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Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

Colin,

Increasing, we use simulators to keep pilots current. They are relatively immune to fleet groundings. And simulators do not incur the o&m trail airplanes do (not to say the Simulators are free- they are anything but).

The prop CAS thing is a non-starter in Canada. CAS (in the rocket firing, strafing sense that you mean it) is dead in all but the most permissive of environments. IMHO...

 
E.R. Campbell said:
I agree ... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to aviation, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.

If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.

And therein lies the rub.  Would Army Aviation be recognized by folks in the (other) Combat Arms corps as another Cbt Arm, or a glorified "battle taxi and escort" service? 
 
Dimsum said:
And therein lies the rub.  Would Army Aviation be recognized by folks in the (other) Combat Arms corps as another Cbt Arm, or a glorified "battle taxi and escort" service?

They should be and if I am ever in a position to bring Tac Aviation into the fold I will do my utmost to make it happen. 

There really should be three definitions of what a combat team is:

Infantry-led
Armour-led
Aviation-led

The Army needs to arrive in the 21st century and start envisioning a three-dimensional battle space.
 
Aviation in the US Army is a combat arm.  The CA isn't, and will never be, IMO, a proponent of AH.  The rest is a moot point.  Canada will never have an Aviation Branch within its Army.  It would impact its own wishes and desires far too greatly.  For the same reason, the CA will never make a bona fide case for CAS integral to the RCAF/CAF. 

Call me from Missouri, but if the Army can't even work out its inter-Branch promises for indirect fires and engineering support, who actually believes it would care any more for aviation support?

Banana republic prop-driven or cheap jet counter-insurgency CAS is a solution looking for a problem where Canada is concerned.

'Tis what it is...
 
Colin P said:
the F-22 is an example that quickly comes to mind for being grounded, not to mention the F-35 fleet has already been grounded once for engine issues, plus the F-15, F-16 (i know it's age related) .

F35 is still in development. There are very few flying, and no operational need to fly with even minimum shortcomings.

Whole-fleet grounding is rare, and brief. It is even more rare when there is an operational imperative to fly. That imperative is reduced when a comparable fleet is available. It is still not a significant concern.

Colin P said:
A pilot flying the "cheaper aircraft" is practicing the other skillsets other than flying the top line machine. As I recall, lot's pilots flew in the older birds to keep their flight status up as there was not enough flying hours and CF-18's for them otherwise.

Up until around the late 1980s, and possibly early 1990s, flying bases kept a handful of CT133s around, mainly for the use of Pilots who were not on the strength of an active Squadron. There is an expense associated with that, and it was ultimately determined to not be worthwhile - especially as the purpose behind maintaining these machines was more likely more morale- and aircrew allowance-related than operationally-driven. Regaining currency, when required following a staff posting, is not a big deal. The actual flying skill is not what fades so much, but the procedural knowledge, which would have to be refreshed on the operational type anyway. I do not see any operational benefit from acquiring and maintaining a machine that has no operational reason for existing simply to provide what is essentially recreational flying.

Colin P said:
When a fighter pilot leaves, we lose those skills

When anybody leaves, we lose their skills. So what?

Why cater to one of the smallest groups, that also has, most likely, the highest maintenance cost - with an associated high cost of returning to full operational status, presuming that members of this group would even be available for operational re-activation? I would rather spend money keeping the skills of the active aircrew sharp and their mounts up-to-date and sound. And, unless there are spare cockpits around, ie insufficient active crews for all of the aircraft available, this additional expense is useless. Into what would we "surge" these people?

Colin P said:
I think the RCAF is terrified of putting anything else on the table that might allow the politicians an excuse not to buy the F-35 or reduce the numbers even further.

I think that there is no justifiable need for an expensive plaything.

Colin P said:
and why would you not want the RCAF to train with the army in the use of CAS?

I did not say that. You were talking about Reserve Pilots. It is a challenge to maintain simple basic currency for part-timers. Expecting them to be sufficiently proficient in CAS is extremely unrealistic. The only thing that save a bunch of people - and me - from being shot up by a new CF5 guy in 1983 was the fact that it was a dual rather than a single and therefore had no guns so the target was engaged with a 33 lb BDU (Bomb Dummy Unit) instead, which went low over our heads.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I agree ... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to aviation, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.

If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.

ERC, exactly, same for Naval Air.

We have created a unique situation in Canada where institutional the Army and Navy neither understand nor care about Aviation, and the Air Force (who own all the aircraft) neither care about nor understand the Army or Navy.

In that environment, CAS and AH, or a littoral maneuver ship, are all just dreams.

So much for th Unified CAF being Joint... we are less Joint than most.

I think the only way it will change is for us to actually experience a failure.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
Colin,

Increasing, we use simulators to keep pilots current. They are relatively immune to fleet groundings. And simulators do not incur the o&m trail airplanes do (not to say the Simulators are free- they are anything but).

The prop CAS thing is a non-starter in Canada. CAS (in the rocket firing, strafing sense that you mean it) is dead in all but the most permissive of environments. IMHO...

do the simulators count as flight time hour for hour? Is there a requirement for x amount of real flight time vs simulator hours?
 
Baz said:
ERC, exactly, same for Naval Air.

We have created a unique situation in Canada where institutional the Army and Navy neither understand nor care about Aviation, and the Air Force (who own all the aircraft) neither care about nor understand the Army or Navy.

In that environment, CAS and AH, or a littoral maneuver ship, are all just dreams.

So much for th Unified CAF being Joint... we are less Joint than most.

I think the only way it will change is for us to actually experience a failure.


That's my perception, too. When I first joined this forum, over a decade ago, I used the name Rusty Old Joint Rusty and Old were to describe my skills and knowledge and me, personally, but I added Joint because my last job was head of a small, specialized joint staff directorate in NDHQ, and a lot of my earlier experience had involved joint environments, including some work with the old 10TAG (10th Tactical Air Group) and with the UK Navy.

Like many I was excited by the integration/unification exercise ~ especially at the notion that we, in Mobile Command had organic air, including "fast air" and smaller fixed wing tactical transports. We were all in the same suits and our pilots wore a mix of RCAF, Canadian Army (mostly RCAC and RCASC, but some gunners and a few RCCS folks, too) and even a couple of RCN badges, but we were all transitioning to a single uniform and we would be a fully unified command ... we thought/hoped.

It all went pear shaped ... we tried to revive the idea when I was in Staff College, but Air Command was having none of it: our air force colleagues were actually warned off even discussing it in syndicate ... but many, including many "fast air" and transport guys wanted the Navy and Army to "own," properly own and be responsible for, their own aviation. So, over 25ish years I watched us go from a really joint structure to three, single service stove pipes that barely even talk to one another.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I agree ... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to aviation, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.

If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.

Why do you have Attack Helicopters to choose from?  I would argue it is in large part because the Air Force wouldn't fly Sky Raiders and wouldn't let the US Army fly them either.  The only service that had a niche need for Attack Helicopters was the USMC and much of their support work was being done from fixed wing carriers.  The Harrier was acquired by the Marines as an alternative to Pappy Boyington's Corsairs flying from grass fields.  For the USMC CAS includes F-18s, AV-8Bs, AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys.

I leave it to the experts to decide which is the most effective platform and the easiest target.

douglas_a1d_karstenpalt_t.jpg


Skyraider on a grass field. 400 m to take off and 800 m to land.  Was it important to develop attack helicopters when that capability already existed
 
RoyalDrew said:
They should be and if I am ever in a position to bring Tac Aviation into the fold I will do my utmost to make it happen. 

There really should be three definitions of what a combat team is:

Infantry-led
Armour-led
Aviation-led

The Army needs to arrive in the 21st century and start envisioning a three-dimensional battle space.

Perhaps this is leading us back to threads on returning TACHEL (and perhaps more AIR elements) to the ARMY.
 
Chris Pook said:
The only service that had a niche need for Attack Helicopters

There is nothing "niche" about AHs.

The US Army considers Aviation to be a Combat Arm for good reason. They get much better support from their Aviators than they ever did from the USAF or its US Army Air Corps predecessor because those Aviators are members of the same organization just as any Infantry, Armor (US spelling intentional), or Artillery person is. They live, train, fight, and die with each other.

AHs do not provide CAS. AHs are heavily-armed vehicles with rotary wings for mobility instead of wheels or tracks. AH units are manoeuvre units, like Armor and Infantry. They conduct blocks, counter-attacks, raids, and ambushes etcetera with or without accompanying ground troops mounted in utility helicopters.

Chris Pook said:
Skyraider on a grass field. 400 m to take off and 800 m to land.  Was it important to develop attack helicopters when that capability already existed

Yes, or it would not have been done. Early gunships escorted UHs conducting air assaults, provided indirect fire support (there were Aerial Rocket Artillery units in Vietnam, with large, boxy 2.75-inch rocket super-pods on each side of UH1s), and conducted very close armed reconnaissance missions (generally as part of Cavalry "Pink" Teams).

AH support is much more intimate, and Much Closer than Close Air Support.

Just imagine how wonderful everything would be with the RCN providing all watercraft support to RCE units because everything that floats has to be Navy.
 
How about this; cheap and effective.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Tractor_AT-802#Specifications_.28AT-802U.29
 
George Wallace said:
Perhaps this is leading us back to threads on returning TACHEL (and perhaps more AIR elements) to the ARMY.

And MH (and one can argue LRP) to the Navy.  Prob less with LRP now that there is a big overland surveillance mission.
 
Colin P said:
do the simulators count as flight time hour for hour? Is there a requirement for x amount of real flight time vs simulator hours?

As it stands, to satisfy NATO expeditionary requirements, we need to fly 180 hours a year of which, 40 can be flown in simulators.  I would not be surprised to see this number increase as simulators get better. A lots of the currency items can be done in the simulator (mostly non-tactical stuff right now, but I would not be surprised to see this change)

For the F-35, there is probably a bunch of things that we will only be allowed to do in simulators so we don't give away critical capabilities. 

 
And emergency responses can be practised in simulators that cannot be practised in a real aircraft, as they are either too dangerous or the emergency cannot be simulated in the real aircraft. There are other benefits, too, from relatively simple but networked systems - multi-aircraft tactical missions can be planned to the same degree whether the mission is conducted in the real aircraft or in simulators. There is little transferable flying skill involved, but more missions can be run in a shorter period at much lower cost,  and none are subject to the vagaries of serviceability or weather. The main intent is to confirm planning and orders and inter-crew communications and co-operation.
 
Loachman said:
.....
Just imagine how wonderful everything would be with the RCN providing all watercraft support to RCE units because everything that floats has to be Navy.
  ;D

 
So we should be investing in more of this stuff and distributing it to armouries and stone frigates across Canada?

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You would be beating them off with sticks on Wednesday nights (and every other night of the week).

 
Well I bought the early Steel Beasts, the Pro series and had a friend who saved a fortune getting his twin engine certificate using a flight sim that counted to his hours. I think simulators are fabulous and a great economy. However they can't bomb the enemy and for that you need real air frames. The question is how many and what types.
 
Colin P said:
However they can't bomb the enemy and for that you need real air frames.  The question is how many and what types.
I think the "what type" has been answered above as a modern multi-role fighter.
 
And, more specifically, F35.
 
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