Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)

[HItorMiss]

"In physics, drag consists of the sum of all the aerodynamic forces in the direction of the external airflow. It therefore acts to oppose the motion of the object. In a moving object it is overcome by thrust. Types of drag include form drag, pressure drag, lift-induced drag, and wave drag. The overall drag of an object is characterized by a dimensionless number called the drag coefficient, and is calculated using the drag equation."- Websters Online Dictionary  changed slighty by me to be applicable.

Now I took some of that from Websters Online dictionary. But it still proves my point on DRAG and how it would act on said rounds. And again proves that the initial theory of more drag on the round to achieve the desired effect would require more thrust to be put on the projectile. Which in turns means that evertyihg from direct to indirect fire is now off.

 

[vonGarvin]

The thing about drag is that much of it can be offset by projectile design, such as dovetailing.

I think that I-6's comments are more telling.  I also find it interesting that in our army at one time we were going to replace a tank with a Wheeled Direct Fire Support vehicle.  Now we are thinking of replacing a mortar with a heavy machine gun.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Some good background on the 60mm is available on the web. The US are looking at ways to improve its effectiveness based on previous successes in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Israeli's mount them on the tanks as a result of lessons learned in the 1973 War.


TTPs for the 60mm mortar section

In the first week of April 2003, Task Force Red Devil, comprised of the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne) and Delta Battery, 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, conducted two artillery/mortar raids outside of the northern Iraqi city of Irbil. These missions were against an Iraqi Republican Guard Battalion supported by armor and artillery.
The mission was to destroy forward Iraqi observation posts, dug-in Iraqi positions, and to neutralize Iraqi armor and artillery pieces. The 60mm mortar primary targets were personnel and light-skinned vehicles near the observation posts. The battalion 120mm mortar section and two 105mm howitzers were tasked to neutralize the enemy armor and artillery. The mounted rifle companies were tasked to provide route security, security of the firing elements at the firing points, quick reaction force (QRF) duties, and to emplace accurate fires onto the enemy using their vehicle-mounted 50-caliber machine guns and Mk-19 grenade launchers.

The 60mm mortars from Alpha Company, 1-508th Infantry, were tasked to provide immediate indirect fire support onto known and suspected targets. Upon reaching their planned mortar firing point, the section immediately dismounted their HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) and conducted an emergency occupation. The section immediately received a call for fire from their forward observers. Within 60 seconds of occupation, the section was placing accurate high explosive (HE) and white phosphorus (WP) rounds onto and in the vicinity of the Iraqi observations

posts.http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_3_93/ai_n6366546


Mortars in Afghanistan
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAzioXfgVhY

81mm and 60mm Mortars in OIF

http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:hp83XNf3ES8Jroceedings.ndia.org/C347/Clayton.pdf+60mm%2Bmortar%2Beffective&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=20&gl=ca





Indirect fire the close fight: the 60mm mortar

Army-wide, light infantry platoons are reluctant to incorporate indirect fires, specifically from the 60mm mortar, when the enemy establishes contact in the close fight. Some platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, team leaders, and also forward observers (FOs) are reluctant to use the mortars in the close fight because they are not familiar with the weapon system, nor do they trust it. This situation should cause great concern. The mortars exist to support infantry platoons, enabling them to conserve their combat power during chance contact and to maximize it during the decisive fight. The 60mm mortar can be a valuable asset to a light infantry platoon by providing highly responsive and short minimum range indirect fires that either kill the enemy or suppress his fire, thus enabling the assaulting rifleman to close with and kill him. We cannot blame the platoon leadership for being wary of using mortars. I wouldn't use a weapon system that I wasn't familiar with or did not trust. It is vital that we develop a solution that will help platoon and company leaders establish trust in a weapon system that is a "critical and irreplaceable element of a rifle company's maneuver"

After action reviews from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from the 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 94 to the 1st Quarter, FY 00, have shown that there is a recurring trend in infantry battalions--team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon leaders are not aware of or just not comfortable with calling for fire. The result is that units have failed to integrate indirect fires into chance contacts with the enemy, thus allowing the enemy to break contact on their own terms. A former senior brigade fire support observer/ controller at JRTC stated that the failure to adjust indirect fires onto a fast-moving enemy when contact is made contributes to the 7:1 loss ratio between the blue force (BLUFOR) and the opposing force (OPFOR) at JRTC. The 60mm mortar is the only indirect weapon system organic to the light infantry company. Regardless of the conditions or constraints applied by higher levels, the 60mm mortar is all-weather, always present, and approved at company level. The situation in Afghanistan reinforces the need for infantry platoons to incorporate mortars into the close fight and fix the problem. Because of conditions such as extreme altitude and inclement weather, coupled with mission specific constraints, there were times when the 60mm mortar was the only indirect fire asset available to companies conducting dismounted patrols during combat operations. The fact is that without the employment of mortars during the close fight, platoons can neither conserve nor maximize their combat power.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_93/ai_n6123808


Defense Update

The 60 mm mortars are becoming a popular weapon of choice among peacekeeping forces, engaged in war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they are rapidly fielded as low-cost, highly effective defensive or offensive weapon to improve the integral fire support of small contingent forces fielded by contributing NATO members. Old generation tubes, including 60mm and 51mm tubes were quite popular in the past, but in recent years were practically shelved due ammunition obsolescence. The British Army already decided to phase out its 51 mm tubes in favor of 60 mm mortars, while the US Army is currently considering a similar move. The Israeli army fields 60 mm tubes with all tanks and heavy APCs as a lesson from the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

http://www.defense-update.com/events/2007/summary/ausa07fires.htm



Small Arms - The 60mm Mortar

For mobile platoon and company level action, an easily portable weapon for use between the effective ranges of hand grenades and the 81mm mortar was needed. Hence, the 60mm M2. The bipod was often left attached to the tube for speed in bringing the mortar into action, and the combination was readily carried by two men, with ammunition in complete rounds being carried by supporting troops.

In the Marine Corps, our 60mm guns were usually in three gun-squads in a 20-man mortar section commanded by a lieutenant, reinforcing each Rifle Company. Each gun-squad consisted of a squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner and 3 ammo bearers. In deployment for action, the ammo carriers humped 6 loads, in addition to their weapons and equipment. On the move, the gunner carried the complete mortar w/o sight, and all other men carried ammo bags or packboards strapping 12 loads. In addition all men carried their equipment and a carbine, and the squad leader carried the M4 sight. These guns were invaluable in close support. Sometimes in battery, but usually assigned one gun per platoon, they moved fluidly close behind our assault troops, and registered on assault lanes in front of the platoons before night, so as to be ready to quickly provide murderous close support.

They often had to.

Infantry mortars are normally employed in defiladed positions, such as the reverse slope of a hill or ridge, so as not to be vulnerable to enemy direct fire positions. Hence direction and altitude settings are normally controlled indirectly by a forward observer, or an aiming stake about 10-25 yards forward of the gunner, and the rounds are normally dropped down the barrel. The 60mm M19 could be used as a direct fire weapon by attaching the small M1 base plate to the barrel. This reduced the mortar weight substantially, and greatly lowered the weapon profile in the open during fluid engagements where targets were close and in direct view.In such situations, however, the recoilless rifle or bazooka were usually more effective.

Comparing weight of material to destruction delivered at the target, mortars are very efficient. "The infantry's artillery", they provide small infantry units artillery-like fire support when artillery either was not available, or could not be moved forward fast enough. The initial Chinese Communist assaults of November and December 1950, did not bring artillery, but they did bring mortars, and used them with great effectiveness.

Typical CCF assault tactics were to drift strong infantry units near our lines at night, and use small probing attacks to locate our automatic weapons and machine guns and, if possible, junctions between our platoons or other weak points. Then, they would attack in strength with platoons armed only with grenades, followed by submachine gun platoons. Their light mortar units would follow quickly, and place their fire on our strong points from fairly close distances, enabling them to fire with reasonable accuracy even though at night and without prior registration.

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/60mm.htm

 

[tomahawk6]

http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_Mortars,,00.html

military. Easily transportable (either by man, truck, or helicopter) and with an ever-increasing range, mortars represent the most effective fire support asset available to maneuver ground commanders. In Afghanistan, for example, ground commanders have turned to mortars to provide immediate fire support during ground operations. The mortars have the advantage of being immediately available, accurate, and easily sustained.

With the introduction of precision-guided mortar munitions(PGMs), the mortar now has the ability to provide extremely accurate and immediate ground support fire in urban environments where the threat of collateral damage is high. In these situations the mortar is superior to air delivered munitions, which require a great deal of planning and cross-service coordination to employ. In addition, while air delivered PGMs are quite accurate, the smallest of these weapons is currently 500 pounds, which, in many cases, is simply too large for use in built-up civilian populated areas. While precision mortar munitions (at $10,000-$20,000 a piece) are more expensive than the mortar rounds typically fired, when a ground commander needs immediate precision ground support, they are priceless.

Afghanistan:

 

[CG440]

I would like to ask the PD to answer one quick question for the board.  It has been pointed to a few times that the project intent (as seen in various media articles) is to deliver a 40 mm automatic weapon capable of indirect fire.  In some of my own searching for answers, I've been told this indirect fire capability includes the same high angles of mortars so that the CASW will be able to put fire onto targets protected by complex terrain (such as compound walls, berms, buildings, hills, etc).  However, in this thread, the standing argument seems to be that CASW cannot replace a mortar because AGLs are direct fire weapons.  So, here comes the question.

Is there a 40 mm automatic weapon, capable of direct and high angle indirect fires, that has been proven in operational trials under realistic field conditions?

The answer is yes.  The 40mm is a light round but surprisingly stable throughout the trajectory.  The biggest issue with high angle was not the ballistic but the self-destruct fuse where the flight time would exceed the normal burn time and the rounds would detonate on the way down.  Some new SD fuses rely on the spin rate of the round instead.    The indirect aspect is mature enough that my current concern is more towards the ergonomics of the tripods than the ballistic.

There is a lot of talk about the indirect aspect of the CASW but it needs to be acknowledged that maybe 99% of rounds fired will be in direct and airburst modes.  If you have a LOS to the target, going into super elevation will just add to engagement time.  Instead, just lase the target, let the computer get the firing solution (almost instant), bring the crosshair on the target and fire away.  If the target is behind a wall, you can shoot through the wall with your normal HEDP or switch to AB, lase the wall, add 3 meters correction and fire.  True indirect without seeing the target will require the normal observer and correction drills.  The big difference is that you can input the grid directly and register a bunch of targets in memory.

Admittedly, it is a bit hard to discuss when we don’t work from the same data.  There were 3 main Operational Studies that were conducted by our research establishments.  They looked at the option of acquiring new 60mm vs other systems, it included gap analysis – Matching best wpn & ammo with effects, it confirmed the suitability of automatic grenade launchers (AGL), it confirmed the lethality of the 40mm High Velocity (HV) and it describes optimum deployment – 4 x AGL per infantry coy.  A lot of it is classified and so is the proprietary information from industry.  Sadly, I just can’t post the movies from the airbursts/indirect trials or some other interesting data that I include in my presentations.

 

[vonGarvin]

Here's the problem, which is obvious to me.  From the time you "see" the target to the time you shoot at him, your LAV cannons have already opened up, on the move.  Same with the Leo cannons.  Now, Taliban fighters may have been born at night, but they were not born last night.  Their TTPs are the same: when shot at, get out of LOS.  Run.  Hide.  Dont' stick around.  So, the "lase and blaze" analogy is good for fig 11 targets, or an enemy that is in the open (hence it may still be a niche weapon for tier 1 or 2).


As posted in a multitude of articles, the 60 mm is capable of firing accurate fire within 60 seconds from setting up.  The 60 is combat proven, reliable, and simple.  It has a bigger kill radius (almost 4 times as big of a kill radius) and I can't say this enough: it's combat proven.  WE DON'T WANT OR NEED ANOTHER HMG IN THE MECH INFANTRY COYS!  The 25mm does quite well, thank you very much. 

 

[Jammer]

I might just toss this one in as well.
Compare the ORBAT with a CA Mech Inf Coy and a Stryker Inf Coy.
Both are similarly equipped in term of veh type, with the glaring difference being the RWS on the Stryker.
Then you can see where a 40mm system would/could make up a firepower shortfall.
From my experience during Medusa (put yer helmets on), the .50 was really the only weapon that we missed. It could have minimized the amount of 25mm expended (causing at times critical shortages).

 

[vonGarvin]

I might just toss this one in as well.
Compare the ORBAT with a CA Mech Inf Coy and a Stryker Inf Coy.
Both are similarly equipped in term of veh type, with the glaring difference being the RWS on the Stryker.
Then you can see where a 40mm system would/could make up a firepower shortfall.
From my experience during Medusa (put yer helmets on), the .50 was really the only weapon that we missed. It could have minimized the amount of 25mm expended (causing at times critical shortages).

The firepower "delta" of Medusa has already been addressed.  Instead of .50 or 25, the troops received 105 mm and then 120 mm.  I still maintain: no niche for CASW in a mech coy or mech cbt tm.  As well, if the 60 goes, then the ability for integral HE, Illum or Smoke within the coy's Area of Influence is gone: the Coy/Cbt Tm will have to rely on higher assets, and therefore compete for priority with other coy/cbt tms.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm still curious about the doctrinal angle to this procurement that I asked about earlier.  We have a 60mm that "fits" into our current orgs, both at the Company and Platoon levels.  We have no such "fit" for an AGL.

 

[vonGarvin]

I'm still curious about the doctrinal angle to this procurement that I asked about earlier.  We have a 60mm that "fits" into our current orgs, both at the Company and Platoon levels.  We have no such "fit" for an AGL.

That is spot on, and I believe part of the problem.  Granted that the 60 is tired and old (yet reliable), so with good intentions, a replacement was sought.  Instead of getting another mortar, they are getting an HMG because, as we all know, battles are fought on Euclidian planes as we "lead with sensors, overmatch with long range precision effects and exploit with infantry"......:

 

[Jammer]

IIRC the 60 was part of the Coys TO&E, but it was a bit of push/pull at the BG level to actually employ them.
E Bty was wary of the Coys interfering with the overall fireplan. ROZs had to be established before ALL indirect fire missions as well as BiPing IEDs and UXOs.
Personally I think there was a certain level of empire building on the part of the guns. They figured that because they controlled 81 tubes as well that they should be the 'Center of Excellence' (deployed), for all indirect fire.

 

[McG]

Personally I think there was a certain level of empire building on the part of the guns. They figured that because they controlled 81 tubes as well that they should be the 'Center of Excellence' (deployed), for all indirect fire.

It has nothing to do with empire building, and is a necessity of the combined joint environment in Afghanistan.  I don’t think I can be more specific than that without getting into TTPs & other things that do not belong on this board.

 

[Arius]

I'm still curious about the doctrinal angle to this procurement that I asked about earlier.  We have a 60mm that "fits" into our current orgs, both at the Company and Platoon levels.  We have no such "fit" for an AGL.

Ah, the elusive doctrine.  What come first? The equipment or the doctrine?  DLR or DLFD?  Here is my take on this.

If I remember well, the original doctrine for the 60mm was from the US.  There was 3 tubes grouped within a section of 19 men at the company level.  Of those 19 men, 12 were ammo carriers – mules basically – and each of those men would wear a vest with 12 pockets carrying 12 bombs. 144 bombs in total.  It was recognized that grouped fire was necessary to achieve some kind of effect.  The US Marines in WW2 were the prime users as they had to wait for the subsequent landing waves to bring in the heavier mortars and artillery.  I may be off a bit but that is a fairly clear cut doctrine.

How we got inspired to procure it in the late 40s and how we ended up basically shelving the 60mm for over 40 years is beyond me.  Korea was probably a big factor.  The 81mm proved itself invaluable and we still tell stories of the tubes firing red hot at masses of Chinese.  For many years the big mortar platoon in the big battalions was a must.  Europe and the Cold War didn’t change this and even reinforced the need of the mortar platoon at unit level because the divisional artillery concept would often make the guns unavailable for small unit action.  This is the origin of the “We can never trust the guns but we can always rely on mortars” mentality that we still have in the infantry.  During that time, the 60mm may be on the REMAR but it doesn’t get fresh air often.  It is so forgotten that we don’t even bother with any life extension or modernization for it.  That’s why we can’t fire at full charge today btw.  It comes out again in the mid to late 80s but there is no doctrine for it.  It is a smoke and illumination device. 

Cold War is over, time to reap the Peace dividends:  Budgets cuts, restructuring, downsizing and massive crippling of the big battalions.  We lose the mortar platoon...  And we don’t even put up a fight about it.  Shame on us for that one.  What now?  We dig up the 60mm.  It’s there, it’s not rusted out yet so let’s use it because we have nothing else in the unit.  That is the doctrine.  Harsh words for a harsh reality.  I'm not sure there was ever a proper "fit".

The people in DLR didn’t try to kill the 60mm btw.  It killed itself by underperforming against a lowly Mk19 during trials.  The thing is that most – if not all – engagement with the 60mm are line of sight under 2000m.  In some scenarios, it takes only 24 40mm rounds to achieve suppression on a platoon versus 18 rounds of 60mm.  You can fire a whole box of 40mm before the first mortar round hits the ground.  What doesn’t help is that we don’t kill anything with the 60mm.  0 kill for the 60mm since we are in Afghanistan.  Suppressed a few guys here and there?  Maybe, but no BDA to backup the claims that it’s the bane of the Taliban.  Battle proven?  It throws illum and smoke in battle.  That’s proven and that’s all.  Line of sight and 2000m or under?  Give me that Mk19, and I’ll trade you the .50 cal also.  CASW = Mk19 + computer + thermal sight airburst + indirect.  I’ll take it – but make sure it comes with good old iron sights also.  Weight?  A Mk47 and 24 rounds vs a full M19 60mm with 18 rounds is probably pretty close I would think.  I’ll calculate some day.

The people in the Land Staff are working on the direct and indirect plans and also on the Army structure for 2011 and beyond.  I saw some stuff of where they wanna go and the CASW is there with guess what?  AMOS 120mm.  Now we’re talking real modern firepower for the infantry.  There is a big push to bring back mortars and go for the 120mm automatic.  AMOS may be too expensive but I’ll go for any 120mm mortar with automatic loading.  A few PGM for those accurate shots and we’re in business.  So, future doctrine for the infantry would include:  Usual small arms, 120mm mortar, CASW, PMEWS, Javelin, still some 25mm and RWS that we don’t know yet.  No 60mm, no .50 cal, no Eryx.  I guess CASW's fit would be in a dismounted-static or short movement-overwatch-protection-suppression role in complex terrain.  The kind of thing you put on your FOB or that you shoot through windows or from rooftops in built up area.  I can see some good use for it but I want the 120mm to be available for the real badass indirect.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

You seem articulate enough so good you fill out your profile to add some credence to your points.
0 death count.  Well that may be true but finding bodies isn't always the easiest so really who's to say.  We also have a bayonet but I don't recall hearing anyone kill a Taliban with that either.
No more .50 Cal.  Been there, heard that, the cheques in the mail and I won't c*m in your mouth.  All these fancy forecasts are great until the NDP gets into power and shuts it all down.
Are you proposing both having the MK19 and MK 47?

 

[KevinB]

While my Arty Tech, and FO tech courses were a long long time ago (damn near 20 years).
I am still somewhat conversant with small arms external ballistics.
Muzzle Velocity, Mass of the projectile can be input with the projectiles BC (ballistic coefficient) to determine both drop and windage.  If somone knows the BC of the two projectiles one can easily input the data and find out how much drift would occur at a given wind.
This all must have been done somewhere - however as mentioned I would guess most if classified or coporate knowledge subject to NDA (non-disclosure agreement not National Defence Act)

  My concent with the Project Managers statments is that he is predetermining the TIC to be a LOS engagement.  However is an dispersed battlefield, especially in Urban areas - it is NLOS -- where you will have insurgent Mortar teams that are attacking a site - however they do not have the good manners to be simply behind a wall across the street.  Imaging they are across a small River (hypothetically we will say the Eurphrates  ) -- and three compounds over from the one ajoinign the river road.  You simply cannot do the whole fucking village to get to them in a LOS engagement (or I hope you wont - for if you think that way Asymetical Warfare is not for you and you should get out now).  Now how do we knwo they are there? -- we have radar and a bunch of other toys.  While I really am a big fan of driving over and shooting people in the face (TM SSFD) due to the terrain the Mortar team will be broken down and dispersed by the time one can do that.  So you need a Mortar, also having the mortar on the roof of your team house with the Mk47's mean you tend to deter the next crew that does not want to meet Allah anytime soon like the first one did...

I think the AGL is great for conventional warfare, and a great convoy firepower enabler when one is mobile and typically dealing with LOS engagements (if any beside a roadside IED/EFP).  However it is not a IDF tool - and its adoption as a replacement rather than augmentation to the 60mm will leave some critial engagement/protection gaps that the enemy will identify and expoit.

just my 0.02 - I am not longer in the CF, but I do still care about it and the soldiers serving in it - and I think the way that this program has been implemted will get troops killed.




 

 

[McG]

My concent with the Project Managers statments is that he is predetermining the TIC to be a LOS engagement. However is an dispersed battlefield, especially in Urban areas - it is NLOS

Actually, he is saying that the CASW will fire high angle in order to lob bombs onto the heads of the enemy mortar that you've described.  There does not seem to be a disconnect in what a rifle company needs to be able to do.  The difference of views is that the PD is telling us the CASW can do this (high angle fires) but many do not believe it is possible.

 

[vonGarvin]

What doesn’t help is that we don’t kill anything with the 60mm.  0 kill for the 60mm since we are in Afghanistan.  Suppressed a few guys here and there?  Maybe, but no BDA to backup the claims that it’s the bane of the Taliban.  Battle proven?  It throws illum and smoke in battle.  That’s proven and that’s all.  Line of sight and 2000m or under?  Give me that Mk19, and I’ll trade you the .50 cal also.  CASW = Mk19 + computer + thermal sight airburst + indirect.  I’ll take it – but make sure it comes with good old iron sights also. 

I have issues with this claim that since WE didn't kill anything, then it is unreliable and/or ineffective.  Now, I personally have not used in in battle, however, several of my colleagues have.  They have nothing but praise for it.  Praise that at times seems over the top; however, given that they are the ones with the experience, I'll take that over anyone's.
Another point of "battle proven" is the experience of our allies.  There are several open source references that also praise the 60mm.  Now, our current model may be worn out, but what's to stop us from (a) getting new barrels or (b) getting a new 60?
As for LOS 2400m and under, I'll take 25mm M 242 over Mk19 AND .50.  Anyday, any time, day or night, moving or not moving.  The problem is as I stated earlier: the bad guys don't like to remain LOS to us.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As much as i like the idea of a 40mm belt fed,no ******* way am I going to give up the 60mm Mortar. The 60 was the most effective dismounted weapon we had during  my Roto with TF 3/06, to get rid of it for a weapon that offers less capability in most areas id just idiotic. Of course the fine folks in the Crystal palace don't seem to give a damn.

This is the only convincing I need.

 

[GK .Dundas]

with all the usual provisions involving copyrights ,just thought I'd add a lil more fuel to the fire.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/articles/20080201.aspx

 

[Arius]

The future of the 60mm mortar was discussed at the Extended Infantry Advisor Board (XIB) held on 14-15 November 2007.  (These are the COs & RSMs & reps of all the battalions and other infantry related units - It's the advising body to the CLS) These form part of the list of recommendations below.

It is recommended that the LF in Horizon 1 take the following action with regard to the 60 mm Mortar System:

Retain the 60mm mortar, including all three natures of ammunition in service until CASW achieves FOC, which is now predicted to be 2012;

Create a new capital project should a capability deficiency be identified after CASW is introduced;

Continue to employ this system using direct fire procedures; and

Obtain the VCDS approval to dispose of the 60mm mortar capability once CASW achieves FOC.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is in 2009 - The first battallion fully equiped.  Full Operational Capability (FOC) is 2012 - All units fully equiped.  The 60mm and CASW will probably co-exist for a bit before they smelt the little guy.  The neat thing is that they leave the door open for another weapon system if there is additional requirement after CASW FOC.  We can rant and curse all we want but this is where we are all going.