Conservatives rebranded: defence policy in the next election?

[Edward Campbell]

Here is an interesting opinion piece from the editorial page of today’s National Post by ‘our own’ Adam Chapnick of the CFC (see: http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/Personnel/chapnick_e.html ).  It is reproduced here (with my emphasis added) under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/editorialsletters/story.html?id=483fa6b0-03dc-4d8f-818d-4ae2608943a4

Conservatives rebranded

Adam Chapnick
National Post

Wednesday, August 30, 2006

Hidden in the midst of the federal Conservatives' slow decline in the polls is a slow, deliberate transition in the way the party is branding itself.

Stephen Harper has of late given speeches on the importance of the Queen and the role of the so-called Anglosphere. Most notably, he chose to skip an international conference on AIDS held in Toronto to tour the Canadian North and promote its importance to Canadian sovereignty and history.

References to Canada's historical roots suggest a reorientation of Conservative political thinking to the big picture and the long term, and stand in stark contrast to the short-term results-oriented priorities upon which the government was originally elected.

Whether or not it is successful, this transition marks a shift in the party's focus from doing what was immediately necessary to win the January election to obtaining a majority government down the road.

Canadian prime ministers who have led majority governments have generally shared one specific quality: an ability to create and promote a vision of the country that was grounded in the future. Sir John A. Macdonald put forward a National Policy that would take years to fulfill. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's goal of expanding the country through immigration was part of a century-long project. John Diefenbaker's northern vision was inspirational in 1958 when he won what was then the greatest majority in Canadian history. Ten years later, Pierre Trudeau plead for a just society, and Trudeaumania launched a new generation of Canadian thinking about social policy and individual rights.

In contrast, Canada's minority governments have more often focused on the present. Mackenzie King, for instance, won a Liberal minority in 1921 when he promised little more than to be different from the Conservatives. It was only in 1926, when he campaigned on a platform of protecting the future of Canada from imperial domination, that he received full-fledged electoral support.

When Lester Pearson challenged the Conservatives in 1963, he promised 60 days of decision. But beyond those two months his plans were less clear, and the Canadian public responded by withholding from him the majority he sought.

Joe Clark's greatest asset in 1979 was that he was not Trudeau. Once the Canadian public decided that this was not enough, he was replaced.

The Harper government's original policy agenda was designed to provide Canadians with immediate results: accountability both in Parliament and in the justice system, money in their pockets through lower taxes and a child care allowance, and improved health care through shorter wait times.

The Conservatives presented themselves as the ultimate party of today. They satisfied the public's craving, post-Gomery inquiry, for an answer to the question: What has the government done for me lately?

At the same time, they also established a standard for themselves that would be impossible to maintain.

The public appetite for immediate results is virtually insatiable; feeding it only increases expectations of even more quick fixes. Eventually, a problem arises that can't be solved with a single promise.

It should therefore have come as no surprise that the Conservatives have struggled, and continue to struggle, to gain majority-level support for their positions on longer-term big-picture issues such as the environment and foreign policy.

In the last election, Mr. Harper gambled that he would be rewarded for not making mistakes. And he was, to the extent that Canadians are willing to reward caution and policies that promote instant gratification.

But as the environment emerges as a primary Canadian concern, and criticisms mount about the Conservative government's approach to foreign policy, the Harper team finds itself in need of something new.

In this context, skipping the AIDS conference in Toronto to visit the Canadian North was understandable.

Showing leadership in the fight against AIDS won't bring about a Conservative majority. Becoming the party to revitalize the Canadian North just might.

Regardless of whether it leads to any concrete results, politicians from all parties should look at the Conservatives' rebranding effort as good news both for them and for the country more broadly.

The last national election catered to the most basic needs and wants of Canadians as individuals.

Perhaps the next one will allow our leaders to remind us that we, our children and our children's children are citizens of a country that can and should make a difference in the world. We can only hope that all of our political parties will now step up, present their visions of the long-term future of Canada, and attempt to earn a majority.

Dr. Adam Chapnick teaches at the Canadian Forces College and is the author of The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations.

© National Post 2006​

I agree with Chapnick on two key points:

• Canadians, not uniquely amongst citizens of democracies, but at least as much as any others, demand instant gratification; and

• Perhaps something other than instant gratification – like a discussion re: how Canada “can and should make a difference in the world” – can happen in the next election – perhaps.

Even though the received wisdom is that Harper/Conservatives are being hurt, especially in Québec, by staking out clear, albeit uncomfortable for many (most?) Canadians, positions on issues* it may be that, in the face on continuing Liberal dithering, Canadians will reward Harper for being able to ”… create and promote a vision of the country that was grounded in the future.”  It may not be the exact vision of the precise future many of those Canadians want but it has the advantage of being out there: clear and visible.

Several months ago our Ruxted Group invited the political parties to discuss foreign and defence policy issues – see: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/38177.0.html .  Sadly, but not surprisingly, they did not; there was the usual mindless drivel about peacekeepers and the Conservatives outdid Roosevelt by promising a chicken in every pot and a battalion in every community in which Gordon O’Connor lighted; but there was, essentially, no discussion of foreign and defence policy issues.

Maybe Dr. Chapnick is right, maybe some, even a few politicians will want to tell us how they think Canada ”can and should make a difference in the world”; I wait, not holding my breath.

----------

* Like Israel’s right to self defence and the status of Hezbollah as murdering terrorists, rightfully to be kept beyond the pale until they can be consigned to their graves

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, from historian (and occasional Army.ca contributor) Jack Granatstein - from today’s Globe and Mail - is one contribution to the debate Adam Chapnick hopes will occur on the campaign trail.  It is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060830.wxcodefence30/BNStory/specialComment/home

Will the U.S. cut Canada loose?
If our superpower neighbour doubts our ability to defend ourselves, says historian J.L. GRANATSTEIN, Washington may go it alone

J.L. GRANATSTEIN
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail

The Conservative government in Ottawa is obviously more friendly toward the United States than its immediate predecessors. Thus far, however, nothing the Harper government has done has eased Washington's growing concerns that Canada's defence weaknesses threaten the U.S.'s own continental security.

Two factors are at play here.

The first comes from the U.S. military's view that the capabilities and equipment of the Canadian Forces have atrophied so much that the Canadian Forces are no longer interoperable with U.S. forces. Given that, why should the United States share command with Canada in the North American Aerospace Defence Command?

As Bernard Stancati writes in the current issue of Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, "The reality of the situation . . . is this: If Canada permits doubt to continually creep into the Canada-U.S. defence and security partnership in the post-9/11 environment, it may find itself slowly being ushered out."

The second factor is political will. A former U.S. Air Force staff officer at NORAD, Mr. Stancati writes bluntly that doubts about Canada could drive the United States to question "whether its northern partner has the political will to pull its share, and to do its part, to secure the continent from attack. Historical and recent events demonstrate a willingness on the part of the United States to take unilateral action on the continent, if it believes such is necessary to protect its own interests. In terms of either a ballistic missile or maritime attack, the possibility exists that the United States would consider defecting from the partnership if Canadian policy-making causes the United States to lose confidence in its partner's willingness, resolve, or ability to take action."

It is not in Canada's national interest to have the neighbouring superpower harbour such doubts. Nor is it in the national interest to lose the co-operative relationship in defence, because that means one of two things: either Canada pays the full cost of providing its own defence to a standard that does not cause concern in the U.S., or Canada cedes its defence to the United States. The first course would be ruinously expensive. The second would be completely destructive to Canadian sovereignty and nationhood.

Canadians have always assumed that the United States will protect Canada in extremis, and this is surely true. In their own interest, Americans can never accept that any hostile power will entrench itself on Canadian territory. That is legitimate and reasonable, not aggressive and overbearing, and Canadians should thank their lucky stars that they live next door to the United States, and not Germany or Russia. We might have been the Poland of North America, subject to the ruthless demands of aggressive neighbours.

But what if, as Mr. Stancati suggests, American national interests some day force the United States to pull out of the defence partnership? That will likely mean that the U.S. assumes full responsibility for the defence of Canadian territory -- with or without Ottawa's consent. If Canadian military incapacity is such that the existence of a vacuum to the north poses a threat to American national interests, then the U.S. will be forced to act, no matter what Ottawa says and no matter the violation of Canadian sovereignty such a policy would entail. This is not a course the United States would follow lightly, and obviously it would always prefer to have Canadian concurrence in any actions it might take on or over Canadian territory.

But necessity knows no law, and it is entirely possible that, under threat, the U.S. might believe itself forced to act. Indeed, it is all but inevitable. If the United States defends us, then our independence will be a sham and our sovereignty will have disappeared. We truly will be a vassal state.

How can such an eventuality be prevented?

There is only one way: Canada must genuinely have the military capacity to be able to tell Washington truthfully that the Canadian Forces can stop any threats from reaching the United States from, through, or over Canadian territory. This means that our military must be of sufficient size and have the right equipment to be able to counter any possible incursion, or to deal with any terrorist threats from the sea, by air, or over land.

Obviously, such capacity will protect Canada's population and territory at the same time as it meets the concerns of the United States. The protection of our people is the first priority of every government, and it is one that Ottawa historically has shrugged off. This was never desirable or acceptable. Now, in the age of terrorism, it is no longer possible. Being a sovereign state carries responsibilities with it, and being capable of mounting your own defence is a basic requirement.

The Harper government has begun the process of rebuilding the military. If Mr. Stancati's article is any guide to current U.S. thinking, Ottawa needs to speed up the process.

Military historian J. L. Granatstein writes for the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century (http://www.ccs21.org).

Image, below, from Anthony Jenkins/The Globe and Mail

Isolationism is the normal state of America’s national mind.  Isolationism is more attractive after 9/11.  Cutting Canada loose is an isolationist reaction.

On the side, keeping us attached firmly to Uncle Sam’s coattails, are:

1. Oil;

2. Water;

3. Tradition and kith and kin relationships; and

4. The bother of solving the first three after cutting us loose. 

 

[North Star]

The problem is that Canadians are used to the idea of having the US partially pick up its defence tab. Now the US, realizing it can be over-stretched in this new world order, is asking Canadians to pick up more of their fair share while potions of the Canadian public seem to have adopted an insatiable appetite for questionable social programs effete anti-american posturing. This, combined with a longstanding tradition of indifference and downright ignorance of defence matters (witness comments on Afghanistan on the GM website) has the potential for a backlash against Defence oriented-spending and missions (witness Bob Rae and Gerard Kennedy's stances in the Liberal leadership race).

The government and the defence lobby needs to get better at its job in explaning to Canadians the threats we face, or risk public acceptance of a attractive utopian mindset that will lead to Canada's humiliation on the world stage at the hands of terrible new forces (Islamic fundamentalism) or our very allies when they question our committment publicly.

 

[rmacqueen]

Slightly off topic but speaking of rebranding the Conservatives, apparently Stephen Harper is doing a cameo on Corner Gas this season.

 

[warspite]

I know that Paul Martin was the first sitting Primeminister to appear on a sitcom(corner gas). So I guess Stephen Harper will be the second.
Good for him

 

[54/102 CEF]

Here, from historian (and occasional Army.ca contributor) Jack Granatstein - from today’s Globe and Mail - is one contribution to the debate Adam Chapnick hopes will occur on the campaign trail.  It is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060830.wxcodefence30/BNStory/specialComment/home Image, below, from Anthony Jenkins/The Globe and Mail

My view only - Jack Granatstein does not reflect what I perceive as more eyes and surveillance and less full time staff across the board. He may be charitably called the best advertiser for the Cold War solution - big ticket costs, lots of careerism, but few enemies near or future to apply the big ticket solution.

There is obviously no answer because future threats will arrive, or be sensed but not perceived as imminent,

An article that says the US resposnse to date is overkill

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html

A strong stream of thinking in the US is that this is no longer relevant to spend 500 Billion a year, yet get 600 expatriate Jihadis running them ragged.

The threats come from having a fragmented national security program, FBI does its thing, CIA does its thing, Customs and Border Patrol do their thing. Nobody shares anything. They can't prevail on Mexico to tune up its economy to keep its people employed. Ask yourself - do Canadians run the border like they do at Juarez Mexico? Well golly gee - they don't!

The Americans are going lite, we are going lite. Brits are lite. USA has lots of eyes up there. We are probably going into long range drones and a layered approach which increasingly complements them.

This new thing is small teams in far away places.

Very new thinking for us. The US has been into it since mid 50s and in a really expanded way after the Desert One disaster in the iranian Desert after the US Embassy was taken over.

To get a good perspective on the why and wherefore

See -- Dana Priest - The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. We read it in the course. Really eye opening
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0393325504/102-6608514-8828962?v=glance&n=283155

Another link - the US can't afford 500 Billion a year on Tracks and Steel that take on a big guy every 30 years
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/neither_shall_the_sword.pdf

As for forces interoperability - have not heard our frigates are anything but identical to US linkages. The F18s are all the same and the new C17s will give us a long reach.

We play with Uncle Sam - many others just dabble.

Letting commentators set all sorts of mental wild fires in the public's mind is not in DND's interests. Yes - we are facing snakes and scumbags out there, but relatively few compared to the out of the blue threats of days gone by from Nuclear War with Ivan.

Have a good long weekend - if you're not having fun - you're not working hard enough at it! 

 

[Kirkhill]

All wars are "hearts and minds" campaigns.
Hearts and minds are won through individual contact, person to person.
Individual contact with large numbers of people requires large numbers of people.

For the State to win the hearts and minds of the people of another state it needs to have contact with those other people.
The best contact is citizen to citizen as occurs when trade is free and borders are open.  This situation is not common when governments fear their people or their neighbours or both.

Heads of State and their ambassadors are able to communicate with governments but they cannot communicate with the population of other countries (at least historically).  Without the ability to communicate directly with the population then they can't win hearts and minds. 
The rise of media, both printed (from the days of Gutenberg and Caxton) and electronic (radio) has allowed Heads of State and others to "go around" the barriers that prevented them contacting other peoples.
But people are untrusting of messaging and wary of propaganda. 
Hence Government Controlled media are less trusted than Corporate or Main Stream Media.  Central broadcasts are less trusted than local. The internet is more persuasive than MSM. E-mails (and letters) are more persuasive than blogs.  Phone calls are more persuasive than e-mails and letters.  Face-to-face encounters are more persuasive than phone calls.  One-on-one discussions over a pint of beer, a glass of wine, a cup of tea or a hookah are more persuasive than listening in a crowd.  Hence the tendency of people to believe rumours from their neighbours before they believe an official pronouncement carried through the media.

In order for one State to influence the people of another State the best method of influencing them is through direct contact.  This requires a lot of ambassadors.

Because the population is inherently untrusting and possibly has been conditioned to be hostile the ambassadors will be put into dangerous situation.  They need to be able to either accept the risk that they will die or else provided with the means to protect themselves - both passive and active.  Enter the soldier.  The soldier is the State's armed ambassador.

The first job of the soldier therefore is to communicate.  Specifically it is to win over the hearts and minds of the population and convince them to acquiesce to the wishes of his government.  He has at his disposal two tools: bribery and brutality.  These are the same tools available to all who seek to control individuals and groups.  There are no other tools even if more acceptable labels such as coercion and patronage are employed.  Hearts and minds are won if the population sees that those tools are being wielded fairly.  People will only believe this to be so if they believe that the wielders of these tools, the arbiters in their lives, are fair people.  That judgement is best made by meeting with the arbiters, sharing a drink and finding out what makes them laugh and what makes them angry and how they manage themselves. 

The State needs soldiers that are good ambassadors for the country.  Not all soldiers need to be good ambassadors however.

There is no guarantee that all meetings are going to go well, or even that meetings will occur. The ambassador is as likely to receive a hostile response as a friendly or even reservedly neutral response. It is this that makes it possible that the soldier/amabassador may end up as a target and a victim.  Unless the soldier/ambassador is willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause (sometimes an effective strategy) then they need the means to defend themselves.  Figuratively speaking they need a shield and a sword, one for defending against the threat and the other for removing the threat.

A shield is non-threatening and it buys time if the soldier/ambassador comes under attack.  A good shield can completely prevent the assailant from harming the soldier/ambassador frustrating the attack.  This will ultimately encourage the assailant to give up the attack and perhaps listen again.  At very least is would allow the soldier/ambassador to withdraw from the situation safely.  No shield, however, is perfect.

A sword is threatening and it allows the soldier/ambassador to kill the assailant if the assailant won't stop the attack and the shields are inadequate.  A sword possessed but not wielded in the face of an attack is likely to convey either an impression of weakness or an impression of rationality - of fairness. 

If the sword is resorted to indiscriminately or too quickly then that sense of rationality is lost.  We now just have two people fighting each other.  If the sword is resorted to pre-emptively then there is no opportunity for dialog and no opportunity to win hearts and minds.

To win hearts and minds therefore it is necessary to equip our soldier/ambassadors with excellent shields (in the form of body armour and vehicles) as well as good swords ( in the form of fire support).

Foreign States generally don't like soldier/ambassadors of other nations trying to win the "hearts and minds" of their people. Generally they try to put up obstacles in the path of those soldier/ambassadors.  Those obstacles can be natural (rivers and mountains), man-made (walls and minefield) or they can be men themselves -an army.  An army has the advantage of being mobile and flexible but it is ultimately just an obstacle between soldier/ambassadors and a population.

For the soldier/ambassadors to engage the population directly they must overcome the obstacles in their way.  These obstacles are overcome by manoeuvering around them, requiring transportation, or eliminating them, requiring the sword.

When the soldiers of the world were armed only with swords, sticks and stones then it required one soldier to match one soldier.  To guarantee the elimination of the opposing force then you needed to be able to pile on 3 to 1.  Organization, training, tactics and planning could change those odds but assuming equally capable sides then numbers prevailed.

Chemical energy, in the form of gun powder changed all that.  Not gun powder as a propellant so much as gun powder as an explosive.  With a well placed, large charge, one soldier could eliminate large obstacles, including large numbers of opposing soldiers.  With gun powder as a propellant to throw the explosive long distances then that individual soldier could eliminate large obstacles over a large area.  The ultimate expression of this is the President of the United States, in his role as soldier (Commander-in-Chief) can press a button and despatch an ICBM to deliver a nuclear device anywhere in the world and eliminate not just the army of a small country and its defences, but the country itself.

Between the limited range and particularity of the sword and the devastation of the nuclear device mankind has developed a number of other system ranging from 9mm Glocks to ICBMs carrying multiple  conventional Precision Guided Munitions that allow a graduated response.  Technology has permitted the reducition in the amount of manpower necessary to eliminate obstacles.

Likewise technology has reduced the amount of man-power necessary to transport people, weapons and supplies and it has reduced the manpower necessary to manufacture the weapons, supplies and transportation.  It has also made it possible for people to see farther in more detail and for them to communicate more easily.

This means that there is less need for people to man guns, planes, ships, trucks, and factories in order to remove obstacles.  These are the very core elements of our "modern" industrial era armies that fought WW1, WW2, the Cold War and the Gulf War.

What technology has not reduced is the need for soldier/ambassadors to conduct the hearts and minds campaign.  It has not reduced the need for people to monitor and understand all the thngs that technology makes it possible to see.  It has not reduced the need for people to filter that information effectively and it has not reduced the need for people to create and execute effective plans.

So what does this have to do with the CF?

It suggests that in future industrial age elements such as the armoured corps (direct fire close range artillery) and artillery (indirect fire) will not be required in the numbers that they were in the past because they are more effective.  Also the level of technical competence required of the operators (not the maintainers) will decrease. How many people understand their cars, tvs, cell phones, computers and microwaves?  They just use them and replace them when they break.

The demand for sensor operators will increase, especially in a 24/7 environment.  It may not be necessary for the operator to close with the opposition by climbing into the platform but it still requires an operator to monitor the screens and understand what is beeing seen.  To give that permanent, 24/7 coverage it requires 5 operators for each position monitored.  However those positions are not physically taxing nor do they expose the operator to any danger requiring extraordinary courage.  Many of these positions can be held by non-military, civil service types.

Likewise in the transport and supply fields much of the supply chain can be filled by non-combatants. 

In both areas (ISTAR and Tpt/Supply) the military portion of the chain is essentially the tactical portion which risks exposure to close range fire. Strategically everyone, civilian and soldier alike, is exposed to equal risk.

The need for commanders will not decline, in fact it will likely increase with the amount of information that needs to be processed.  Sigs types will be less required for making phonecalls than for establishing and maintaining the phonelines.

The other area where man-power will be required is in the field of soldier/amabassadors. 

Some of those soldier/ambassadors will be required to work independently or in small groups - requiring a great degree of personal skill and bravery.  The ability to conduct a conversation will be as important as skill at arms.

Others will be useful in large, well shielded, lightly armed groups for confronting crowds.  The threat of personal violence is still a great coercive power when dealng wth crowds moreso than the nebulous threat of a 155mm round.  That is not a useful threat until used and when used it is no longer a threat and the consequences are unpredictable.  This is place for young soldiers to learn discipline and for older soldiers not cut out for the soldier/ambassadors role to serve.  It is also a place where the troops could be double-hatted - as both "police" and as gunners and tankers.

So in the end we might end up with force heavy in Command and ISTAR personnel (not all of the latter military), with decreasing needs for logistical personnel (again not all of them military), with increasing needs for soldier/ambassadors (lightly armed but well armoured and supported Special Forces, Infantry and Cavalry), decreasing needs for "trigger pullers" (gunners, tankers and air force bombers) and increasing needs for formed, disciplined, well shielded, lightly armed masses for crowd control (Infantry with out-of-role gunners and tankers).

There is still a need for all arms and skills, but the balance is changing.