Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

[McG]

3.  MCG mentioned Sudan, but should we really be basing our force structure planning off of preparing for abjectly poor strategic decisions?  Canada deciding to unilaterally sort out the Sudan, or pretty much in any real contested idea, is – at this point in time - poor, any way you cut it. 

While potentially a poor strategic decision, it is a probable type of task the Canadian government & public will call on us to perform.  As an instrument of the national will, we should be basing our force structure planning on achieving those tasks for which the nation is likely to call on us.  If the Sudan is a bad fit for our current force structure but also the type of mission that Canada is likely to ask of its military, then we absolutely have to address this ... but maybe we are getting broader than the scope of this thread.  For now, I will simply state that I think the Sudan is a suitable model environment against which to assess CAS and AD force design (and any force structure should be assessed against several models of potential operating environments).

1.  Interesting debate on threat assessments, and one that must go with any argument to by any piece of hardware.  What's the threat?  People have a good bogeyman in China, but guys like Thomas Barnett make good cases against that scenario.  White Paper material.

2.  What can be assumed?  Some hard assumptions have to be made - we simply don't have the resources to cover all eventualities (or tailor forces for every niche conflict).  Will we always have air superiority?  My initial thought is that we can count on air dominance, or at least air superiority, for the next decade or so - we don't really go anywhere without the US.  Can we afford to plan against a relatively thin enemy air defence in the near and mid-term future?  Some have made relatively convincing arguments that we can.  Again, White Paper material.

China, North Korea, Iran, etc ... I think these countries constitute the "most dangerous" scenarios, and it is safe to say we probably will not pick a fight with any such nation our own.  When using the most dangerous model to assess our force structure it should be done with our forces in a coalition context.  While our allies might to the heavy hitting to establish air supremacy, we still need to be capable of participating (on the ground & in the air) during these opening stages.  At the same time, we might want to consider the possibility that the US is not present & the heavy lifters are European nations.
  ... and again this might be straying from the topic.

For this thread, the conclusion from my responses above is that we still must plan to be in a fight where there is an organized, sophisticated, and competent enemy Air & AD threat.  We cannot assume the threat away.

5.  This mention of a COIN fighter is silly - I'm unsure of how it has come to dominate this thread.  Dropping bombs and strafing does not constitute "COIN" anymore than a rifleman using a rifle means he is a "COIN Policeman" vice soldier - why should we define a fighter by an operational construct?  This thread is on the verge of creating a false dichotomy of HIC/LIC airpower – that if something is good at dropping bombs on bad guys it is a “COIN fighter”.  How about just a “warfighter” airplane – something that drops bombs on bad guys regardless of what sort of uniform they put on.

+1

We (the Canadian military) cannot afford an aircraft which is only suited to a particular "level of intensity" or specific slice in the spectrum of conflict.  There are plenty of generic terms that can be used without pigeon holing an aircraft into a particular intensity of conflict.  Consider: attack fighter, ground-attack fighter, fighter-bomber, tactical fighter, tactical bomber, close support bomber, strike fighter, light strike aircraft, gunship, etc.  I'm not sure which of these terms is the best fit, and it really should not matter until we've figured out what the capability requirement is.  We should always define the capability requirement and then identify the equipment to best fit.  Otherwise, we end-up with a solution (COIN fighter, FOB CAS, LASSO, Typhoon Gunship, etc) that is looking for its problem.

7.  The other is cost - I once read an interesting article somewhere that measured the cost and time to produce a modern fighter and how if two guys went at it with similar machines that attrition would soon render all super high-tech models obsolete as there is no way they could replaced in good order.  Do an experiment and picture what would happen if we got in a fight with country "X" and 23 CF-18s were shot down in the first week or two of conflict?  How the hell would we replace those?  How long does it take a factory to spit out an F-22 or an F-35 to replace it?  Interesting thought experiment anyways, and something the "low tech" crowd may be right in bringing up?

The same argument could be made of LAVs. It is possible to plan for this and procure reserve war fleets & battle replacement stock.  This may be an unpleasant cost upfront, but it avoids the industrial back-log when the equipment is urgently needed in conflict.

Another big price tag is the pilot.  Freshly trained each is already a seven digit financial investment, and has taken longer to train than is required to manufacture a fighter in production run.

4.  That being said, I think the F-35 is (for all the right reasons) a given.  It can cover off enough vital roles to hit those baseline Air Force requirements (patrol Canadian skies, contribute to allied ops, drop a bomb on something, intercept something) that we can’t avoid getting it.  This thread shouldn’t be an either/or argument, but rather on how to effectively augment the capabilities of this airframe that we will undoubtedly acquire in limited numbers.


6.  I think the crux of what some on this thread were aiming at was an airframe that dealt with two major issues with deploying airpower; the footprint it requires to operate it (airstrips, control towers, etc, etc) and the maintain it (mechanics, vehicles, etc, etc).  This makes employment of the vehicle more likely as it is easier to deploy and sustain on operations.  The “low-tech” solution was put forward, and was intriguing, as a solution to meet these demands; however others may be more feasible/palatable – such as armed mini-UAVs launched from LAVs or something.  Either way, I think the discussion of “Green Airpower” should focus on footprint vice capability to put lead on a target (as most airframes can do so, especially with a good JTAC).

I think we've already seen that any manned fixed-wing aircraft (even if we use 1945 vintage Warthogs) will increase foot print, tie-up more ground combat power, steal resources from more capable multi-role aircraft and not provide any increase in capability.  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40352/post-774643.html#msg774643

If there is an exception to this statement, then it would be an expensive modern A-10 type platform.  Otherwise, we are looking at expensive helicopter or tilt-rotor platforms (and even here there are large resource trade-offs & footprint issues to be addressed).

I still believe that if the F-18 (and its eventual replacement) requires another platform to compliment it in CAS, then that platform is likely a UAV or a family of UAV.

 

[Good2Golf]

One of the biggest problems with this thread is that much of it devolves to debating/discussing the platform-specific issues, vice the capability/effects you want.  At the moment, nothing says persistent CAS like a B-52 out of Diego Garcia loitering for half a day overhead spitting out JDAMs to the JTAC on the ground, when/where required.  If you are a small-medium power and you tie yourself to specific weapon systems for some rather specialized employment, you are setting yourself up for disappointment.  CAS is a doctrinal employment of air power in support of ground force --  a UAV targeting precision fires can be jsut as much CAS as the A-10 rolling in burping with its GAU-8.

Do a proper mission analysis, figure out what you need to do to respond to what the enemy might likely, or in the worst case, do (this solid point noted by our ground-borne brethren - good stuff  :nod: ) in a number of different force employment scenarios and stop when the price tag for the overall capability set gets to high.  It is probably fair to say that Canada is not going to resource capabilities to anything beyond a smaller number of multi-mission capable aircraft -- in fact this is reinforced as there is a drive to reduce numbers of fleets and conduct several mission types with fewer fleets and airframes.


Safe to say that for CAS-like capabilities (in varying degrees of persistence or max effect), you could use a CF-18, a UAV, an Aurora, a Griffon, etc...

What hasn't been discussed in enough detail in this thread is ensuring that the AF develops a clear-enough understanding of what the ground forces need (phrases such as "Air-Land Integration" come to mind), and how best to integrate into that framework to conduct the required missions.  Personally, I still like the USMC's idea of CAS which, while departing slightly from the nice NATO AAP-6 definition, gets no argument from the Leatherneck on the ground, who knows that his/her fellow soldier above them, raining down a variety of munitions (bombs, rockets, 20mm, etc...) is providing ["lower-case"] close air-support.  Ask a Marine if the "grey angel of death" raining down hot 20mm shells from directly overhead him is, or isn't "CAS"... 

Cheers
G2G

 

[time expired]

GOOD2GOLF
                Hit the nail right on the head,Marine air exists purely to
supply the Marine grunt with CAS.read anything about Korea,Vietnam,the
Marines,and anyone else who happened to be blessed with Marine Air
CAS swore by it and wrote that it was head and shoulders above what
ever else was in the air.
              One thing that is always apparent when threads on equipment
acquisition are on this site, is the very low level of expectation that one
senses as though we were still a country of 14 million people.Canada is
one of the riches countries in the World with a population of 32 million,
that is incidentally about half the population of the UK,surely a country
of this wealth and size can afford 24 airframes dedicated to providing
CAS for our deployed troops.
                                      Regards

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

some outstanding points brought up.  I certainly agree that Canada needs to sit down and make a real analysis of what we require. Do we want an Air Defence/interceptor, CAS, and deep strike combination (CF-18, A-10 type, and JSF), or do we just need the AD Capability.  Is there a role for AH? Take it a step further, why not just stand army aviation back up and let the army take care of it's own integral suppport? For my two cents, as an Air Defence guy, I would say the AH is the better bet... cheaper, and can stay on station, and much stealthier... defending against fast air is pretty routine for GBAD, helo is much trickier... plus AH gives you more airmobile options. Just food for thought.

 

[a_majoor]

Infanteer has it right (for me anyway), one of the questions I was trying to address was "footprint".

I have a few blue sky thoughts WRT how this might play out in the mid term (after the F-35 is deployed):

1. UACV's become capable enough to be "trusted" to do the ground support mission. A control aircraft similar to an AWACS will probably be in the area to provide guidance, SA and ensure the ROE's are followed. As this evolves, the control function may be transferred to the back seaters of two place fighters, since the control aircraft will need to be able to survive in an unfriendly sky.

2. Technological advances will bring weapons like lasers and railguns out of SF into real world service. The carrier aircraft will need to be large enough to carry the weapon, power system and sensors, so we are talking about a 747 or "Dreamliner" sized aircraft, but one which can rapidly engage targets from the ground to the edge of space. In this case the "footprint" will change, with several large aircraft orbiting the edge of the battlespace to provide continuous coverage rather than fleets of smaller aircraft based nearby.

3. Technological advances may also bring about a real "green airforce". Small aircraft based on ultralights with limited costs and footprints could literally be carried around by the manouvre force folded up on the back of a LAV or MLVW to provide "instant on" air response to situations. Even smaller aircraft are also possible or even in current service, I believe there is a micro UAV that an individual soldier can carry in a backpack and hand launch to see what is over the next hill. FOG-M missiles also combine the attributes of being portable, allow you to see what is over the next hill and take armed action against a target (and are also usable in all intensities of conflict). This isn't an aircraft per se, but an evolution of the concept (using a small turbine engine or even a propeller for long endurance and being able to recover the FOG-M if nothing shows up) may be possible.

 

[McG]

... I believe there is a micro UAV that an individual soldier can carry in a backpack and hand launch to see what is over the next hill.

Are you thinking of the Skylark, or something smaller?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Predicting technological trends is always fun. I have a book written in 1935 where a master mariner predicted that Merchant ships would have aircraft catapulted off of them for the junior officers to do ice recce! He also predicated coal dust replacing that upstart diesel oil….. 

The UAV world is full of promise. However the wavelength realm has limitations. Of course with super small UAV's, perhaps new AD troops might be issued a long barrelled over and under shotgun! 

 

[MarkOttawa]

A post at Defence of the Realm (lots of links in original):

Gaining momentum
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/08/gaining-momentum.html

From a minority obsession, the deployment of light turboprop strike reconnaissance aircraft to aid the conflict in Afghanistan has achieved the status of an idea whose time has come.

The latest writing on the wall came with a Pentagon briefing reported on 23 July, when Michael Vickers, the acknowledged guru on special operations and low intensity conflict told a small group of defence reporters that upcoming Quadrennial Defence Review (QRD) would be looking at creating "irregular warfare air units" to beef up the US counterinsurgency capability.

The US Navy is SEALs are, of course, already ahead of the game. They are testing leased an EMB-314 Super Tucano aircraft in the desert ranges in California, under a year-long project codenamed "Imminent Fury", picked up recently by Strategy Page.

But now we learn from Flight Global that the US Air Force has issued a "request for information" (RFI) to identify sources that can supply 100 new aircraft to perform light attack and armed reconnaissance.

This is from Air Combat Command, issued on 27 July, calling for aircraft deliveries to start in 2012 and the first operational squadron to activate a year later.

The requirements call for a two-seat turboprop capable of flying up to 30,000ft and equipped with zero-altitude/zero-airspeed ejection seats, full motion video camera, data link, infrared suppressor, radar warning receiver and armoured cockpit. Weapons must include a gun, two 500-lb bombs, 2.75-inch rockets and rail-launched munitions.

The known for competitors for the requirement include the Air Tractor AT-802U, Embraer Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II and Pilatus PC-9 [emphasis added].

The thinking is based on a summary study that concludes that, "As far as can be determined without actual operational testing, the use of light aircraft is suitable, feasible and acceptable", reinforced by a study last year that concluded that a light attack aircraft could save the USAF billions.

This study, conducted by Col Gary Crowder, commander of the Middle East-based Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, complains that there has not been a "substantial ... intellectual investment" into air-ground integration in the 21st Century.

Crowder argues that a platform like the AT-6 could dramatically reduce the number of fighter jets deployed, provide a light observation utility, save thousands of flying hours on the fighter fleet and extend the life of fighter and attack platforms while saving money.

"At the end of five years, you not only have a suitable force that is ... capable of doing counterinsurgency, stability support and peacekeeping operations, you've also saved thousands of flying hours on your F-16s," he says.

But strike/reconnaissance aircraft are not the only options being considered. A week earlier the USAF issued an RFI for as many as 60 light mobility aircraft (LiMA) to airlift up to six passengers or small loads of cargo from austere or unimproved surfaces [emphasis added--new-build Twotters, anyone?
http://www.vikingair.com/content.aspx?id=276 ].

This goes back to our thinking on the utility of such aircraft as the Pilatus Porter. But the concept of using light STOL transport aircraft goes much further back, to the use by British forces in the 1950s and 60s of the Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer (pictured above) the Single Pioneer and even the Beaver.

In fact the idea of fixed-wing re-supply aircraft for mobile formations was exploited during the Second World War, using single-engined Waco biplanes to support the LRDG.

Nor indeed is the idea foreign to the US. During Vietnam, extensive use was made of the DHC-4 Caribou (and other air forces – pictured RMAF, right). The type was operated by the US Army until 1966 when the aircraft were traded to the USAF, under the Johnson-McConnell agreement, in exchange for an end to restrictions on Army helicopter operations.

Therein, actually lie much of the current doctrinal difficulties where, in the UK also, there is an unofficial agreement with the RAF restricting the use of fixed wing aircraft in the Army.

While the issues are being thrashed out in the United States, if there is a debate in the UK about restoring light, fixed wing aviation to the battlefield, it is being carried out in private, with little indication that the Service Chiefs are taking it seriously.

One of the problems, it seems, is that fixed wing aircraft are not seen as a 100 percent answer, providing only supplemental capacity to helicopters on the one hand and fast jets on the other.

As the argument has matured in the US, however, the economic benefits have come to the fore and, as Crowder observes, even if light aircraft take some of the load off existing assets, the overall savings could run into billions.

Certainly, in UK terms, where the media (and political) focus has been on increasing helicopter capacity, much of the capability could be achieved by light, fixed wing assets, at considerably less cost. Where Apaches are currently used to escort Chinooks, for instance (in which role they struggle to keep up with the faster transport helicopters) aircraft such as the Tucano could do the job better.

Equally, STOL transport aircraft could deliver to FOBs [emphasis added] – even parachuting supplies in – and support mobile formations, delivering supplies, transferring personnel and even evacuating casualties - as well as radio relay and reconnaissance. They have a possible additional role as a light gunship.

It is a measure of the paucity of the UK scene, therefore, that such ideas are not being openly discussed, or that the Armed Forces themselves are not initiating a debate as a cost-effective way of relieving some of the pressure on air assets in Afghanistan. The debate needs to move on from capacity to capability.

Nevertheless, the rediscovery of light aviation is gaining momentum and, one supposes, three or four years hence, the British media will suddenly wake up to the idea, unless there happens to be a journalist out there who can actually kick-start our military into action. We live in hope.

Comment thread:
http://umbrellog.com/forum3/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1007733

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Loachman]

Nice-sounding chaps, but they are flopping in the dark, and living in the past - completely oblivious to modern technology and its capability (thermal imagery, synthetic aperture radar, GPS guidance).

This is not WWII, Korea, or Vietnam anymore.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The problem with the article is they deal with 2 distinct issues. Resupply/transport and light CAS

I suspect the Super Turnaco (spelling?) will have a fairly decent sensor suite.

As for remote base resupply, it has a certain appeal, however a short strip means more area to guard and a much more predictable approach than a helo requires. That being said I have seen Beavers, Porters plunk down and take off in some remarkable bad landing areas here in Canada and in South America (the term strip likely would not even apply). Also as far as the US is concerned, you are now chomping on the territory that the Osprey is supposed to fill, that will not go over well I bet.
The authors forget that the causality rates of these aircraft just from accidents was fairly high, both in military and civilian use. Squeezing a heavily loaded aircraft onto a small strip, often with the worst possible alignment of rocks, winds and slope is a guaranteed to cost you a few aircraft.

All being said the approach make sense for smaller militaries who can afford enough helo’s to support operations. 

 

[YZT580]

DHC5, DHC4, DHC2.  I guess Viking is going to be trying to market their aircraft in lots more places besides OW and for lots more reasons than S&R.  If I remember my history correctly remote resupply was the reason for the Caribou and Buffalo and it was only when the airforce took over fixed wing from the army that helicopters became the vehicle of choice because the air force refused to use the short strips.  What ever is old is new again!

 

[Loachman]

What ever is old is new again!

Some things should just be allowed to stay old.

 

[GAP]

Regarding Mark's Post....

There's a valuable place for an aerial observer with good SA...I'm not all that in love with the 2-500lb bombs, but the rest sounds about right.

We loved when the fast movers came in, but mostly they came in after the birddog vectored them in.....we knew they would hit what we wanted because birddog was doing overwatch.

The article points out some of the stuff they want to do, and like all hierarchies they are taking a tin cup and making it into the holy grail sans rockets/bombs/super sensors/etc. etc......  simply use it the way it was meant to be used.

 

[aesop081]

because the air force refused to use the short strips. 

Source ?

 

[GAP]

And then you have this.....

Air Force may buzz before bombing in Afghanistan
(AP) – 1 hour ago
Article Link

SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, S.C. — The Air Force general in charge of the air war in Afghanistan says a new strategy means warplanes in some cases may be buzzing rather than bombing some insurgents.

Lt. Gen. Gilmary Hostage said Thursday that his job is to support the strategy of winning Afghan support as formulated by the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. As part of that, McChrystal imposed restrictions on air power to limit civilian casualties.

Hostage told reporters at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina his forces can easily drop bombs with pinpoint accuracy.

But the three-star general said that at times, it may be better to fly low over enemy forces and disperse them with noisy warplanes that threaten with firepower but don't immediately unleash it.
More on link

 

[YZT580]

To Cdn Aviator: Here are the figures the army used for the caribou. 

Two piston engines are mounted in the wings’ leading edges, and the engine nacelles extend beyond leading edges. Powered by two Pratt & Whitney engines of 1,450 hp each, it cruised at 149 knots with a service ceiling of 27,500 ft. It is designed to take off and clear a 50-foot obstacle in a distance of 1040 feet with zero wind. With a 20-mile headwind, the takeoff distance over a 50-foot obstacle is just 460 feet. Its landing distance is just over 590 feet while clearing a 50-foot obstacle. These characteristics enabled the Caribou to operate out of tiny jungle landing strips, from beachheads, or from improvised military landing strips as short as 850 feet. The wings are high-mounted with straight leading edge and forward-tapered trailing edge from engines to the blunt tips. The fuselage is slab-sided with a solid, rounded nose and stepped cockpit. The tail flats are mid- to low-mounted on the tail fin and tapered with blunt tips. The large fin is tapered with blunt tip.


When the air force took it over they added about a third to the requirements: ending the close in resupply missions.  Article is from Global Security.org.  The air force refused to use the figures that the army pilots were using and instead went to the DH published figures which are about 1000 feet, as shown above

 

[a_majoor]

The Iraqi Air force gets more punch:

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A65bfc2c9-0f02-462d-8af9-ad7f060c30c8

Armed Bread Box for Iraqi Air Force
Posted by David A. Fulghum at 10/15/2008 9:29 AM CDT

Right now, the new strike capability for the Iraqi Air Force is flying out of a civilian airport in Fort Worth and will be delivered to Iraq starting in December.

Two Cessna Grand Caravan 208Bs, armed with a pair of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles each, were photographed flying out of Meacham Airport earlier this month. The field has no official military presence, but it is the home of a major ATK Integrated Systems major modification facility and the armed Caravan is one of its projects.

Also operating out of ATK’s shops are C-130s, a deHavilland Dash-8 and a Swearingen Metro IV all heavily modified for clandestine ISR operations, say those with knowledge of the field’s operations.

In Dec. the IqAF will receive the first three armed Cessna Caravans -- with laser designators for the missiles -- followed by two more in early 2009, says Brig. Gen. Brooks Bash, current chief of the coalition air force transition team.

The IqAF is already flying a number of unarmed Caravans for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), VIP transport and pilot training and it is expecting its armed Caravans by year’s end.

In July, the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq signed over eight Cessna 172s as primary trainers and three Cessna Caravan 208s as advanced trainers to the Iraqi Defense Ministry for the Iraqi Air Force’s training program at Kirkuk AB. The plan is to train 130 new pilots annually. The service’s projected size is 6,000 airmen and 133 aircraft by late 2009.

The olive-drab Caravans have with no national markings, but they do carry an off-colored rectangle near the top of the vertical stabilizer where Iraq puts national flag markings on its military aircraft. The aircraft are fitted with an EO/IR surveillance sensor ball offset to the left side of the aircraft. The engine exhaust is offset to the right to avoid interference with the IR sensor. The sensor ball, targeting pods and missiles will be the same as those on the Predator UAV. A pod on the leading edge of the right wing of the Caravan holds a weather radar. The aircraft also has missile warning sensors on the tail and nose and what appears to be chaff and flare dispensers for self protection.

 

[a_majoor]

Looking at more out of the box solutions:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2009/11/missile-delivered-uavs.html

Missile Delivered UAVs

The US Army is funding Missile Delivered UAVs amongst dozens of other projects

A10-006  Missile Delivered UAV
A10-010  Real-time Visualization Tool for Distributed Intrusion Detection System Data
A10-011  Intelligent Agents for Improved Sensor Deployment and Surveillance
A10-012  Coordinated Responses through Knowledge Sharing in Mobile Agent-Based Intrusion Detection Systems
A10-013  Intrusion Detection System (IDS) With Automatic Signature Generation for Self Healing Networks
A10-014  Spoofing Network Architectures in Response to Hostile Reconnaissance
A10-015  Linearity Improvement of MMIC Power Amplifiers at Reduced Output Power Backoff
A10-016  Wideband Multi-Carrier Digital Up-Converter
A10-017  Indium Surface Preparation for Improved Flip-Chip Hybridization
A10-018  In-Vacuo Passivation of High Aspect Ratio HgCdTe Surfaces
A10-019  Electronically Switchable infrared Beam Splitter Technology
A10-020  Advanced Molded Glass Lenses
A10-021  Lightweight, Wide Field-Of-View Wave-guided Head-mounted Display
A10-022  Innovative Annealing Apparatus for Mercury-Based, Compound Semiconductors
A10-023  Untethered Real Time Low Cost Head Tracking
A10-024  Real-Time Vis-SWIR Multispectral Sensor for Day/Night Operations
A10-025  Large Format Dual Band FPA ROIC for Low Flux Environments
A10-026  A Viable Method for Metal Nano-Coating of Graphite Microfibers
A10-027  Improved Methods of Explosively Disseminating Bi-Spectral Obscurant Materials

A10-028  Innovative and Novel Concepts for Eye-Safe Wavelength High Power Fiber Lasers for Increased Performance
A10-029  Flux Compression Generators
A10-030  Electromagnetic Attack Detector
A10-031  Lightweight Nanosatellite Propulsion System to Enhance Battlespace Awareness and Battle Command Capabilities
A10-032  Information Security and Trust in a Space Communications Network

    OBJECTIVE

    To develop innovative concepts to provide near real-time situational awareness on the battlefield with the possibility of providing a quick response attack.

    DESCRIPTION

    ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platforms delivered from missiles can potentially provide battlefield information that is only seconds old when transmitted from long ranges. This information is particularly valuable since it is so current. It provides the potential for striking a very mobile enemy before he has time to alter his position. In addition, it also offers the possibility of a deep strike by the platform itself.

    Among the potential ISR platforms that have recently been proposed/developed/built are a large number of UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) and LAM (loiter-attack missile) concepts. Some of these concepts have the potential of being packaged in a missile and carried for long distances from their launch point. Obviously, the quicker the missile arrives in the vicinity of the targets, the more valuable the information being transmitted to the war fighter for use in targeting the enemy and/or providing situational awareness and/or providing battle damage information. The use of any existing components for this system obviously is important since the cost of the system is directly affected.

    PHASE I: This solicitation seeks innovative concepts to deliver an ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platform that reports back in near real-time and provides the possibility of a long-range strike mission at the end of the ISR mission. Technical approaches formulated in Phase-I shall place emphasis on minimization of the delay in providing battle field information and attacking the enemy target complex. Phase-I concept development shall include simulated fly-outs of the system to determine flight parameters of interest (area-time coverage, maximum and minimum range, dispense altitude, operational altitude, etc.) and, thus, establish the potential for Phase-II success.

    PHASE II: The technical approach formulated in Phase-I will be developed and refined for full-scale flight simulation. The contractor shall pay particular attention to the dispense of the ISR platform from the missile accounting for any aero-propulsion interference between the platform and missile. The contractor will also pay particular attention to the missile proposed for delivery of the ISR system to insure there are no incompatibilities between the delivery mission and the original operational requirements of the missile (center-of-gravity, angle-of-attack, flight velocity, etc.). The critical flight phase of the concept shall be refined and the dispense of the ISR platform planned for a test in a full scale, Government owned ground test facility using instrumented tunnel models at a fidelity level deemed appropriate at that time. Tunnel time will be provided as GFE; tunnel models will be developed under Phase-II.

    PHASE III: If successful, the end result of this Phase-I/Phase-II research effort will be a validated concept and set of validated research tools for the dispense, by AMRDEC, of a ISR platform from a tactical missile. The transition of this product will require additional upgrades of the software tool set for a user-friendly environment along with the concurrent development of application specific data bases to include the required input parameters such as vehicle geometries, aerodynamic and aero-propulsion properties, and performance parameters.

    For military applications, this technology is directly applicable to the battle field awareness provided from UAVs and other ISR platforms. Currently, this information is near real-time and is not provided for any long range battle field situations. There are no known commercial applications for this technology at this time; however, it is conceivable that search/rescue and wild fire control operations that have a very short time line could benefit directly from this technology product.

    The most likely customer and source of Government funding for Phase-III will be those service project offices responsible for the development of battle field situational awareness specifically using UAV ISR platforms. Indeed, the expansion of UAV capabilities and missions throughout the armed services continues as one of the most promising areas of research as evident in Reference 1 which forecasts a combined service and industry near term investment of over $20 billion.

 

[a_majoor]

Here is the ultimate in reducing footprint:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/killer-micro-drone/

Air Force Completes Killer Micro-Drone Project

    * By David Hambling Email Author
    * January 5, 2010  |
   
The Air Force Research Laboratory set out in 2008 to build the ultimate assassination robot: a tiny, armed drone for U.S. special forces to employ in terminating “high-value targets.” The military won’t say exactly what happened to this Project Anubis, named after a jackal-headed god of the dead in Egyptian mythology. But military budget documents note that Air Force engineers were successful in “develop[ing] a Micro-Air Vehicle (MAV) with innovative seeker/tracking sensor algorithms that can engage maneuvering high-value targets.”

We have seen in recent years increased strikes by larger Predator and Reaper drones using Hellfire missiles against terrorist-leadership targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But these have three significant drawbacks.

First, you can never be quite sure of what you hit. In 2002’s notorious “Tall Man incident,” CIA operatives unleashed a Hellfire at an individual near Zhawar Kili in Afghanistan’s Paktia province. His unusual height convinced the drone controllers that the man was Bin Laden (who stands 6 feet, 5 inches). In fact, he was merely an innocent (if overgrown) Afghan peasant.

A second problem is that the Hellfire isn’t exactly the right weapon for the mission. Originally designed as an anti-tank missile, it’s not especially agile, nor is it designed to cope with a target that might swerve or dodge at the last second (like cars and motorbikes).

And thirdly, such strikes tend to affect a number of others, as well as the intended target. It raises the risk of killing or injuring innocent bystanders.

This was the rationale for Project Anubis. Special Forces already make extensive use of the Wasp drone made by AeroVironment. This is the smallest drone in service, weighing less than a pound. It has an endurance of around 45 minutes, and line-of-sight control extends to 3 miles.

It might seem limited compared to larger craft, but the Wasp excels at close-in reconnaissance. Its quiet electric motor means it can get near to targets without their ever being aware of its presence.

The Air Force’s 2008 budget plans described the planned Project Anubis as “a small UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] that carries sensors, data links, and a munitions payload to engage time-sensitive fleeting targets in complex environments.” It noted that after it was developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Anubis would be used by Air Force Special Operations Command. The total cost was to be just over half a million dollars.

No official announcements have been made since then, and the Air Force did not return a request to comment on this story (hardly surprising for a weapon so likely to be used covertly). But the current Air Force R&D budget does mention the effort, briefly. This newer document refers to Project Anubis as a development that has already been carried out. According to the budget, $1.75 million was spent to reach the goal.

The current state of Project Anubis is unknown. It could be one of tens of thousands of military research efforts that started, made some progress and ended without a conclusion. Or Anubis could now be in the hands of Air Force Special Operations Command.

If so, Anubis would solve both of the problems associated with the Predator-Hellfire combination. It would follow and catch the most elusive target, and its ability to take a video sensor close to the target should mean it can be positively identified before the operator has to make a go or no-go decision.

(There may be a classical reference here: The god Anubis was responsible for weighing the hearts of the dead to judge whether they would have eternal life. The Project Anubis MAV will have to make similarly fine judgments.)

A tiny warhead, weighing a fraction of a pound, could mean extremely little collateral damage, compared to the 20-pound warhead on a Hellfire.

I reported in 2007 on a rumor that the miniature Wasp drone (photo at top) might get a lethal “sting.” It now appears that word of this new weaponry was more than idle talk.

 

[a_majoor]

This is about the ultimate in micro UAV's and even is controlled by an iPhone or iPod touch. Most of the troops would have their own control interfaces without any DND purchase!:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2010/01/ces-2010-parrot-ar-drone-and-duck-hunt.html

CES 2010 - Parrot AR Drone and Duck Hunt Extreme

The Parrot ARDrone is the first quadricopter that can be controlled by an iPhone or iPod Touch

* made of carbon fiber and PA66 plastic
* MEMS and video for intuitive piloting
* two cameras, wifi and video streaming
* image processing software for augmented reality
* 5 meters/sec or 18 km/hour
* 15 minute running time
* lithium polymer batteries
* 360-400 grams (a little less than one pound)

OK you probably won't use this to drop bombs or kill bad guys directly,  but you could get close enough to guide in fire from almost any platform available (imagine this linked to a sniper, for example).