From The Economist:
China’s leaders face miserable economic-growth figures
The jingxi hotel in Beijing is known for its home-made yogurt—and for hosting some of the most important meetings in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. These gatherings include the “third plenum” of 1978, which confirmed Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power and the opening of China’s economy. From July 15th-18th, the country’s leaders met for
another “third plenum” in this closely guarded venue. With luck, they savoured their yogurt. Because outside the hotel walls, the economy was again turning sour.
Figures released on the opening day of the meeting showed that the economy grew by 4.7% in the second quarter, compared with a year earlier. The number was both weaker than expected and slower than the previous quarter’s figure, when growth seemed to be stabilising. It puts the government’s official growth target for this year—around 5%—in doubt.
Beneath the headline figure, things were even worse. Nominal gdp, unadjusted for inflation, grew more slowly than the adjusted figure. The gap implies that prices across the economy continue to fall. In fact, by this measure, China has suffered its fifth quarter of deflation in a row.
Since China’s housing slump began in mid-2021, economists have feared that the world’s second-biggest economy might follow in the footsteps of Japan, which suffered two lost decades of deflation after asset bubbles burst. By some measures, China is a fast follower. Japan did not enter the fifth quarter of its deflationary spell until the end of 1995, over four years after its property market peaked. In Japan the pattern of falling prices persisted, with few interruptions, for another 18 years.
In both Japan then and China today, deflation is a symptom of lacklustre demand. China’s retail sales, for example, grew by only 2% in nominal terms in June, compared with a year earlier. Vehicle sales shrank by more than 6%. The slump in property rumbles on. Even the push to finish half-built homes, one of the government’s priorities, seems to have lost momentum. The amount of floor space completed by developers in June was almost a third less than a year earlier.
Just as deflation reflects weak spending, it can also cause it. Firms will hesitate to borrow and invest if falling prices mean that the money they must repay is worth more, in real terms, than the money they borrowed. In response to slowing credit growth, China’s central bank could cut interest rates. But it worries that lower rates would weaken China’s currency and erode the profitability of its banks. The central bank’s recent announcements have instead focused on refinements to its policymaking apparatus, helping it prop up bond yields and keep interest rates in a narrower range. It has been more active in sharpening its tools than using them.
Could policy signals from the third plenum come to the rescue? In recent days official media have presented Xi Jinping, China’s ruler, as an “outstanding reformer”, much like Deng. A communiqué on July 18th vowed to “place reform in a more prominent position”, “actively expand domestic demand” and “give better play to the role of the market mechanism”. But these pronouncements may not be convincing enough to lift the mood. The party routinely promises to boost consumption and honour private enterprise. The problem is that it also periodically cracks down on successful firms and forswears consumer-friendly handouts in times of distress. Ultimately, confidence is low not because policy signals have been absent, but because they have been mixed.
Some reforms could even make the country’s cyclical problems worse. Local governments, for example, need new sources of revenue to replace dwindling proceeds from selling land. One answer could be an annual tax on the value of property. However, introducing such a tax would be perverse in the midst of a property slump. Another possibility is expanding China’s consumption tax, which falls mainly on luxuries, like jewellery, and sinful goods, like booze. Yet such a tax would only further depress weak retail sales.
Over the next few days and months, China’s leaders need to keep this balance in mind. Long-term reforms following the plenum must be sweetened with further stimulus spending in the short term. The Jingxi hotel’s yogurt reportedly tastes even better with a sprinkling of sugar. ■