Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

[Kirkhill]

Loachman - Harvards, Tutors and Hawks are not considered combat viable in Canada (well, to be fair the Tutor isn't combat capable anywhere),  but Harvards and Hawks are armed in other Air Forces.  And I doubt if the Hawk is much different in price than this Scorpion thingy.

I do not challenge the need to focus on the CF18 replacement - and I support purchasing the F35.  But the RCAF, even the fixed wing branch, has other aircraft that need replacing.  Don't they? 

If there is a price saving to be had in purchasing non-combat capable trainer and the training value is equal then I am all for minimizing that expenditure to maximize the front line effort. 

But....

If there is minimal difference in price between a platform on which you can attach weapons and one which you can't, couldn't it be considered?

 

[SupersonicMax]

Loachman - Harvards, Tutors and Hawks are not considered combat viable in Canada (well, to be fair the Tutor isn't combat capable anywhere)

Il all fairness, the Malaysians bought Tutors to use as Air-to-Surface Attack aircraft

 

[Loachman]

Loachman - Harvards, Tutors and Hawks are not considered combat viable in Canada (well, to be fair the Tutor isn't combat capable anywhere),  but Harvards and Hawks are armed in other Air Forces.  And I doubt if the Hawk is much different in price than this Scorpion thingy.

We do not own the Harvards and Hawks. The Tutors will eventually be replaced, yes, but most likely with the cheapest jet trainer that can be found/bought from Bombardier.

What military organization of significance uses Hawk as a combat aircraft? We had a CAS aircraft at one time that was described as "an excellent aircraft if you wanted to bomb the end of your own runway". That was the CF5. Payload or fuel, but not much of both.

"Cheap" aircraft are not so cheap when one has to factor in cost of more aircraft to drop the same number of bombs as one "pricey" one, the cost of more personnel to fly and maintain the additional aircraft, the hangar costs to house the additional aircraft, and the cost in lives and mission failure if we ever have to use them for real.

Stop thinking about airframes and think, instead, of the desired operational effect and then look for the best method of achieving it.

I do not challenge the need to focus on the CF18 replacement - and I support purchasing the F35.  But the RCAF, even the fixed wing branch, has other aircraft that need replacing.  Don't they?

Neither Scorpion nor Hawk can carry enough cargo or people or ASW kit or SAR Techs or fly far enough or hover.

If there is minimal difference in price between a platform on which you can attach weapons and one which you can't, couldn't it be considered?

There is more involved than simply "attaching weapons". Are the weapons that can be attached actually useful? Can enough be carried? Can they be carried far enough? Can they be delivered accurately? Can the machine survive in combat? What will our allies think and say? Do we want to be perceived by allies and potential enemies as a serious force or not? Why waste the money?

Il all fairness, the Malaysians bought Tutors to use as Air-to-Surface Attack aircraft

They bought four, which could each carry two small bombs and were used for counter-insurgency for twenty years. Not really what I would consider to be a "combat" aircraft".

Three of these were eventually registered in the US by civilians, but I've never seen any indication of them flying (nor have I looked for such).

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm gonna stop.  Honest I am.

I didn't want this to become about the aircraft.  I was just curious about the procurement thought process that allows for purchasing kit that "might come in handy" to see what can be done with it operationally.  That was it.  Full stop.

I am not promoting the cause of a light attack craft.  That doesn't mean that I think it is wrong for some to suggest there are benefits.

But.....

Before I go

From Wiki

Hawk 200[edit]
Main article: British Aerospace Hawk 200

Hawk 208 of the Royal Malaysian Air Force
The Hawk 200 is a single-seat, lightweight multi-role combat aircraft for air defence, air-denial, anti-shipping, interdiction, close air support, and ground attack.[27]

Hawk 203 – Export version for the Royal Air Force of Oman. (12)
Hawk 205 – Proposed export version for the Royal Saudi Air Force.
Hawk 208 – Export version for the Royal Malaysian Air Force. (18)
Hawk 209 – Export version for the Indonesian Air Force. (32)

Apparently something over 1000 have been built - including 221 for the USN as trainers - and at least some of the clients have attached weapons and used them to "supplement" front line capability.  Indonesia, Malaysia and Zimbabwe (smile if you want) have considered and/or employed them as "combat" aircraft.  Finland bought them as trainers to employ them as fighters (ducking under the terms of a 1947 treaty with the USSR) and the RAF employed some between 83 and 88 as short range interceptors.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAE_Systems_Hawk#United_Kingdom

Again, I am not promoting.  Neither the Hawk, nor the Scorpion, nor the role.

I am intrigued by the concept of buy and then try.

And just a final point.  We may not own the Harvards and the Hawks - but we certainly paid for them.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The flaw in all this musing about the Scorpion is that we (the CF) does not own the Hawk. Our contractor in Moose Jaw does. The contractor provides jets, parts and technicians to the CF for a price.

So, if you want Sqns of Scorpions for the RCAF, what are you prepared to give up? Because PYs are a zero sum game in the CF and no HQ ever shut itself down to provide PYs for a new capability....

Perhaps a replacement that the RCAF owns and the contractor operates and maintains, that has hard points and also replaces the Tutor. Which would reduce both the types of airframes, training and parts. Having ownership means that if you decide to do something offensive with them, you can, particularly if support for them including outside of the country as required is written into the contract. 

 

[MilEME09]

Perhaps a replacement that the RCAF owns and the contractor operates and maintains, that has hard points and also replaces the Tutor. Which would reduce both the types of airframes, training and parts. Having ownership means that if you decide to do something offensive with them, you can, particularly if support for them including outside of the country as required is written into the contract.

I think for a military as small as our own, getting as many multi-platform aircraft to cut down on the total types of fleets has marit. Having a low cost jet trainer that could be brought into a CAS role for operations where there is little to no GBAD present could be beneficial. However I'm a ground walker, not a pilot or a airforce expert, my knowledge goes as far as reading Canadian defense review and other media sources.

 

[Loachman]

Changing rank insignia again would be cheaper and more worthwhile than wasting millions/billions on a cheap aircraft that has no battlefield utility.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Changing rank insignia again would be cheaper and more worthwhile than wasting millions/billions on a cheap aircraft that has no battlefield utility.

A Skyraider with a modern sensor pod and GPS would be fine in Mali or Afghanistan. All depends on who you are going to be fighting.

 

[Old Sweat]

I wonder. Is there more benefit in a "low and slow" platform or in a faster aircraft that can carry and launch smart ordnance that can be guided by the aircraft itself, another aircraft, manned or nor, or a ground observer depending upon the circumstances. Now add in that the faster aircraft can also perform a variety of "traditional" fast air functions.

Again, I am old, brown - except for the grey parts, and way behind the curve, but it seems to me that the day of the utility aircraft is in the past.

 

[MarkOttawa]

The Spad in Vietnam--now just give it a turboprop engine too:

http://www.schifferbooks.com/the-a-1-skyraider-in-vietnam-the-spads-last-war-1593.html

More:

Able Dog: Was the AD Skyraider the Best Attack Bomber Ever Built?
http://www.historynet.com/able-dog-was-the-ad-skyraider-the-best-attack-bomber-ever-built.htm

A perfect example of this air-to-ground workhorse the Military Aviation Museum's impressive AD-4 Skyraider has gone from gate guard to airshow star.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Loachman]

What do we give up in order to buy a niche aircraft with limited capabilities?

What can it do that F35 cannot?

Modern munitions render the "need" to go low and slow, which is quite risky, obsolete.

 

[MilEME09]

What do we give up in order to buy a niche aircraft with limited capabilities?

What can it do that F35 cannot?

Modern munitions render the "need" to go low and slow, which is quite risky, obsolete.

My counter argument about modern munitions is cost, why drop a $25,000 JDAM from a $104 million aircraft (F-35) when you could do the job when a cheap CRV-7 rocket from a $20 million dollar plane (Textron scorpion) Again it is situation dependent but the costs do add up.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Why buy a specialized aircraft that can only operate in a very specific scenario (unopposed CAS)?  They would not have been used in Iraq (1990), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).  So, they would only have been used for a single operational deployment.  Bang for buck?

 

[Kirkhill]

Wiki, so suspect, but curious.

NATO Flight Training in Canada (NFTC) is a military flight training program for NATO and allied air forces provided by the Canadian Forces.

Located at 2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School, 15 Wing, CFB Moose Jaw in Saskatchewan and 4 Wing, CFB Cold Lake in Alberta, the program is delivered as a cooperative operation between a civilian contractor, CAE Inc. (CAE Training Centres),[1] and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).

Two types of aircraft are flown at NFTC: the CT-156 Harvard II and the CT-155 Hawk. NFTC training consists of Phases II, III, and IV. Phase II is subdivided into IIA and IIB.

All pilots in the NFTC program undertake Phase IIA[2] (Basic Pilot Training), which consists of 95.1 flying hours on the CT-156 Harvard II. After Phase IIA, students are split into 3 streams: fast-jet trainees (future instructors and/or fighter pilots); multi-engine trainees; and helicopter trainees.

Those moving on to Phase III training on the Helicopter and Multi-Engine tracks go to 3 Canadian Forces Flying Training School in Manitoba. Those selected for the Fast Jet track complete Phase IIB (another 45 flying hours on the Harvard II). Fast-jet candidates then move on to Phase III in Moose Jaw (69.8 flying hours). At the completion of Phase III, pilots are awarded their Pilot's Wings (Canadian Forces Flying Badge).

Future fighter pilots move on to Phase IV, still on the Hawk, but now at 419 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron in Cold Lake. Phase IV consists of 48.9 flying hours. Successful graduates of Phase IV are then trained on the CF-18 Hornet (CF-188) at 410 Tactical Fighter Operational Training Squadron.

Division of responsibilities between DND (RCAF), CAE, and participating Air Forces is as follows:

RCAF: All in-aircraft flying instruction is given by military pilots from the Canadian Forces. DND oversees training standards, provides Canadian military trainees, provides airspace, and dictates the syllabus.

CAE: The NFTC aircraft are owned by the Government of Canada, then leased to and maintained and serviced by CAE. Academic and simulator instruction is given by CAE employees (who must have had previous military flying instruction experience). CAE also operates infrastructure (buildings) and provides food services.

Other participating Air Forces: International program management, foreign military flight instructors, foreign military students, quality control.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Flying_Training_in_Canada
http://www.cae.com/defence-and-security/training-and-services/training-centres/NATO-flying-training-in-canada-NFTC/

Is that verifiable?

 

[daftandbarmy]

In comparison with peer/ near peer militaries our biggest capability gap in terms of close support must be the lack of an Apache, or Apache-like, attack helicopter. This should probably be our first step in closing any CAS type gaps.

Or am I wrong?

 

[Loachman]

My counter argument about modern munitions is cost, why drop a $25,000 JDAM from a $104 million aircraft (F-35) when you could do the job when a cheap CRV-7 rocket from a $20 million dollar plane (Textron scorpion) Again it is situation dependent but the costs do add up.

Because in a real war you can drop one JDAM from one well-protected aircraft and stand a better chance of hitting the target AND seeing both Pilot and aircraft returning home. And that aircraft can perform other tasks as well, including air-to-air.

The costs of buying more aircraft to deliver the same amount of weaponry onto a target also add up.

Replacing lost aircraft is more expensive than buying munitions. It also takes too much time to build replacements, and far too long to train replacement Pilots.

Funerals cost a lot more, and not just in monetary terms.

I - and many others here - went to more than enough ramp ceremonies and funerals over several years, hunted for the trigger men at the other end of the command wire, tried to keep people alive one way or another, grieved for friends and colleagues and strangers, and comforted families and, to me, at least, cheaping on equipment is false economy.

Another Site member here, during the planning phase for the first Stalwart Guardian exercise, articulated something that I had already long understood. He was discussing mundane things such as printers and photocopiers for Excon HQ, and stated, several times, "Don't make do". Don't buy the cheapest one available to save a few dollars, because it will fail. Buy the best available, because it will save money in the long run. I was a quality-over-quantity guy long before that, but PPCLI Guy had a better way of expressing it.

Modern aircraft can now, individually, do much more than hundreds of their predecessors could just a few decades ago, with a one-person crew vice a crew of ten (B17G).

The "cheap" aircraft will require larger fleets and more Pilots to do the same job at greater individual risk than a single F35. It is not worth the cost.

Cheap aircraft are fine for countries who only have to worry about insurgencies. They are not so fine for those flying close to Russia.

We still have to buy enough F35s for the hard jobs. A small, orphan fleet of semi-useless cheapies adds nothing, but takes away from something else.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Because in a real war you can drop one JDAM from one well-protected aircraft and stand a better chance of hitting the target AND seeing both Pilot and aircraft returning home. And that aircraft can perform other tasks as well, including air-to-air.

The costs of buying more aircraft to deliver the same amount of weaponry onto a target also add up.

Replacing lost aircraft is more expensive than buying munitions. It also takes too much time to build replacements, and far too long to train replacement Pilots.

Funerals cost a lot more, and not just in monetary terms.

I - and many others here - went to more than enough ramp ceremonies and funerals over several years, hunted for the trigger men at the other end of the command wire, tried to keep people alive one way or another, grieved for friends and colleagues and strangers, and comforted families and, to me, at least, cheaping on equipment is false economy.

Another Site member here, during the planning phase for the first Stalwart Guardian exercise, articulated something that I had already long understood. He was discussing mundane things such as printers and photocopiers for Excon HQ, and stated, several times, "Don't make do". Don't buy the cheapest one available to save a few dollars, because it will fail. Buy the best available, because it will save money in the long run. I was a quality-over-quantity guy long before that, but PPCLI Guy had a better way of expressing it.

Modern aircraft can now, individually, do much more than hundreds of their predecessors could just a few decades ago, with a one-person crew vice a crew of ten (B17G).

The "cheap" aircraft will require larger fleets and more Pilots to do the same job at greater individual risk than a single F35. It is not worth the cost.

Cheap aircraft are fine for countries who only have to worry about insurgencies. They are not so fine for those flying close to Russia.

We still have to buy enough F35s for the hard jobs. A small, orphan fleet of semi-useless cheapies adds nothing, but takes away from something else.

And there's fewer and fewer of us, people are not joining the military in sufficient numbers, and the ones that are left are (except for me of course ) getting older and fatter.

Therefore: technology.

Future Soldiers: “The Few ...” Military Personnel Trends in the Developed World

High-Tech Militaries. Advanced militaries aggressively pursue cutting-edge technology—largely information-processing, but also precision-guided munitions. One significant impetus for this is the requirement to keep casualties low. Equally important, as recruiting pools grow shallower and qualified personnel more expensive, investment in technology enables militaries to substitute capital for labour.45 High-tech weapons (i.e., pilotless drones and cruise missiles) are more efficient than other means at projecting force to remote locations, while also limiting non-combatant casualties. They negate the need for large numbers of troops on the ground, and greatly reduce the hazards of combat for those who are deployed. Indeed, the transformation of the American military following the Vietnam War was predicated on just such strategic needs: “the need for power projection, quick wins, low casualties, and the flexibility to move from one theatre to another.”46

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no4/page12-eng.asp

 

[Loachman]

In comparison with peer/ near peer militaries our biggest capability gap in terms of close support must be the lack of an Apache, or Apache-like, attack helicopter. This should probably be our first step in closing any CAS type gaps.

Or am I wrong?

We should have Attack Helicopters, but they do not perform CAS. (The USMC did, many years ago, employ their Sea Cobras in a CAS-like role, but I do not know if they still do; the US Army acquired TOW long before the USMC did and that changed a lot.)

The term "Close Combat Attack" was coined for the theatre-specific tactics used by AHs and armed UHs in Afghanistan, and most likely Iraq. In a conventional war, AH units are treated as manoeuvre units.

 

[Loachman]

Wiki, so suspect, but curious.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Flying_Training_in_Canada
http://www.cae.com/defence-and-security/training-and-services/training-centres/NATO-flying-training-in-canada-NFTC/

Is that verifiable?

Is it relevant?

Only if you advocate stealing trainers to send to war.

If so, how do you continue to train Pilots if their training aircraft have left? Do you expect Instructors to maintain proficiency in the CAS role as well as instruct? That may be possible, but it is far from practical.

Buy trainers to train.

Buy combat aircraft to fight.

Far simpler.

Far more effective.

Stryker MGS costs less per unit than Leopards as well. Does anybody here think that acquiring a bunch of them instead of tanks makes sense?

 

[dimsum]

I wonder. Is there more benefit in a "low and slow" platform or in a faster aircraft that can carry and launch smart ordnance that can be guided by the aircraft itself, another aircraft, manned or nor, or a ground observer depending upon the circumstances. Now add in that the faster aircraft can also perform a variety of "traditional" fast air functions.

Again, I am old, brown - except for the grey parts, and way behind the curve, but it seems to me that the day of the utility aircraft is in the past.

Or, an aircraft built to take a bunch of stand-off weapons (not fitted, but still possible), loitering behind the FLOT and lobbing them in either self-designated or from other aircraft closer to the fight.  Wonder if we have any of those kicking around?