of nostalgia among some of China’s older generation, despite the government’s attempts to downplay the event.  Indeed, Mao Zedong’s fourth wife, Jiang Qing, was responsible for a large part of the radical Cultural Revolution that had many political opponents and intellectuals ruthlessly persecuted. With this as a reminder, perhaps the Chinese should proceed with caution before completely adopting Peng as their version of a prominent and popular woman at home and abroad.”

Finally, Jane Perlez and Bree Feng at The New York Times flesh out the first lady’s biography.

 
Ms. Peng became a household name in China well before her husband. She joined the People’s Liberation Army as a civilian when she was 18.
 
She soon emerged as a talented singer with a voice suited to folk tales and operatic scores that heralded the bravery of China’s soldiers. For several decades, she starred in the nation’s annual New Year’s television extravaganza, where she wore boldly hued gowns with well-fitted bodices and flouncy skirts.
   
In 2004, Ms. Peng took the role of Mulan, the heroine of a Chinese folk tale depicted in Mulan Psalm, an opera about a young woman who disguises herself as a man to take the place of her ailing father in the army.

compiled by Araminta Wordsworth
[email protected]

 

[CougarKing]

Updates on China's clone of the C17 airlifter, the Y20:

The Y-20, of which China reportedly has an inventory of 200, can travel long distances and ferry the heaviest tank---features that state media touts can help secure "overseas interests" of the aggressive Asian giant. PHOTO FROM CHINESEMILITARYREVIEW.BLOGSPOT.COM

Aircraft on course for service after successful test flight, designer says
usa.chinadaily.com.cn
<snipped>

The Ministry of Defense confirmed shortly after the successful test flight that the Yun-20, mainly developed by the Xi'an Aircraft Industry (Group) Co Ltd, has a load-carrying capacity of 66 metric tons.

It is 47 meters long, has a wingspan of 45 meters and a maximum take-off weight of 200 tons, Xinhua News Agency reported on March 3.

"We are still conducting test flights. They are going well, but more tests have to be carried out before it is put into use," Tang said.

Tang made the remarks on the sidelines of the annual session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the country's top political advisory body. The meeting concluded last Tuesday.

Even when it is in service, designers will be carrying out upgrades to improve its performance, he said.

Tang revealed that domestically designed and manufactured engines will be tested during test flights and once they have passed various tests they will power the jumbo airfreighter.

The Chinese engines perform better in terms of fuel efficiency and thrust-weight ratio, he said.

And not as recent:

CHINA MUSCLE | New military plane can travel far 'to safeguard overseas interests'
By: Agence France-Presse

BEIJING - China's new long-distance military transport aircraft will "enhance its global power projection ability", state media said on Monday, after the plane's maiden flight at the weekend.

The Y-20, China's biggest home-produced military transport jet to date, had its first test flight on Saturday in the northwest of the country, just months after Beijing's first aircraft carrier entered service.

The state-run Global Times hailed the "significant milestone", saying China needed the planes, which can carry a load of 66 tonnes over distances of up to 4,400 kilometers (2,700 miles), to "enhance its global power projection ability."

The aircraft will allow China's military to end its dependence on the Russian-made Il-76, a mainstay of humanitarian and disaster relief around the world, the Global Times quoted a military expert as saying.

more here: link

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Atlantic is a somewhat maybe this/maybe that  :dunno:  article,  by old China hand James McGregor,* about what to expect over the next decade, with a special emphasis on China/US relations:

http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/china-back-to-the-future/274471/

China: Back to the Future
What the poet Lu Xun -- and other voices of China's past -- can tell us about the country's present challenges.

JAMES MCGREGOR

MAR 28 2013

I just arrived back in Beijing after a month-long trip across the U.S. My trip started with discussions with mutual and hedge fund managers, corporate executives and Washington policymakers. It ended in Palo Alto where I talked to technology executives and then stumbled across the Chinese literary legend and social critic Lu Xun, who has been dead since 1936 but still dispenses great insights and wisdom.

I am writing this under winter camping conditions in my Beijing apartment, wearing long underwear and three layers of fleece. That is because the Beijing municipal government annually turns off the heat in all residential complexes on March 15th and then turns it back on November 15th, no matter what the weather. As I write this, the temperature is 34 degrees, and the air pollution level is 224, which is considered okay these days as it only qualifies for "health warnings of emergency conditions" and "protections recommended." After readings of more than 1,000 on New Year's Eve, today's murky atmosphere is a relative oxygen bar, though I have my newly installed air filter whirring behind me.

I return to China asking myself if the country is poised to move forward or if China is heading back to the future. For much of the trip, I was watching the National People's Congress and the Chinese leadership transition from afar. While doing so, I found that everybody I talked to -- from those who have hundreds of millions invested in Chinese stocks to those who are advising Obama on how to interact with China during his second term -- is simultaneously very negative about China and also very hopeful that the new leadership can turn the country around and revitalize reform and opening.

The new Communist Party chairman and China president Xi Jinping is in a similar situation to that of Obama after his first election. People at home and abroad are disenchanted and disappointed with Xi's predecessors, and expectations are so high about Xi bringing positive change that even if he does a decent job he is likely to disappoint. We are seeing some early hopeful signs in Xi's governing style, messaging and the people chosen by the Party and rubber-stamped by the NPC for important government posts. The new foreign minister, Wang Yi, is a fluent Japanese speaker, former ambassador to Japan and was China's front man for the Six-Party talks with North Korea. He has the experience and relationships to help wind down the very dangerous and volatile China-Japan territorial dispute over the Diaoyu islands and help China rejigger its outdated "close-as-lips-and-teeth" relationship with an increasingly whacko North Korea.

The new finance minister, Zhu Rongji protege Lou Jiwei, has the experience and relationships to find a face-saving solution to China's dispute with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission and US accounting regulators. Left unresolved, the dispute could lead to a wholesale delisting of Chinese companies from American exchanges if China doesn't allow U.S. inspectors to examine the auditors in China who are certifying the books of U.S.-listed Chinese companies as well as American companies with significant business in China. Lou is coming from the China Investment Corporation sovereign wealth fund that needs free access to overseas investments.

One discouraging sign is that speculation that Pan Yue would become Minister of Environmental Protection did not pan out, no pun intended. He had been sidelined years ago when as deputy director of the then State Environmental Protection Agency he had criticized the "growth at any cost" development model and tried to enforce environmental laws against powerful, high-polluting state-enterprises.

American government officials who deal with China who I met with in Washington are increasingly frustrated that China doesn't even bother to pretend to tell the truth when discussing contentious issues. Very solid evidence of state-directed cyber-hacking of just about any American multinational with valuable technology and industrial trade secrets is met with the admonishment that the U.S. must cease with these "groundless accusations" that result from "ulterior motives". The hedge funds and mutual funds that have been big investors in the China growth story and strong proponents of patience with China's reform process have run out of patience themselves. They figure that all Chinese companies are lying to their investors so they are now turning toward investing in American and European companies with significant China exposure or playing China stocks on pure speculation. In short, the American business community that has long been the stalwart supporter of China in the U.S. has basically lost trust in China as an entity while they still have great respect for the Chinese people and what they have accomplished.

All eyes are now on Xi Jinping and the new premier, Li Keqiang. So far there are many positive signs. Their atmospherics and rhetoric are mostly progressive and positive. In their speeches both leaders have emphasized that the Chinese government needs to loosen its grip and be more of a "service oriented" government. Xi has told Party cadres to "think a little more, learn a little more" and focus on fulfilling "the Chinese dream" of job stability, quality education, higher income, reliable social security and better medical care. Li Keqiang says that there needs to be a "division of power" between the government and enterprises, the government and investors and the government and civil society. As he exited his decade as premier, Wen Jiabao set the stage for Xi and Li by passionately calling for political and economic reforms -- which it seems he didn't have the power to carry out - while characterizing the economy as "unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable."

If you get right down to it, Xi and Li have inherited a huge pile of unsustainability. The OECD is projecting that China will overtake the U.S. economy in size in 2016 in terms of purchasing power parity. To keep that engine humming, however, the growth model has to shift from investment-led to driven by consumption. As Economist Andy Xie put it in Caixin Magazine recently: "If China keeps pushing growth through fixed-asset investment and credit, a full-blown banking crisis is likely within five years. Kicking the can down the road is not a viable option for the new government. Reform is necessary for survival, not a choice."

During his "southern tour" in December, Xi paid homage to Deng  Xiaoping and his transformative market reforms. Xi said that the Party Congress that had just appointed him as Party chairman had issued "a new mobilization order" to deepen reform and opening up. An official speech from that tour is now circulating among Party officials. According to an analysis by independent Chinese journalist Gao Yu, Xi expands his vision for "the China Dream" to lay down firm lines against political reforms. He discusses the Soviet Union's collapse and complains that the Soviet Communist Party fell because "nobody was man enough to stand up and resist" when the military was no longer under the firm grip of the Party. The speech makes clear that Xi does not want to become China's Gorbachev and undertake risky reforms that could unravel the system. Instead, Xi emphasizes that "Only socialism can save China. Only reform and opening-up can develop China, develop socialism, and develop Marxism." An evolving early mantra employed by Xi is being called the "three confidences." They are: "confidence in direction, confidence in theoretical foundation, and confidence in system."

And this brings us to Lu Xun, who I ran into at Bell's Books, a wonderful used book bookstore in Palo Alto on my last U.S. stop. I stumbled upon a copy of "A Brief History of Chinese Fiction" that grew out of notes Lu Xun drafted for his lectures at Peking University between 1920 and 1924. Paging through this English translation from 1959, I found several passages that offer some ageless insight and wisdom about China that can explain the obstacles facing Xi and Li and how their efforts could play out.

As Lu Xun told his students 90 years ago: "When we look at the evolution of China we are struck by two peculiarities. One is that the old makes a comeback long after the new has appeared -- in other words, retrogression. The other is that the old remains long after the new has appeared -- in other words, amalgamation. This does not mean there is no evolution, however. Only it is comparatively slow, so that hotheads like myself feel that 'one day is like three autumns'."

As for Xi and Li's campaign to eradicate government corruption and extravagance with such efforts as limiting official banquets to "four dishes and a soup" and banishing traffic-choking official motorcades, Lu Xun cites the difficulties faced by reformers in the Qing, China's final dynasty. "They carry on as usual, concealing the true state of affairs from above and below, while the worst of them employ bad men to get them off by bribery. Thus the evil, instead of being checked, goes from bad to worse."

Xi and Li's pursuit of plain talk and less formalism brings to mind this advice from a Qing Dynasty novel "Exposure of the Official World" cited by Lu Xun. "The son of the Minister of Justice sought advice for how to handle his first audience with the emperor from a senior adviser to the emperor who his family had provided with "ten thousand taels of curios." He was told "Kowtow a lot and say little: that is the way to be promoted," later adding, "Even kowtowing when it isn't strictly necessary will do no harm."

In Deng Xiaoping's day, when nobody had nothing, nearly everybody in China supported reform and opening. Now that there are so many vested interests that profit handsomely from the current system, Xi and Li have their work cut out for them. The last leadership team in China seemed to be stuck in a reform pattern of taking one step forward and two steps back. Maybe the best Xi and Li can hope for is two steps forward and one step back.

In other words: hope, but not for too much.


_____
* James McGregor is author of two highly regarded books: No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism, published in October 2012, and One Billion Customers: Lessons from the Front Lines of Doing Business in China, published in 2005.  He was China bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal in the early 1990s and the longtime CEO of Dow Jones China.

He was a Washington correspondent for Knight-Ridder Newspapers during the Reagan administration, and Taiwan bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal from 1987 to 1990. He was chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham) in 1996 and a board member for a decade. As a Senior Counselor for APCO Worldwide, he currently counsels US and European multinationals on their China business, political and communications strategies. As a senior advisor to China research firm Pacific Epoch, he advises mutual funds and hedge funds about the China macro outlook. McGregor is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, a Global Council member of the Asia Society, a board member of the U.S.-China Education Trust and a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He is a resident of Beijing and has lived in China for 25 years.

 

[CougarKing]

An article from 2010 that is applicable even today in North Korea's latest tantrum and the growing rift between Beijing and Pyongyang:

link

Wikileaks cables reveal China 'ready to abandon North Korea'

Leaked dispatches show Beijing is frustrated with military actions of 'spoiled child' and increasingly favours reunified Korea

China has signalled its readiness to accept Korean reunification and is privately distancing itself from the North Korean regime, according to leaked US embassy cables that reveal senior Beijing figures regard their official ally as a "spoiled child".

News of the Chinese shift comes at a crucial juncture after the North's artillery bombardment of a South Korean island last week that killed four people and led both sides to threaten war. China has refused to condemn the North Korean action. But today Beijing appeared to bow to US pressure to help bring about a diplomatic solution, calling for "emergency consultations" and inviting a senior North Korean official to Beijing.

China is sharply critical of US pressure tactics towards North Korea and wants a resumption of the six-party nuclear disarmament talks. But the Guardian can reveal Beijing's frustration with Pyongyang has grown since its missile and nuclear tests last year, worries about the economic impact of regional instability, and fears that the death of the dictator, Kim Jong-il, could spark a succession struggle.

China's moves to distance itself from Kim are revealed in the latest tranche of leaked US embassy cables published by the Guardian and four international newspapers. Tonight, the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, said the US "deeply regrets" the release of the material by WikiLeaks. They were an "attack on the international community", she said. "It puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security and undermines efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems," she told reporters at the state department.

The leaked North Korea dispatches detail how:

• South Korea's vice-foreign minister said he was told by two named senior Chinese officials that they believed Korea should be reunified under Seoul's control, and that this view was gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing.

• China's vice-foreign minister told US officials that Pyongyang was behaving like a "spoiled child" to get Washington's attention in April 2009 by carrying out missile tests.

• A Chinese ambassador warned that North Korean nuclear activity was "a threat to the whole world's security".

• Chinese officials assessed that it could cope with an influx of 300,000 North Koreans in the event of serious instability, according to a representative of an international agency, but might need to use the military to seal the border.

In highly sensitive discussions in February this year, the-then South Korean vice-foreign minister, Chun Yung-woo, told a US ambassador, Kathleen Stephens, that younger generation Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regarded North Korea as a useful or reliable ally and would not risk renewed armed conflict on the peninsula, according to a secret cable to Washington.

(...)

"The two officials, Chun said, were ready to 'face the new reality' that the DPRK [North Korea] now had little value to China as a buffer state – a view that, since North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC [People's Republic of China] leaders. Chun argued that in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly 'not welcome' any US military presence north of the DMZ [demilitarised zone]. Again citing his conversations with [the officials], Chun said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the US in a 'benign alliance' – as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labour-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help 'salve' PRC concerns about … a reunified Korea.

"Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan and South Korea – not North Korea."

Chun told Stephens China was unable to persuade Pyongyang to change its self-defeating policies – Beijing had "much less influence than most people believe" – and lacked the will to enforce its views.

A senior Chinese official, speaking off the record, also said China's influence with the North was frequently overestimated. But Chinese public opinion was increasingly critical of the North's behaviour, the official said, and that was reflected in changed government thinking.

Previously hidden tensions between Pyongyang and its only ally were also exposed by China's then vice-foreign minister in a meeting in April 2009 with a US embassy official after North Korea blasted a three-stage rocket over Japan into the Pacific. Pyongyang said its purpose was to send a satellite into orbit but the US, South Korea and Japan saw the launch as a test of long-range missile technology.

Discussing how to tackle the issue with the charge d'affaires at the Beijing embassy, He Yafei observed that "North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a 'spoiled child' in order to get the attention of the 'adult'. China encouraged the United States, 'after some time', to start to re-engage the DPRK," according to the diplomatic cable sent to Washington.

A second dispatch from September last year described He downplaying the Chinese premier's trip to Pyongyang, telling the US deputy secretary of state, James Steinberg: "We may not like them ... [but] they [the DPRK] are a neighbour."

(...)

Cheng said Beijing "hopes for peaceful reunification in the long term, but he expects the two countries to remain separate in the short term", Hoagland reported. China's objectives were "to ensure they [North Korean leaders] honour their commitments on non-proliferation, maintain stability, and 'don't drive [Kim Jong-il] mad'."

While some Chinese officials are reported to have dismissed suggestions that North Korea would implode after Kim's death, another cable offers evidence that Beijing has considered the risk of instability.

It quoted a representative from an international agency saying Chinese officials believed they could absorb 300,000 North Koreans without outside help. If they arrived "all at once" it might use the military to seal the border, create a holding area and meet humanitarian needs. It might also ask other countries for help.

The context of the discussions was not made explicit, although an influx of that scale would only be likely in the event of regime failure. The representative said he was not aware of any contingency planning to deal with large numbers of refugees.

(...)

The ff. prediction of political collapse from the 2010 article above did not occur (or hasn't happened yet). So far, the regime seems to be maintaining the appearance that the son's succession was uncontested and holds the reins of power:

Political collapse would ensue once Kim Jong-il died, despite the dictator's efforts to obtain Chinese help and to secure the succession for his son, Kim Jong-un.

And there's this update at the North Korea superthread:

Kim Jong Un's Aunt and Uncle: the real power couple behind North Korea

 

[a_majoor]

A retired US Admiral has a few suggestions to allow American Sea power to remain viable to keep the sea lanes open for international trade for a few more decades. The weakness in the suggestion is the lack of redundancy and robustness; there should be multiple sensors widely dispersed to prevent the system from being blinded for any reason. Railgun point defense is quite plausible (and there is another interesting article in the NBF blog that suggests there are now technical means to make more efficient electromagnetic weapons similar in concept to a railgun but using vastly less energy).

http://nextbigfuture.com/2013/04/retired-us-admiral-suggest-railguns.html

Retired US Admiral suggest railguns with Mach 5 shotgun pellets for anti aircraft and anti-missile steel cloud

  China is about 30 years from catching up to US miltary spending and about 40-50 years from catching up with a comparable military capability. Even after catching up on budgets, China would lag in training and other factors that would take time to mature. China currently has developed some anti-ship missiles which pose a possible threat to US carriers and other navy ships.

Retired Adm. James A. Lyons was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations. Admiral Lyons is playing up China's military as justification for further modernization and buildup of US military capability. This is in spite of the fact that it seems virtually certain that China, USA, Europe and Russia are not getting into any kind of shooting war. (interpolation: this was also a widely held position in the years leading up to the Great War of 1914-1918...)

In a Feb. 11 Wall Street Journal article by Bret Stephens, Gen. Victor Esin, former chief of staff of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, highlighted the “stealthy” rise of China to a position of nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. He stated that China may have 850 warheads ready to launch, and he estimated China’s inventory of nuclear weapons at between 1,600 and 1,800 warheads, as compared with the current U.S. estimate of China having 200 to 400. Many reports note the administration wants to reduce U.S. warheads to 1,000 or fewer.Gen. Esin went on to state that he has solid evidence that China conducted a multiple-warhead test in July 2012, and a month later, launched a new, long-range multiple-warhead-capable missile from a submarine.

Lyons suggests

1. putting anti-ship ballistic missiles on U.S. ships, submarines and aircraft. Such a capability could be accomplished in the near term as a relatively inexpensive option, while posing a risk to China’s ever-expanding surface navy.

2. create an Asian regional long-range sensor network that would provide our allies real-time warning of broad Chinese military activity. Beyond the recent decision to install a second Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) radar in southern Japan, he suggset placing a similar radar in the Philippines. We currently have an FBX-T radar in Shariki, Japan, with a 600-to-1,200-mile range. Installing an updated 3,700-mile-range SBX radar in the Philippines would permit continuous missile and aircraft coverage of all nations in the western Pacific littoral, including China.

3. Continue to pursue the development of energy weapons. A railgun with “shotgun” pellets flying at Mach 5 has the potential to produce a “steel cloud,” which would shred most missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft flying through it. In tests, the railgun has fired artillery-size projectiles up to speeds of Mach 5 with a potential range of 62 miles. Such a system would be quite adaptable to a destroyer-sized ship.

 

[CougarKing]

Xinhua attempting to divert attention to the PLA Navy amphibious group that arrived in Malaysian waters recently...

KUALA LUMPUR, April 5 (Xinhua) -- Senior Chinese and Malaysian military officials reached consensus on Friday to further strengthen military cooperation between the two countries.

Qi Jianguo, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), said the PLA hopes to bring the bilateral relations between the two armies to a higher level by strengthening high-level exchange, strategic consultations, joint training and other forms of cooperation.


<snipped>


Quote

Abdul Latiff praised China's efforts to keep world peace and promote common development. He said Malaysia is willing to increase exchange and cooperation with China, in order to further promote the military relations between the two countries.


Source: news.xinhuanet.com

Plus a repost of pics of the PLA Navy amphibious group in the South China Sea- pictures originally from the Indonesian defence forum "Kaskus" :

Chinese naval taskforce conducts live-ammunition fire drill

The four warships of the combat-readiness patrol and high-sea training taskforce under the South China Sea Fleet of the Navy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted live-ammunition fire drill in the waters of the west Pacific Ocean on March 31, 2013. (Chinamil.com.cn / Qian Xiaohu, Song Xin, Gan Jun and Gao Yi)

link

 

[CougarKing]

China to open 2 disputed isles to tourists
By: Agence France-Presse
April 7, 2013 3:47 PM

Boao, China - China is to open disputed South China Sea islands up to tourism this month, state media reported Sunday, a move likely to inflame a long-running territorial row with its neighbors.

The plans to allow tourists to visit the Paracel Islands before the May Day holiday is the latest stage in Beijing's development of the territory, which has previously angered Vietnam and caused concern in Washington.

Vietnam and China have a longstanding territorial row over the Paracel Islands. Hanoi last month accused a Chinese vessel of firing on one of its fishing boats which had sailed in disputed waters in the area.

The plan to allow cruise tours follows rapid development of infrastructure in a new city -- Sansha -- along with the establishment of an army garrison on one of the Paracels last year.

Read more from the BBC

 

[Edward Campbell]

China to open 2 disputed isles to tourists

By: Agence France-Presse
April 7, 2013 3:47 PM

Cheeky buggers! 

 

[CougarKing]

Cyber attacks hurt China's credibility, US official says

By Terril Yue Jones, Reuters
Posted at 04/09/2013 11:46 PM | Updated as of 04/09/2013 11:46 PM
<snipped>


Quote

BEIJING - Cyber attacks against the United States from China are eroding the country's credibility and scaring off potential foreign investors afraid of losing their intellectual property, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday.

The sheer scale of hacking attacks from China bred mistrust in the U.S. government as well as the business community, said Robert Hormats, U.S. under secretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment.


<snipped>


Quote

"The cyber intrusions are particularly troubling because they've gotten so much visibility lately that the intensified visibility is really undermining a lot of business confidence of people who would otherwise invest here," Hormats told Reuters.

"So it's hurt Chinese interests," he said after speaking at a U.S.-China Internet industry forum. "The Chinese really need to take a look at this and decide if it's in their interest for these policies to continue."


<snipped>


Quote

"We shouldn't militarise cyberspace," he said. "Such attacks violate the rights of other countries and also moral standards."

 

[cupper]

China to open 2 disputed isles to tourists

Cheeky buggers! 

Betcha Carnival Cruises won't be high on the list though.

 

[CougarKing]

A consequence of North Korea's current round of brinksmanship: furthering the US "strategic pivot" towards Asia in spite of Beijing's wariness.

link

Analysis: In bitter irony for China, North Korea furthers U.S. strategic goals

By Paul Eckert

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Nobody but Kim Jong-un knows what he hopes to achieve with his saber-rattling campaign, but the young North Korean leader probably didn't set out to aid the United States, the sworn enemy of three generations of Kims, at the expense of his country's main ally, China.

In a boon for U.S. policy that can only add to China's frustration with Kim, North Korean bellicosity has helped reinforce an American strategy of rebalancing its security policies toward the Asia-Pacific region.

To a China that often sounds more wary of Washington than of Pyongyang, months of North Korean missile and nuclear tests followed by a daily stream of bloodthirsty war threats may be worrisome, but the U.S. reaction is even more troubling.

"We understand what kind of regime North Korea is, but we also understand that North Korea is playing games," said Sun Zhe, director of the Center for U.S-China Relations at Beijing's Tsinghua University.

"Most importantly, we are complaining that the United States is using military drills as an excuse to continue to do this (rebalancing), putting up B-2s and other advanced weapons systems," he said.


B-2 and B-52 bombers, radar-evading F-22s and anti-missile system vessels like the USS John S. McCain represented the initial U.S. response to North Korea's repeated, explicit threats to launch nuclear strikes against the United States.

The U.S. also said it would shift THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System) to defend Guam from missile attack. And Tokyo's Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper said Japan would permanently deploy Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) anti-missile systems in Okinawa to counter North Korean missiles.

CHINA LAMENTS CHAOS FOR 'SELFISH GAIN'

The U.S. deployments, although focused on North Korea and mostly temporary, could be adapted or expanded to counter the extensive array of anti-access military capabilities Beijing has built up to delay or prevent the arrival of American forces to areas near China in the event of conflict.

Chinese President Xi Jinping may have underscored Chinese ambivalence when he did not specifically name North Korea when he said no country "should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain."

Xi's remarks at the Davos-like Bo'ao Forum on the Chinese island of Hainan might have been targeting Washington as well as Pyongyang, reflecting Chinese unease at the U.S. "rebalancing" or "pivot" policy of winding down wars in Southwest Asia and paying renewed attention to the Asia-Pacific region.

"In China, it's widely believed that the pivot is a containment strategy of China. Almost everyone sees it as that," Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, a Beijing-based China analyst for the International Crisis Group.

In a talk in Washington explaining the rebalancing policy and the Pentagon's response to North Korea, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter did not mince words in addressing Chinese complaints.

"North Korea's behavior is causing not just the United States, but others in the region to take action," he told the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"If the Chinese find them the kinds of things they don't like to see, there's an easy way to address that, which is to talk to the North Koreans about stopping these provocations," said Carter.

DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE FOR KERRY

Carter was forceful and unapologetic in presenting the rebalancing as a continuation of post-war U.S. policy that allowed allies Japan and South Korea, followed by Southeast Asia, China and India "to develop politically and economically in a climate that has been free from conflicts."

"It's good for us and it's good for everyone in the region. And it includes everyone in the region. It's not aimed at anyone, no individual country or group of countries," he said.

Carter said the coming drawdown of forces from Afghanistan would allow the U.S. Navy to shift to the Pacific region surface combatant ships, carriers and other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance vessels.

Analysts who accept the rebalancing as based on sound geo-strategic principles nevertheless say Pentagon statements and force deployments should not be the most visible face of the Obama administration's core Asia policy.

"We've oversold the military and undersold the diplomatic and economic components of the integrated strategy of the rebalance," said Douglas Paal, a former U.S. official who heads Asian Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"The reaction we're getting from China is 'they're coming to get us, we've got to respond, we've got to step up our military development,'" he said.

When Secretary of State John Kerry visits China, Japan and South Korea later this week in his first trip to the region as the top U.S. diplomat, he will need to adjust his rebalancing sales pitch to China while he engages in Korea crisis diplomacy.

That will be a tall order in Beijing, where new President Xi is consolidating his rule with a political and military elite that is highly suspicious of U.S. motives.

"When the economic, political and cultural elements were tacked on to the pivot, the Chinese said 'oh, so now we're being encircled economically, politically and culturally, too," said Kleine-Ahlbrandt.

"The problem with trying to disabuse someone of a conspiracy theory is that any argument you make becomes part of the conspiracy, so I don't know if it's possible to convince the Chinese that it's not about encircling them," she said.
(Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Editing by Warren Strobel, Mary Milliken and Todd Eastham)

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 1 of 2

From the Korea thread:

Here is a video of former Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd on North Korea and China. You don't have to agree with Mr Rudd, but he does have some (considerable) interest and knowledge about the region. I disagree, for example, with his assertion that China favours a divided Korea, but I do agree with him that Xi Jinping is off to a good start as Paramount Leader. His prescriptions for America and China are interesting.

And here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Foreign Affairs is Kevin Rudd's prescription for Sino-American relations:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138843/kevin-rudd/beyond-the-pivot?page=show

Beyond the Pivot
A New Road Map for U.S.-Chinese Relations

By Kevin Rudd

March/April 2013

    The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia made sense, because China was starting to doubt U.S. staying power. Now that Washington has sent Beijing a clear message it will be around for the long haul, however,
    the time has come for the two countries to deepen and institutionalize their relationship in order to secure Asia’s lasting peace and prosperity.

    KEVIN RUDD is a Member of the Australian Parliament. He served as Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 and Foreign Minister from 2010 to 2012.

Debate about the future of U.S.-Chinese relations is currently being driven by a more assertive Chinese foreign and security policy over the last decade, the region's reaction to this, and Washington's response -- the "pivot," or "rebalance," to Asia. The Obama administration's renewed focus on the strategic significance of Asia has been entirely appropriate. Without such a move, there was a danger that China, with its hard-line, realist view of international relations, would conclude that an economically exhausted United States was losing its staying power in the Pacific. But now that it is clear that the United States will remain in Asia for the long haul, the time has come for both Washington and Beijing to take stock, look ahead, and reach some long-term conclusions as to what sort of world they want to see beyond the barricades.

Asia's central tasks in the decades ahead are avoiding a major confrontation between the United States and China and preserving the strategic stability that has underpinned regional prosperity. These tasks are difficult but doable. They will require both parties to understand each other thoroughly, to act calmly despite multiple provocations, and to manage the domestic and regional forces that threaten to pull them apart. This, in turn, will require a deeper and more institutionalized relationship -- one anchored in a strategic framework that accepts the reality of competition, the importance of cooperation, and the fact that these are not mutually exclusive propositions. Such a new approach, furthermore, should be given practical effect through a structured agenda driven by regular direct meetings between the two countries' leaders.

HIDDEN DRAGON NO LONGER

The speed, scale, and reach of China's rise are without precedent in modern history. Within just 30 years, China's economy has grown from smaller than the Netherlands' to larger than those of all other countries except the United States. If China soon becomes the largest economy, as some predict, it will be the first time since George III that a non-English-speaking, non-Western, nondemocratic country has led the global economy. History teaches that where economic power goes, political and strategic power usually follow. China's rise will inevitably generate intersecting and sometimes conflicting interests, values, and worldviews. Preserving the peace will be critical not only for the three billion people who call Asia home but also for the future of the global order. Much of the history of the twenty-first century, for good or for ill, will be written in Asia, and this in turn will be shaped by whether China's rise can be managed peacefully and without any fundamental disruption to the order.

The postwar order in Asia has rested on the presence and predictability of U.S. power, anchored in a network of military alliances and partnerships. This was welcomed in most regional capitals, first to prevent the reemergence of Japanese militarism, then as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, and then as a security guarantee to Tokyo and Seoul (to remove the need for local nuclear weapons programs) and as a damper on a number of other lesser regional tensions. In recent years, China's rise and the United States' fiscal and economic difficulties had begun to call the durability of this framework into question. A sense of strategic uncertainty and some degree of strategic hedging had begun to emerge in various capitals. The Obama administration's "rebalance" has served as a necessary corrective, reestablishing strategic fundamentals. But by itself, it will not be enough to preserve the peace -- a challenge that will be increasingly complex and urgent as great-power politics interact with a growing array of subregional conflicts and intersecting territorial claims in the East China and South China seas.

China views these developments through the prism of its own domestic and international priorities. The Standing Committee of the Politburo, which comprises the Communist Party's top leaders, sees its core responsibilities as keeping the Communist Party in power, maintaining the territorial integrity of the country (including countering separatist movements and defending offshore maritime claims), sustaining robust economic growth by transforming the country's growth model, ensuring China's energy security, preserving global and regional stability so as not to derail the economic growth agenda, modernizing China's military and more robustly asserting China's foreign policy interests, and enhancing China's status as a great power.

China's global and regional priorities are shaped primarily by its domestic economic and political imperatives. In an age when Marxism has lost its ideological relevance, the continuing legitimacy of the party depends on a combination of economic performance, political nationalism, and corruption control. China also sees its rise in the context of its national history, as the final repudiation of a century of foreign humiliation (beginning with the Opium Wars and ending with the Japanese occupation) and as the country's return to its proper status as a great civilization with a respected place among the world's leading states. China points out that it has little history of invading other countries and none of maritime colonialism (unlike European countries) and has itself been the target of multiple foreign invasions. In China's view, therefore, the West and others have no reason to fear China's rise. In fact, they benefit from it because of the growth of the Chinese economy. Any alternative view is castigated as part of the "China threat" thesis, which in turn is seen as a stalking-horse for a de facto U.S. policy of containment.

What China overlooks, however, is the difference between "threat" and "uncertainty" -- the reality of what international relations theorists call "the security dilemma" -- that is, the way that Beijing's pursuit of legitimate interests can raise concerns for other parties. This raises the broader question of whether China has developed a grand strategy for the longer term. Beijing's public statements -- insisting that China wants a "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development" and believes in "win-win" or a "harmonious world" -- have done little to clarify matters, nor has the invocation of Deng Xiaoping's axiom "Hide your strength, bide your time." For foreigners, the core question is whether China will continue to work cooperatively within the current rules-based global order once it has acquired great-power status or instead seek to reshape that order more in its own image. This remains an open question.

End of Part 1

 

[Edward Campbell]

Part 2 of 2

XI WHO MUST BE OBEYED

Within the parameters of China's overall priorities, Xi Jinping, the newly appointed general secretary of the Communist Party and incoming president, will have a significant, and perhaps decisive, impact on national policy. Xi is comfortable with the mantle of leadership. He is confident of both his military and his reformist backgrounds, and having nothing to prove on these fronts gives him some freedom to maneuver. He is well read and has a historian's understanding of his responsibilities to his country. He is by instinct a leader and is unlikely to be satisfied with simply maintaining the policy status quo. Of all his predecessors, he is the most likely Chinese official since Deng to become more than primus inter pares, albeit still within the confines of collective leadership.

Xi has already set an unprecedented pace. He has bluntly stated that unless corruption is dealt with, China will suffer chaos reminiscent of the Arab Spring, and he has issued new, transparent conflict-of-interest rules for the leadership. He has set out Politburo guidelines designed to cut down on pointless meetings and political speechifying, supported taking action against some of the country's more politically outspoken publications and websites, and praised China's military modernizers. Most particularly, Xi has explicitly borrowed from Deng's political handbook, stating that China now needs more economic reform. On foreign and security policy, however, Xi has been relatively quiet. But as a high-ranking member of the Central Military Commission, which controls the country's armed forces (Xi served as vice chair from 2010 to 2012 and was recently named chair), Xi has played an important role in the commission's "leading groups" on policy for the East China and South China seas, and Beijing's recent actions in those waterways have caused some analysts to conclude that he is an unapologetic hard-liner on national security policy. Others point to the foreign policy formulations he used during his visit to the United States in February 2012, when he referred to the need for "a new type of great-power relationship" with Washington and was apparently puzzled when there was little substantive response from the American side.

It is incorrect at present to see Xi as a potential Gorbachev and his reforms as the beginning of a Chinese glasnost. China is not the Soviet Union, nor is it about to become the Russian Federation. However, over the next decade, Xi is likely to take China in a new direction. The country's new leaders are economic reformers by instinct or intellectual training. Executing the massive transformation they envisage will take most of their political capital and will require continued firm political control, even as the reforms generate strong forces for social and political change. There is as yet no agreed-on script for longer-term political reform; there is only the immediate task of widening the franchise within the 82-million-member party. When it comes to foreign policy, the centrality of the domestic economic task means that the leadership has an even stronger interest in maintaining strategic stability for at least the next decade. This may conflict occasionally with Chinese offshore territorial claims, but when it does, China will prefer to resolve the conflicts rather than have them derail that stability. On balance, Xi is a leader the United States should seek to do business with, not just on the management of the tactical issues of the day but also on broader, longer-term strategic questions.

OBAMA'S TURN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE

More than just a military statement, the Obama administration's rebalancing is part of a broader regional diplomatic and economic strategy that also includes the decision to become a member of the East Asia Summit and plans to develop the Trans-Pacific Partnership, deepen the United States' strategic partnership with India, and open the door to Myanmar (also called Burma). Some have criticized Washington's renewed vigor as the cause of recent increased tensions across East Asia. But this does not stand up to scrutiny, given that the proliferation of significant regional security incidents began more than half a decade ago.

China, a nation of foreign and security policy realists where Clausewitz, Carr, and Morgenthau are mandatory reading in military academies, respects strategic strength and is contemptuous of vacillation and weakness. Beijing could not have been expected to welcome the pivot. But its opposition does not mean that the new U.S. policy is misguided. The rebalancing has been welcomed across the other capitals of Asia -- not because China is perceived as a threat but because governments in Asia are uncertain what a China-dominated region would mean. So now that the rebalance is being implemented, the question for U.S. policymakers is where to take the China relationship next.

One possibility would be for the United States to accelerate the level of strategic competition with China, demonstrating that Beijing has no chance of outspending or outmaneuvering Washington and its allies. But this would be financially unsustainable and thus not credible. A second possibility would be to maintain the status quo as the rebalancing takes effect, accepting that no fundamental improvement in bilateral relations is possible and perpetually concentrating on issue and crisis management. But this would be too passive and would run the risk of being overwhelmed by the number and complexity of the regional crises to be managed; strategic drift could result, settling on an increasingly negative trajectory.

A third possibility would be to change gears in the relationship altogether by introducing a new framework for cooperation with China that recognizes the reality of the two countries' strategic competition, defines key areas of shared interests to work and act on, and thereby begins to narrow the yawning trust gap between the two countries. Executed properly, such a strategy would do no harm, run few risks, and deliver real results. It could reduce the regional temperature by several degrees, focus both countries' national security establishments on common agendas sanctioned at the highest levels, and help reduce the risk of negative strategic drift.

A crucial element of such a policy would have to be the commitment to regular summitry. There are currently more informal initiatives under way between the United States and China than there are ships on the South China Sea. But none of these can have a major impact on the relationship, since in dealing with China, there is no substitute for direct leader-to-leader engagement. In Beijing, as in Washington, the president is the critical decision-maker. Absent Xi's personal engagement, the natural dynamic in the Chinese system is toward gradualism at best and stasis at worst. The United States therefore has a profound interest in engaging Xi personally, with a summit in each capital each year, together with other working meetings of reasonable duration, held in conjunction with meetings of the G-20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit.

Both governments also need authoritative point people working on behalf of the national leaders, managing the agenda between summits and handling issues as the need arises. In other words, the United States needs someone to play the role that Henry Kissinger did in the early 1970s, and so does China.

Globally, the two governments need to identify one or more issues currently bogged down in the international system and work together to bring them to successful conclusions. This could include the Doha Round of international trade talks (which remains stalled despite approaching a final settlement in 2008), climate-change negotiations (on which China has come a considerable way since the 2009 UN Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen), nuclear nonproliferation (the next review conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is coming up), or specific outstanding items on the G-20 agenda. Progress on any of these fronts would demonstrate that with sufficient political will all around, the existing global order can be made to work to everyone's advantage, including China's. Ensuring that China becomes an active stakeholder in the future of that order is crucial, and even modest successes would help.

Regionally, the two countries need to use the East Asia Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus forum to develop a series of confidence- and security-building measures among the region's 18 militaries. At present, these venues run the risk of becoming permanently polarized over territorial disputes in the East China and South China seas, so the first item to be negotiated should be a protocol for handling incidents at sea, with other agreements following rapidly to reduce the risk of conflict through miscalculation.

At the bilateral level, Washington and Beijing should upgrade their regular military-to-military dialogues to the level of principals such as, on the U.S. side, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This should be insulated from the ebbs and flows of the relationship, with meetings focusing on regional security challenges, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea, or major new challenges, such as cybersecurity. And on the economic front, finally, Washington should consider extending the Trans-Pacific Partnership to include both China and Japan, and eventually India as well.

TOWARD A NEW SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ

Should such efforts begin to yield fruit and reduce some of the mistrust currently separating the parties, U.S. and Chinese officials should think hard about grounding their less conflictual, more cooperative relationship in a new Shanghai Communiqué. Such a suggestion usually generates a toxic response in Washington, because communiqués are seen as diplomatic dinosaurs and because such a process might threaten to reopen the contentious issue of Taiwan. The latter concern is legitimate, since Taiwan would have to be kept strictly off the table for such an exercise to succeed. But this should not be an insurmountable problem, because cross-strait relations are better now than at any time since 1949.

As for the charge that communiqués are of little current value, this may be less true for China than it is for the United States. In China, symbols carry important messages, including for the military, so there could be significant utility within the Chinese system in using a new communiqué to reflect and lock in a fresh, forward-looking, cooperative strategic mindset -- if one could be worked out. Such a move should follow the success of strategic cooperation, however, rather than be used to start a process that might promise much but deliver little.

Skeptics might argue that the United States and China must restore their trust in each other before any significant strategic cooperation can occur. In fact, the reverse logic applies: trust can be built only on the basis of real success in cooperative projects. Improving relations, moreover, is increasingly urgent, since the profound strategic changes unfolding across the region will only make life more complicated and throw up more potential flash points. Allowing events to take their own unguided course would mean running major risks, since across Asia, the jury is still out as to whether the positive forces of twenty-first-century globalization or the darker forces of more ancient nationalisms will ultimately prevail.

The start of Obama's second term and Xi's first presents a unique window of opportunity to put the U.S.-Chinese relationship on a better course. Doing that, however, will require sustained leadership from the highest levels of both governments and a common conceptual framework and institutional structure to guide the work of their respective bureaucracies, both civilian and military. History teaches that the rise of new great powers often triggers major global conflict. It lies within the power of Obama and Xi to prove that twenty-first-century Asia can be an exception to what has otherwise been a deeply depressing historical norm.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I agree with Kevin Rudd that China is not an imperialist state - but, see Prof Andrew Basevich, here, who holds that the USA will not tolerate a "near peer."

China, as Xi Jinping knows only too well, must deal with serious domestic issues - especially endemic corruption. It is neither able nor inclined to challenge the USA in the Western Pacific, but it will not tolerate American interference in what it considers its "homelands:" Taiwan and Tibet above all.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Change of pace ...

I found this fascinating collection of pictures of very ordinary Chinese folks on trains.

Most are in "hard sleepers" (six bunks (2 tiers X 3 beds per compartment - no door) or "hard seats" (three abreast). (There are "soft sleepers" (four beds) and "soft seats" and even "special cabins with two beds and a private bathroom, but most ordinary Chinese cannot afford and will not pay for such luxuries. The advent of the new high speed (300+ km/h) trains connecting major centres has been met with mixed reviews - the costs are high and many Chinese prefer longer, less direct, slower and cheaper routes. In the rural regions the cheap, slow trains are the only option.

I traveled with some friends into a fairly remote rural area in one of the "hard sleeper" cars - the people were warm and friendly (just lie almost all people everywhere) and insatiably curious about a foreigner in such a quintessentially Chinese place as the "cheap seats." (There was no "soft" car on that train.) Some of the pictures bring back happy memories.