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Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

This is a long thread so I thought I'd try to sum things up, let me know what I missed.
1. Needs good loiter time.
2. Ease of maintenance.
3. Reliability.
4. High number of sorties per day.
5. Can be forward deployed easily with minimum of support equipment.
6. Not fixed to an airfield.
7. Needs advanced detection capabilities.
8. Must have good hot/high performance for deployability.
9. Must be inexpensive.
10. Minimum training and requirement for pilots and ground crew.
11. Easily deployable from Canada.
 
SMax

I'll caveat this by saying that most of our Hornet pilots (IMO) are still pretty damn good at CAS even with the Nighthawk but its time to move past that(Pod I mean). As mentioned previously I understand some of these things are coming and are being held up with Red Tape so I'm not really laying fault here. The first thing we need is the Pod project rectified, a SNIPER Pod will/can work and make sure we get one that hasn't been chopped down, ie no ROVER/MOVER capability, good PODS aren't the end all to be all with CAS but it sure makes it alot easier and quicker. WRT munitions, well once again I'm lead to believe this is held up but something GPS guided would sure come in handy, I know its just a kit but these things have been around for a long time now, time to get on board. I'm thinking GBU-39s SDBs and 49s could easily cover about 90% or more of the CAS drops.And last but not least(well theres more but I'll sum up at 3) we need to start doing LL runs again, some day CF pilots will operate in a High Threat environment and hanging out at 20K won't cut it. To go along with that and to re state Pt 2, on a cloudy or dusty day laser guided doesn't work too well.

These points are strictly my opinion and nothing but, there are probably valid arguments for and against what I said but just expressing what I think. I don't think we need a new a/c just some "accessories".

My 2 cents.
 
Thucydides said:
Do the aircraft carry their own dedicated sensors or are the pilots being cued?

Laser designation or GPS, with target information/location and/or designation by themselves, another manned aircraft, a UAV, or ground observer.

Thucydides said:
What munitions are being used?

I would suspect that everything is precision-guided due to the nature of the targets and environment. A websearch would probably turn up the Israeli inventory.

Thucydides said:
How are the pilots trained to discriminate targets in heavily cluttered environments?

You'd have to ask them.

If they're dropping from high altitude in a permissive environment, they are probably loitering and observing with IR. If low-level, designation is by somebody else. They'd never have time to see the target.
 
For whatever reason, the message itself won't post but here is a link to an interesting story about TF ODIN; which has many of the attributes discussed for a "Green Air Force":

http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/01/fighting-ieds-in-afstan-task-force-odin.html

Enjoy
 
Further on TF ODIN:

http://www.casr.ca/ft-coin-army-aviation-1.htm

Counterinsurgency  Legacy  –  US  Army  Aviation Supports its Own
US  Air  Force  turns  out  to  be  too  Tardy  to  be  Tactically  Useful

Edited  excerpts  from  an  article  published  in  The  Sunday  New  York  Times    [1]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
US Ground Forces dissatisfied  with their dependence on far off  USAF Commander Centres

Ever since the US Army  lost its warplanes  to a newly independent US Air Force after World War II,  soldiers have depended on their sister service for help from the sky  –  from bombing and strafing, to transport  and surveillance. But  the [counterinsurgency]  warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan have frayed the relationship, with  US  Army officers making increasingly vocal complaints that the Air Force is not pulling its weight.

In Afghanistan, Army officers have complained about bombing missions gone awry that have killed innocent civilians.  In Iraq,  US Army officers say that the US Air Force has often been out of touch,  fulfilling only half of  their requests  for the sophisticated  surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find  roadside bombs and track down insurgents.

The US Air Force responds that  it  has only a limited number of  those remotely  piloted  Predator  UAVs  (left),  and other advanced  surveillance  aircraft [ manned or remotely piloted ], so that  priorities  for  assigning them must  be  set  by  senior commanders at  the  local  headquarters  in  Baghdad.  [ Those Baghdad commanders must  then, in  turn, consult ]  with their counterparts  at  the  USAF  Regional  Command  in  Qatar.

In Iraq,  the US Army quietly decided to 'go it alone',  especially in the surveillance missions

[In response, the US Army has] organized an 'all-Army' surveillance unit. [This US Army unit] represents a  new move by  the ground forces towards self-sufficiency,  and  away from 'joint' operations.  Senior aides to US  Defense Secretary  Robert  M. Gates  say  that  he has shown  keen interest in this US Army initiative as a quick way to improve battlefield surveillance.

The work of  the new aviation battalion  was initially kept secret,  but Army officials involved in its planning say it has been exceptionally active.  [They used] remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in  Apache  helicopter  strikes  [using  Hellfire  missiles and  30mm  cannon fire].

The US Army aviation task force became  fully operational  last July, setting up  its  headquarters at  Camp Speicher,  in  the north-central Iraq city of Tikrit. [The aviation task force] has focused its efforts on insurgents [who have been found ]  planting roadside bombs [IEDs]. However,  it has also located and attacked insurgents in battles with US and  Iraqi troops. [ In additon ],  it has supported  Special  Opera- tions  missions intended  to capture or kill  high-value targets in Iraq.

The battalion is called Task Force ODIN. The name is that of  the  Norse god,  but it is also an acronym  for  ' observe,  detect,  identify,  and  neutralize '.  The task force of about 300 people and 25 aircraft is a  'Rube Goldberg' [2] collection of surveillance, communications,  and attack systems.  [ It  is a  lash - up ]  of  manned  and  remotely  piloted  vehicles,  commercial  aircraft with  infrared  sensors  strapped  to the fuselage,  along  with attack  helicopters and  infantry.

The  US  Army  cobbled  together  small  civilian aircraft, including the Beech C-12 [3],  fitting them with advanced  reconnaissance sensors [infrared and radar]. Small, medium, and large remotely pilo- ted surveillance vehicles,  including  Warrior and Shadow  UAVs  [4]  –  carrying  infrared  cameras for night operations and  full-motion video cameras  –  have also  been assigned to TF  ODIN.

All are linked  by radio to  Apache  attack helicopters, with Hellfire missiles and  30-millimeter cannons  –  and  to  infantry  units  in  armoured  vehicles.

The Army  claims  that  civilian  casualties  are  lower  when  they  perform  local  airstrikes

Civilian casualties are always  a risk  in air raids,  particularly  those  attacking  bomb-placing teams that operate in cities and villages. Army officials declined to say whether they believed the casualties  from  the new  US Army raids  included innocent civilians,  but they sought to pre-empt some criticism  by screening an aerial surveillance video  that they said  showed the precise nature of the raids.  The video showed an insurgent who had escaped attack and hid in a courtyard a few feet from a grazing mule.  It then showed  Apache  helicopter fire,  killing the insurgent,  while the  mule was  left grazing  beside  the corpse.

In contrast to  Predators,  which are assigned by  the  top  USAF  headquarters  for  missions all  across  Iraq,  TF ODIN  is  'on  call '  for  commanders  at  the level  of  brigade  and  below. [This is]  an effort  by  the  US  Army  to be  responsive  to the needs of  smaller combat units in direct contact with adversaries  –  [a clear divergence from the USAF concept of readiness].

The Pentagon's  press secretary,  Geoff  Morrell,  said  that  Secretary  Gates  "wants  to  make sure that we are looking at,  not  just  top - down  solutions,  but  also  ground - up  solutions. We  need  to  pay  attention  to  anything  that  works."

Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have strained relations between the services

Army and Marine Corps officers in Afghanistan have complained that Air Force pilots flying attack missions  in  support of  ground operations  do not come in as  low  as their Navy and Marine counterparts.  Instances of civilian casualties from bombing and missile attacks have increased tensions among  the local people. These tensions must then  be eased  by ground commanders, adding to their burden of winning  hearts and minds in the counterinsurgency.

"We are supporting the Army as best we can," Michael W. Wynne,  the departing Air Force Secretary, said Friday.  He said that, as the Army and Marine Corps increased ground forces in Iraq as part of the so-called 'troop surge' over the past year,  the Air Force  quadrupled its number of  sorties  and  increased  its bombing  tenfold.  The number of  surveillance flights by Predators  and  Reapers over  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  has doubled  since  January  2007.

US Army officers who are promoting the new concept have shown senior Pentagon officials classified [ targetting sights ] video clips intended to advertise the service�s increasing  'go-it-alone ' ability. One clip from a remotely piloted vehicle shows an insurgent using palm fronds to smooth dirt over a bomb he had buried late at night along a major convoy route. Moments later, he disappeared in  30- millimeter  fire  from an  Apache, alerted  by  the Army - controlled  UAV overhead.  The Army is asking  for money  to create  a similar unit  in  Afghanistan  within  the  next  six  (6)  months.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1]  Article published under the title,  'Edging away from Air Force,  Army adds Air Unit',
        in  The  Sunday  New  York  Times,  22  June  2008.

[2]  ' Rube  Goldberg '  is  an  American  anachronism  for  the  ' Red  Green '  approach  to
        problem-solving.  It  involves  a lot of  duct  tape  and  a  cheerful,  unrelenting  faith
        in  one's  own  technical  abilities.

[3]  US Army Raytheon Beech C-12R Huron transport aircraft have been modified into ARMS
        (Aerial Reconnaissance Multi-Sensor) carriers known as 'Horned Owls'.  A C-12 is a more
        powerful version of the C90B King Air, used to train Canadian Forces pilots in Manitoba.

[4]  "Warrior" is the General Atomics MQ-12 Sky Warrior (which the US Army prefers to call
        the Warrior-Alpha). "Shadow" is the much smaller AAI RQ-7 Shadow 200 Tactical UAV.

A battalion sized unit of @ 300 personell fielding a mix of aircraft and UAV's sounds like the sort of "Green Air Force" that would be viable, affordable and tactically useful for a deployed Battlegroup. Tweak the mix of aircraft a bit (rugged Caravan STOLs vs Beechcraft "King Airs") and make allowances for the lack of dedicated attack helicopters (either armed UAV's or some sort of weapons package for the Caravans might substitute) and we might be getting somewhere.
 
This is not a "green a** f**ce". It is an Army Aviation Corps/Branch.

Terminology is important. Use "a** f**ce" in the name, and those in blue will think that it is theirs and will try to steal it. It will then shortly cease to serve those whom it was intended to serve.

There is good reason why many countries, this one included, re-formed Army and Naval Aviation components again several years after forming a** f**ces. Task Force ODIN illustrates this quite nicely: "In Iraq, US Army officers say that the US Air Force has often been out of touch, fulfilling only half of their requests for the sophisticated  surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find  roadside bombs and track down insurgents".

Light seized-wing aircraft are not, not, not a substitute for attack helicopters. Neither are armed UAVs.

They may be able to perform some of the function of AHs, but still only fill a narrow niche role at best and lack any capability for employment in a higher threat environment.

There are plenty of other platforms around already which can put bombs and bullets on the ground with sufficient accuracy and in a timely manner, regardless of the threat environment.
 
Loachman said:
This is not a "green a** f**ce". It is an Army Aviation Corps/Branch.

Terminology is important. Use "a** f**ce" in the name, and those in blue will think that it is theirs and will try to steal it. It will then shortly cease to serve those whom it was intended to serve.

There is good reason why many countries, this one included, re-formed Army and Naval Aviation components again several years after forming a** f**ces. Task Force ODIN illustrates this quite nicely: "In Iraq, US Army officers say that the US Air Force has often been out of touch, fulfilling only half of their requests for the sophisticated  surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find  roadside bombs and track down insurgents".

Light seized-wing aircraft are not, not, not a substitute for attack helicopters. Neither are armed UAVs.

They may be able to perform some of the function of AHs, but still only fill a narrow niche role at best and lack any capability for employment in a higher threat environment.

There are plenty of other platforms around already which can put bombs and bullets on the ground with sufficient accuracy and in a timely manner, regardless of the threat environment.

Touched a nerve Loach?
 
All things being equal TF ODIN is great but not sure it qualifies as Close Air Support, if it alerted "armed" UAVs you could say that but seeing how its the AH-64 doing the strike piece its probably closer to CCA than CAS. To go along those lines I could see them changing in Afghanistan to using all branches again, theres alot more UAVs and planes flying around over there than there is 64s. I could just be interpreting the article wrong though too :-\

My 2 cents, the bottom line is getting the upper hand on the INS, who does the sense and who does the strike is irrelevant, as long as it gets done.
 
To go along with the CAS, CCA issue that I raised you could easily make the argument that its neither if no troops are actually around. That would then make it AI I would think.

Bottom line is still the same though.
 
Loachman said:
Merely stating the facts.

Again.

::)    Saying it over and over won't make it a reality or any more valid.  If that was the case, I would be a multi-billionaire.
 
Please point out those things that I said that were not reality or not valid.
 
rampage800 said:
To go along with the CAS, CCA issue that I raised you could easily make the argument that its neither if no troops are actually around. That would then make it AI I would think.

Nope. AI is not an Army mission.

The US Army rightfully considers AHs to be a manouevre element, just like Infantry and Armour. This is simply application of firepower to a target, no different than any other application of firepower to a target.

As far as I can see, "CCA" falls into that category as well. A tank can engage a target a thousand metres from friendly troops, or one in close proximity to them, without need of a fancy name applied to the latter. AHs are no different.

I suspect that the US Army came up with the term as a self-protection measure, ie to avoid confused people referring to certain things that they do as CAS and blurring the lines between the Army AH role and fighters/bombers. There is much more overlap in the two current conflicts than in "normal" wars, and the US Army is protective of its turf.
 
Loachman said:
Light seized-wing aircraft are not, not, not a substitute for attack helicopters. Neither are armed UAVs.

They may be able to perform some of the function of AHs, but still only fill a narrow niche role at best and lack any capability for employment in a higher threat environment.

There are plenty of other platforms around already which can put bombs and bullets on the ground with sufficient accuracy and in a timely manner, regardless of the threat environment.

Since we do not have AH-64s, Supercobras, Tigers, A129 Mangusta etc. to fill the actual "shooter" role, armed UAV's or Cessna Caravans packing "Hellfire" missiles or rocket pods (or machine guns firing out the side door) will have to substitute in this thought experiment.
 
Yea, I agree that AI is not a Army mission........yet, remembering of course that this new program is in its infancy,

Air interdiction (AI) is the use of aircraft to attack tactical ground targets that are not in close proximity to friendly ground forces. It differs from close air support because it does not directly support ground operations and is not closely coordinated with ground units.

The purpose of air interdiction is to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area before they do any harm against friendly forces.


But if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck...................there are obviously some things like coordinating with ground units as to troop loc but I'd have to say that what they're doing is probably more AI than any other mission verb I can think of.
 
Seems that we actually had an aircraft other than the first line fighters to fill the ground attack role.


http://www.malaysian-museums.org/rmaf/

The introduction of this jet strike aircraft marked the end of the "Non-Fighting Force" concept of the RMAF since its formation in 1958. With these CL41G Tebuans No. 6 and 9 Squadrons were formed in August 1967 and September 1969, respectively. The Tebuans were unique since the RMAF 'G' version was not even used by the RCAF. The RMAF was the only operator in the world -- with 20 aircraft and 30 specially modified J85 engines. However, the RMAF managed to keep the aircraft flying for 20 years.

The CL41G Tebuan is an "all through" trainer - from initial through advanced stages of pilot training, including tactical and armament training phases. In a permissive environment, the Tebuan also provides a significant strike capability.

Dam, now where did I put that pot stirring icon........ ;D
 
Loachman said:
Nope. AI is not an Army mission.

The US Army rightfully considers AHs to be a manouevre element, just like Infantry and Armour. This is simply application of firepower to a target, no different than any other application of firepower to a target.

As far as I can see, "CCA" falls into that category as well. A tank can engage a target a thousand metres from friendly troops, or one in close proximity to them, without need of a fancy name applied to the latter. AHs are no different.

I suspect that the US Army came up with the term as a self-protection measure, ie to avoid confused people referring to certain things that they do as CAS and blurring the lines between the Army AH role and fighters/bombers. There is much more overlap in the two current conflicts than in "normal" wars, and the US Army is protective of its turf.

You are correct, however, it is even more subtle than that.  The Marines use their AH as CAS because they understand their role to be the firepower for the guys on or going ashore esp until the artillery can make it to the beach and deploy.  If controlling Marine AH, you use the standard CAS 9-line brief.  Army Avn see their role (as you point out) as a manoeuvre element and they want a mission - i.e. you give them a good read in of the sit and make sure they know where you are, give them a target using a 5-line brief and you basically hand over the fight to them. While there often appears that there is potential for them to be less responsive to the guys on the ground, in reality it is pretty much the same thing as CAS.

As for AI, while the execution of the targets is indeed (by definition) an air mission the selection of those targets is not.  What gets hit is truly based on the level of HQ the AF is supporting because they do not just go randomly bombing targets.  Yes, the AF can also nominate targets but at some level, someone on the ground owns every bit of realestate.  They draw lines on a map detailing who has to deconflict with who, where and when.  And BTW just because the AF nominates a tgt does not mean they hit it.  Joint Fires work both ways and an ATACMS strike on that AD Bty may be just what the doctor ordered before the fast movers come in.  In the end though (regardless of specific distances) if it is determined that there is a need for "detailed coordination" then it becomes CAS.  In today's nonlinear battlefield these lines are less easy to define so the terms often get blurred.  In any case, there are courses on this that last for weeks, so this being a very short post I understand it is extremely basic/general.
 
The Air Force's less-than-timely responsiveness:

1)    I had a 4-day in-theatre swan up to Club Med er, Kabul for a Weapons and Tactics conference on the subject of "Improving Air-Land Cooperation." The participants consisted of about 45 Air Force LCols/Cols (mostly-US), and a whopping 4 Army people -- with the highest rank being Capt. Needless to say, the Air Force perspective prevailed.

One of the USAF taskers insisted, "If you want air support, you MUST request it 72 hours in advance; I don't care if it's VIP travel, ISR, TICs, or a one-off requirement." Yes, it was pointed out that Troops in Contact was tough to schedule; it clashed with his powerpoint, so it didn't seem to register.

2)    Not all Canadians fall under ISAF; some are deployed under OEF. Some of our NATO "allies" refuse to support OEF taskings *cough* France, Holland *cough*  (Before, I despised the Dutch merely because my ex-wife is one)

The bottom line in most endeavours (business as well as war-fighting) -- if you require support, there are fewer snags if you own the requisite capability. If the Canadian Army requires CAS, we really ought to own/deploy CAS assets.

...my bitter, twisted $0.02 anyway


--------------
Mind you, those zoomies can be a pretty funny bunch: "The U2 isn't really a good platform for a Show of Force task – sure we could bring it down to 60,000 feet, but…"
 
I know we've been around and around and around this over and over and over again, and I also know that there are arguments against, but:

The kind of Close Air Support the Canadian Army needs for most of the eventualities it is likely to face* is Army Aviation - attack (at least armed) helicopters in green suit, Army combat arms units..

My opinion, anyway, and it's free and it's worth everything you paid.
-------------------------

* In my opinion these 'eventualities' will occur in Central and West Asia (where we are now), in Africa (where I am around 99% certain we will be, in combat, within about five years) and even in the Caribbean (where we have been and will, almost certainly go again, as the situations deteriorate). These 'eventualities' will involve large, mixed (land/aviation) battle groups of 1,500-2,000 soldiers (maybe even small brigades? - one cavalry regiment (tank squadron + recce squadron + AH squadron) one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, one engineer squadron, maybe one combat logistics unit) serving within larger joint (Canadian land/air) and combined (multinational) forces.

 
I'm sadend by that BS Journeyman, the air types should be there to support the guys on the ground regardless of notice or situation.

Speaking only from this air force guy's perspective, we have always done everything we can to give the guys on the ground what they want, when they want it. We retask airborne at moments, notice, we shut down engines to extend our on-station time, rearange schedules with airports/ATC and stick around until the guys on the ground say they're done. The USMC is always more than happy with our support and requests us over their own Navy assests.

Some of us are in the AF but we're still focused on whats important.
 
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