Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)

[daftandbarmy]

IMHO, the riflemen can carry pistols if they want, as long as you have a 60mm MOR that can flush 'em out and C9s and C6s that can chop 'em up.

A GMG alone won't be able to dig the bad guys out of a good defilade position beyond the range of your grenade launchers, and it can't be used where you can't take a vehicle anyways. Also, as the experts tell me, the best anti-sniper weapon is either another sniper or indirect fire, like a 60mm MOR.

Regardless, I think this issue has been discussed to death elsewhere in this forum, no?  ???

 

[Kirkhill]

Not really Rick,

I get your point.  I really do.  But I also get DAP's point - perhaps that is because I have moved around amongst a number of different organizations, civil and military, as employee, customer and supplier and seen that there is one verity in life:  Everything is political.

There is never enough money to do all the things everyone wants to do.  The other guy's project is always ridiculously expensive and can be done for a whole lot less than he is asking and in any case it is unnecessary.  My project is, however, absolutely essential and is being proposed on a shoestring budget and will be delivered on time an on budget.  If only I was a better salesman/politician then I could make my boss's boss's boss see that and give me my necessary dime from that other department's dollar budget.

Ex-D needs/wants a new AAW frigate.  GW needs/wants new Leos.  TV needs/wants new mortars.  CDS needs/wants new radios, computers and satellites just to see what's going on and talk to you lot.  Decisions are made.  People get p*ssed off.  That ultimately is why politicans get voted out.  As soon as they start making decisions they start losing friends.


Treasury Board and the CDS have decided they can only give the Infantry X number of dollars to get the job done.  That sucks.  But that will always be reality.

And I was around wnen the 5.56/7.62 debate  was raging.  And the reason you have the 5.56 is that somebody made a decision that p*ssed off a whole bunch of people who then rewrote the training pams to accomodate the new, and to many unpleasant, reality.

As to translations - I am sorry if I am unable to make myself understood by you.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm not too sure where savings could be made by moving from 2 primary small arms calibers to 1 - you still have to buy the same amount of bullets either way.

 

[vonGarvin]

I'm not too sure where savings could be made by moving from 2 primary small arms calibers to 1 - you still have to buy the same amount of bullets either way.

Not true, my NATO friend.  You see, 7.62mm is heavier, and the magazines are only 20 rounds, so...by that logic, assuming that we still provide soldiers with x amount of magazines' worth of bullets a year, we decrease that amount by 1/3. 

Stand by, we're going with 5-round .50 calibre magazines for all.  A whopping 1/6th of the cost!  ;D

 

[ArmyRick]

Section attacks are going to be real bag drive if we all humping barret 50 cal rifles (Glad I am a WO now)!

 

[SeanNewman]

...a GMG alone won't be able to dig the bad guys out of a good defilade position ...

Nor can a mortar have any hope to hit a truck speeding away (which as you mentioned has been  :deadhorse: already).

But it just keeps reinforcing that they shouldn't be compared against each other because they do different things.

 

[vonGarvin]

Section attacks are going to be real bag drive if we all humping barret 50 cal rifles (Glad I am a WO now)!

The weapons will be .50 cal, but they can't be the baretta (too big).  Go with Desert Eagles all round ;D

 

[Oh No a Canadian]

The weapons will be .50 cal, but they can't be the baretta (too big).  Go with Desert Eagles all round ;D

.50 Beowulf  ;D

It was on Future Weapons so it must be what the US will soon use. 

 

[vonGarvin]

I started to reply to a previous post, but then thinking back to other  posts about what weapon does what within the infantry platoon, I asked myself this question:
What capability is provided by what weapon in the Infantry Platoon?
So, without further ado, here is my list.  The points in bold demonstrate which capability is either unique or is provided by another system out to longer ranges.  All ranges listed below are “estimates”, and in some cases are explained.  The list of capabilities are as follows:
Point fire: the ability for the soldier to fire at one target and hit it with one round.
Direct Area Suppression: the ability for the soldier/crew to fire at an area target and suppress it, thereby prohibiting that target the freedom of action.
Anti-APC Fire: the ability for the crew to fire at an APC and destroy it.
Anti-bunker fire: the ability for a crew to fire at entrenched targets and destroy them.
Indirect area suppression: the ability for a crew to fire at a target having received initial aiming points and subsequent corrections from a detached observer.
Blind/Screen/Marking: the ability for a crew to fire smoke munitions.
Illumination: the ability for a crew to provide battlefield white light or IR illumination
Rifle:  Point fire out to 300 m  
The range of 300 m is a bit of a stretch in my opinion, as it assumes the firer is prone-supported and firing at a stationary man-sized target.  Its useful or practicable range is certainly much less.
40mm Rifle Grenade: Direct area suppression out to 350m
LMG (C9): Direct area suppression out to 600m
LMG (C6): Direct area suppression out to 800m
MMG (C6 SF): Direct area suppression out to 1800m; indirect area suppression out to 2400m
Coax: Direct area suppression out to 1400m
Pintle: Direct area suppression out to 800m
25mm: Anti APC fire out to 2200m; direct area suppression out to 2400m
84mm: Anti APC fire out to 700m; battlefield illumination out to 1000m;  anti-bunker fire out to 500m
60mm: Direct and Indirect area suppression (modern systems), Illumination and blind/screen/marking over 3500m (modern 60mm Mortars).
AGLS: Direct area suppression out to 2000m; anti-APC  fire out to 1500m
So, looking at the list above, there are to the detached observer a number of apparent redundancies, and one could argue that infantry platoons only need rifles, LAV 3 APCs, Carl Gustavs and 60mm Mortars.  This, naturally, is nonsense.  LMGs and MMGs provide infantry platoons with hand-held capabilities for when the LAV 3 APC cannot influence the battlefield.  As well, even though a 60mm provides direct and indirect area suppression at ranges much longer than any other system, and even though the 60mm is man-portable, it cannot provide the reactive fire that low-angle weapons can, even in the direct fire role.  So, we now include the machine-gun back to the infantry platoon.  But which one?
The LMG (C9) is operated by one person, and the LMG (C6), though can be operated by one person, is normally crewed by two.  It has a longer range than the LMG (C9); however, there are six within the platoon, and is integral to the section, thereby providing the section commander greater flexibility.  The LMG (C6) on the other hand, is a platoon weapon, and its greatest flexibility is that when mounted on a sustained fire kit, it “morphs” into the MMG (C6), providing the platoon commander over double the range of effectiveness.  As for the COAX and the Pintle Mounted MG, they are part of the LAV 3 APC, therefore, they stay with the platoon along with both the LMG (C9), LMG (C6) and MMG (C6).  The latter two will henceforth be referred to as the GPMG (C6), as they are one in the same gun.
The role of the 40mm Rifle Grenade is less clear.  It can hit targets in the open and in limited cover, and it is integral to the section, at a scale of issue of two per section.  Just as the LMG (C9) provides the section commander with integral direct area suppression out to 600m, the 40mmm Rifle Grenade adds an extra dimension with its ability to provide high-explosive capabilities out to 350m.  This high-explosive capability is good for targets in limited cover, including in buildings or thin-skinned vehicles.
The last weapon to be considered is the ALGS.  It provides a unique capability if and only if the LAV 3 is not able to affect the battle (Anti APC fire out to 1500m).  Having said that, it is not man-portable for long distances, therefore making it useful only in a defensive role, such as mounted in a sangar at a FOB or other defended locality.    For direct area suppression, it does have a marginally better range than the MMG (C6); however, as stated, it is not able to be easily manoeuvred about the battlespace for any useful distance.
So, having said all this, my question to DLR is this: just what capability gap is the AGLS supposed to bridge?  Whatever it can do can be done by other existing weapons within the platoon.  A C6 and a 25mm can both hit that moving truck, and given the stabilised turret on the 25mm, it can do so much more accurately at longer ranges.  The GPMG can provide longer-ranged area suppression (indirect), and is by far much more man portable.  An AGLS is tripod-mounted, and the HK 40mm  (I'm not sure what kind we are getting, but could very well be this, and it's lighter than the US AGLS)  I'm not sure how much the ammo weighs..
So, anyone, what gap is the AGLS supposed to bridge?

 

[SeanNewman]

Techno,

Awesome points of course, but in Plato-like fashion I will attempt to make your counter-argument to prove or disprove your argument; not out of disagreeing but in order to find the truth.

Much of your logic I believe can be thinned down to this:  The LAV can do all of your heavy precision + suppression killing when it is there with the soldiers, and since the C16 is not easily man-portable it provides no use since a LAV will always be close by.

So here are my best answers:

1.  Why must the argument boil down to the LAV being the vehicle?  There are sub points to this:

a.  Seeing how long we've had the mortar and C6, they have both outlived many vehicles, thus we must assume the C16 will outlive the LAV.

b.  Even if assuming the LAV is the answer for Mech Infantry, what about Motorized Infantry?  What happens if we de-couple ourselves from the LAV in a non-IED/mine environment?  Why can't the Infantry have the C16 on a LUVW cupola?  Why can't a Recce Platoon have the C16 in an ATV trailer to move it around and then place it on a tripod when static?  Why can't an IRU or NEO carry a C16 in a crate and carry it around in a pickup bed when they get where they're going if LAVs will take weeks to get there?

c.  Why even Infantry?  Why can't the Log convoys have a C16 on the roof of an HLVW / AHSVS to do their precision + supression killing when there aren't any LAVs around?  Why can't the Armour have a C16 on one of the troop's pintles when a 7.62 or 105/120mm doesn't seem like the right choice?

2.  How non-portable is it, anyway? 

a.  As per the comparison test where it was theoretically trialled against a mortar, the difference between the two systems is that the C16 is gun heavy and ammo light where as the mortar is tube light and ammo heavy.  So ironically the more you use the C16 the lighter it gets in comparison (I think it was something like 3-4 fire missions where it passed the mortar and just got lighter after that).

b.  Does man portable mean that it has to go everywhere at a fast pace?  Did the 81mm mortar or .50cal MG ever go anywhere dismounted at a high rate of knots?  Were they equally useless because of their weight, or could they be broken down into a crew of three who had to suck it up (at the cost of their spine) and do what they could?  Or were those systems also brought a few km up the road whenever an MLVW was close by?

3.  Does it have to be brought everywhere at all?  We have taken systems like the C6, 84, and 60 and made them permanent fixtures, but there are also certain systems like the ERYX that have become "sometimes" weapons (static defence, etc). 

4.  Worst-case scenario: Say we face an enemy with air superiority to us and they destroy all of our LAVs relatively soon because Finger Wood-like spots to back in and cam up don't exist everywhere.  Then what?  Don't we have overlapping effects for a reason, or did the cool guy on Navy Seals who said "Two is One and One is None" have it wrong?

I have tried my best in the name of finding the answers to these questions.  I also feel very good that I belong to a military where professionals at arms can have these discussions.

 

[vonGarvin]

c.  Why even Infantry?  Why can't the Log convoys have a C16 on the roof of an HLVW / AHSVS to do their precision + supression killing when there aren't any LAVs around?  Why can't the Armour have a C16 on one of the troop's pintles when a 7.62 or 105/120mm doesn't seem like the right choice?

I limited my argument deliberately to the infantry.  For other arms and services, I agree that a C16 on a pintle on anything would be perfect, especially for future missions in which we may have LUVW (or something similar).  Having said that, "they" have decided, in their infinite wisdom, to only have it ground mounted :

So, for capabilities-only arguments, with Mech Infantry (supposedly we are all "mechanised", yet we still have para coys....so....), there are other things out there.  But unless they put a C16 on a vehicle, I see no role for it in the infantry platoon.

 

[SeanNewman]

...supposedly we are all "mechanised", yet we still have para coys...

Don't knock the Para Coys!  Everything can be Airborne nowadays:

Small detail: Not that the rest of the scene is believable, but do you think if you were falling through the sky in a tank that you would have a nice pile of brass under the gun?

[/tangent] [C16]

 

[vonGarvin]

maintaining the tangent:
I seriously just recovered from laughing at that!  I must have laughed for five minutes straight!  Thanks, I needed that laugh. 

 

[Franko]

Ahhh yes, tank paratroopers.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOSK-7Vrijg

Enjoy the tangent.

Regards

 

[Infanteer]

So, looking at the list above, there are to the detached observer a number of apparent redundancies, and one could argue that infantry platoons only need rifles, LAV 3 APCs, Carl Gustavs and 60mm Mortars.  This, naturally, is nonsense.  LMGs and MMGs provide infantry platoons with hand-held capabilities for when the LAV 3 APC cannot influence the battlefield.  As well, even though a 60mm provides direct and indirect area suppression at ranges much longer than any other system, and even though the 60mm is man-portable, it cannot provide the reactive fire that low-angle weapons can, even in the direct fire role.  So, we now include the machine-gun back to the infantry platoon.  But which one?

What is the definition and difference between "point fire" and "suppressive fire"?  These seem to me to be two different concepts, thus undermining your model.

As well, the Storr articles I referenced elsewhere on this site point to empirical data that points to machine guns, and direct/indirect high-explosive as being the real killers on the battlefield.  How does this impact your model?

Finally - what the weapons do is nice, but perhaps what they do to the enemy is more more important (you touched on it with the idea of suppression).  How are tactical engagements "won"?  Is it when one side is wiped out?  From my understanding, this is very rarely the case; rather, victory and defeat revolve around one side believing it is beaten.  How do weapons effects make this happen?

 

[SeanNewman]

How are tactical engagements "won"?  Is it when one side is wiped out? ... rather, victory and defeat revolve around one side believing it is beaten.

Clausewitz?  Is that you?? 

 

[vonGarvin]

What is the definition and difference between "point fire" and "suppressive fire"?  These seem to me to be two different concepts, thus undermining your model.

I don't see how this undermines anything.  I'm talking about individual weapons, and their capabilities, what they allow an infantry platoon to do with various tools.
"Point fire" I loosely define as one person firing one weapon at one target.  Yes, I realise that several rifles together at an area target can provide suppression fire, but I don't refer to "suppressive fire" but "area suppressive fire".  Semantics, perhaps, but again, loosely defined, the ability to fire at a target area that consists of several individual targets with the aim of limiting or negating that target area from manoeuvre, be it firing back or moving out of the target area. 

As well, the Storr articles I referenced elsewhere on this site point to empirical data that points to machine guns, and direct/indirect high-explosive as being the real killers on the battlefield.  How does this impact your model?

It doesn't.  I'm talking solely about the integral tools that the infantry platoon can use. 

Finally - what the weapons do is nice, but perhaps what they do to the enemy is more more important (you touched on it with the idea of suppression).  How are tactical engagements "won"?  Is it when one side is wiped out?  From my understanding, this is very rarely the case; rather, victory and defeat revolve around one side believing it is beaten.  How do weapons effects make this happen?

I talk solely about what they do to the enemy, so I'm not sure what you mean.  I also didn't talk about manoeuvre, the use of shock action, the tactics, techniques and procedures that we use.  These are simply the tools that provide capabilities to an infantry platoon, and by using those capabilities effectively as a start.  Weapons effects are all I am talking about, and at what ranges they can do that. 

As an example, suspend reality for a minute, and imagine two identically armed groups of men arrayed on the battlefield.  They all have the same number of rifles, machine guns, etc that a Canadian Platoon has.  All members of both groups know how to use their weapons.  But on side "A", the leaders know how to employ those weapons, know tactics, leadership, etc.  On the other, they don't know jack about the employment of those weapons.  Sure, number 1 on the GPMG knows his burst rates, how to aim, how to record targets, etc.  But that side is lacking higher knowledge.  That side we'll call side "B".  Side "A" will then know how to use those tools and beat side "B" every time.

Another analogy is to imagine Mike Holmes versus me in a house building contest.  We have the same number of hammers, screws, nails, etc.  He will beat me hands down, as I am rushed to the hospital for nailing my hand to something.

So, in conclusion, we have to start somewhere, and if someone wants to say that all we need is MGs and high explosives, that's fine.  But in the time before that HE starts dropping, perhaps the platoon can only suppress.  Keep that in mind, and re-read what I posted.

 

[dapaterson]

Another analogy is to imagine Mike Holmes versus me in a house building contest.  We have the same number of hammers, screws, nails, etc.  He will beat me hands down, as I am rushed to the hospital for nailing my hand to something.

Yes, but you have 60mm mortars to call down fire on his position...

 

[daftandbarmy]

So, anyone, what gap is the AGLS supposed to bridge?

The LCF-envy gap that exists between us and the UK & US forces, of course  ;D

 

[ArmyRick]

Do we not have 33 x LAVIII Infantry Section Carriers (The LAVIII without turrets equipped with nanook RWS)?

Why not equip some of thos with the AGLS?

I could imagine a few other places that AGLS will slide in.

I do agree with the point that it NEVER should be a "you can have 60mm or 40mm but not both" situation.

I absolutely agree that leadership needs to know how to properly site and employ their support weapons. Guys would get nailed for that when we did our combat estimates on 3B.