Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[Kirkhill]

Really? I doubt there's an engineer out there who is dumb enough to cheerfully drive a thinly armoured vehicle at full speed into a wall of heavy enemy fire. That's a job for paratroopers!

Besides, I keep getting told that engineers are too valuable to waste on that kind of thing... mostly by senior engineer officers.  ;D

The reason given by the Brigade of Guards for giving up on the Paras was their predilection for sandbags:  the Brigade felt that if ever the Paras were called on to mount guard at Buck House they would show up in 4 tonners, deploy sandbags and wire, set up the MGs and then organize a brew up.

If the Paras were stuck with LAVs expect the LAVs to start sprouting sandbags and wire. 

I would expect that if the Engineers got stuck with LAVs they would start welding plate all over the place.......

But better yet.... Perhaps they could be supplied with the Kangaroo Mark II, AKA the Namer, or the Leo 2 equivalent.

 

[a_majoor]

The Engineers would probably like a Merkava as the section vehicle since it already has attachment points for plows or rollers and mounts a large cannon, which is quite handy for reducing field fortifications (especially if the loadout is HE or HESH). For our purposes a 105 will be just fine, since you can carry a large loadout of shells and still have a section in the back.

Even without a gun, heavy engineer vehicles have been part of the IDF for some time now (second picture)

 

[McG]

A unique platform is not the right idea for an engr sect carrier.  It is better to have an engr specific variant of whatever the infantry are riding in. 

 

[Kirkhill]

A unique platform is not the right idea for an engr sect carrier.  It is better to have an engr specific variant of whatever the infantry are riding in.

Perhaps.  But what happens if the infantry doesn't have a ride?  That is the premise from which I, and I believe Kevin B, are working.

Also,  while I get the logistics thing I think we can overdo the concern.

These days we don't differentiate amongst sawyers, joiners and carpenters.  One person carries many tools to perform many tasks.  Equally construction companies with 20 employees will have access to a large variety of earthmovers.  Likewise for lumber companies.  Farmers have many tractors and implements that enable a small cadre of 2 to 4 people to manage sections and townships.

The logistics cost is the cost of doing business.  It replaces the cost of manpower.

 

[McG]

It is not just logistic costs.  It is training burden (here is another unique micro fleet on top of all the others for you to maintain proficiency), it is the uncommon mobility characteristics (sorry, the company group cannot go that way because the engineers won't fit/can't keep up), it is the exaggeratedly unique shillouette to facilitate the enemy's identification of an HVT, and yes it is also the logistics.  Wishing away the logistic costs and burden as "the cost of doing business" is fine in a universe of infinite resources - we are not in that universe.

If you want to discuss infantry operating in isolation from any sort of mechanization, then you are not talking about combat teams (the thread subject).  If you are talking combat teams, then the infantry have a platform to get them around the battle field and a variant of that platform is what the engineers need for a section carrier.

 

[a_majoor]

A unique platform is not the right idea for an engr sect carrier.  It is better to have an engr specific variant of whatever the infantry are riding in.

From a logistics POV, maybe. If the engineer variant can do most or all the things the Engineers need to do then this would be the preferred COA.

However, the IDF gave engineers HAPC's long before they developed Achzarits and Namers (Engineer PUMAs are rebuilt Centurion tank chassis) because they recognized the Engineers had special needs that even heavily modified M-113's (the most common APC in the Israeli inventory) could provide. Given this, I would say COA 2 would have to be specialized engineer vehicles.

 

[Kirkhill]

It is not just logistic costs.  It is training burden (here is another unique micro fleet on top of all the others for you to maintain proficiency), it is the uncommon mobility characteristics (sorry, the company group cannot go that way because the engineers won't fit/can't keep up), it is the exaggeratedly unique shillouette to facilitate the enemy's identification of an HVT, and yes it is also the logistics.  Wishing away the logistic costs and burden as "the cost of doing business" is fine in a universe of infinite resources - we are not in that universe.

If you want to discuss infantry operating in isolation from any sort of mechanization, then you are not talking about combat teams (the thread subject).  If you are talking combat teams, then the infantry have a platform to get them around the battle field and a variant of that platform is what the engineers need for a section carrier.

Point taken on costs.  I just don't know how you do business without incurring costs.

With respect to Combat Teams - I consider Combat Teams to be the antithesis of Infantry operating on their own.  All we are debating is which Union is going to do what task and who has the necessary Tickets.

Of course Infantry needs to operate in Combat Teams.  But not all combat teams need LAVs.  Some combat teams are better served with HAPCs and Tanks while others will be more effective with Helos.

 

[KevinB]

.  But not all combat teams need LAVs.  Some combat teams are better served with HAPCs and Tanks while others will be more effective with Helos.

Quoted for the truth...

 

[blacktriangle]

Just curious - in this day and age, and with current budget constraints, what is the largest force the CF is likely to deploy? Afghan size?  Even that seemed to tax us heavily in all ways - or did it just seem that way?

Should such realities perhaps shape the kind of force we put together with our limited dollars?

 

[dapaterson]

Just curious - in this day and age, and with current budget constraints, what is the largest force the CF is likely to deploy? Afghan size?  Even that seemed to tax us heavily in all ways - or did it just seem that way?

Should such realities perhaps shape the kind of force we put together with our limited dollars?

What would we deploy?  It depends.  Where?  When?  Why?

All those would factor in to the size and composition of the force the government would decide to deploy.

Once that decision is made, the force generation questions have to be be asked to determine how to generate it.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Just curious - in this day and age, and with current budget constraints, what is the largest force the CF is likely to deploy? Afghan size?  Even that seemed to tax us heavily in all ways - or did it just seem that way?

Should such realities perhaps shape the kind of force we put together with our limited dollars?

The army force generates battlegroups but like dapaterson said, it all depends on what the government of the day wants to accomplish.

In other words, who knows

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Just curious - in this day and age, and with current budget constraints, what is the largest force the CF is likely to deploy? Afghan size?  Even that seemed to tax us heavily in all ways - or did it just seem that way?

Should such realities perhaps shape the kind of force we put together with our limited dollars?

The Line of Operation 3 Task Force is 1800-2500 strong, with an Infantry Battle Group, Task Force HQ, Forward Support Group, and various enablers.  It is currently on 90 days notice to be in theatre....wherever that theatre may be.

 

[Old EO Tech]

The Line of Operation 3 Task Force is 1800-2500 strong, with an Infantry Battle Group, Task Force HQ, Forward Support Group, and various enablers.  It is currently on 90 days notice to be in theatre....wherever that theatre may be.

And hopefully we would get the full 90 days to deploy....it would take nearly that long to get our VOR rate back down after basically driving the fleet until the wheels came off all spring in order too conduct the training to achieve high readiness status for TF 1-13 :-/

 

[Fabius]

Having read and followed this thread, it has occurred to me that much of what has been discussed here since the thread was started in 2004 now has little to no bearing on what our actual combat teams now look like.
Specifically virtually all of the supporting elements have been reduced in size and scope and their weapons capabilities have been divested and eliminated to include systems which were still in play up until the last 2-3 years.
The list of equipment and capabilities which are no longer available is quite lengthy and everyone is familiar with the list.

I will be honest I really not sure what the tactical concept of employment is with regards to our current force against a near or somewhat near peer adversary.  This is specifically true with regards to the armour / anti armour component of a combat team.
According to Force 2013 the Army has the ability to deploy one Tank Squadron at a time. So within a high readiness Infantry BG we have a Tank Squadron that we might deploy along with 3-4 Infantry Coys.
In terms of a tactical concept for a Combat Team within a BG context where we have no anti tank weapons (M72 and 84mm do not count in many cases due to lack of range and limited penetration capability against anything newer than a T-64) how do we employ the Tank Squadron? Piecemeal it out, one troop per Infantry Coy? This at least gives each sub unit some anti armour ability but at the cost of spreading our armoured fist very thin.
However with the removal of all anti armour weapons (TOW, Eryx) from the Coy’s if we leave the tanks massed as a squadron for the BG Comd to employ our Infantry are now without any ability to deal with any sort of armour threat that pops up.
Due to the limited resources available doing both options concurrently is not feasible.

 

[daftandbarmy]

FYI....

Heavy Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/bct-heavy.htm

The Army normally deployed forces in 2,500 to 4,200-soldier Brigade Combat Teams. These consist of a ground-maneuver brigade (most divisions have three) augmented by other units, such as artillery battalions, which are controlled by the division commander.

The new "brigade based" structure will replace the current arrangement, designed for the Cold War when the Army was prepared to fight giant set-piece battles on European soil, where the support roles were organized at the division level. It will improve the deployment ratio so that there can be two brigades at home for every one deployed overseas.

Brigade combat teams will be restructured into Brigade Units of Action. Once transitioned, BUAs will enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive and sustained employment to support combatant commanders. BUAs will also enhance the expeditionary and campaign qualities of Army forces by better enabling Joint/coalition operations. The transition to BUAs will also increase the brigade-equivalent forces available to meet both enduring and emerging mission requirements.

The restructuring would leave a division with three types of brigades: heavy, with armor; light, with motorized infantry, and airborne. This new Brigade Units of Action is different from the Units of Action the Army is forming to achieve the Future Combat Systems [FCS]. The FCS first unit equipped (FUE)-one battalion equivalent-in 2008 and an initial operating capability of one brigade Unit of Action (UoA) in 2010.

The design of the different types of modular brigades is consistent across the Army: a heavy brigade in 4th Infantry Division will be the same as a heavy brigade at 3rd Infantry Division. Each of the units of action, otherwise known as brigade combat teams, consist of two combined arms battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, an artillery battalion, and attached special troops and support battalions. The combined arms battalions each have two armor companies, two infantry companies, an engineer company and a headquarters and headquarters company.

The heavy force was given some capabilities that they haven't had, things like sniper teams. Why would you put a sniper team or a sniper section inside of a heavy force? It's because they encounter cities and this ability to transition, to be more full-spectrum, you may be optimized at some point along the spectrum, but you need to be able to conduct operations across that full range of military operations.

The Heavy Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action design analytical work conducted simulations, and also leveraged earlier analysis in things like FBCB2, which is a command and control apparatus. TRADOC also looked at things like the precision fire studies. As TRADOC went through the war gaming and at the tactical level and at the operational level, things came to the surface. For example, within the brigade headquarters, civil affairs and PSYOPS don't show up in a simulation, but in a war game and work from lessons learned in the field show they are important. A key example of things learned from analysis is in the use of UAV's. People who were going through these simulations actually were able to leverage sensors in ways that had not really been anticipated, mass sensors so they could then mass effects. So, there is an example of it. Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) analysis center led a large part of this.

This Brigade Combat Team can take a company from one battalion and place it in another. A Brigade Combat Team can add, say a civil affairs battalion to it if that was what was required. So the Army will still task organize, but when TRADOC worked to make this more capable, more self-contained, they looked at things like the brigade staff. If the brigade staff has to be able to receive attachments and issue them out, which they've done in the past, it's very much stressful. So TRADOC increased the robust nature and size of the staff so that they can help plug and play, even at the Brigade Combat Team level or the maneuver brigades.

 

[Ostrozac]

I will be honest I really not sure what the tactical concept of employment is with regards to our current force against a near or somewhat near peer adversary.  This is specifically true with regards to the armour / anti armour component of a combat team.

An army with no anti-tank guided missiles and no self-propelled artillery is not optimized to fight a near peer adversary.

I don't know if the doctrine gurus in Kingston have figured that out, or if Foxhole U and the Tactics School have caught up yet, but our equipment selection makes us a COIN army, whether we like it or not.

 

[daftandbarmy]

[quote author=
I don't know if the doctrine gurus in Kingston have figured that out, or if Foxhole U and the Tactics School have caught up yet, but our equipment selection makes us a COIN inexpensive post AFG conflict Peace dividend army, whether we like it or not.
[/quote]

There... FTFY  ;D

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

An army with no anti-tank guided missiles and no self-propelled artillery is not optimized to fight a near peer adversary.

I don't know if the doctrine gurus in Kingston have figured that out, or if Foxhole U and the Tactics School have caught up yet, but our equipment selection makes us a COIN army, whether we like it or not.

Completely agree with this.  I think the government and a portion of the army have acknowledged that we are probably not going to be fighting a peer or near peer adversary in the forseeable future.  We have the doctrine, but you are right, we are optimized for brushfire fighting and not for full out combat against the Russian hordes.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Completely agree with this.  I think the government and a portion of the army have acknowledged that we are probably not going to be fighting a peer or near peer adversary in the forseeable future.  We have the doctrine, but you are right, we are optimized for brushfire fighting and not for full out combat against the Russian hordes.

Or, apparently, many 2nd world armies e.g.,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Army

Parachute Infantry Brigade, with: 3x Parachute Infantry Battalions
1x Parachute Cavalry Troop.

1x special operations Brigade, with: 1x Special Operations
1x Commando
1x Psychological Operations Battalions.

1x Light Infantry (Air Assault) Brigade, with: 3x Light Infantry Airborne Battalions
1x Light Cavalry Troop.

1x Light Infantry Brigade GLO (Peacekeeping Operations/Urban Warfare), with:

Troops during patrols in action law and order.3x Light Infantry GLO Battalions
1x Mechanized Cavalry (Wheeled) Battalion.

1x Frontier Infantry (Wetlands Infantry) Brigade, with: 3x Wetlands Infantry Battalions.

2x Armoured Cavalry Brigades, each with: 2x Armored Cavalry
2x Armoured Infantry Battalions
1x Mechanized Cavalry (Wheeled) Troop.

4x Mechanized Cavalry (Wheeled) Brigades, each with: 3x Mechanized Cavalry Battalions
1x Armoured Cavalry Battalion.

5x Jungle Infantry Brigades, each with: 3 - 4 Jungle Infantry Battalions
1x Mechanized or Jungle Cavalry Troop.

10x Motorized Infantry Brigades, in change to Mechanized Infantry Brigades, each with: 3x Mechanised Infantry Battalions
1x Mechanized Cavalry Troop.

4x Divisional Artillery Brigades, each with: 3 - 5 Field and/or Rocket Artillery Battalions (Agrupements, in Brazilian Army).

2x Construction Engineer Brigades.
1x Air Defence Artillery Brigade, with: 5x Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

1x Army Aviation Command(Brigade), with: 4x Army Aviation Battalions (Anti-tank, reconnaissance, multi-purpoise, transport, utility).

 

[PPCLI Guy]

An army with no anti-tank guided missiles and no self-propelled artillery is not optimized to fight a near peer adversary.

I don't know if the doctrine gurus in Kingston have figured that out, or if Foxhole U and the Tactics School have caught up yet, but our equipment selection makes us a COIN army, whether we like it or not.

I would state that slightly differently: an army without medium and long range anti tank weapons, and without any Air Defence capability at all is not optimised to fight a near peer enemy ALONE.  We can of course be an integral part of a coalition.  I would also suggest that there is a wide range of potential foes that fall in between the Taliban and the Chinese.