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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

That’s why we need to be judicious in how we talk about our political rivals. Overheated rhetoric can turn into violence pretty quick.

That goes for both sides.
Agreed. When one side is too vociferous and insulting then the moderates will gravitate to the other side.

"if yer not fer us yer agin us" thinking is dangerous.
 
Agreed. When one side is too vociferous and insulting then the moderates will gravitate to the other side.

"if yer not fer us yer agin us" thinking is dangerous.
Problem is, both sides can be vociferous. Partisans become even more radicalized, moderates stay quiet.
 

China’s Strengthening of Nuclear Submarine Capabilities Alters Power Dynamics.​


On June 27, 2024, China demonstrated its unwavering commitment to enhancing its nuclear submarine capabilities, despite encountering challenges such as the serious accident in October last year involving a Type 093 nuclear submarine. The incident resulted in the tragic loss of 55 Chinese Navy personnel.
In recent years, China has vigorously built up its nuclear capabilities, constructing numerous missile silos in the northwest, clearly preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. Originally, China thought 300 nuclear warheads would suffice to deter any major power, but the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw millions of deaths in the US while maintaining social stability, altered Chinese perceptions. The US’s restraint during the Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided China with significant insights. According to a mid-June report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China’s nuclear arsenal reached 500 warheads in January this year, a significant increase of 90 from the previous year. It is estimated that China actually possesses over 1,000 nuclear warheads.
The Pentagon’s annual assessment of China’s military power, released last October, noted that the PLA currently has 60 submarines, including six strategic nuclear submarines, six nuclear attack submarines, and 48 conventionally powered submarines. By 2035, the total number of Chinese submarines is expected to reach 80.

 
From The Economist:

China’s leaders face miserable economic-growth figures​

The jingxi hotel in Beijing is known for its home-made yogurt—and for hosting some of the most important meetings in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. These gatherings include the “third plenum” of 1978, which confirmed Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power and the opening of China’s economy. From July 15th-18th, the country’s leaders met for another “third plenum” in this closely guarded venue. With luck, they savoured their yogurt. Because outside the hotel walls, the economy was again turning sour.

Figures released on the opening day of the meeting showed that the economy grew by 4.7% in the second quarter, compared with a year earlier. The number was both weaker than expected and slower than the previous quarter’s figure, when growth seemed to be stabilising. It puts the government’s official growth target for this year—around 5%—in doubt.

Beneath the headline figure, things were even worse. Nominal gdp, unadjusted for inflation, grew more slowly than the adjusted figure. The gap implies that prices across the economy continue to fall. In fact, by this measure, China has suffered its fifth quarter of deflation in a row.

Since China’s housing slump began in mid-2021, economists have feared that the world’s second-biggest economy might follow in the footsteps of Japan, which suffered two lost decades of deflation after asset bubbles burst. By some measures, China is a fast follower. Japan did not enter the fifth quarter of its deflationary spell until the end of 1995, over four years after its property market peaked. In Japan the pattern of falling prices persisted, with few interruptions, for another 18 years.

In both Japan then and China today, deflation is a symptom of lacklustre demand. China’s retail sales, for example, grew by only 2% in nominal terms in June, compared with a year earlier. Vehicle sales shrank by more than 6%. The slump in property rumbles on. Even the push to finish half-built homes, one of the government’s priorities, seems to have lost momentum. The amount of floor space completed by developers in June was almost a third less than a year earlier.

Just as deflation reflects weak spending, it can also cause it. Firms will hesitate to borrow and invest if falling prices mean that the money they must repay is worth more, in real terms, than the money they borrowed. In response to slowing credit growth, China’s central bank could cut interest rates. But it worries that lower rates would weaken China’s currency and erode the profitability of its banks. The central bank’s recent announcements have instead focused on refinements to its policymaking apparatus, helping it prop up bond yields and keep interest rates in a narrower range. It has been more active in sharpening its tools than using them.

Could policy signals from the third plenum come to the rescue? In recent days official media have presented Xi Jinping, China’s ruler, as an “outstanding reformer”, much like Deng. A communiqué on July 18th vowed to “place reform in a more prominent position”, “actively expand domestic demand” and “give better play to the role of the market mechanism”. But these pronouncements may not be convincing enough to lift the mood. The party routinely promises to boost consumption and honour private enterprise. The problem is that it also periodically cracks down on successful firms and forswears consumer-friendly handouts in times of distress. Ultimately, confidence is low not because policy signals have been absent, but because they have been mixed.

Some reforms could even make the country’s cyclical problems worse. Local governments, for example, need new sources of revenue to replace dwindling proceeds from selling land. One answer could be an annual tax on the value of property. However, introducing such a tax would be perverse in the midst of a property slump. Another possibility is expanding China’s consumption tax, which falls mainly on luxuries, like jewellery, and sinful goods, like booze. Yet such a tax would only further depress weak retail sales.

Over the next few days and months, China’s leaders need to keep this balance in mind. Long-term reforms following the plenum must be sweetened with further stimulus spending in the short term. The Jingxi hotel’s yogurt reportedly tastes even better with a sprinkling of sugar. ■
 
Well, well, well - looky who's headed over for a visit ....
"Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly to Visit China" (CHN embassy, Ottawa)
 
Well, well, well - looky who's headed over for a visit ....
"Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly to Visit China" (CHN embassy, Ottawa)
Probably to grovel at the feet of the Chinese leadership apologizing for our harsh racist views of Chinese people.
 
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