Continental Defence Corvette

[IKnowNothing]

I'm tracking a range requirement of only 4000nm.

But this is all academic.

There is no funding for this project, there's no spot for it in the NSS, and there's not even a definition of what role/capability these ships are designed to fulfil. Everything that the Government has asked for is covered by the AOPs and RCD.

Eventually. What do we do if eventually isn't fast enough? What if the ask is changing?

Moving in Parallel to the River Class Deliveries​

Moving beyond the River Class, what might be done? William Ellery Channing gave us the answer almost two centuries ago when he said that “quantity has a quality all its own”.

Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy indicated the government is now considering ‘up to 15’ River Class destroyers – a change from the definitive number of 15 as the minimum number of surface combatants defined as required by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). As the hull buy might now shrink below 15, it makes sense to pursue another class of less expensive surface combatants to be prepared to add the desired firepower for our Navy. And if geopolitics so dictate, an entire new class of such warships might be required to go beyond the Navy’s minimum essential fleet size.

Expediting Delivery of Warships - Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Based on OP's complement #'s, the personnel trade off is 3 or 4 to 1.

 

[Lumber]

Eventually. What do we do if eventually isn't fast enough? What if the ask is changing?

Expediting Delivery of Warships - Canadian Global Affairs Institute

So, here is where I believe military procurement, and naval procurement especially, makes things over cumbersome; there's what you need them to be able to do, and what you actually do with them.

Determining what we want/need them to do is a long process. You have to take in countless amounts of information, all the way from grand strategic (what do we want Canada's role in the world to be) down to the tactics (how many multi-axis supersonic missiles should it be able to defend against simultaneously), and everything in between (how much of it should be built in Canada, how much Canadian IP, how many days at sea, how many days of maintenance per days at sea, daily expenses, berthing location, interoperability, expandability, etc).

However, figuring out what you actually do with them is rather easy; just look at recent history and see both where we sent MCDVs and CPFs, but also ask Fleet, CHOJ, and SJS about "asks" for Canadian ships that we weren't able to satisfy.

For the latter, just about ANY ship will do. Whether it's humanitarian aide, flag waving, sovereignty and/or fisheries patrols, constabulary duties, or simple naval task group FG, just about any corvette sizes ship will do.

However, to actually be capable of standing toe to toe with a near-peer advisory, you absolutely need, at MINIMUM, the capabilities of the RCD.

So, if you know you aren't going to build another RCD, then don't overcomplicate it. Get somethings that's maybe a little better armed than a USCG National Security Cutter, and send them all over the world on all the missions where you aren't planning on them actually fighting high-level multi-threat naval warfare, which in reality, is what our ships spend 99.9% of their lives doing.

Seriously, you could pick just about any one of a dozen existing corvettes designs out of a hat, and any one of them could do 99.9% of what the government will actually be asking them do to during their careers.

 

[dapaterson]

If we picked another design we'd still have to Canadianize the hell out of it, because tradition.

 

[Halifax Tar]

So, here is where I believe military procurement, and naval procurement especially, makes things over cumbersome; there's what you need them to be able to do, and what you actually do with them.

Determining what we want/need them to do is a long process. You have to take in countless amounts of information, all the way from grand strategic (what do we want Canada's role in the world to be) down to the tactics (how many multi-axis supersonic missiles should it be able to defend against simultaneously), and everything in between (how much of it should be built in Canada, how much Canadian IP, how many days at sea, how many days of maintenance per days at sea, daily expenses, berthing location, interoperability, expandability, etc).

However, figuring out what you actually do with them is rather easy; just look at recent history and see both where we sent MCDVs and CPFs, but also ask Fleet, CHOJ, and SJS about "asks" for Canadian ships that we weren't able to satisfy.

For the latter, just about ANY ship will do. Whether it's humanitarian aide, flag waving, sovereignty and/or fisheries patrols, constabulary duties, or simple naval task group FG, just about any corvette sizes ship will do.

However, to actually be capable of standing toe to toe with a near-peer advisory, you absolutely need, at MINIMUM, the capabilities of the RCD.

So, if you know you aren't going to build another RCD, then don't overcomplicate it. Get somethings that's maybe a little better armed than a USCG National Security Cutter, and send them all over the world on all the missions where you aren't planning on them actually fighting high-level multi-threat naval warfare, which in reality, is what our ships spend 99.9% of their lives doing.

Seriously, you could pick just about any one of a dozen existing corvettes designs out of a hat, and any one of them could do 99.9% of what the government will actually be asking them do to during their careers.

We, the military, need to start thinking one generation ahead.

We're building RCDs, great, what's next ?

We need to stop getting caught at the end of service life scrambling for a replacement. Instead plan for end of service life and start introducing the the replacements in that process.

 

[IKnowNothing]

So, here is where I believe military procurement, and naval procurement especially, makes things over cumbersome; there's what you need them to be able to do, and what you actually do with them.

Over weighing on what you actually do (did) is by nature a rearword looking process that is defined by the limitations of both what you happened to have available and what you were needed to do at the time. If all you have is forks you're not going to eat much soup- which isn't a problem when soup isn't on the menu.

However, to actually be capable of standing toe to toe with a near-peer advisory, you absolutely need, at MINIMUM, the capabilities of the RCD.

What about that mushy middle? Not going toe to toe with a Chinese battlegroup, but not being outgunned by a pirate ship with drones and handheld launchers. Or not going toe to toe, but being of value in A2AD at the limits of adversary ranges? Providing air cover for coastal civilian infra?

 

[OldSolduer]

What about that mushy middle? Not going toe to toe with a Chinese battlegroup, but not being outgunned by a pirate ship with drones and handheld launchers. Or not going toe to toe, but being of value in A2AD at the limits of adversary ranges? Providing air cover for coastal civilian infra?

You had me at pirates.....

 

[lenaitch]

sails

You jest, but . . .



Might impact on arcs of fire.

 

[PrairieFella]

New ships tend to lower the number of people not waiting to sail. Living conditions are better, and there are less breakdowns of systems like fresh and black water.

We also have a long time to recruit for these. BZ to the RCN for having the vision to capitalize on the times and adovcate so effectively for themselves. In the future we truly xould have one of the world's most lethal navies, especially for a middle power. I wish Wright had the hutzpa of Topshee.

 

[HavokFour]

We also have a long time to recruit for these. BZ to the RCN for having the vision to capitalize on the times and adovcate so effectively for themselves. In the future we truly xould have one of the world's most lethal navies, especially for a middle power. I wish Wright had the hutzpa of Topshee.

I'm starting to believe Topshee is among us. He's got an idea on how to pump up the numbers the RCN is going to need for all the new boats.

Navy weighs expanding ship training to patrol maritime Canada-U.S. border

Move would enable deploying of more ships all over the country, including the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River

www.theglobeandmail.com

 

[Czech_pivo]

I'm starting to believe Topshee is among us. He's got an idea on how to pump up the numbers the RCN is going to need for all the new boats.

Navy weighs expanding ship training to patrol maritime Canada-U.S. border

Move would enable deploying of more ships all over the country, including the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River

www.theglobeandmail.com

Good.

 

[Maxman1]

15 Destroyers, 12 light frigates, 12 submarines.

Does the navy have the sailors to man all of these ships?

From what I understand the navy currently has some issues with a number of sailors either not wanting to sail or being non MELs.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Not exactly related but here's a cool 45 minute YouTube video touring a Orca patrol boat.

I assume a costal patrol vessel would be bigger?

 

[YZT580]

We, the military, need to start thinking one generation ahead.

We're building RCDs, great, what's next ?

We need to stop getting caught at the end of service life scrambling for a replacement. Instead plan for end of service life and start introducing the the replacements in that process.

I am guessing from the open information available that production will run at 1 delivery every roughly 15 months so that would put hull number 15 arriving around 2043 plus or minus a bit. At that time hull one will be 18 years old and will probably have been tied up for spare parts or be on the way to the breaker's yard. So why are we talking about numbers at all. No. 15 will probably only have a superficial resemblance to number 1 anyways so for planning purposes just plan for 3.5 ships every 5 years and go from there. In 10 years time if we find we need more, increase the rate of delivery or plan to keep no. 1 a little longer but always have your 3.5 in 5 year plan operating. That way we never get caught out again

 

[Navy_Pete]

I'm starting to believe Topshee is among us. He's got an idea on how to pump up the numbers the RCN is going to need for all the new boats.

Navy weighs expanding ship training to patrol maritime Canada-U.S. border

Move would enable deploying of more ships all over the country, including the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River

www.theglobeandmail.com

This is a much better idea than the corvettes, provided they are fully crewed by the naval reserves and maintained by ISSC. Crewing the Orcas, MCDVs etc with reg for Martechs caused a lot of strain and we don't have people to spare. They broke a few electricians that were on a 'shore posting' supporting MCDVs by sailing the hell out of them on MCDVs.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Which is one of the reasons why there is one aspect I don't like in his plan: Making them commissioned vessels (HMCS) instead of tenders. That requires, by Rules, that it be under a Commanding Officer instead of an OIC. This, in turn means minimum Minor Warship Command certificate instead of a Tender command one. It similarly requires a CERA with proper ticket. This is too onerous for naval reserve units that currently have a hard time qualifying their "real reservist" officers to a BWK level in less than six to eight years, and can't really qualify any similar "in-unit" MarEng to a CERA level. As a tender, it could be manned by reservists, not as commissioned vessel.

Moreover, as I have mentioned before, they cannot be of the same type as the ones used for officer cadet/midshipmen training by Venture. They have to have an actual proper crew: Bosns, communicators, engineers, cooks, NCIOps and qualified officers running the ship in watches as a proper ship. These are not "training" vessels in the sense of providing a platform to train up officers, but a vessel used for consolidation and team training of the various already qualified trades and officers through actually doing the job they qualifies for.

A few unqualified sailors/officers can be onboard to further their qualification but it should not be the focus of those vessels. The actual trades/officer training must remain on the coasts.

 

[dapaterson]

Which is one of the reasons why there is one aspect I don't like in his plan: Making them commissioned vessels (HMCS) instead of tenders. That requires, by Rules, that it be under a Commanding Officer instead of an OIC. This, in turn means minimum Minor Warship Command certificate instead of a Tender command one. It similarly requires a CERA with proper ticket. This is too onerous for naval reserve units that currently have a hard time qualifying their "real reservist" officers to a BWK level in less than six to eight years, and can't really qualify any similar "in-unit" MarEng to a CERA level. As a tender, it could be manned by reservists, not as commissioned vessel.

Moreover, as I have mentioned before, they cannot be of the same type as the ones used for officer cadet/midshipmen training by Venture. They have to have an actual proper crew: Bosns, communicators, engineers, cooks, NCIOps and qualified officers running the ship in watches as a proper ship. These are not "training" vessels in the sense of providing a platform to train up officers, but a vessel used for consolidation and team training of the various already qualified trades and officers through actually doing the job they qualifies for.

A few unqualified sailors/officers can be onboard to further their qualification but it should not be the focus of those vessels. The actual trades/officer training must remain on the coasts.

The RCN discovers the difference between personnel generation and force generation!